Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kulwinder Singh vs The Punjab State And Anr on 18 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-2525 of 1994
Kulwinder Singh
......Appellant
Versus
The State of Punjab and another
......Respondents
Sr. No. Particulars Details
1. The date when the judgment is reserved 19.01.2026
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 18. 02.2026
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 18. 02.2026
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or full judgment is pronounced
5. The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full Not applicable
judgment, and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Argued by:: - Mr. Sandeep Vermani, Advocate, and
Mr. Aditya Vermani, Advocate, for the appellant.
Mr. Satnampreet Singh Chauhan, DAG, Punjab.
NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the
judgment and decree dated 01.05.1994,, passed by the Court of learned
Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, vide which the appeal preferred
by the respondents has been allowed and the judgment and decree dated
24.12.1992, passed by learned Sub Judge IInd Class, Jalandhar,
whereby suit of the appellant-plaintiff
appellant for declaration was decreed, has
been set aside.
2. Parties to the lis are being referred to as per their status
before the trial Court. Brief facts of the case are that pplaintiff filed a
suit for declaration to the effect that the plaintiff joined the Police
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Department as a Constable on 20.05.1985 at Jalandhar and after
successfully completing the requisite training
training, he duly discharged his
official duties. In April, 1987,
1987 he was posted as a gunman to Sh.
Roshan Singh Makkar and become involved in FIR No.69 da
dated
18.04.1987,, registered under Section 394 read with Section 34 IPC,
Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 3 & 4 of the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
Act at Police Station Division No.6,
Jalandhar. However, the plaintiff was acquit
acquitted in the said case by the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur, vide judgment
dated 04.05.1989.
04.05.198 Plaintiff pleaded that on the same allegations, he
was also detained under the provisions of the National Security Act,
1980, for a period of one year vide order dated 13.11.198
13.11.1987, passed by
the District Magistrate, Jalandhar.
Jalandhar The
he said detention order was
subsequently revoked by the State Government
Government, vide order dated
29.04.1988,
8, however, another detention order under the National
Security Act,
Act 1980 was simultaneously passed against the plaintiff on
the same date. Vide
ide order dated 14.11.1987, passed by Senior
Superintendent of Police, Jalandhar, plaintiff was dismissed from
service under Rule 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules read with Article
311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. Hence, the suit for declaration.
3. Upon issuance of notice, the defendants contested the suit.
In the written statement,
statement it was pleaded that the plaintiff was removed
from service on account of his alleged close connections with
extremists and anti-social
anti social elements. It was further pleaded that
that, when
the plaintiff was posted as a gunman with Roshan Singh Makkar
Makkar, he
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developed friendship with another constable Raghbir Singh. On
18.04.1987, the plaintiff along with the said Raghbir Singh
Singh, conspired
to loot affluent persons while armed with weapons. On the same date,
at about 8.30 p.m. the plaintiff and Raghbir Singh carrying the sten gun
issued to the plaintiff went to the shop of Darshan Kumar Chopra
situated in New Jawahar Nagar and attempted to rob him. When
Darshan Kumar Chopra resisted and grappled with the plaintiff
plaintiff,
Constable Raghbir Singh fired from the sten gun of the plaintiff
plaintiff, and as
a result of which Darshan Kumar Chopra ssustained bleeding injuries.
The turban of the plaintiff and one magazine fell at the spot and
thereafter both the accused persons fled from the place of occur
occurrence.
Consequently, aforesaid FIR No.69 dated 18.04.1987 was registered
against the plaintiff and his co-accused
co accused Ragh
Raghbir Singh. It was further
pleaded that plaintiff was acquitted in the aforesaid FIR on technical
grounds. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff had close connections
with absconding
abscond extremists,, in respect of which secret reports dated
16.07.1987 and 02.11.1987 were received. Therefore, the plaintiff was
detained under the provisions of National Security Act
Act, 1980, vide
order dated 13.11.1987,
13.11.1987 passed
ssed by the District Magistrate
Magistrate, Jalandhar.
The said detention order was revoked by the State Government on
technical grounds;
grounds however, a fresh detention order was subsequently
passed which was confirmed. It was pleaded that since the plaintiff had
close connections with the anti-social
anti social elements and anti
anti-national
elements,
ments, therefore, it was not feasible to serve a notice upon him or to
hold a departmental enquiry against him under Rule 16.24 of the
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Punjab Police Rules.
Rules Keeping in view the public interest and the
interest of administration, it was considered inappropr
inappropriate to retain the
plaintiff in service, and accordingly,, he was dismissed from service
under Article 311(2)(b)
311(2) of the Constitution of India read with Rule 16.1
of the Punjab Police Rules, vide order dated 14.11.1987.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were
framed by the trial Court: –
“1. Whether the order dated 14.11.1987 is illegal and
void and the plaintiff is entitled to declaration and
consequential relief? OPP.
2. Relief.
5. After appreciating the evidence on record and hearing the
learned counsel for the parties, the
the trial Court
Court, vide judgment and
decree dated 24.12.1992, decreed the suit of the plaintiff by holding
that the order dated 14.11.1987 was
as illegal, unconstitutional, void and
not binding upon the rights of the plaintiff
plaintiff. The plaintiff was
consequently held entitled to all rights, privileges and emoluments
attached to his post.
post Aggrieved by, the defendant
defendants preferred an appeal,
which was allowed by the lower Appellate Court vide judgment and
decree dated 01.05.1994 whereby the judgment and decree of the trial
Court dated 24.12.1992 were set aside.
aside. Hence, th
the present Regular
Second Appeal has been filed by the plaintiff
plaintiff.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court are erroneous, as it
has erred in law in allowing the appeal filed by the respondents and
setting aside the well-reasoned
well reasoned judgment and decree of the trial Court
Court.
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He contended that the order passed by the respondents dispensing with
the departmental
artmental enquiry
enquiry is wholly laconic and does not germane to the
requirements of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India
requirements India, as the
satisfaction recorded in the order of dismissal was not supported by any
independent material so as to justify the dispen
dispensing with the
departmental enquiry. He contended that order of dismissal was wholly
arbitrary and was an attempt to deprive the appellant of his rights
conferred by Article 311(2),
311(2), namely, the right to have a fair hearing
before imposition of extreme penalty of dismissal from service, which
is an extreme act against an employee. He further contended that the
action of the authorities was in violation of provisions of Rule
Rules 16.1
and 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules,, 1934
1934. He contended that
judgment and
an decree passed by the first appellate Court being perverse
are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel in support of his contentions
relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, 1991
1991(1) SCC 362; Risal
Singh v. State of Haryana and others, 201
2014(13) SCC 244; judgment
of Division bench of this Court in Darshan Jit Singh Dhindsa v. State
of Punjab and others, (1993) 1 SLR 209 and judgments of the Delhi
High Court in Commissioner of Police and an
another v. Jagmal Singh,
2024 NCDHC 2259;
2259; Govt. of NCT of Delhi and others v. Dushyant
Kumar 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1136 and Commissioner of Police and
others v. Shri Karam Pal, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 4906
4906.
7. Per contra, learned State counsel contended that the
judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is perfectly
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legal and valid. It was submitted that the appellant was associated with
extremists and their unlawful activities in State of Punjab and holding
of a departmental enquiry against the appellant was not reasonably
practicable.. Therefore,
herefore, the punishing authority was justified in
invoking the provisions
provision of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India
read with Rule 16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934
1934. He contended
that judgment and decree of the first appellate Court do not warrant any
interference by this Court and the appeal filed by the appellant is liable
to be dismissed. In support of his contentions, llearned counsel placed
reliance upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union
Territory, Chandigarh v. Mohinder Singh, 1997(2) S.C.T. 39 and
judgments of this Court in Yunish Masih v. State of Punjab and
others, 2011(3) S.C.T. 81;
81 RSA-862
862 of 1997 – Harvinder Singh v. The
State of Punjab and others decided on 21.03.2024 and RSA-2491 of
1994 – The State of Punjab v. Constable Jaswinder Singh
Singh, decided on
30.05.2024..
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the record.
9. Admittedly, the appellant was a Constable in the Punjab
Police and while he was posted as a gunman to Roshan Singh Makkar,
a criminal case,
case being FIR No.69 dated 18.04.1987
18.04.1987, was registered
against the appellant under Section 394 read with Section 34 IPC,
Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 3 & 4 of the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act at Police Station Division No.6,
Jalandhar. The Appellant was also detained under the National Security
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Act, 1980 for a period of one year,
year vide order dated 13.11.1987, passed
by the District Magistrate, Jalandhar. However, the said detention
order was revoked by the State Government
Government, vide order dated
29.04.1988,
8, and another order under the provisions of the National
Security Act,
Act 1980 was passed against the appellant on the same date.
Vide
ide order dated 14.11.1987, passed by Senior Superintendent of
Police, Jalandhar, the plaintiff was dismissed from service under Rule
16.1 of the Punjab Police Rules read with Article 311 (2)(b) of the
Constitution of India as he was associated with anti
anti-social and anti-
national elements in their unlawful activities in the State of Punjab
Punjab.
The appellant was involved in very serious crime during the time when
the State of Punjab
Punjab was affected by terrorism. The State received two
secret reports dated 16.07.1987 and 06.02.1987/
06.02.1987/02.11.1987 to the effect
that appellant had close connections with the extremists in the State of
Punjab. The said reports are reproduced hereunder: –
“P.S. DIVISION NO. 6
DISTRICT JALANDHAR
SOURCE REPORT
SECRET
Sir,
It is submitted that I have received special information
through trusted sources that on 01.11.1987 at Lyallpur Khalsa
Senior Secondary School, Nakodar Road, Jalandhar Sukhdev
@ Sukha @ General Labh Singh who is a former Constable
and a absconding terrorist held a secret meeting at 2pm
wherein 10 Sikh youth were present. Jaspal@Dhana former
Constable and Constable Raghuvir Singh No.2111 and
Kulwinder Singh No.2066 took part in the said me
meeting. In the
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said meeting, Sukhdev @ Sukha stated that the list of Police
Officers involved in fake encounters shall be prepared so that
they could be eliminated. The information regarding
movements of certain High Rank Police officers including
timings off them visiting the city shall be obtained to eliminate
them and the Sikh Youth involved in Terror activities against
the Government shall be provided with financial support. The
local pubic shall be convinced to provide with every possible
support to the Sikh Youth involved in terrorist activities when
required. The Anti-Sikh
Sikh people can be successfully extracted
from Punjab which is possible by terrorising them with fear of
homicide. Be prepared and make efforts for the success of our
common mission. The participants
articipants expressed agreement with
Sukhdev Alias Sukha and assured full support.
Presented for information and appropriate action.
Harmail Singh
Division No.6 Jalandhar City
06-02-1987″
“P.S. DIVISION NO. 6
DISTRICT JALANDHAR
SOURCE REPORT
SECRET
Sir,
It is submitted that I have received special information
through trusted sources that on 15.07.1987, at Guru Gobind
Singh Stadium, New Jawahar Nagar, where Jaspal Singh,
former Police Constable, who is an absconding terrorist, held
a secret meeting att about four o’clock in the evening, in which
among police employees Constable Avtar Singh No. 2111 and
Kulwinder Singh No. 2066 took part.
These constables gave Jaspal Singh @ Dhanna many
important pieces of information about the police department
and alsoo told about the movements of certain High Rank Police
officers including timings of them visiting the city. In this
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meeting they decided that these Constable Avtar Singh No.
2111 and Kulwinder Singh No. 2066, along with Jaspal Singh,
Ex-Head Constable, andd other absconding terrorists, will
provide all kinds of assistance in every way.
They will, by mixing and associating with every police
employee, make efforts to persuade them to help the Singhs
who are struggling for the Sikh community, and to give them
shelter and financial assistance. They will give financial help
to Sikh youths who are absconders, and by conducting
reconnaissance about their coming and going, will keep giving
them timely information, so that they do not fall into the police
net and remain
ain saved from arrest.
In this manner these two constables, by establishing
association with a terrorist operative, have shown interest in
terrorist activities, and dangerous consequences could have
resulted from their inclinations. Therefore, continuous
surveillance
urveillance of these constables is necessary and appropriate
action should be taken. In this meeting, eight Sikh youths took
part.
Presented for information and appropriate action.
Harmail Singh
Division No.6 Jalandhar City
16-07-1987″
10. Perusal of the above-referred
referred secret reports shows thatthere was sufficient material with the Department to form a bonafide
satisfaction that the respondent was actively involved in unlawful
activities and had established links with extremists operating in the
State of Punjab.
Punjab The nature
ature of allegations and the prevailing law andorder situation at the relevant time demonstrate that holding a regular
departmental enquiry was not reasonably practicable. The State of
Punjab was then passing through an extraordinary phase marked by
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heightened
tened terrorist activities, and in such circumstances, neither the
witnesses nor any other person associated with the enquiry could be
expected to depose freely or without fear. The possibility of
intimidation, coercion, or threat to life could not be rule
ruled out. In view
of the gravity of the allegations and the sensitive security
considerations involved, the competent authority was justified in
forming the opinion that continuation of the respondent in service
would be prejudicial to the public interest and detrimental to the
discipline of the force. Once such satisfaction was arrived at on the
basis of relevant material, the authority was legally empowered to
dispense with the requirement of holding a departmental enquiry
enquiry.
Therefore, on the basis of the material
material placed on record, the order of
dismissal, by dispensing with the departmental enquiry
enquiry, cannot be
faulted with and is held to be lawful, justified, and in accordance with
constitutional and statutory provisions.
11. The Division Bench of this Court in Yunish Masih‘s case
(supra) while considering the similar issue has held that the condition
precedent for the application of Clause(b) of Article 311(2) is the
satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an enquiry. Such satisfaction is a matter of
assessment to be made by the said authority
authority, which is the best Judge of
the situation. In the said judgment it has been held as under: –
“18.
18. It was on the basis of the aforesaid statement made
during interrogationn of Jaspal Singh alias Kulwant Singh
in case FIR No. 159/92, dated 28.12.1992, that the
competent authority, namely, Senior Superintendent of10 of 25
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19Police, Amritsar, has formed an opinion that holding of
departmental inquiry against the petitioner appellant
would
ld not be reasonably practicable and has accordingly
invoked the provision of Article 311(2)(b). The
requirement of the aforesaid provision have been stated in
paragraphs 130, 133 and 135 of the 55- Judge Constitution
Bench judgment of Honble the Supreme Co
Court rendered in
the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra). It has been held that
the condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is
the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry contemplated by
clause (2) of Article 311.. The Constitution Bench further
held that it was not possible to enumerate the cases in
which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold an
inquiry. The decision to conclude that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry
iry is a matter of assessment to
be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is
available on the spot and knows what is happening. It is
because the disciplinary authority is the best Judge of the
situation which has resulted in insertion of cla
clause (3)
under Article 311 making the decision of the disciplinary
authority on this question final. The finality given to the
decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is
not binding upon the Court so far as its power of judicial
review is concerned.
oncerned. The Constitution Bench also
observed that it is not necessary first to constitute the
inquiry and only after the witnesses are attacked or
Enquiry Officer is subjected to violence that the
Government should form an opinion that it was not
reasonably
bly practicable to hold an inquiry. In para 132, the
following pertinent observation has been made:
“132. It is not necessary that a situation which
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19practicable should exist before the disciplinary
inquiry is initiated against a Government servant.
Such a situation can also come into existence
subsequently during the course of an inquiry, for
instance, after the service of a charge
charge-sheet upon
the Government
nment servant or after he has filed his
written statement thereto or even after evidence has
been led in part. In such a case also the disciplinary
authority would be entitled to apply clause (b) of the
second proviso because the word “inquiry” in that
clause
use includes part of an inquiry. It would also not
be reasonably practicable to afford to the
Government servant an opportunity of hearing or
further hearing, as the case may be, when at the
commencement of the inquiry or pending it the
Government servant absconds and cannot be served
or will not participate in the inquiry. In such cases,
the matter must proceed ex parteand on the
materials before the disciplinary authority.
Therefore, even where a part of an inquiry has been
held and the rest is dispensed with under clause (b)
or a provision in the service rules analogous
thereto, the exclusionary words of the second
proviso operate in their full vigour and the
Government servant cannot complain that he has
been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank in
violation
lation of the safeguards provided by Article
311(2).”
19. The second condition necessary for valid application
of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary
authority should record in writing its reason for its
satisfaction that it was not reasonably
easonably practicable to hold
the inquiry as contemplated by Article 311(2). In the
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absence of recording of reason in writing, the order
dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty would
both be void and un-constitutional.
constitutional. However, it has been
clarified
rified in para 135 that such reasons are not required to
be necessarily communicated and it would be suffice if the
same are recorded in the file.
20. When we apply the aforesaid principles to the facts of
the present case, it becomes patent that the order dated
17.6.1993 (P-28)
28) would satisfy both these requirements.
During the course of arguments we asked the learned
Additional Advocate General as to how the statement
made by Jaspal Singh alias Kulwant Singh would have any
relevance to the investigation of case FIR No.159/92,
dated 28.12.1992. A satisfactory answer has been given by
Mr. Sehgal revealing that Jaspal Singh alias Kulwant
Singh was absconding and was not available for
interrogation in the aforesaid case registered against him.
In order to satisfy
fy the authorities about his absence, he
had revealed the mysterious activities of the petitioner
petitioner-
appellant. A perusal of the Zimni No. 14, dated 13.6.1993,
would make it patent that the appellant had close
connection with various terrorist organizations aas he used
to pass on information to them with regard to movement of
the police. The hard/nonhardcore terrorist like Jaspal
Singh alias Kulwant Singh was the beneficiary and he also
disclosed that there were other terrorist organisations who
were beneficiaryy of the disclosure of information by the
petitioner-appellant.
appellant. It was, therefore, rightly concluded
by the authorities that it was not reasonably practicable to
hold an inquiry in accordance with Article 311(2) of the
Constitution because of the links of the appellant-
petitioner with the terrorist organisations.
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21. It is also pertinent to notice that their Lordships of
Hon’ble the Supreme Court in two judgments have noticed
the situation which was obtaining in the State of Punjab
during the period 1990-1991.
91. In Mohinder Singhs case
(supra) inquiry was dispensed with on the report
submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Intelligence. In
para 6 it has been held that there were sufficient grounds
for dispensation of regular departmental inquiry and the
terrorists
rrorists were not likely to depose against the petitioner
in that case particularly when the terrorism was at its
peak in Punjab at that time i.e. 1991. It is further pertinent
to mention that the judgment rendered in Mohinder
Singh‘s case (supra) would al
also apply to the facts of the
case in hand. There the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Chandigarh, had dispensed with holding of inquiry by
invoking Article 311(2)(b)
(2)(b) by citing the reason that the
witness would not come forward to depose against that
officerr in a regular departmental inquiry. In that case the
order dispensing with the inquiry was based on a report
submitted by the Superintendent of Police revealing gross
misuse of power and extortion of money by illegally
detaining and torturing innocent per
persons by that
delinquent officer. He was regarded as a terror in the area
while discharging his duty as Sub
Sub-Inspector of Police. The
view of Hon’ble the Supreme Court is discernible from
para 6 of the judgment, which reads thus:
“6. Clause (3) of Article 311, it may be noticed,
declares that where a question arises whether it is
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry as
contemplated by clause (2), the decision of the
authority empowered to dismiss such person shall
be final on that question. The Tribunal has not
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19suggesting that because of clause (3), the Court or
the Tribunal should completely shut its eyes. Nor
are we suggesting that in every case the Court
should blindly accept the recital in terms oof the said
proviso contained in the order of dismissal. Be that
as it may, without going into the question of extent
and scope of judicial review in such a matter, we
may look to the facts of this case. The
Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, has repor
reported
that the respondent “is a terror in the area” and,
more important, in his very presence, the
respondent “intimidated the complainant Shri Ranjit
Singh who appeared to be visibly terrified of this
Sub-Inspector”.
Inspector”. It is also reported that the other
persons
ns who were arrested with Ranjit Singh, and
who were present there, immediately left his office
terrified by the threats held out by the respondent.
In such a situation – and keeping in view that all this
was happening in the year 1991, in the State of
Punjab – the Senior Superintendent of Police cannot
be said to be not justified in holding that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry against
the respondent.”
22. Therefore, the issue in the present case in a way is
similar to the one which has been decided by Honble the
Supreme Court in Mohinder Singhs case (supra). In the
case in hand it was the Zimni recorded by SI Gurbachan
Singh of Police Station B Division, Amritsar in case FIR
No. 159/92, dated 28.12.1992, which has been made the
basis for formation of an opinion as already observed in
the preceding paras.
23. However, the facts of Kuldip Singh‘s case (supra) are
akin to the facts of the present case. Kuldip Singh was a
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Head Constable of Police and he was dismissed from
service like the petitioner-appellant
appellant without holding an
inquiry because the Senior Superintendent of Police has
invoked second proviso (b) appended to clause (2) of
Article 311 for dispensing with the inquiry opining that it
was not reasonably practicable to hold such an inq
inquiry in
his case. After exhausting departmental remedy he lost
before this Court. The Appellate Authority had found in
Kuldip Singh‘s case (supra) that he was mixed up with the
terrorists and he was supplying secret information of the
police department to them, which created hindrance in its
smooth functioning. He was interrogated in a case (FIR
No. 219/1990) where he admitted to have links with the
terrorists like Major Singh Shahid and Sital Singh Jakhar.
Despite the fact that he was acquitted in case FIR
No.219/1990, the use of the aforesaid interrogation and
his admission was not considered irrelevant for the
purposes of concluding that inquiry was not reasonably
practicable to be held. Their Lordships of Hon’ble the
Supreme Court have gone to the extent that even if the
confession has been made to the police or while in custody
of the police, it would not be of much consequence as long
as it is germane to the requirement of Article 311(2)(b)
and inspires confidence. The view of Hon’ble the Supreme
Court is evident from the perusal of para 11, which reads
thus:
“11. In this sense, if the appellant’s confession is
relevant, the fact that it was made to the police or
while in the custody of the police may not be of
much consequence for the reason that strict rules of
Evidence Act do not apply to
departmental/disciplinary enquiries. In a
departmental enquiry, it would perhaps be
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permissible for the authorities to prove that the
appellant did make such a confession/admission
during the course of interrogation aand it would be
for the disciplinary authority to decide whether it is
a voluntary confession/admission or not. If the
disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that
the statement was indeed voluntary and true, he may
well be entitled to act upon the ssaid statement. Here,
the authorities say that they were satisfied about the
truth of the appellant’s confession. There is
undoubtedly no other material. There is also the fact
that the appellant has been acquitted by the
Designated Court. We must say that the facts of this
case did present us with a difficult choice. The fact,
however, remains that the High Court has opined
that there was enough material before the
appropriate authority upon which it could come to a
reasonable conclusion that it was not rea
reasonably
practicable to hold an enquiry as contemplated by
clause (2) of Article 311
311. Nothing has been brought
to our notice to persuade us not to accept the said
finding of the High Court. Even a copy of the
counter filed by the respondents in the High Cou
Court is
not placed before us. Once proviso (b) is held to
have been validly invoked, the Government servant
concerned is left with no legitimate ground to
impugn the action except perhaps to say that the
facts said to have been found against him do not
warrant
nt the punishment actually awarded. So far as
the present case is concerned, if one believes that
the confession made by the appellant was voluntary
and true, the punishment awarded cannot be said to
be excessive. The appellant along with some others
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causedd the death of the Superintendent of Police
and a few other police officials. It must be
remembered that we are dealing with a situation
obtaining in Punjab during the years 1990
1990-91.
Moreover, the appellate authority has also agreed
with the disciplinary authority
uthority that there were good
grounds for coming to the conclusion that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary
enquiry against the appellant and that the appellant
was guilty of the crime confessed by him. There is
no allegation of mala ffides levelled against the
appellate authority. The disciplinary and the
appellate authorities are the men on the spot and we
have no reason to believe that their decision has not
been arrived at fairly. The High Court is also
satisfied with the reasons for which the disciplinary
enquiry was dispensed with. In the face of all these
circumstances, it is not possible for us to take a
different view at this stage. It is not permissible for
us to go into the question whether the confession
made by the appellant is voluntary or not, once it
has been accepted as voluntary by the disciplinary
authority and the appellate authority.”
24. In view of the aforesaid, we find that in the present
case the condition that there are sufficient reasons, which
are germane to the provisions of Article 311(2)(b), stands
satisfied. Once it has been found, while investigating case
FIR No. 159/92, dated
ed 28.12.1992, that Jaspal Singh alias
Kulwant Singh had revealed that the petitioner
petitioner-appellant
was mixed up with the terrorists and was passing on secret
information to them then no fault can be found with the
order dated 17.6.1993 (P-28).
28). The report of tthe Senior
Superintendent of Police, Amritsar, dated 15.6.1993,
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based on the interrogation has also been placed on record
along with the affidavit dated 8.2.2011, which reads as
under:
” ASI Yunis Masih No. 2077/ASR has been found to
be mixed up with terrorists. It is not practicable to
hold regular departmental enquiry against him in
public interest and as such it is dispensed with by
virtue of power conferred upon me by Article
311(2)(b)
b) of Constitution of India read with PPR
16(1). ASI Yunis Masih No. 2077/ASR is hereby
dismissed from service w.e.f. 15.06.1993 F.N.”
x x x x
26. It is, thus, evident that even second condition that the
reason in writing should be cited in the order
order, stands
satisfied. On further examination of the original record the
aforesaid fact is fully substantiated. Therefore, the view
taken by the learned Single Judge deserves to be
approved, which has upheld the order dated 17.6.1993 (P
(P-
28) and the subsequent appellate order (P
(P-29).”
12. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh
(supra) has held as under: –
“6. Clause (3) of Article 311, it may be noticed, declares
that where a question arises whether it is reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry as contemplated by clause
(2), the decision of the authority empowered to dismiss
such person shall be final on that question. The Tribunal
hass not referred to clause (3) at all in its order. We are not
suggesting that because of clause (3), the court or the
Tribunal should completely shut its eyes. Nor are we
suggesting that in every case the court should blindly
accept that recital in terms of the said proviso contained
in the order of dismissal. Be that as it may, without going19 of 25
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19into the question of extent and scope of judicial review in
such a matter, we may look to the facts of this case. The
Superintendent of Police, Intelligence, has report
reported that
the respondent “is a terror in the area” and, more
important, in his very presence, the respondent
“intimidated the complainant Shri Ranjit Singh who
appeared to be visibly terrified of this Sub Inspector”. It is
also reported that the other person
persons who were arrested
with Ranjit Singh, and who were present there,
immediately left his office terrified by the threats held out
by the respondent. In such a situation – and keeping in
view that all this was happening in the year 1991 in the
State of Punjab – the Senior Superintendent of Police
cannot be said to be not justified in holding that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry against the
respondent.”
13. Dismissal of the appellant was based upon credible
material indicating his association and contacts with terrorist elements.
This Court is of the considered opinion that
that, at the relevant point of
time, terrorism was at its peak in the State of Punjab
Punjab. In such a volatile
environment, there existed sufficient
ufficient grounds for dispens
dispensing with the
holding of a regular departmental enquiry.. It is evident that no witness
would have come forward to depose against the appellant-plaintiff due
to fear of reprisal and threat to life.
life Further, a departmental enquiry
would have taken a long time and duri
during the pendency thereof,
permitting the appellant to continue in service till its completion would
have posted a serious risk to public safety, discipline of the force, and
the largest public interest.
interest Hence, it was not reasonably practicable to
hold a departmental
partmental enquiry in this case.
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14. It is true that for holding a departmental enquiry, the
provisions of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules
Rules, 1934 might be
mandatorily
ily adhered to.
to. However, same is not applicable to the cases
where no departmental inquiry is to be held. In the present case,
departmental inquiry was dispensed with as the same was not
practicable,, therefore, Rule 16.38 would not be applicable to the facts
of the present case.
15. Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, reads aas
under:-
“16.38. Criminal offences by police officers and
strictures by Courts – Procedure regardin
regarding –
(1) Immediate information shall be given to the District
Magistrate of any complaint received by the
Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission
by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with
his official relations with the publi
public. The District
Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the
complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made
over to a selected Executive Magistrate.
(2) When investigation of such a complaint establishes a
prima facie case, a judiciall prosecution shall normally
follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only
if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be
recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally
the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24 shall be followed.
An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred
to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed.”
16. This Court in Constable Pale Ram vs. State of Haryana
and others passed in CWP No. 24413 of 2012
2012, decided on 14.12.2012
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held that “the said Rule
Rule i.e. Rule 16.38, comes into operation in case
the punishing authority i.e. the Superintendent of Police instead of
proceeding against the delinquent employee for judicial prosecution
decides not to proceed for the same purpose and instead decides to ta
take
action departmentally. It is in this situation that the concurrence of the
District Magistrate has to be obtained.” Reliance is also placed on the
judgments of this Court in RSA-963
963 of 2000 – Surinder Pal v.
Haryana State and another,
another decided on 15.05.
15.05.2024; RSA-2491 of
1994 – The State of Punjab v. Constable Jaswinder Singh
Singh, decided on
30.05.2024 and RSA-2797 of 1999 – Ved Parkash and others v. State
of Haryana,
Haryana decided on 31.05.2024.
17. The judgments
udgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the
appellant as mentioned above are clearly distinguishable and not
applicable to the facts of the present case
case. In the case of Jaswant
Singh
h (supra),
(supra), the appellant was placed under suspension on April 19,
1978 on the ground he had absented himself from duty to attend the
Annual Nirankari Samagam held on April 13, 1978. After enquiry, he
was exonerated and taken back in service with effect from the date of
his suspension.
suspension. Thereafter, two departmental enquiries were initiated
against him. As per outcome of the first enquiry, he was reverted to the
lower post of Constable; the second enquiry resulted in his dismissal
from service. The enquiry orders pertain to dated 27.4.1979 and
12.10.1979 respectively. These orders were challenged by two separate
appeals which were dismissed, vide orders dated 18/19.03.1980.
Aggrieved by, two separate revision applications were filed to the
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inspector General of Police, Punjab which were allowed on October 13,
1980 and both the cases were remanded with a direction to re-consider
the inquiry report and pass fresh orders. The enquiry officer was
directed to reinstate the appellant and then issue fresh show cause
notices. The appellant rejoined duties as Head Constable on March 5,
1981. He was again placed under suspension
suspension forthwith and show
show-cause
notice was issued to him why he should not be dismissed from service.
Before the service of these show cause notices an incident occurred on
April 6, 1981 and allegation against the appellant was that he tried to
plunge his chest
chest with a knife to commit suicide. The appellant was
charge-sheeted
sheeted under Section
ection 309 Cr.P.C. and was sent to the hospital
for treatment. While he was in hospital, two show
show-cause notices were
served on him on April 6, 1981.Even
1981 ven though he was allowed 10 ddays
time to show cause, the respondent who was biased against him passed
the impugned order of dismissal on April 7, 1981. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the earlier departmental enquiries were duly
conducted against the appellant and there was no allegation that the
department faced any difficulty in examining witnesses in such
enquiries, the authorities were required to justify what impelled them to
terminate the services of the appellant forthwith without holding an
enquiry as mandated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India
India.
Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the order date
dated
7.4.1981 was passed,
passed as the petitioner’s activities were objectionable.
He was instigating his fellow police officials to cause indiscipline,
show insubordination
insubordination and exhibit disloyalty, spreading discontentment
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and hatred, etc. and his retention in service was adjudged harmful. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the decision to dispense with a
departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on tthe ipse
dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction rendered by the
concerned authority is questioned before a court of law, it is incumbent
upon
on those supporting
support the order, to demonstrate that such satisfaction is
based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or
caprice of the concerned officer. However, the facts and circumstances
of the present case are distinguishable from those of the judgment
relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant
appellant. In the present case,
the appellant was dismissed from service, on account of his contacts
with extremists and his conduct.
conduct In support thereof, the State has
placed on record two secret reports dated 16.07.1987 and 02.11.1987
02.11.1987.
At the relevant time, terrorism was at its peak in the State of Punjab,
therefore, impugned order dated 14.11.1987 rendered by the concerned
authority dispensing
dispens with the holding of regular departmental enquiry
was justified
ified and proper, as no witness would have been willing to
come forward to depose against the appellant
appellant-plaintiff. Equally
distinguishable are the other judgments relied upon by learned counsel
for the appellant.
appellant
18. No other point has been urged.
19. In view of the above, appeal is dismissed. Judgment and
decree of the appellate Court is upheld.. Decree
Decree-sheet be prepared
accordingly.
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20. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of
accordingly.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
18.02.2026 JUDGE
R.S.
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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