inkinccorporation@gmail.com
Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kuldeep Singh vs National Investigation Agency on 12 February, 2026
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CRA-D-1502-2024 and other connected 2
Mr. Tanheer Singh Bariana, Advocate
for the appellant in CRA-D-1543-2024.
Mr. Sukhdeep Singh Sandhu, NIA
Special Prosecutor for the respondent-NIA.
N.S. SHEKHAWAT, J.
1. This order shall dispose off afore-mentioned four appeals,
whereby the appellants in all these appeals have prayed for grant of
concession of bail in a trial arising out of FIR No.152 dated 19.10.2018
under Sections 124-A, 153A, 153B & 120-B IPC and registered at Police
Station Sultanwind, Amritsar then re-registered as RC-19/2020/NIA/DLI
dated 05.04.2020 under Sections 117, 122, 124A, 436, 153B, 120-B IPC
under Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short `the UAPA’) and under Section 25 of the
Arms Act. Since all the appeals involve common questions of law and facts,
the same are being disposed of simultaneously.
2. Initially, FIR No. 152 dated 19.10.2018, under Sections 124-A,
153-A, 153-B and 120-B IPC was registered at the Police Station
Sultanwind, Amritsar with the allegations that on 19.10.2018, Amritsar
Police had apprehended Sukhraj Singh @ Raju and Malkeet Singh @ Meetu
on the spot, i.e. Kot Mit Singh Flyover, Amritsar, while they were hanging
“Khalistan Jindabad” and “Khalistan Referendum 2020” cloth banners at
the pillars of the flyover. During the course of investigation, the other
accused, namely Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky, Manjit Singh @ Manga, Jatinder
Singh @ Goldy, Harpreet Singh @ Happy, Gurwinder Singh @ Gurpreet
Singh @ Gopi, Harmeet Singh @ Raju, Roofel @ Rufal @ Rahul Gill,
Sukhmandar Singh @ Gopi and Kuldeep Singh @ Kuldip Singh @ Keepa
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were also arrested by Punjab Police on finding sufficient evidence against
them. It was found that the accused had received funds from abroad, sent by
the members of “Sikhs for Justice” (SFJ) and the said amount was used for
spreading terrorist activities and other preparatory acts i.e. attempts to
procure weapons for terror activities in India and to get arms training in
Pakistan.
3. Ultimately, since the matter pertained to propagation of
secessionist “Khalistan Referendum 2020” movement by affixing posters
and banners of “Khalistan Jindabad” and “Khalistan Referendum 2020”,
procurement of weapons, efforts for arms training in Pakistan, acts of
violence in Punjab and other parts of the country; NIA registered the present
case as RC-19/2020/NIA/DLI, dated 05.04.2020 under Sections 124-A, 153-
A, 153-B and 120-B IPC and under Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short `the UAPA’) and took over the
investigation in the present case. It requires mention that Punjab Police had
already submitted a charge sheet on 16.04.2019 and also two supplementary
charge-sheets on 10.07.2019 and 26.08.2019, prior to registration of the case
by NIA. Now, the NIA has also filed charge-sheets before the competent
court of law and the trial is pending before the Special Judge, NIA, SAS
Nagar (Mohali), Punjab.
Submissions in CRA-1502-2024 (Kuldeep Singh Vs NIA)
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argued
that the appellant was not named in the FIR and even during the course of
investigation, no incriminating evidence could be collected against him. Still
further Manjit Singh alias Manga, who is the real brother of the appellant,
has been granted the concession of regular bail by this court vide order dated
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19.07.2024 (Annexure A-2). Learned counsel further argued that in the
present case, after the presentation of challan, charge has been ordered to be
framed by the trial Court on 09.11.2021. However, the trial Court has been
able to record the statements of only 31 prosecution witnesses and 86
prosecution witnesses are yet to be examined by the trial court. Still further,
the appellant was arrested in the present case on 26.11.2018 and there are no
allegations that he had funded any terrorists or terror activities. Even no
arms and ammunitions have been recovered from the present appellant. He
further contended that, Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held in catena of
judgments, that long custody of an accused, even in the cases of UAPA
would be a good ground to entitle him to grant of bail by invoking Article 21
of the Constitution of India. Thus, the appellant may be ordered to be
released on bail.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent-NIA submitted that the investigation had established that the
appellant was a member of terrorist gang formed by US-based Gurpatwant
Singh Pannu for carrying out illegal activities and terrorist acts in India. The
appellant was in direct contact with Nihal Singh, who had emerged as
kingpin of conspiracy hatched in the present case. On the directions of Nihal
Singh, the appellant had pasted posters of “Khalistan Referendum 2020” at
various public places in Patiala, Ludhiana, Jalandhar, and many other places
in Punjab and Red Fort of Delhi along with Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky. Even
the said fact has been proved by the CDR analysis of Kuldeep Singh @
Keepa, appellant and Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky. Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky
was recruited to the terrorist gang by the appellant and both of them were
also co-accused in case FIR No.107 dated 27.07.2015 under Sections 399
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and 402 of the IPC, and Section 25 of the Arms Act, Police Station, Passian,
District Patiala. The appellant received approximately Rs.1,22,550/- in his
name from “SFJ’s proxies in South Africa in the year 2017-18. Out of these
funds, an amount of Rs.72,550/- was sent by the same entities to Sukhraj
Singh, Harmeet Singh and Pargat Singh, all co-accused, indicating that they
were all members of the same terrorist gang, working for SFJ (Sikhs for
Justice). Still further, he also received funds in the accounts of his relatives
and acquaintances. He received a sum of Rs.50,000/- in the name of one
Kamaljit Singh through MTSS channels, which was sent by Tauseef
Ahamed, a Pakistani national through an Indian national, based in UAE.
Additionally, Manjit Singh had also received a sum of rupees 17,000/- from
a Pakistani National in the same manner. Even Harmeet Singh @ Raju had
received a sum of Rs1,00,000/- in the same manner. Learned counsel next
contends that it was established during investigation that the appellant was
in direct contact with Nihal Singh @ Fatih Singh of ‘SFJ’ through mobile
phone of the appellant. Even charge has been framed against the appellant
under Sections 117, 120-B and 436 of IPC and Sections 13, 17, 18, 19 and
20 of the UAPA.
6. Learned counsel for respondent further argued that from the
production cum seizure memo of six transaction receipts through which the
appellant received an amount of Rs.72,500/- via Muthoot Finance and it also
showed that he had received a sum of Rs.50,000/- from an Indian National
based in Dubai. Even he had CDR connectivity with Bikramjit Singh @
Vicky and other accused in the present case. Apart from that, the CDR
analysis of the appellant established that he and Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky
had visited Patiala on several occasions for their court hearings and had
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pasted Khalistani posters at public places. Even the petitioner was in touch
with the other accused as well. The statement of protected witness X6 has
been already registered, which sufficiently proves the involvement of the
appellant in the crime.
Submission in CRA-D-1489-2024 (Rufal Vs NIA)
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has
vehemently argued that the appellant was not initially named in the FIR and
no incriminating recovery has been effected from him so far. The appellant
was arrested in the present case 23.11.2018 and no purpose will be served by
keeping him behind bars. Learned counsel further contends that even charge-
sheet has been presented against him. He belongs to Christian community
and had nothing to do with the “Khalistani Referendum 2020” and is not
involved in any other crime.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of NIA,
respondent submits that the appellant was a member of a terrorist gang
“Sikhs for Justice”, which was formed on the directions of Gurpatwant
Singh Pannu for carrying out unlawful activities or the terrorist acts. The
appellant was part of a larger conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts for
executing target killings, aimed to disrupt peace and for creation of a
separate State “Khalistan”. Even all the accused in the present case were
members of a terrorist gang. As per the investigation, the appellant was
involved with Sukhmandar Singh and was involved in planning and
conspiracy for killing a Delhi-based lady, namely, Paramjit Kaur, which
could not be executed. One .32 bore country-made pistol along with four
live cartridges were recovered from Rufal, which was bought by
Sukhmandar Singh and the appellant. Even on checking the mobile phone of
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the appellant, incriminating photographs of weapon were recovered, which
indicated his inclination towards violence and weapons. It was also found
from the CDR analysis that he was in touch with Sukhmandar Singh and
Harmeet Singh @ Raju. Learned Counsel also submitted that in case the
appellant is released on bail, he would run away from the process of law
and may also threaten the witnesses.
Submissions in CRA-D-1504-2024 (Pargat Singh Vs NIA)
9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
vehemently argued that he was arrested on 22.06.2020 and is in custody
since then. Neither he was named in the FIR initially, nor any other
incriminating material was collected against him during the course of
investigation. He further contends that co-accused Manjit Singh @ Manga
has already been granted the concession of bail by this court vide order dated
19.07.2024 (Annexure A-2). Even the appellant had never funded any
terrorist or violent activity and no incriminating material either in the forms
of arms and ammunition or any other such material has been recovered from
the appellant. Learned counsel further submits that the long custody of the
appellant even in a UAPA case would itself entitle him to grant of bail by
invoking Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of NIA,
respondent submits that during investigation, it was revealed that the
appellant was member of a terrorist gang “Sikhs for Justice” and he was in
direct contact with Nihal Singh alias Fateh Singh, who was the kingpin of
the conspiracy hatched in the present case, which was aimed at disrupting
the peace in the State of Punjab for creation of separate Sikh State,
‘Khalistan’. The appellant also recruited Sukhraj Singh and directed him to
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collect the stencils of “Khalistan Jindabad Referendum 2020” from a
location shared by Nihal Singh. Sukhraj Singh collected the same and made
impressions of “Khalistan Jindabad Referendum 2020” at various places in
Amritsar. The investigation also established that the appellant himself made
impressions of “Khalistan Jindabad Referendum 2020” on the walls of the
government schools and water-works at village Tarmala. He also clicked the
pictures and recorded the video of impressions and sent it to SFJ operatives.
In lieu of this unlawful activity, he received Rs.6000/- through SFJ
operatives in South Africa. Now, charges have been framed against him
under Sections 117, 120-B, 124-A and 436 of the IPC, and Sections 13, 17,
19 and 20 of UAPA on 09.12.2021. Even the appellant had received a sum
of Rs.3,000/- from Archary Union, resident of South Africa on 27.02.2018
and also received a sum of Rs.3000/- again on 15.01.2018. Even the
statements of X-3, X-7 and X-12 (protected witnesses) were recorded and
they had highlighted the involvement of the appellant in the crime.
Submissions in CRA-D-1543-2024 (Sukhraj Singh alias Raju Vs. NIA)
11. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the
appellant was arrested in the present case on 23.10.2018. He further
submitted that the appellant was never involved in any other criminal
activity and no recovery was effected from him. It has been wrongly alleged
that the appellant had received a sum of Rs.798/- through different sources.
Still further, he was in custody for almost 8 years and this itself was a
ground for granting concession of bail as the trial is progressing at snail’s
pace.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of NIA –
respondent vehemently argued that during the course of trial, the statements
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of X-5, X-6 and X-8 witnesses were recorded and their statements prima
facie indicated the involvement of the appellants in the crime. Even Sukhraj
Singh, appellant, was recruited to a terrorist gang by Pargat Singh, who
introduced him with SFJ/Nihal Singh, a close associate of Gurpatwant Singh
Pannu and was in the process of hanging cloth banners with “Khalistan
Jindabad” and “Khalistan Referendum 2020”, written on them at the pillars
of Kot Mit Singh Flyover, Amritsar. Apart from that, the appellant carried
out a number of unlawful activities including painting Khalistan slogans at
public places and burning liquor shops with Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky and
received funds from abroad via MTSS and also received funds in the bank
accounts of his acquaintances. Even the scrutiny of call detail records was
conducted by NIA, which specifically showed his proximity with other
accused in the present case.
13. We have heard the submissions made by learned counsel for the
parties and perused the records carefully.
14. In the cases in hand, learned counsel for both the parties have
referred to Section 43-D (5) of the NIA Act and the relevant extract of the
same has been reproduced below.
“Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of
this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own
bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity of being heard on the application for such release.
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on
bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case
diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of
the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.”
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15. While interpreting the provisions of Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA in SLP (Crl.) No.10047 of 2023 titled as ‘Gurwinder Singh Vs. State
of Punjab and another‘ Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as follows:-
16. The source of the power to grant bail in respect of non-
bailable offences punishable with death or life imprisonment
emanates from Section 439 CrPC. It can be noticed that Section
43D(5) of the UAP Act modifies the application of the general
bail provisions in respect of offences punishable under Chapter
IV and Chapter VI of the UAP Act.
17. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows
that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special
Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the
Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the
application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to
Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the
powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It
lays down that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case diary or the
report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that the accusation, against such person, as
regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV
and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such
accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own
bond. It is interesting to note that there is no analogous
provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in
Section 43D(5) of the UAPAct. In that sense, the language of
bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act.
18. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis
ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in
favour of the oft-quoted phrase – ‘bail is the rule, jail is the
exception’ – unless circumstances justify otherwise – does not
find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP
Act. The ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the
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UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words
used in proviso to Section 43D (5)– ‘shall not be released’in
contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1)
CrPC – ‘may be released’- suggests the intention of the
Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
19. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task
on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the
courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject
bail. The ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary
and the final report submitted before the Special Court. The
legislature has prescribed a low, ‘prima facie’ standard, as a
measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court
when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This
standard can be contrasted with the standard of ‘strong
suspicion’, which is used by Courts while hearing applications
for ‘discharge’. In fact, the Supreme Court in Zahoor Ali Watali
2 (2019) 5 SCC has noticed this difference, where it said:
“In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the
Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against the accused is prima
facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be
recorded for considering a discharge application or framing
of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act.”
20. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite
plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the
public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Caste
Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima
facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied
– that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application
in accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear
by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the
restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are
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in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal
Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant
of bail.
21. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the
inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail
applications under the UAP Act can be summarised in the form
of a twin-prong test :
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’
make out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP
Act
1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and
final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail
in light of the general principles relating to grant of bail
under Section 439 CrPC (‘tripod test’)?
On a consideration of various factors such as nature of offence, length
of punishment (if convicted), age, character, status of accused etc., the
Courts must ask itself :
2.1 Whether the accused is a flight risk?
2.2. Whether there is apprehension of the accused
tampering with the evidence?
2.3 Whether there is apprehension of accused influencing
witnesses?
22. The question of entering the ‘second test’of the inquiry will not
arise if the ‘first test’is satisfied. And merely because the first test is
satisfied, that does not mean however that the accused is
automatically entitled to bail. The accused will have to show that he
successfully passes the ‘tripod test’.
Test for Rejection of Bail: Guidelines as laid down by Supreme
Court in Watali’s Case
23. In the previous section, based on a textual reading, we have
discussed the broad inquiry which Courts seized of bail applications
under 14 Section 43D(5) UAP Act r/w Section 439 CrPC must indulge
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in. Setting out the framework of the law seems rather easy, yet the
application of it, presents its own complexities. For greater clarity in
the application of the test set out above, it would be helpful to seek
guidance from binding precedents. In this regard, we need to look no
further than Watali’s case which has laid down elaborate guidelines
on the approach that Courts must partake in, in their application of
the bail limitations under the UAP Act. On a perusal of paragraphs 23
to 29 and 32, the following 8-point propositions emerge and they are
summarised as follows:
Meaning of ‘Prima facie true’ [para 23]: On the face of it, the
materials must show the complicity of the accused in commission of
the offence. The materials/evidence must be good and sufficient to
establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence,
unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence.
Degree of Satisfaction at Pre-Chargesheet, Post Chargesheet and
Post Charges – Compared [para 23]: Once charges are framed, it
would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded
upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to
form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to
justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have
to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that 15 despite the
framing of charge, the materials presented along with the chargesheet
(report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds
for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true.
Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst
considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report
made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.
Reasoning, necessary but no detailed evaluation of evidence [para
24]:
The exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage–of giving
reasons for grant or non-grant of bail–is markedly different from
discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate
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examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at
this stage.
•Record a finding on broad probabilities, not based on proof beyond
doubt [para 24]: “The Court is merely expected to record a finding on
the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the
accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.”
•Duration of the limitation under Section 43D(5) [para 26]: The
special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the
stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI
of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof.
Material on record must be analysed as a ‘whole’; no piecemeal
analysis [para 27]: The totality of the material gathered by the
investigating agency and presented along with the report and
including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by
analysing individual pieces of evidence or circumstance.
Contents of documents to be presumed as true [para 27]: The Court
must look at the contents of the document and take such document into
account as it is.
Admissibility of documents relied upon by Prosecution cannot be
questioned [para 27]: The materials/evidence collected by the
investigation agency in support of the accusation against the accused
in the first information report must prevail until contradicted and
overcome or disproved by other evidence…….In any case, the
question of discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of
being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible.”
16. Even still further, in the matter of Keljroesatip Tep and Ors Vs.
National Investigation Agency (2023) 6 SCC 58, Hon’ble the Supreme
Court held as follows:
“while dealing with the bail petition filed by the accused
against whom offences under chapter IV and VI of UAPA have
been made, the court has to consider as to wheterh there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the14 of 17
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CRA-D-1502-2024 and other connected 15accused is prima facie true. The bench also observed that
distinction between the words “not guilty” as used in TADA,
MCOCA and NDPS Act as against the words ” prima facie” in
the UAPA as held in Watali’s Caste (supra) to state that a
degree of satisfaction required in the case of “not guilty” is
much stronger than the satisfaction required in a case where the
words used are “prima facie”.
17. Now, we would proceed to examine the facts of the present case
in the light of the above stated principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, which have to be kept in mind by the Courts while deciding the bail
applications in such cases.
18. From the record, it is apparent that on 19.10.2018, Sukhraj
Singh @ Raju, appellant, and his co-accused Malkiat Singh alias Meetu
were arrested by Punjab Police while they were putting cloth banners of
“Khalistan Zindabad” and “Khalistan Referendum 2020” at the pillars of
Kot Meet Singh Flyover, Amritsar and the FIR was registered against them
under Sections 124-A, 153-A, 153-B and 120-B IPC.
19. During the course of investigation by Punjab Police, it was
found that the other accused, namely Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky, Manjit
Singh @ Manga, Jatinder Singh @ Goldy, Harpreet Singh @ Happy,
Gurwinder Singh @ Gurpreet Singh @ Gopi, Harmeet Singh @ Raju,
Roofel @ Rufal @ Rahul Gill, Sukhmandar Singh @ Gopi and Kuldeep
Singh @ Kuldip Singh @ Keepa were also involved in the present case.
Later on, in compliance of the Government of India order dated 04.04.2020,
the NIA again registered the present FIR on 05.04.2020 and took over the
investigation of the present case. During the process of investigation,
sufficient incriminating evidence was collected to show that all the
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appellants and their co-accused were members of a terrorist gang “Sikhs for
Justice”, which was formed by a notified terrorist Gurpatwant Singh Pannu.
20. Even the appellants and their co-accused had created Facebook
pages and YouTube channels containing Khalistan related materials to
recruit the youth, particularly of Punjab State, so that they may be involved
in various terrorist activities in different parts of Punjab, Delhi and other
parts of the country.
21. Even from the arguments raised by learned counsel for the
parties, it was apparent that sufficient evidence had been collected by Punjab
Police as well as NIA, which revealed the involvement of the appellants in a
terrorist gang and different roles were assigned to them.
22. Further, the analysis of call detail records clearly showed that
they were constantly in touch with each other, and the funds were received
from Pakistan and other countries from the entities, which had close
relations with the banned terrorist organization “Sikhs for Justice”. Even, the
investigating agency had collected material which showed transfer of funds
in the accounts of the appellants and their relatives/friends. Thus, the
material on record clearly indicated the complicity of all the appellants and
they had knowingly facilitated the commission of a preparatory act towards
the commission of terrorist act under Section 18 of the UAPA.
23. Apart from that, in the present case, certain protected witnesses
are yet to be examined. In case the appellants are ordered to be released on
bail, they may influence the witnesses and may also tamper with the
prosecution evidence.
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24. As a result of the above discussion, we find no merit in all the
aforementioned cases filed by the appellants and accordingly, all the appeals
are ordered to be dismissed.
25. Nothing stated herein shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the cases in hand and the observations have been
made only for the limited purpose of disposal of the bail matters. The trial
court shall decide the trial on the basis of the evidence led by both the sides
before the court.
26. Since the appellants are in custody for a long period, the trial
Court is directed to expedite the trial and conclude the same preferably
within a period of 18 months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this
order.
27. A copy of this order be sent to the concerned trial Court for
compliance of the same.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
JUDGE
(H.S. GREWAL)
JUDGE
12.02.2026
mks
Whether Speaking/Reasoned: YES / NO
Whether Reportable: YES / NO
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