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Lochani Nayak & Ors vs State Of Odisha & Ors. …. Opp. Party (S) on 13 March, 2026

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Orissa High Court

Lochani Nayak & Ors vs State Of Odisha & Ors. …. Opp. Party (S) on 13 March, 2026

Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

                                                              Signature Not Verified
                                                              Digitally Signed
                                                              Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
                                                              Reason: Authentication
                                                              Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
                                                              CUTTACK
                                                              Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09




              IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                           CRLMC No.138 of 2026

    (In the matter of an application under Section 528 of B.N.S.S., 2023 read
    with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973).

    Lochani Nayak & Ors.                   ....                 Petitioner (s)
                                    -versus-
    State of Odisha & Ors.                 ....                Opp. Party (s)

  Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:

    For Petitioner (s)          :                 Mr. Satyabrata Dash, Adv.
                                                         R.K. Sarangi, Adv.
                                                         V.K. Sharma, Adv.
    For Opp. Party (s)          :                    Ms. Gayatri Patra, ASC
                                                Mr. Gajendranath Raut, Adv.
                                                 Mr. Suryakanta Palat, Adv.
                                                             (for O.P. No.2)

               CORAM:
               DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI
                  DATE OF HEARING:-27.02.2026
                  DATE OF JUDGMENT:-13.03.2026
  Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J.

1. The present CRLMC has been filed by three petitioners, namely the

mother-in-law aged about 78 years, the sister-in-law, and the brother-in-

SPONSORED

law of Opposite Party No. 2, seeking quashing of the entire proceeding in

D.V. Case No. 14 of 2025 pending before the learned J.M.F.C. (P), Kujang,

instituted under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic

Violence Act, 2005.

Page 1
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

2. The facts of the case are as follows:

(i) Opposite Party No. 2 is the legally married wife of Hemanta Nayak.

Her case is that after marriage she lived in the matrimonial

household along with her husband and his family members,

including the present petitioners, and during the subsistence of that

domestic relationship she was subjected to physical and mental

cruelty, neglect, deprivation of food, threats to her life, and other

acts alleged to constitute domestic violence.

(ii) Prior to the institution of the D.V. proceeding, Opposite Party No. 2

had lodged Kujang P.S. Case No. 332 of 2023 corresponding to G.R.

Case No. 868 of 2023 against her husband and the present

petitioners for offences under Sections 498-A/406/506/34 IPC.

Charge-sheet was submitted, cognizance was taken, charges were

framed, and the case proceeded to full trial.

(iii) By judgment dated 05.04.2025, the learned J.M.F.C. (P), Kujang

acquitted the accused persons in the said G.R. case, holding that the

prosecution had failed to prove the charges under Sections 498-

A/406/506/34 IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court noted

omissions in the Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement, contradictions

among prosecution witnesses, absence of seizure of alleged dowry

articles, lack of medical evidence, and vagueness in relation to the

allegation of criminal intimidation.

Page 2
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

(iv) Thereafter, on 13.08.2025, Opposite Party No. 2 instituted D.V. Case

No. 14 of 2025 seeking reliefs under Sections 17, 19, 20, 22 and 23 of

the PWDV Act. The present petitioners have challenged the

continuance of that proceeding on the ground that it amounts to

abuse of process, whereas the State and Opposite Party Nos. 2 and 3

contend that the D.V. proceeding is a distinct statutory remedy and

is maintainable notwithstanding the earlier acquittal in the criminal

case.

II. PETITIONERS’ SUBMISSIONS:

3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following

submissions in support of his contentions.

(i) The petitioners contend that the D.V. proceeding is a clear abuse of

the process of law insofar as the present in-laws have been roped in

again on the basis of the very same factual allegations which had

earlier been made the subject matter of Kujang P.S. Case No. 332 of

2023 and which culminated in their acquittal after a full-fledged

criminal trial.

(ii) It is their case that Opposite Party No. 2 has been residing in her

parental house since lodging of the FIR and that no fresh cause of

action has been disclosed against the present petitioners after the

earlier criminal proceeding. According to them, the allegations in

the domestic violence application are identical, in other words,

substantially the same, as those contained in the FIR and the

deposition in the prior criminal case.

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

(iii) The petitioners submit that the judgment of acquittal dated

05.04.2025 has attained finality and contains findings that the

allegations of dowry demand, physical torture, criminal

intimidation, and misappropriation were not proved. They

therefore argue that permitting another proceeding on the same

allegations would amount to harassment through repeated

litigation and would defeat the finality attached to the earlier

adjudication.

(iv) The petitioners further contend that there are no specific allegations

against them individually and the allegations are omnibus, vague,

and generalized. Stress is laid on the fact that petitioner No. 1 is an

elderly widowed mother-in-law aged 78 years, petitioner No. 2 is

the sister-in-law, and petitioner No. 3 is the husband of the sister-in-

law, and that they have been implicated only out of personal

grudge.

(v) The petitioners also urge that the principal relief, if any, is really

directed against the husband, Hemanta Nayak, and not against the

present petitioners. On that basis, they argue that continuation of

the proceeding against the in-laws is unwarranted, especially when

no distinct or independent role is attributed to them in a legally

sustainable manner.

(vi) A further contention raised is that the D.V. complaint is barred by

limitation, having been filed nearly one year and eleven months

after the alleged last cause of action, namely the FIR-related

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

incident. In support of this plea, reliance is placed on the decision in

Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab1 and the argument is built

that cognizance ought not to have been taken in a belated

proceeding.

(vii) The petitioners also rely on precedents to submit that where

domestic violence proceedings are manifestly attended with gross

illegality, abuse of process, or are instituted against in-laws on

vague and retaliatory allegations, the High Court may quash the

same in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS.

III. OPPOSTITE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS:

4. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following

submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The State and Opposite Party Nos. 2 and 3 contend that the D.V.

proceeding is maintainable because the Protection of Women from

Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a distinct and special enactment

meant to provide civil and remedial protection to women facing

violence within the domestic sphere, and its scope is not exhausted

or barred merely because a prosecution under the IPC has ended in

acquittal.

(ii) Their case is that Opposite Party No. 2 had lived in a shared

household with her husband and the present petitioners and was

therefore in a domestic relationship with them within the meaning

1
2011 AIR SCW 6259

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

of Section 2(f) of the Act. On that premise, it is submitted that the

petitioners fall within the statutory framework of persons against

whom relief can be claimed under the Act.

(iii) It is contended that the allegations disclosed in the domestic

violence petition, read with the domestic incident report and the

overall facts pleaded, prima facie make out domestic violence in

terms of Section 3 of the Act, including physical abuse, emotional

abuse, economic abuse, threats, and harassment connected with

matrimonial discord and dowry-related conduct.

(iv) The opposite parties further submit that the acquittal in the earlier

G.R. case does not conclude the issue for purposes of the PWDV Act

because the nature, object, and standard of inquiry in the two

proceedings are not identical. According to them, the criminal

court’s failure to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt cannot

automatically wipe out the aggrieved woman’s claim for residence,

protection, maintenance, compensation, or other civil reliefs under

the special statute.

(v) It is further argued that the victim’s testimony and surrounding

circumstances reveal a continuous course of domestic abuse

beginning during marriage, intensifying after she came to know of

her husband’s illicit relationship, and continuing even after

attempts at settlement and resumed cohabitation. Thus, the matter

ought to go to trial before the Magistrate rather than being

terminated at the threshold.

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

(vi) The State also argues that the trial court’s earlier acquittal was itself

based on an erroneous appreciation of evidence, inasmuch as the

victim had consistently spoken about assault, wrongful

confinement, threats, and rescue by police after dialing emergency

services, and that the testimony of the victim, if credible, cannot be

discarded merely for want of corroboration in every case.

(vii) The opposite parties therefore maintain that the present CRLMC

lacks merit, that the D.V. case discloses sufficient prima facie

material requiring adjudication, and that quashing the proceeding

at this stage would seriously prejudice the aggrieved woman and

defeat the protective purpose of the statute.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT:

5. The Analysis of the Order of the Trial Court is as follows:

(i) The judgment of the learned trial court in G.R. Case No. 868 of 2023

proceeds on a close scrutiny of whether the prosecution had

established the offences under Sections 498-A, 406 and 506 IPC

beyond reasonable doubt. The court did not return a positive

finding that no incident whatsoever occurred; rather, it held that the

prosecution evidence suffered from such omissions, contradictions,

and evidentiary gaps that the criminal charges could not be said to

have been proved to the required standard.

(ii) In relation to Section 498-A IPC, the trial court laid substantial

emphasis on omissions in the informant’s Section 161 Cr.P.C.

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

statement concerning dowry demand, wrongful confinement, and

administration of chilly smoke, and treated the subsequent

assertions in court as improvements or afterthoughts. It also noticed

inter se inconsistencies among prosecution witnesses on whether

dowry articles had in fact been given and the absence of seizure of

such alleged articles during investigation.

(iii) On the allegations of physical and mental cruelty, the lower court

considered the absence of medical examination and supporting

medical documents as a significant circumstance. It also found that

the related witnesses had made only broad or bald allegations of

torture without furnishing sufficiently concrete substantiation,

thereby rendering the prosecution version doubtful in the criminal

law sense.

(iv) With respect to Section 406 IPC, the trial court found a complete

failure to establish the foundational ingredient of entrustment and

subsequent dishonest misappropriation. The reasoning of the court

was that, in the absence of clear evidence that specific property had

been entrusted to the accused and thereafter converted or

misappropriated by them, conviction under that provision could

not be sustained.

(v) As regards Section 506 IPC, the trial court held that the allegation of

threat remained general and vague, without specific attribution as

to which accused had uttered the threat, and without sufficient

material to show the requisite legal ingredients of criminal

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

intimidation. This led the court to conclude that the charge under

Section 506/34 IPC was also not proved.

(vi) The overall analytical structure of the lower court judgment is

therefore evidentiary and offence-specific: it separates the

ingredients of each penal provision, compares them with the

prosecution material on record, and acquits on the basis of

insufficiency of proof. Its focus is on proof beyond reasonable doubt

in a criminal trial, particularly in light of omissions in prior

statements, inconsistencies in testimony, and lack of corroborative

material such as seizure or medical evidence.

(vii) At the same time, the lower court judgment is confined to

adjudication of criminal liability under the IPC and does not

examine the availability of civil or protective remedies under the

PWDV Act. The acquittal therefore represents a finding on failure of

criminal proof in that prosecution; whether the same facts can still

furnish the basis for adjudication under a different statutory

framework is a separate legal question arising in the present

CRLMC.

V. EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL MATRIX:

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed

on record.

7. The present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita seeks quashing of the entire proceeding in D.V. Case No. 14 of

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

2025 pending before the learned J M F C, Kujang, instituted under Section

12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

8. The jurisdiction under Section 528 is an exceptional jurisdiction. It is not a

forum for a reappreciation of evidence or for recording disputed findings

of fact. Interference is warranted only where the proceeding is palpably

without jurisdiction, does not disclose the foundational legal ingredients

even if the pleadings are accepted at the face value, or is otherwise a clear

case of gross abuse of process.

9. The proceeding under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act is

predominantly civil and remedial in character, though it is entertained by

a criminal court. The Supreme Court has time and again reiterated that

while exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash a proceeding arising out of

an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, the High Court should be

very slow and circumspect, and interference can be made only when the

case clearly discloses gross illegality or gross abuse of process.

10.The petitioners contend that the D.V. case is founded on the very same

allegations which were earlier tried in the prosecution arising out of the

police case under Sections 498 A, 406 and 506 read with Section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code and which ended in acquittal by judgment dated 05

April 2025, and therefore the continuation of the D.V. case is oppressive

and amounts to an abuse of process.

11.They further contend that there is no fresh cause of action after the earlier

criminal case, that the allegations against the petitioners are omnibus, and

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

that the application is barred by limitation, reliance being placed

on Inderjit Singh Grewal (Supra).

12.The State and Opposite Party contend that the D.V. Act provides distinct

civil and protective reliefs, that an acquittal in an Indian Penal Code

prosecution does not bar statutory remedies under the D.V. Act, and that

the application is maintainable and discloses prima facie domestic

violence.

13. The Supreme Court in Kunapareddy alias Nookala Shanka

Balaji v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari2 has explained that the scheme of

the D V Act provides civil remedies in the first instance, and the element

of criminality arises upon breach of protection orders. The proceeding

under Section 12 is, in essence, an amalgamation of civil rights and

protective reliefs. The Court held as follows:

“11. We have already mentioned the prayers which were
made by Respondent 1 in the original petition and Prayer A
thereof relates to Section 9. However, in Prayer B,
Respondent 1 also sought relief of grant of monthly
maintenance to her as well as her children. This prayer falls
within the ambit of Section 20 of the DV Act. In fact,
Prayer A is covered by Section 18 which empowers the
Magistrate to grant such a protection which is claimed by
Respondent 1. Therefore, the petition is essentially under
Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act, though in the heading
these provisions are not mentioned. However, that may not
make any difference and, therefore, no issue was raised by
the appellant on this count. In respect of the petition filed

2
(2016) 11 SCC 774

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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

under Sections 18 and 20 of the DV Act, the proceedings
are to be governed by the Code, as provided under Section
28
of the DV Act. At the same time, it cannot be disputed
that these proceedings are predominantly of civil nature.

12. In fact, the very purpose of enacting the DV Act was to
provide for a remedy which is an amalgamation of civil
rights of the complainant i.e. aggrieved person. Intention
was to protect women against violence of any kind,
especially that occurring within the family as the civil law
does not address this phenomenon in its entirety. It is
treated as an offence under Section 498-A of the Penal Code,
1860. The purpose of enacting the law was to provide a
remedy in the civil law for the protection of women from
being victims of domestic violence and to prevent the
occurrence of domestic violence in the society.”

14.Similarly, Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal3, has reaffirmed that

notwithstanding the penal provisions in the Act, proceedings before the

Magistrate under the D.V. Act are predominantly of a civil nature. It has

further held that the High Court can exercise inherent jurisdiction to

quash proceedings arising out of an application under Section 12 to

prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice, but the High

Court must ordinarily adopt a hands off approach and interfere only in

cases of clear gross illegality or gross abuse of process.

15.The earlier judgment of acquittal dated 05 April 2025 in the prosecution

under Sections 498 A, 406 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code was rendered on the yardstick of proof beyond reasonable

3
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158.

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Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

doubt. The reasons noted by the trial court, as placed before this Court,

indicate that the acquittal followed from omissions, contradictions and

lack of corroborative material, and not from any definitive finding that no

domestic discord or maltreatment ever occurred.

16.The reliefs claimed in the pending D.V. proceeding are in the nature of

protection, residence, monetary relief, compensation and interim orders.

These reliefs are civil and remedial. The D.V. Act is a welfare legislation

and the proceeding under Section 12 is predominantly civil. Therefore,

the mere fact of acquittal in the earlier criminal case does not, by itself,

extinguish or bar the statutory civil remedies under the D.V. Act.

17.The petitioners have urged that there is no fresh cause of action. This

contention, at the present stage, does not lead to an inevitable conclusion

of abuse of process. The D.V. Act provides protection against domestic

violence as defined, including economic abuse and deprivation, and the

entitlement to civil reliefs under the statute has to be adjudicated in

accordance with the pleadings and evidence. Whether the allegations are

ultimately proved, and to what extent any relief lies against each

respondent, are matters squarely within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate

to decide on merits.

18.On the question of limitation, the Supreme Court in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi

Narayanan4, has held that the High Court erred in equating an

application under Section 12 with lodging of a criminal complaint or

4
2022 15 SCC 50

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Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

initiation of prosecution, and consequently it was erroneous to apply a

rigid one-year limitation to such an application.

19.Hence, the plea of limitation as urged in the present case cannot be

accepted in the manner urged. The decision in Kamatchi (supra) as

clarified the legal position that an application under Section 12 cannot be

treated as initiation of prosecution so as to import a rigid one year bar.

The petitioners’ limitation objection, therefore, does not furnish a ground

for quashing the proceeding at the threshold.

20.The petitioners have also urged that the allegations against them are

vague and omnibus. This Court has perused the application under

Section 12 and the accompanying material placed. The application asserts

that Opposite Party lived in the shared household along with the

husband and his family members including the present petitioners, and

that during the subsistence of that domestic relationship she was

subjected to cruelty and deprivation. At the stage of a quashing petition,

this Court is not to assess the probative worth of those allegations or to

weigh possible defences. Unless the pleadings are wholly bereft of the

essential elements of domestic relationship and domestic violence, the

Court would ordinarily refrain from stifling a D.V. proceeding at

inception.

21.On an overall consideration, this Court does not find the present case to

be one of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law warranting

exercise of inherent jurisdiction to quash the D.V. proceeding. The

petitioners have efficacious remedies before the Magistrate including

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Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT,
CUTTACK
Date: 06-Apr-2026 18:20:09

raising all permissible objections, seeking appropriate orders regarding

personal appearance, and contesting interim reliefs on merits in

accordance with law.

22.Accordingly, the CRLMC stands dismissed.

23.The interim order staying the proceedings, if any, is vacated.

(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 13th March, 2026/

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