Patna High Court
M/S Maa Katyayni Mercantile Pvt. Ltd vs Indian Bank And Anr on 15 May, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.19818 of 2015
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M/s Maa Katyayni Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. Son of Bhola Prasad Singh Resident
of Mohalla 2/C, New Patliputra Colony, Param Vihar Apartment, P.S.
Patliputra, Distt. Patna.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. Indian Bank through its Branch Manager-cum-Assistant General Manager,
Patna Main Branch, Biscomaun Building, Ground Floor, West Gandhi
Maidan, Patna
2. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, 34, Bank Road, Opp. New
Police Line, Lodipur, Patna.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Arbind Kumar Jha, Advocate
For the Bank : Dr. Binod Kumar Jha, Advocate
Mr. Devendra Prasad, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE JUSTICE SMT. G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY
CAV JUDGMENT
Date : 15-05-2025
1. The petitioner has filed the Writ
petition for the following reliefs:
" That the writ petition is
being filed or issuance of writ in the
nature of certiorari for quashing the
order dated 11.09.2015 passed by the
Ld. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery
Tribunal, Patna which was passed
violating the provisions of the Recovery
of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 and Rule made
there under and the order was passed is
without assigning the reasons though
the issues were raised and form part of
the order under challenge. The
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petitioner further prays for a direction
to Ld. Presiding Officer to record reason
in original order, as it can not be
compensated by the reason in the
appellate order.
The petitioner further prays
for issuance of writ of mandamus
restraining the respondents concerned
from proceeding further and giving
effect to order dated 11.9.2015 passed
in OA Case No. 178 of 2014 and the
Certificate issued U/s 19(22) of the DRT
Act, 1993.
The petitioner further prays
for issuance of any other appropriate
writ/writs, order/orders and or
direction/directions for which petitioner
may be found entitled."
2. The brief facts of the case culled out of
the writ petition is that the petitioner, M/s Maa
Katyayni Mercantile Pvt. Ltd., a private limited
company registered under the Companies Act,
1956, is engaged in business through loans from
banks. Initially, the business was run as a
proprietorship under the name "Sai Enterprises" by
Sanjay Kumar Singh, with two partners and nine
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guarantors.
3. It is submitted in the Writ petition that
the respondent bank granted a Cash Credit Facility
of Rs.150 lakhs on 10.12.2008. Due to unforeseen
circumstances, the account turned non-performing
(NPA) and was classified as such on 31.12.2009.
Sai Enterprises had received a work order worth
Rs.1,09,98,000 from Vishal Builtech (India) Pvt. Ltd.
for supplying stone chips. In response, the
petitioner made the required supply, and a cheque
dated 15.03.2008 for Rs.1,64,97,000 (cheque no.
391622) was issued in its favour by Vishal Builtech.
The cheque was submitted to the respondent bank,
but no payment was made. The petitioner alleges
that the bank refused to honor the cheque based
on undisclosed advice from Vishal Builtech,
causing significant loss to the petitioner's business.
No reason for non-payment was communicated by
the bank. Subsequently, on the bank's advice, the
proprietorship was restructured into M/s Maa
Katyayni Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. With no adjustment
made for the cheque amount, the petitioner filed
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CWJC No. 5515 of 2011. During proceedings, the
Court sought clarification on paragraph 5 of the
writ petition (CWJC No. 5515 of 2011), which
detailed the cheque transaction. The bank, in its
counter affidavit, denied receipt of the cheque and
emphasized the absence of a deposit slip or any
supporting document. It suggested that the
petitioner may have been informed of insufficient
funds in Vishal Builtech's account, which showed a
debit balance ranging from Rs.1.73 crores to
Rs.1.66 crores during March 2008. The bank
strongly denied any misconduct. In a
supplementary affidavit, the petitioner maintained
that the cheque was deposited, but neither
returned nor dishonored formally, and no reason
for non-payment was provided. While the writ
petition was pending, the bank filed two Original
Applications (O.A. No. 177/2014 and O.A. No.
178/2014) before the Debt Recovery Tribunal
(DRT), Patna. Consequently, CWJC No. 5515 of
2011 was disposed of on 23.06.2015 with liberty to
the parties to raise all factual and legal issues
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before the DRT.
4. In compliance, the petitioner submitted
evidence before the Tribunal in support of its claim.
(i) Letter dated 28.2.2008 written by Vishal
Builtech (India) Pvt.Ltd.
(ii) Cheque No. 15.3.2008 for Rs.
1,64,97,000/- no. "391622" alongwith deposit
receipt.
(iii). Fund Book Folio No. 015 dated
9.5.2008
(Annexure-4) maintained by respondent
bank.
(iv) Fund Book dated 23.5.2008 (Annexure-
4/A) showing hold value of Rs. 2,40,00,000/-.
5. It is submitted that the petitioner
produced undisputed evidence during the
proceedings of O.A. No. 178/2014. However, the
Tribunal recorded that the Cheque No. 391622 was
received by the Bank, but could not be realized
due to insufficient funds in the account of M/s
Vishal Builtech. It is further conceded by the
Learned Counsel for the Bank that the Bank is
holding Rs.2.4 crore of M/s Vishal Builtech.
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6. It is submitted by the petitioner that this
statement is contradictory. On one hand, the Bank
claims the cheque was dishonoured due to
insufficient funds; on the other, it admits holding
Rs.2.4 crore of M/s Vishal Builtech. If the cheque
was dishonoured, it ought to have been returned
unpaid as per Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, making the drawer liable.
However, no such record of dishonour or return of
cheque exists.
7. The Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the Tribunal’s refusal to allow set-
off, as stated in Paragraph 11 of the judgment, is
unsupported by evidence and reads: “11. In this
case, the main dispute regarding set off of Rs.
1,64,97,000/-. In this respect, Ld. Counsel of
applicant bank has submitted that cheque no.
391622 has been received by bank and the
cheque could not be realized due to insufficient
fund in the account of M/s Vishal Builtech. Hence,
the stands taken by defendants is not tenable.
Since, the cheque amount has not been credited in
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loan account, therefore, the question of set off
does not arise.”
8. It is submitted that this finding is
beyond the pleadings and amounts to an error of
fact apparent on the face of the record, thus
constituting a jurisdictional error.
9. It is further submitted by the Learned
counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal’s
judgment is contrary to Rule 12(8), which
mandates that the provisions of Section 4 of the
Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891 shall apply. In
this regard, the Learned counsel for the petitioner
cited Section 4 of Banker”s Books of Evidence ,
which reads as follows:
“Mode of proof of entries in banker’s
book:
Subject to provisions of this Act, a
certified copy of any entry in banker’s book
shall, in all legal proceedings be received as
prima facie evidence of the existence of such
entry, and shall be admitted as evidence of
the matters, transactions, and accounts
therein recorded in every case where, and to
the same extent as, the original entry itself is
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otherwise.”
10. It is further submitted that the certified
copy submitted by the Bank under Section 19(1)
showed a balance of Rs.2,59,67,919.27, yet the
Tribunal awarded Rs.6,37,57,097.64 — an amount
unsupported by evidence and contrary to Rule
12(8) read with Section 19(1) of the DRT Act, 1993.
11. The Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the Tribunal failed to assign any
reason for awarding contractual interest and
ignored objections that interest must be governed
by Section 34 CPC, which permits only simple
interest. The petitioner raised the following issues:
(i) Charging of interest from date of cause of action
till date of filing of application, (ii) From date of
filing of application till date of certificate and (iii)
From the date of certificate till date of realization.
12. In support of the case of the
petitioner, the Learned counsel has relied on the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
judgments, (I) Punjab & Sind Bank v. Allied
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Beverage Co. Pvt. Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 640],
where the Apex Court, following Central Bank of
India v. Ravindra [(2002) 1 SCC 367], held that
pendente lite and post-decree interest is
discretionary under Section 34 CPC and must be
applied judicially, (2) C.K. Sasankan v.
Dhanlakshmi Bank Ltd. [(2009) 11 SCC 60],
where the Court examined Section 34 CPC and
Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978, and held that
interest must be reasonable and aligned with the
prevailing bank rate.
13. It is submitted by the petitioner that in
these judgments, the Apex Court emphasized that
interest from the date of filing till realization is
within the court’s discretion and must be based on
legal principles. In Ravindra (supra), an interest
rate of 25% p.a. (pendente lite) and 19.4% p.a.
(post-decree) was deemed exorbitant and reduced
to 9% p.a. It was further submitted that both
Section 34 CPC and Section 3 of the Interest Act
empower courts to grant only simple interest and
do not authorize compound interest or interest on
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interest.
14. The Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that despite clear legal principles, the
Tribunal passed the judgment dated 11.09.2015
(Annexure-5) in O.A. No. 178/2014 without
assigning proper reasons and based on no
admissible evidence. The findings are contrary to
law, beyond pleadings, and passed in excess of
jurisdiction. Left without any effective remedy, the
petitioner seeks intervention of this Hon’ble Court
to declare the impugned judgment void being
contrary to law and without jurisdiction.
15. A detailed counter affidavit was filed
by respondent Indian Bank. Per contra, it is averred
that the petitioner has made irresponsible and
maliciously false statements in the writ petition.
Therefore, the respondent bank most respectfully
submits that the instant writ application is not
maintainable, either on facts or in law.
16. It is further contended on behalf of the
respondent bank that the Hon’ble Apex Court, in a
catena of judgments, has held that a party seeking
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the issuance of a high prerogative writ must first
exhaust all alternative remedies available under
the law before approaching the Hon’ble Court.
17. It is further contended on behalf of the
respondent Bank that in its judgment dated
26.07.2010 passed in the Civil Appeal No. 5990
of 2010 between United Bank of India vs
Satyawati Tondon and others (2010) 8 SCC
110, Hon’ble Apex Court has clarified and directed
in Para 55 as ” It is a matter of serious concern that
despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the
High Courts continue to ignore the availability of
statutory remedies under the DRT Act and
SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under
Article 226 for passing orders serious adverse
impact on the right of banks and other financial
institutions to recover their dues. We hope and
trust that in future the High Courts will exercise
their discretion in such matters with greater
caution, care, and circumspection.”
18. In the case of Phoenix ARC Private
Limited vs. Vishwa Bharti Vidhya Mandir &
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Others, Civil Appeal Nos. 257-259/2022, Hon’ble
Apex Court vide their judgement dated 12.01.2022
has held that High Court should not entertain
Petition when a remedy under SARFAESI Act is
available. It is further contended that Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Mathew K.C.
reported in [(2018)3 SCC 85 after referring to
and/or considering their decision in the case of CIT
v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603,
has observed, and held in paragraph 5 as under:
“5. We have considered the
submissions on behalf of the parties.
Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath
to interfere with an interim order passed in a
pending proceeding before the High Court,
except in special circumstances, to prevent
manifest injustice or abuse of the process of
the court. In the present case, the facts are
not in the discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226 is not absolute but has to be
exercised judiciously in the given facts of a
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rule is that a writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution ought not to be
entertained if alternate statutory remedies
are available, except in cases falling within
the well-defined exceptions as observed in
CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil
Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603], as follows:
(SCC p. 611, para 15)
“15. Thus, while it can be said that
this Court has recognised some exceptions to
the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the
statutory authority has not acted in
accordance with the provisions of the
enactment in question, or in defiance of the
fundamental principles of judicial procedure,
or has resorted to invoke the provisions
which are repealed, or when an order has
been passed in total violation of the
principles of natural justice, the proposition
laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case
[Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes, AIR
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[Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433] and other similar
judgments that the High Court will not
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective alternative
remedy is available to the aggrieved person
or the statute under which the action
complained of has been taken itself contains
a mechanism for redressal of grievance still
holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory
forum is created by law for redressal of
grievances, a writ petition should not be
entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation.”
19. The Learned counsel for the
respondent Bank has further submitted that in
Assistant collector Central Excise, Chandan
Nagar, west Bengal Vs Dunlop India Ltd. And
others reported in (1985) 1 SCC 260, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “Article 226
is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent
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statutory procedures. It is only where statutory
remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the
demands of extraordinary situations, as for
instance where the very vires of the statute is in
question or where private or public wrongs are so
inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public
injury and the vindication of public justice require it
that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the
constitution. But then the Court must have good
and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative
remedy provided by the statute….”
20. The Learned counsel for the
respondent Bank further contended that the writ
petition has proceeded on misleading facts and
misconceived provisions of Banking laws and
practices and suffers from the vice of “Suppressio
Veri, Suggestio falsi” , hence the petitioner is not
entitled for grant of prayers made in the writ
petition.
21. The respondent Bank, in reply to para
4 of the writ petition, submitted that the
averments are incorrect. M/s Sai Enterprises was a
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proprietorship firm (Proprietor: Sanjay Kumar
Singh) sanctioned a loan of Rs.30 lakhs on
18.05.2006, which was enhanced over time, the
last being Rs.150 lakhs on 22.02.2008. This loan
was repaid and closed on 07.10.2008, after which
the firm was converted into a partnership between
Ms. Meena Singh and Mr. Chandra Shekhar Singh.
A new OCC limit of Rs.150 lakhs was sanctioned on
07.10.2008. The account became NPA on
31.12.2009 due to non-compliance with repayment
terms, as per RBI guidelines.
22. Regarding para 5, the Bank submitted
that no copy of the alleged work order of
Rs.1,09,98,000/- was ever submitted or annexed
by the petitioner, hence, the claim is not accepted.
The letter dated 28.02.2008 (Annexure A-1) only
acknowledges receipt of material worth
Rs.1,64,97,000/-, with no mention of an enclosed
cheque. Also, the material rate and quantity
calculation is inconsistent with the claimed cheque
value, casting doubt on the authenticity of the
letter.
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23. In response to para 7, the Bank denied
having advised the petitioner to change the
structure of Sai Enterprises. In fact, M/s Katyayani
Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. was already a separate
registered company and sanctioned an OCC limit of
Rs.1.5 crore on 14.08.2008. Sai Enterprises
continued as a separate entity with its own limit.
24. As to para 8, the Bank submitted that
the cheque for Rs.1,64,97,000/- was returned
unpaid due to insufficient funds and could not be
credited. The claim of “no adjustment” is denied.
The court’s order dated 19.05.2011 did not direct
explanation of para 5; it merely granted time to file
a counter affidavit. In response to paras 9, 10, 12-
14, the Bank reiterated that the cheque was
dishonoured and returned. Another cheque (No.
391715 for Rs.72,50,000/-) was honoured and
credited to Sai Enterprises on 23.05.2008, showing
that non-payment of the disputed cheque was due
to insufficient funds, not mala fide intent.
25. The issue of cheque adjustment was
raised only in 2011, during restructuring proposals
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and SARFAESI proceedings, and never during
earlier credit sanction or conversion phases,
suggesting it was an afterthought to avoid
repayment. Further, the disputed cheque was
unrelated to the loan account of M/s Katyayani
Mercantile Pvt. Ltd., which filed this writ.
26. It is submitted by the Learned counsel
of the respondent Bank that the petitioner never
pursued the cheque recovery with Vishal Builtech
(issuer), who remains the liable party. This
supports the Bank’s claim that the petitioner, in
collusion with the issuer, fabricated the claim to
frustrate recovery proceedings.
27. In para 11, the Bank noted that the
writ petition CWJC 5515 of 2011 was rightly
dismissed, as the petitioner had an alternative and
effective remedy under Section 17(1) of the
SARFAESI Act, as affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon
[(2010) 8 SCC 110].
28. In response to paras 15-18, the Bank
submitted that certified ledger copies and
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contractual interest calculations, as per RBI
guidelines and the Bankers Books Evidence Act,
1891, were properly filed before the DRT. Hence,
the petitioner’s allegations lack merit, and the
judgment was delivered in accordance with law.
29. Regarding paras 19-24, the Bank
stated that the interest rate was granted under
Section 34 CPC, aligned with Supreme Court
judgments. Section 34(3) allows interest above 6%
in commercial transactions, up to the contractual
rate or the standard rate for commercial lending by
nationalized banks.
30. The Learned counsel for the
respondent Bank submitted that the DRT’s
judgment was passed lawfully, based on evidence
and the petitioner’s admission of availing and
using the loan.
31. The Learned counsel for the
respondent Bank lastly submitted that from the
facts and circumstances and as per the Judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the petitioner has
got an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy
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to approach Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal
(DRAT) under Sec 18 of the SARFAESI Act. For
better appreciation of the case, Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act is quoted here as under:
“18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal.
(1) Any person aggrieved, by any
order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal
1 [under section 17, may prefer an appeal
Along with such fee, as may be prescribed]
to the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days
from the date of receipt of the order of
Debts Recovery Tribunal.
2) [Provided that different fees may
be prescribed for filing An appeal by the
borrower or by the person other than the
borrower:]
3) [Provided further that no appeal
shall be entertained unless The borrower
has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal
fifty percent of the amount of debt due from
him, as claimed by the secured creditors or
determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
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whichever is less: Provided also that the
Appellate Tribunal may, for the reasons to
be recorded in writing, reduce the amount
to not less than twenty-five per cent of debt
referred to in the second proviso.]”
32. Heard the Learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as the Learned counsel for the
respondent Bank.
33. From the facts and circumstances of
the case it is pertinent to mention that the recently
Hon’ble Apex Court in Celir LLP Vs. Bafna
Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd. and Others, reported
in 2024(2) SCC 1 Para 97, 98, 110 have held as
under:-
“97. This Court has time and again,
reminded the High Courts that they should
not entertain petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution if an effective remedy is
available to the aggrieved person under the
provisions of the SARFAESI Act. This Court in
Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v.
Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] made the following
observations : (SCC pp. 123 & 128, paras
43-45 & 55)
Patna High Court CWJC No.19818 of 2015 dated15-05-2025
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[Satyawati Tondon v. State of U.P., 2009
SCC OnLine All 2608] overlooked the
settled law that the High Court will
ordinarily not entertain a petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution if an
effective remedy is available to the
aggrieved person and that this rule applies
with greater rigour in matters involving
recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of
public money and the dues of banks and
other financial institutions. In our view,
while dealing with the petitions involving
challenge to the action taken for recovery
of the public dues, etc. the High Court must
keep in mind that the legislations enacted
by Parliament and State Legislatures for
recovery of such dues are a code unto
themselves inasmuch as they not only
contain comprehensive procedure for
recovery of the dues but also envisage
constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for
redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved
person. Therefore, in all such cases, the
High Court must insist that before availing
remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution, a person must exhaust the
remedies available under the relevant
statute.
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44. While expressing the aforesaid
view, we are conscious that the powers
conferred upon the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution to issue to any
person or authority, including in appropriate
cases, any Government, directions, orders
or writs including the five prerogative writs
for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III or for any other
purpose are very wide and there is no
express limitation on exercise of that power
but, at the same time, we cannot be
oblivious of the rules of self-imposed
restraint evolved by this Court, which every
High Court is bound to keep in view while
exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of
exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule
of discretion and not one of compulsion, but
it is difficult to fathom any reason why the
High Court should entertain a petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution and
pass interim order ignoring the fact that the
petitioner can avail effective alternative
remedy by filing application, appeal,
revision, etc. and the particular legislation
contains a detailed mechanism for
redressal of his grievance.
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***
55. It is a matter of serious concern
that despite repeated pronouncement of
this Court, the High Courts continue to
ignore the availability of statutory remedies
under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act and
exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for
passing orders which have serious adverse
impact on the right of banks and other
financial institutions to recover their dues.
We hope and trust that in future the High
Courts will exercise their discretion in such
matters with greater caution, care and
circumspection.
98. In CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal
[CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC
603] , this Court in para 15 made the
following observations : (SCC p. 611, para
15)
“15. Thus, while it can be said that
this Court has recognised some exceptions
to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where
the statutory authority has not acted in
accordance with the provisions of the
enactment in question, or in defiance of the
fundamental principles of judicial
procedure, or has resorted to invoke the
provisions which are repealed, or when an
order has been passed in total violation of
Patna High Court CWJC No.19818 of 2015 dated15-05-2025
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the principles of natural justice, the
proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal
case [Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of
Taxes, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13] , Titaghur
Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co.
Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 :
1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other similar
judgments that the High Court will not
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective alternative
remedy is available to the aggrieved person
or the statute under which the action
complained of has been taken itself
contains a mechanism for redressal of
grievance still holds the field. Therefore,
when a statutory forum is created by law
for redressal of grievances, a writ petition
should not be entertained ignoring the
statutory dispensation.”
110. We summarise our final
conclusion as under:
110.1. The High Court was not
justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution more
particularly when the borrowers had
already availed the alternative remedy
available to them under Section 17 of the
SARFAESI Act.
110.2. The confirmation of sale by
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invests the successful auction-purchaser
with a vested right to obtain a certificate of
sale of the immovable property in the form
given in Appendix V to the Rules i.e. in
accordance with Rule 9(6) of the Security
Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.
110.3. In accordance with the
unamended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI
Act, the right of the borrower to redeem the
secured asset was available till the sale or
transfer of such secured asset. In other
words, the borrower’s right of redemption
did not stand terminated on the date of the
auction-sale of the secured asset itself and
remained alive till the transfer was
completed in favour of the auction-
purchaser, by registration of the sale
certificate and delivery of possession of the
secured asset. However, the amended
provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI
Act, make it clear that the right of the
borrower to redeem the secured asset
stands extinguished thereunder on the very
date of publication of the notice for public
auction under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules.
In effect, the right of redemption available
to the borrower under the present statutory
regime is drastically curtailed and would be
Patna High Court CWJC No.19818 of 2015 dated15-05-2025
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available only till the date of publication of
the notice under Rule 9(1) of the 2002
Rules and not till the completion of the sale
or transfer of the secured asset in favour of
the auction-purchaser.
110.4. The Bank after having
confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the
2002 Rules could not have withheld the
sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the 2002
Rules, and entered into a private
arrangement with a borrower.
110.5. The High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution could not
have applied equitable considerations to
overreach the outcome contemplated by
the statutory auction process prescribed
under the SARFAESI Act.
110.6. The two decisions of the
Telangana High Court in Concern Readymix
[Concern Readymix v. Corporation Bank,
2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 783 : (2019) 3 ALD
384] and Amme Srisailam [Amme Srisailam
v. Union Bank of India, 2022 SCC OnLine AP
3484] do not lay down the correct position
of law. In the same way, the decision of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Pal Alloys
[Pal Alloys & Metal India (P) Ltd. v.
Allahabad Bank, 2021 SCC OnLine P&H
2733] also does not lay down the correction
Patna High Court CWJC No.19818 of 2015 dated15-05-2025
28/29
position of law.
110.7. The decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Sri Sai Annadhatha
Polymers [Sri Sai Annadhatha Polymers v.
Canara Bank, 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 178]
and the decision of the Telangana High
Court in K.V.V. Prasad Rao Gupta [K.V.V.
Prasad Rao Gupta v. SBI, 2021 SCC OnLine
TS 328] lay down the correct position of law
while interpreting the amended Section
13(8) of the SARFAESI Act.”
35. This case is squarely covered by the
aforementioned judgment.
36. Admittedly, the petitioner is aggrieved
by the order dated 11.09.2015 passed by Learned
Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery Tribnunal Patna in
O.A. No. 178/2014 determining the debt for
recovery of Bank’s and in accordance with the
provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)
and the rules made thereunder circumventing the
statutory provisions of appeal under Section 20 of
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 as also under Section 18 of
Patna High Court CWJC No.19818 of 2015 dated15-05-2025
29/29
37. As stated supra, the Hon’ble Apex
Court has reminded that High Courts should not
entertain application under Article 226 of the
Constitution, if there is an effective remedy
available to the aggrieved persons under the
provisions of the SARFAESI Act. This Court is of the
considered opinion that the petitioner has an
effective alternative remedy of appeal and
therefore, the Writ petition itself is not
maintainable. However, the petitioners are at
liberty to pursue their remedies.
38. In result, Writ petition is dismissed as it
is devoid of merits.
39. Interlocutory Application(s), if any,
shall stand disposed of.
(G. Anupama Chakravarthy, J)
Spd/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR CAV DATE 04.04.2025 Uploading Date 15.05.2025 Transmission Date