Chattisgarh High Court
Khushbu Devangan vs Principal Judge, Family Court on 15 April, 2026
Digitally
signed by
YOGESH
YOGESH TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.04.15
17:52:23
+0530
1
2026:CGHC:17176
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 11.03.2026
Order Delivered on : 15.04.2026
WPS No. 1363 of 2023
Khushbu Devangan D/o Shri Ghanshyam Devangan Aged About 28
Years R/o Sadar Bazar, Near Durga Temple District Durg Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner
Versus
1 - Principal Judge, Family Court, Block G-3, Civil Lines, Durg District
Durg Chhattisgarh
2 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Social Welfare
Department, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPS No. 2468 of 2023
Jitendra Kumar Sinha S/o Jailal Sinha Aged About 37 Years R/o
Chhattisgarh Disability Finance And Development Commission, Old
DRDA Building Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Principal Judge, Family Court Block G-3, Civil Lines, Durg, District :
Durg, Chhattisgarh
2 – State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Social Welfare
Department, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
2
WPS No. 2505 of 2023
Pramod Manikpuri S/o Ratandas Manikpuri, Aged About 32 Years R/o
Dr. Sharma Street, Tata Line Kohka, Bhilai, District Durg Chhattisgarh
—Petitioner
Versus
1 – Principal Judge, Family Court Block – G-3, Civil Lines, Durg, District
Durg Chhattisgarh
2 – State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Social Welfare
Department Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
— Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners : Mr. Parth Kumar Jha, Advocate on
behalf of Mr. Tarendra Kumar Jha,
Advocate
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Aniket Verma, Advocate on behalf
(In WPS No.1363/2023) of Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava,
(In WPS Nos.2468/2023 and Advocate
2505/2023)
For State/Respondent No.2 : Mr. Arpit Agrawal, Panel Lawyer
Hon’ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. Heard Mr. Parth Kumar Jha, learned counsel holding brief of Mr.
Tarendra Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also
heard Mr. Aniket Verma, holding brief of Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned
counsel for respondent No.1 in WPS No.1363/2023, Mr. Anurag
Dayal Shrivastava, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in WPS
3
Nos.2468/2023 and 2505/2023 as well as Mr. Arpit Agrawal,
learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State/respondent No.2.
2. Since common questions of fact and law are involved in these writ
petitions and the challenge in all the petitions arises out of the
same selection process initiated by respondent No.1, they were
heard analogously with the consent of learned counsel appearing
for the parties and are being disposed of by this common order for
the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition of facts and
issues.
3. By filing the present petitions, the common grievance of the
petitioners is that the selection process initiated pursuant to the
advertisement dated 16.06.2022 issued by respondent No.1, and
the consequential selection list and waiting list declared on
14.03.2023, have not been conducted in accordance with the
applicable statutory rules and governing legal principles.
According to the petitioners, the entire process of recruitment
suffers from various irregularities and illegalities, thereby rendering
the selection process arbitrary and unsustainable in the eyes of
law. On these grounds, the petitioners have prayed for quashing of
the impugned advertisement as well as the resultant selection and
waiting list, and have further sought a direction to the respondents
to undertake a fresh selection process strictly in accordance with
the prescribed rules and applicable law.
4. In WPS No.1363/2023, the petitioner has sought for following
4
relief(s) :-
“10.1 That, the Hon’ble High Court may kindly
be please to quash/set aside the advertisement
dated 16-06-2022 (Annexure P-1) issued by
the respondent No.1 along with the result
declared and the whole selection process.
10.2 That, the Hon’ble High Court may kindly
be please to issue a fresh advertisement by
following the rules and laws prescribed.
10.3 Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed
in favor of the petitioner together with cost of
the petition.”
5. In WPS No.2468/2023, the petitioner has sought for following
relief(s) :-
“10.1 That, the Hon’ble High Court may kindly
be please to quash/set aside the selection and
waiting list dated 14.03.2023 (Annexure P-1)
issued by the respondent No.1.
10.2 That, the Hon’ble High Court may kindly
be please to issue a fresh advertisement by
following the rules and laws prescribed.
10.3 Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed
in favor of the petitioner together with cost of
the petition.”
6. In WPS No.2505/2023, the petitioner has sought for following
relief(s) :-
5
“10.1 That, the Hon’ble High Court may kindly
be please to quash/set aside the selection and
waiting list dated 14.03.2023 (Annexure P-1)
issued by the respondent No.1.
10.2 That, the Hon’ble High Court may kindly
be please to issue a fresh advertisement by
following the rules and laws prescribed.
10.3 Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit and proper, may also be passed
in favor of the petitioner together with cost of
the petition.”
7. For the sake of convenience, WPS No.1363/2023 is taken as the
lead case and the facts necessary for adjudication of the present
batch of writ petitions are being referred to from the said petition.
The pleadings and documents available in the said petition are
treated as the basis for consideration of the controversy involved
in all the connected matters.
8. The facts projected by the petitioners are that respondent No.1
issued Advertisement No.193/2-11-1/2022 dated 16.06.2022
inviting applications for recruitment to the posts of Stenographer
(Hindi) and Assistant Grade-III (Deposition Writer/Process
Writer/Saleameen), wherein a total of 14 posts were notified.
Pursuant to the said advertisement, the petitioners, being eligible,
submitted their applications and participated in the selection
process along with other candidates. After submission of the
application forms, admit cards were issued to the candidates
6
including the petitioners for appearing in the examination. It is
further averred that prior to conducting the first phase of the
examination, no scrutiny of the application forms was undertaken
to verify the eligibility or ineligibility of the candidates. Initially, the
Principal Judge, Family Court, Durg constituted a Selection
Committee comprising the Second Additional Principal Judge (Shri
Rizwan Khan) as President, the Third Additional Principal Judge
(Smt. Shradha Shukla) as Member and the Administrative Officer
of the Family Court, Durg as Member. As per the advertisement,
the selection process was to be conducted in two phases, namely,
the written examination and the skill test.
9. According to the petitioners, the written examination, which
constituted the first phase of the selection process, was conducted
on 15.01.2023. However, just two days prior to the examination,
i.e., on 12.01.2023, the Principal Judge, who is respondent No.1
herein, reconstituted the Selection Committee and assumed the
position of President of the Committee, while the Second and
Third Additional Principal Judges were made members and the
Administrative Officer was appointed as Secretary of the
Committee.
10. The petitioner have further averred that as per the terms of the
advertisement dated 16.06.2022, the written examination was to
consist of 50 questions carrying a total of 100 marks. However,
during the examination held on 15.01.2023, only 25 questions
7
were asked, which, according to the petitioners, was contrary to
the conditions stipulated in the advertisement and the prescribed
rules governing the examination. The petitioners submit that an
application was moved seeking a copy of the question paper, but
the same has not been supplied till date.
11. It is also the case of the petitioners that neither before nor after the
written examination were objections invited from the candidates
regarding the question paper or the conduct of the examination.
Subsequently, the result of the written examination was declared
on 25.01.2023 and the same was uploaded on the official website
of the District Court, Durg. Being aggrieved by the declaration of
the result as well as the manner in which the entire selection
process was conducted, the petitioners have challenged the said
result and the entire selection process in the present batch of writ
petitions.
12. Mr. Parth Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
Mr. Tarendra Kumar Jha learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, submits that the impugned advertisement dated
16.06.2022 (Annexure P-1) issued by respondent No.1 is itself
contrary to the constitutional and statutory provisions governing
public employment and, therefore, the entire selection process
initiated pursuant thereto is liable to be set aside. He would submit
that the advertisement has been issued without indicating the
percentage of reservation applicable to various categories, which
8
is in clear violation of the constitutional mandate relating to
reservation in public employment and the settled principles
governing recruitment to public posts.
13. Mr. Jha further submits that after receipt of the applications from
the candidates, no scrutiny was conducted by the respondents to
segregate eligible and ineligible candidates prior to the
commencement of the examination process. According to him,
such omission on the part of the respondents has vitiated the
entire selection process, as candidates who may not have fulfilled
the eligibility criteria were also permitted to participate in the
examination, thereby defeating the very object of a fair and
transparent recruitment process.
14. It is contended by Mr. Jha that merely two days prior to the written
examination, i.e., on 12.01.2023, the Selection Committee was
abruptly reconstituted by respondent No.1. By virtue of the said
reconstitution, the earlier President of the Committee, namely the
Second Additional Principal Judge, was replaced and respondent
No.1 himself assumed the position of President of the Selection
Committee. It is submitted that respondent No.1, being the
appointing authority, could not have acted as the President of the
Selection Committee, as such action is contrary to the principles of
fairness and transparency and violates the well-established
principles of natural justice. Mr. Jha further argues that the manner
in which the examination was conducted also demonstrates
9
serious irregularities. He submits that as per the terms and
conditions of the advertisement, the written examination was to
consist of 50 questions carrying a total of 100 marks; however,
during the examination only 25 questions were asked, which is in
clear deviation from the stipulations contained in the
advertisement. According to him, once the recruitment process
had commenced, the respondents could not have altered the
scheme of the examination, as it is a well-settled principle of law
that the rules of the game cannot be changed in the midway. It is
also submitted that prior to declaration of the result neither any
model answer key was published nor were objections invited from
the candidates, which is contrary to the fair procedure ordinarily
followed in competitive examinations.
15. Lastly, it is submitted by Mr. Jha that even the result declared by
the respondents suffers from serious infirmities, inasmuch as the
categories of the candidates with respect to their caste have not
been mentioned in the result sheet. According to learned counsel,
such omission is contrary to the reservation policy and adversely
affects the constitutional rights of candidates belonging to
reserved categories. On these grounds, learned counsel submits
that the impugned advertisement, the selection process conducted
pursuant thereto, and the resultant selection list are arbitrary,
illegal and liable to be quashed by this Court. In support of his
submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed
reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tej
10
Prakash Pathak and others v. Rajasthan High Court and
others passed in Civil Appeal No.2634/2013 decided on
07.11.2024 as well as the decision rendered in Anil Kishore
Pandit v. The State of Bihar and others passed in Civil Appeal
No.1566/2024 decided on 02.02.2024.
16. Reliance has also been placed upon the order passed by this
Court in Radhika Netam and another v. State of Chhattisgarh
and others passed in WPS No.3787/2022 decided on
10.08.2023 as well as the judgment rendered by the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh in Dr. Arti v. M.P. Public Service Commission
and others,2026 : MPHC-IND-2473, to buttress his submissions.
17. Mr. Aniket Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned counsel for respondent No.1 in WPS
No.1363/2023, on the other hand, opposes the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that
the present writ petition has been filed on the basis of self-serving
and misconceived averments, and therefore the same does not
warrant any interference by this Court. He would submit that the
entire selection process has been conducted strictly in accordance
with the terms and conditions stipulated in the advertisement
dated 16.06.2022 and the relevant rules governing the field. It is
further submitted that the petitioners, having participated in the
selection process with full knowledge of the terms of the
advertisement and having failed to secure the requisite merit,
11
cannot now be permitted to challenge the same merely because
they were unsuccessful in the examination.
18. Mr. Verma further submits that the petition suffers from the defect
of non-joinder of necessary parties. It is contended that the written
examination was conducted on 15.01.2023 and the result thereof
was declared on 25.01.2023, pursuant to which 192 candidates
were shortlisted to participate in the next phase of the selection
process, i.e., the skill test. According to him, rights have already
accrued in favour of those candidates who were declared
successful in the written examination and subsequently
participated in the skill test. Therefore, in the absence of those
candidates being impleaded as party respondents, the writ petition
itself is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on this
ground alone.
19. It is submitted by Mr. Verma that the allegation regarding improper
constitution of the Selection Committee is wholly misconceived.
Learned counsel submits that the Selection Committee was
constituted in strict compliance with the directions issued by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh vide memo dated 04.01.1995,
which specifically provides that for recruitment to Class-III and
Class-IV posts, the Selection Committee shall consist of the
Principal Judge as President along with two senior judicial officers
as members. In accordance with the said directions, the Selection
Committee was reconstituted on 12.01.2023 with the Principal
12
Judge as President and two Additional Principal Judges as
members, and therefore no illegality or violation of principles of
natural justice can be attributed to the said action.
20. Mr. Verma further submits that the decision to reduce the number
of questions in the written examination from 50 to 25 was taken by
the duly constituted Selection Committee in a meeting held on
13.01.2023 in view of the large number of candidates who had
applied for the posts. It is submitted that the marks allotted for
each question were proportionately increased so that the total
marks of the examination remained unchanged. According to him,
the said decision was taken to facilitate smooth and transparent
conduct of the examination and falls within the administrative
discretion of the Selection Committee, particularly in view of
Clause 6 of the advertisement which clearly provides that the
decision of the Principal Judge with respect to the selection
procedure shall be final.
21. Lastly, it is submitted by Mr. Verma that the written examination
was merely a preliminary screening test intended to shortlist
candidates for the skill test, and therefore there was no
requirement to publish a model answer key or to invite objections
from the candidates at that stage. It is further submitted that the
written examination was only for the purpose of shortlisting
candidates and not for determining the final merit, and therefore
there was also no necessity to declare the category-wise result at
13
that stage. On these grounds, learned counsel submits that the
selection process has been conducted fairly and strictly in
accordance with law, and as such the petitioners have failed to
make out any case for interference by this Court and the writ
petition deserves to be dismissed.
22. Mr. Anurag Dayal Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing for
respondent No.1 in WPS Nos.2468/2023 and 2505/2023, while
opposing the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners,
submits that the challenge raised in the present writ petitions is
wholly misconceived and deserves to be rejected at the threshold.
He would submit that the petitioners had applied for the post
pursuant to the advertisement dated 16.06.2022 and had
voluntarily participated in the entire selection process without
raising any objection at the relevant stage. However, after having
remained unsuccessful in the selection process, the petitioners
have now chosen to challenge the very procedure in which they
had participated. According to learned counsel, it is a settled
principle of law that a candidate who has participated in a
selection process without protest cannot subsequently turn around
and challenge the same merely because the outcome has gone
against him.
23. Mr. Shrivastava further submits that the allegations made by the
petitioners with regard to lack of scrutiny of the applications are
factually incorrect. It is submitted that upon receipt of the
14
applications, proper scrutiny was undertaken by the authorities
and out of the total applications received, nine applications were
found to be incomplete or defective and were accordingly rejected.
The remaining candidates were issued admit cards and permitted
to participate in the written examination. He further submits that
due to the large number of applications received, which were
approximately 3775, the written examination had to be conducted
in three shifts, and therefore certain administrative decisions were
taken by the Selection Committee to ensure smooth and efficient
conduct of the examination.
24. It is contended by Mr. Shrivastava that the reconstitution of the
Selection Committee was carried out strictly in accordance with
the directions issued by the High Court vide memo dated
04.01.1995, which provides that the Selection Committee for
recruitment to the concerned posts shall consist of the Principal
Judge as Chairman along with two senior judicial officers as
members. Accordingly, the Selection Committee was reconstituted
under the chairmanship of the Principal Judge, Family Court,
along with the Second and Third Additional Principal Judges as
members. He submits that the said reconstitution was purely an
administrative decision taken in compliance with the directions of
the High Court and has not caused any prejudice whatsoever to
the petitioners. Mr. Shrivastava further submits that although the
number of questions in the written examination was reduced from
50 to 25, the total marks for the examination remained unchanged
15
at 100 marks, and therefore each question carried proportionately
higher marks. According to him, the said modification was
necessitated in view of the large number of candidates and the
logistical difficulties involved in conducting the examination. He
submits that the said change was applied uniformly to all
candidates and therefore no prejudice was caused to any
participant, including the petitioners. He further submits that
Clause 6 of the advertisement clearly empowers the Principal
Judge, Family Court to take necessary decisions regarding the
procedure of selection.
25. Lastly, Mr. Shrivastava submits that the written examination was
merely a preliminary screening test intended to shortlist
candidates for the next phase, namely the skill test, and therefore
the declaration of category-wise results or inviting objections at
that stage was not required. It is submitted that candidates up to
fifteen times the number of advertised posts were declared eligible
on the basis of the written examination to participate in the skill
test. He also submits that the reservation policy was duly followed
while issuing the advertisement as well as while declaring the
results. On these grounds, learned counsel submits that the
petitions are devoid of merit and deserve to be dismissed.
26. Mr. Arpit Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the
State/respondent No.2, submits that on a plain reading of the
reliefs sought in the writ petitions, it is evident that the grievance of
16
the petitioners is essentially directed against the actions of
respondent No.1 and no specific relief has been claimed against
the State. He would submit that the allegations and grounds raised
by the petitioners pertain to the manner in which the selection
process was conducted by respondent No.1, and therefore the
State has no direct role to play in the controversy involved in the
present petitions. He further submits that respondent No.2 has
been arrayed merely as a formal party in the present proceedings
and the dispute projected by the petitioners does not involve any
specific action or decision attributable to the State Government. In
such circumstances, it is submitted that no substantive relief can
be granted against the State and the petitions, insofar as they
relate to respondent No.2, deserve to be dismissed.
27. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as learned
counsel appearing for the respondents and have perused the
pleadings and documents placed on record.
28. From a perusal of the record, it appears that in the advertisement it
was specifically stipulated that in the first stage, i.e., the written
examination, a total of 50 multiple-choice questions of various
subjects such as General Knowledge, Computer/Internet and
Chhattisgarh Current Affairs were to be asked carrying an
aggregate of 100 marks, and two marks were to be allotted for
each question. The duration of the examination was fixed as one
hour. It was further provided that the written examination was to be
17
conducted only for the purpose of screening/shortlisting the
candidates, and on the basis of the marks obtained therein a merit
list would be prepared. Thereafter, candidates up to 15 times the
number of advertised vacant posts, on the basis of merit, were to
be declared eligible and invited to participate in the skill test. It was
also provided that in case multiple candidates secured equal
marks at the last position in the merit list of the written
examination, all such candidates would be called to appear in the
skill test. Thus, the written examination was not the final stage of
selection but merely a preliminary screening mechanism intended
to shortlist candidates for the next stage of the recruitment
process, namely the skill test, which was the determinative stage
for assessment of comparative merit of the candidates.
29. It is not in dispute that during the conduct of the written
examination the number of questions was reduced from 50 to 25,
however the total marks of the examination remained unchanged
at 100 marks, meaning thereby that the marks assigned to each
question were proportionately increased. The material placed on
record further indicates that such modification was adopted by the
Selection Committee in view of the large number of candidates,
approximately 3775 applications, received pursuant to the
advertisement. The written examination had to be conducted in
multiple shifts and, therefore, the Selection Committee, in its
administrative wisdom, took a decision to modify the number of
questions while maintaining the total marks of the examination.
18
The said modification was applied uniformly to all candidates who
participated in the examination and the petitioners have not been
able to demonstrate that the change resulted in any hostile
discrimination or arbitrariness affecting them individually.
30. The law is well settled that every irregularity in a recruitment
process does not necessarily vitiate the entire selection unless it is
shown that such irregularity has caused real prejudice to the
candidates. In the present case, the petitioners have not been
able to establish that the reduction of questions from 50 to 25 has
caused any specific prejudice to them. On the contrary, the total
marks remained the same and the modified scheme of
examination was uniformly applied to all candidates. In such
circumstances, the contention raised by the petitioners that the
entire selection process deserves to be set aside merely on
account of modification in the pattern of the written examination
cannot be accepted.
31. At this stage, it would be apposite to note that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that courts should not
ordinarily interfere with recruitment processes on mere
technicalities unless it is shown that the action complained of has
materially affected the fairness of the selection.
32. In Union of India and others v. S. Vinodh Kumar and others,
(2007) 8 SCC 100, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in
matters relating to recruitment and selection, minor deviations or
19
procedural variations which do not cause prejudice to the
candidates cannot be made a ground for setting aside the entire
selection process. The Court emphasized that the primary
consideration must always be whether the process has been
conducted in a fair and transparent manner.
33. Similarly, in Madan Mohan Sharma and others v. State of
Rajasthan and others, (2008) 3 SCC 724, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed that unless the candidates are able to
demonstrate that the alleged irregularity has resulted in actual
prejudice, the entire selection process should not be annulled
merely on speculative grounds.
34. In the present case, the written examination was merely a
screening test intended to shortlist candidates for the skill test. The
final determination of merit was to be made on the basis of the
skill test and other criteria prescribed in the advertisement. The
petitioners have not demonstrated that the modification in the
number of questions had any direct bearing on the ultimate
selection of candidates or that it has deprived them of an
opportunity to compete fairly in the recruitment process.
35. Furthermore, another important aspect which cannot be lost sight
of is that the petitioners had participated in the entire selection
process without raising any objection at the relevant stage. Only
after being unsuccessful in the written examination have they
chosen to challenge the process. It is a well-settled principle of law
20
that a candidate who has participated in the selection process with
full knowledge of the procedure cannot subsequently turn around
and challenge the same merely because the result is not
favourable to him.
36. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madan Lal and others v. State of
Jammu and Kashmir and others, (1995) 3 SCC 486, wherein it
has been held that a candidate who takes part in the selection
process without protest cannot subsequently challenge the
procedure of selection after having failed to secure selection. The
Supreme Court held that such a challenge would be hit by the
principle of estoppel.
37. The same principle has been reiterated in Ashok Kumar and
another v. State of Bihar and others, (2017) 4 SCC 357,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that once a
candidate participates in the selection process with knowledge of
the selection criteria, he cannot be permitted to challenge the
process merely because the outcome is not favourable to him.
38. Another significant factor which weighs with this Court is that the
petitioners have challenged the entire selection process
culminating in the final selection list dated 14.03.2023, however
the selected candidates have not been impleaded as party
respondents in the present writ petitions. Once a recruitment
process has culminated and candidates have been selected and
21
appointed, any challenge to such selection necessarily requires
that the selected candidates be impleaded as parties to the
proceedings, since their rights are directly affected.
39. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabodh Verma and others v.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1984) 4 SCC 251, has
categorically held that when the selection of candidates is under
challenge, the selected candidates are necessary parties, and in
their absence the petition is liable to be dismissed for non-joinder
of necessary parties. The Court observed that no order adversely
affecting the rights of selected candidates can be passed behind
their back.
40. The same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Ranjan Kumar and others v. State of Bihar and others,
(2014) 16 SCC 187, wherein it was held that in the absence of
selected candidates being impleaded as parties, a challenge to
the recruitment process cannot be entertained and observed as
follows :-
“6. In Indu Shekhar Singh and others v. State of
U.P. and others, (2006) 8 SCC 129 it has been
held thus: –
“56. There is another aspect of the matter.
The appellants herein were not joined as
parties in the writ petition filed by the
respondents. In their absence, the High
Court could not have determined the
question of inter se seniority.”
22
7. In Km. Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service
Commission and others (2006) 12 SCC 724,
after referring to Prabodh Verma (supra) and
Indu Shekhar Singh (supra), the Court took
note of the fact that when no steps had been
taken in terms of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of
Civil Procedure or the principles analogous
thereto all the seventeen selected candidates
were necessary parties in the writ petition. It
was further observed that the number of
selected candidates was not many and there
was no difficulty for the appellant to implead
them as parties in the proceeding. Ultimately,
the Court held that when all the selected
candidates were not impleaded as parties to
the writ petition, no relief could be granted to
the appellant therein.
8. In Tridip Kumar Dingal and others v. State of
West Bengal and others, (2009) 1 SCC 768,
this Court approved the view expressed by the
tribunal which had opined that for absence of
selected and appointed candidates and without
affording an opportunity of hearing to them, the
selection could not be set aside.
9. In Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal v.
Mamta Bisht and others, (2010) 12 SCC 204
this Court, while dealing with the concept of
necessary parties and the effect of non-
implementation of such a party in the matter
when the selection process is assailed,
observed thus: –
“9….in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Board
23of Revenue, wherein the Court has explained
the distinction between necessary party,
proper party and pro forma party and further
held that if a person who is likely to suffer
from the order of the court and has not been
impleaded as a party has a right to ignore the
said order as it has been passed in violation
of the principles of natural justice. More so,
proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter called ‘Code of
Civil Procedure‘) provides that non-joinder of
necessary party be fatal. Undoubtedly,
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not
applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the
provision of Section 141 Code of Civil
Procedure but the principles enshrined
therein are applicable. (Vide Gulabchand
Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat,
Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal (2009) 1
SCC 768 (2010) 12 SCC 204 AIR 1963 SC
786 AIR 1965 SC 1153 Khodidas Barot and
Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT)”
10. In J.S. Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
another, (2011) 6 SCC 570, it has been held
that:
“31. No order can be passed behind the back
of a person adversely affecting him and such
an order, if passed, is liable to be ignored
being not binding on such a party as the
same has been passed in violation of the
principles of natural justice.”
It was further held that:
24
“31. ….The litigant has to ensure that the
necessary party is before the Court, be it a
plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise the
proceedings will have to fail. In service
jurisprudence if an unsuccessful candidate
challenges the selection process, he is
bound to implead at least some of the
successful candidates in representative
capacity.”
11. In Vijay Kumar Kaul and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors., (2012) 7 SCC 610 it has been
ruled thus:
“36. Another aspect needs to be highlighted.
Neither before the Tribunal nor before the
High Court, Parveen Kumar and others were
arrayed as parties. There is no dispute over
the factum that they are senior to the
Appellants and have been conferred the
benefit of promotion to the higher posts. In
their absence, if any direction is issued for
fixation of seniority, that is likely to jeopardise
their interest. When they have not been
impleaded as parties such a relief is difficult
to grant.”
12. Recently in State of Rajasthan v. Ucchab
Lal Chhanwal, (2014) 1 SCC 144, it has been
opined that: –
“14. ….Despite the indefatigable effort, we
are not persuaded to accept the aforesaid
preponement, for once the Respondents are
promoted, the juniors who have been
25promoted earlier would become juniors in the
promotional cadre, and they being not
arrayed as parties in the lis, an adverse order
cannot be passed against them as that would
go against the basic tenet of the principles of
natural justice.”
13. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law,
we are disposed to think that in such a case
when all the appointees were not impleaded,
the writ petition was defective and hence, no
relief could have been granted to the writ
petitioners.”
41. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Karunesh Kumar and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1706,
has reiterated that a candidate who has participated in the
selection process cannot subsequently challenge the procedure
after being unsuccessful. Further, in Tajvir Singh Sodhi and
others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, (2023) 17
SCC 147, the Supreme Court held that candidates who voluntarily
participate in the selection process cannot challenge the
procedure after being declared unsuccessful, as the doctrine of
waiver and acquiescence would apply, while observing as
follows :-
“Selection Process for Public Employment:
Interference by Courts:
31. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to
preface our judgment with the view that Courts
in India generally avoid interfering in the
26selection process of public employment,
recognising the importance of maintaining the
autonomy and integrity of the selection
process. The Courts recognise that the process
of selection involves a high degree of expertise
and discretion and that it is not appropriate for
Courts to substitute their judgment for that of a
selection committee. It would be indeed,
treading on thin ice for us if we were to venture
into reviewing the decision of experts who form
a part of a selection board. The law on the
scope and extent of judicial review of a
selection process and results thereof, may be
understood on consideration of the following
case law:
32. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke vs. Dr. B.S.
Mahajan, AIR 1990 SC 434, this Court
clarified the scope of judicial review of a
selection process, in the following words:
“12…It is needless to emphasise that it is
not the function of the court to hear
appeals over the decisions of the selection
committees and to scrutinise the relative
merits of the candidates. Whether the
candidate is fit for a particular post or not
has to be decided by the duly constituted
selection committee which has the
expertise on the subject. The court has no
such expertise. The decision of the
selection committee can be interfered with
only on limited grounds, such as illegality
or patent material irregularity in the
27constitution of the committee or its
procedure vitiating the selection, or proved
malafides affecting the selection etc…..”
33. In a similar vein, in Secy. (Health) Deptt. Of
Health & F.W. vs. Dr. Anita Puri, (1996) 6 SCC
282, this Court observed as under as regards
the sanctity of a selection process and the
grounds on which the results thereof may be
interfered with:
“9. … It is too well settled that when a
selection is made by an expert body like the
Public Service Commission which is also
advised by experts having technical
experience and high academic qualification
in the field for which the selection is to be
made, the courts should be slow to interfere
with the opinion expressed by experts unless
allegations of mala fide are made and
established. It would be prudent and safe for
the courts to leave the decisions on such
matters to the experts who are more familiar
with the problems they face than the courts.
If the expert body considers suitability of a
candidate for a specified post after giving
due consideration to all the relevant factors,
then the court should not ordinarily interfere
with such selection and evaluation…….”
34. This position was reiterated by this Court in
M. V. Thimmaiah vs. Union Public Service
Commission, (2008) 2 SCC 119, in the
following words:
28
“21. Now, comes the question with regard to
the selection of the candidates. Normally, the
recommendations of the Selection
Committee cannot be challenged except on
the ground of mala fides or serious violation
of the statutory rules. The courts cannot sit
as an Appellate Authority to examine the
recommendations of the Selection
Committee like the court of appeal. This
discretion has been given to the Selection
Committee only and courts rarely sit as a
court of appeal to examine the selection of
the candidates nor is the business of the
court to examine each candidate and record
its opinion…
xxx
30. We fail to understand how the Tribunal
can sit as an Appellate Authority to call for
the personal records and constitute Selection
Committee to undertake this exercise. This
power is not given to the Tribunal and it
should be clearly understood that the
assessment of the Selection Committee is
not subject to appeal either before the
Tribunal or by the courts. One has to give
credit to the Selection Committee for making
their assessment and it is not subject to
appeal. Taking the overall view of ACRs of
the candidates, one may be held to be very
good and another may be held to be good. If
this type of interference is permitted then it
would virtually amount that the Tribunals and
29the High Courts have started sitting as
Selection Committee or act as an Appellate
Authority over the selection. It is not their
domain, it should be clearly understood, as
has been clearly held by this Court in a
number of decisions…..”
35. Om Prakash Poplai and Rajesh Kumar
Maheshwari vs. Delhi Stock Exchange
Association Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 117, was a
case where an appeal was filed before this
Court challenging the selection of members to
the Delhi Stock Exchange on the ground that
the Selection Committee formed for the
aforesaid purpose, arbitrarily favoured some
candidates and was thus, against Article 14.
This Court rejected the allegation of favouritism
and bias by holding as under:
“5. …the selection of members by the Expert
Committee had to be done on the basis of an
objective criteria taking into consideration
experience, professional qualifications and
similar related factors. In the present cases,
we find that certain percentage of marks
were allocated for each of these factors,
namely, educational qualifications,
experience, financial background and
knowledge of the relevant laws and
procedures pertaining to public issues etc. Of
the total marks allocated only 20 per cent
were reserved for interviews. Therefore, the
process of selection by the Expert
Committee was not left entirely to the sweet-
30
will of the members of the Committee. The
area of play was limited to 20 per cent and
having regard to the fact that the members of
the Expert Committee comprised of two
members nominated by the Central
Government it is difficult to accept the
contention that they acted in an
unreasonable or arbitrary fashion……”
36. Thus, the inexorable conclusion that can be
drawn is that it is not within the domain of the
Courts, exercising the power of judicial review,
to enter into the merits of a selection process, a
task which is the prerogative of and is within
the expert domain of a Selection Committee,
subject of course to a caveat that if there are
proven allegations of malfeasance or violations
of statutory rules, only in such cases of
inherent arbitrariness, can the Courts
intervene.
37. Thus, Courts while exercising the power of
judicial review cannot step into the shoes of the
Selection Committee or assume an appellate
role to examine whether the marks awarded by
the Selection Committee in the viva-voce are
excessive and not corresponding to their
performance in such test. The assessment and
evaluation of the performance of candidates
appearing before the Selection
Committee/Interview Board should be best left
to the members of the committee. In light of the
position that a Court cannot sit in appeal
against the decision taken pursuant to a
31
reasonably sound selection process, the
following grounds raised by the writ petitioners,
which are based on an attack of subjective
criteria employed by the selection
board/interview panel in assessing the
suitability of candidates, namely, (i) that the
candidates who had done their post-graduation
had been awarded 10 marks and in the viva-
voce, such PG candidates had been granted
either 18 marks or 20 marks out of 20. (ii) that
although the writ petitioners had performed
exceptionally well in the interview, the
authorities had acted in an arbitrary manner
while carrying out the selection process, would
not hold any water.
38. The next aspect of the matter which
requires consideration is the contention of the
writ petitioners to the effect that the entire
selection process was vitiated as the eligibility
criteria enshrined in the Advertisement Notice
dated 5th May, 2008 was recast vide a
corrigendum dated 12th June, 2009, without
any justifiable reason. In order to consider this
contention, regard may be had to the following
case law:
38.1 Manish Kumar Shahi vs. State of Bihar,
(2010) 12 SCC 576, this Court authoritatively
declared that having participated in a selection
process without any protest, it would not be
open to an unsuccessful candidate to challenge
the selection criteria subsequently.
38.2 In Ramesh Chandra Shah vs. Anil Joshi,
32
(2013) 11 SCC 309, an advertisement was
issued inviting applications for appointment for
the post of physiotherapist. Candidates who
failed to clear the written test presented a writ
petition and prayed for quashing the
advertisement and the process of selection.
They pleaded that the advertisement and the
test were ultra vires the provisions of the Uttar
Pradesh Medical Health and Family Welfare
Department Physiotherapist and Occupational
Therapist Service Rules, 1998. After referring
to a catena of judgments on the principle of
waiver and estoppel, this Court did not
entertain the challenge for the reason that the
same would not be maintainable after
participation in the selection process. The
pertinent observations of this Court are as
under:
“24. In view of the propositions laid down in
the above noted judgments, it must be held
that by having taken part in the process of
selection with full knowledge that the
recruitment was being made under the
General Rules, the respondents had waived
their right to question the advertisement or
the methodology adopted by the Board for
making selection and the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court committed grave error by entertaining
the grievance made by the respondents.”
38.3 Similarly, in Ashok Kumar vs. State of
Bihar, (2017) 4 SCC 357, a process was
33
initiated for promotion to Class-III posts from
amongst Class-IV employees of a civil court. In
the said case, the selection was to be made on
the basis of a written test and interview, for
which 85% and 15% marks were earmarked
respectively as per norms. Out of 27 (twenty-
seven) candidates who appeared in the written
examination, 14 (fourteen) qualified. They
were interviewed. The committee selected
candidates on the basis of merit and prepared
a list. The High Court declined to approve the
Select List on the ground that the ratio of full
marks for the written examination and the
interview ought to have been 90:10 and 45
ought to be the qualifying marks in the written
examination. A fresh process followed
comprising of a written examination (full marks
– 90 and qualifying marks – 45) and an interview
(carrying 10 marks). On the basis of the
performance of the candidates, results were
declared and 6 (six) persons were appointed
on Class-III posts. It was thereafter that the
appellants along with 4 (four) other
unsuccessful candidates filed a writ petition
before the High Court challenging the order of
the High Court on the administrative side
declining to approve the initial Select List. The
primary ground was that the appointment
process was vitiated, since under the relevant
rules, the written test was required to carry 85
marks and the interview 15 marks. This Court
dismissed the appeals on the grounds that the
appellants were clearly put on notice when the
34
fresh selection process took place that the
written examination would carry 90 marks and
the interview 10 marks. The Court was of the
view that the appellants having participated in
the selection process without objection and
subsequently found to be not successful, a
challenge to the process at their instance was
precluded. The relevant observations are as
under:
“13. The law on the subject has been
crystalized in several decisions of this Court.
In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala
Shukla, this Court laid down the principle that
when a candidate appears at an examination
without objection and is subsequently found
to be not successful, a challenge to the
process is precluded. The question of
entertaining a petition challenging an
examination would not arise where a
candidate has appeared and participated. He
or she cannot subsequently turn around and
contend that the process was unfair or that
there was a lacuna therein, merely because
the result is not palatable. In Union of India v.
S. Vinodh Kumar (2007) 8 SCC 100, this
Court held that:
“18. It is also well settled that those
candidates who had taken part in the
selection process knowing fully well the
procedure laid down therein were not
entitled to question the same (See also
Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil (1991) 3
35SCC 368 and Rashmi Mishra v. M.P.
Public Service Commission (2006) 12 SCC
724)”.
39. It is therefore trite that candidates, having
taken part in the selection process without any
demur or protest, cannot challenge the same
after having been declared unsuccessful. The
candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at
the same time. In other words, simply because
the result of the selection process is not
palatable to a candidate, he cannot allege that
the process of interview was unfair or that there
was some lacuna in the process. Therefore, we
find that the writ petitioners in these cases,
could not have questioned before a Court of
law, the rationale behind recasting the selection
criteria, as they willingly took part in the
selection process even after the criteria had
been so recast. Their candidature was not
withdrawn in light of the amended criteria. A
challenge was thrown against the same only
after they had been declared unsuccessful in
the selection process, at which stage, the
challenge ought not to have been entertained
in light of the principle of waiver and
acquiescence.
40. This Court in Sadananda Halo has noted
that the only exception to the rule of waiver is
the existence of mala fides on the part of the
Selection Board. In the present case, we are
unable to find any mala fide or arbitrariness in
the selection process and therefore the said
36
exception cannot be invoked.”
42. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the
aforementioned judicial precedents, it becomes quite vivid that the
challenge raised by the petitioners does not satisfy the well-settled
parameters governing judicial review in matters of recruitment and
selection. As discussed hereinabove, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in a catena of decisions has consistently held that interference
with a completed selection process can be justified only when the
process is shown to suffer from patent illegality, violation of
statutory rules, demonstrable mala fides or such irregularities
which materially affect the fairness of the selection. Mere
procedural deviations or administrative adjustments, which do not
cause real prejudice to the candidates, cannot be made the basis
for annulling the entire recruitment exercise. In the present case,
despite making various allegations regarding the conduct of the
examination and the procedure adopted by the Selection
Committee, the petitioners have failed to place any material on
record to establish that the alleged irregularities resulted in any
tangible prejudice to them or that the selection process was
vitiated by arbitrariness or mala fide exercise of power.
43. The record further reveals that the written examination conducted
pursuant to the advertisement dated 16.06.2022 was only a
preliminary screening test intended to shortlist candidates for
participation in the skill test, which was the decisive stage for
assessment of merit. The modification in the number of questions
37
from 50 to 25 was an administrative decision taken by the duly
constituted Selection Committee in view of the large number of
applications received and the logistical requirements of conducting
the examination in multiple shifts. Significantly, the total marks
allotted for the written examination remained unchanged and the
modification was applied uniformly to all candidates who appeared
in the examination. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that
the said change resulted in any hostile discrimination or unequal
treatment so as to render the process arbitrary or violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
44. Equally significant is the fact that the petitioners had voluntarily
participated in the selection process with full knowledge of the
terms and conditions stipulated in the advertisement and the
procedure adopted by the respondents. At no stage prior to the
declaration of the result did the petitioners raise any objection with
regard to the constitution of the Selection Committee, the conduct
of the examination or the modification in the number of questions.
It is only after they were declared unsuccessful in the written
examination that the present challenge has been mounted. Such
conduct clearly attracts the doctrine of waiver, acquiescence and
estoppel as repeatedly recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in decisions such as Madan Lal (supra), Ashok Kumar (supra)
and Tajvir Singh Sodhi (supra). Once a candidate participates in
the selection process without protest and takes a calculated
chance of success, he cannot subsequently question the
38
procedure merely because the result has gone against him.
45. Apart from the above, another fundamental infirmity which goes to
the very root of the maintainability of the present writ petitions is
the failure on the part of the petitioners to implead the selected
candidates as party respondents. The pleadings on record clearly
indicate that the recruitment process has already culminated in the
declaration of the final select list dated 14.03.2023 and
appointments have been made pursuant thereto. Any order setting
aside the impugned selection would inevitably and directly affect
the rights and interests of those candidates who have been
declared successful and have secured appointment. The law is
well settled that no order prejudicially affecting the rights of a
person can be passed behind his back. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Prabodh Verma (supra) and Ranjan Kumar (supra) as
also several subsequent decisions has categorically held that in
cases where the selection process is challenged, the selected
candidates are necessary parties and in their absence the writ
petition is liable to fail on the ground of non-joinder of necessary
parties.
46. In the present batch of writ petitions, the petitioners have chosen
to challenge the entire selection process culminating in the
appointment of successful candidates, yet no effort has been
made to implead even a representative set of selected candidates.
The number of selected candidates is neither large nor
39
indeterminate so as to render such impleadment impracticable. In
the absence of those candidates being before this Court, any
adjudication on the validity of the selection process would result in
serious prejudice to their vested rights without affording them an
opportunity of hearing. Such a course would clearly offend the
principles of natural justice and therefore cannot be countenanced
in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
47. Thus, when the matter is viewed holistically, two crucial
circumstances emerge. Firstly, the petitioners have failed to
establish any illegality, mala fides or violation of statutory rules in
the conduct of the recruitment process which would warrant
judicial interference. Secondly, the petitions suffer from the fatal
defect of non-joinder of necessary parties inasmuch as the
selected candidates, whose rights would be directly affected, have
not been impleaded. Both these factors, independently as well as
cumulatively, disentitle the petitioners from seeking the
extraordinary relief prayed for.
48. It is also pertinent to bear in mind that the scope of judicial review
in matters relating to recruitment is inherently limited. Courts do
not sit as appellate authorities over the decisions of duly
constituted Selection Committees nor do they substitute their own
views for that of experts entrusted with the task of assessing the
suitability of candidates. Interference is warranted only when the
decision-making process itself is shown to be vitiated by illegality
40
or arbitrariness of a substantial nature. In the absence of such
circumstances, judicial restraint is not merely advisable but
necessary to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the selection
process.
49. In the present batch of cases, the petitioners have not been able
to demonstrate that the recruitment process suffered from any
such fundamental infirmity. On the contrary, the material available
on record indicates that the selection process was conducted in
accordance with the applicable rules and administrative
instructions, and the minor procedural modifications made during
the course of the process were uniformly applied and did not
prejudice the candidates in any manner.
50. Consequently, upon a careful consideration of the pleadings,
documents placed on record, and the submissions advanced by
the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioners have failed
to establish any legal or factual infirmity in the impugned action of
the respondents. The material placed on record does not disclose
any violation of statutory provisions, principles of natural justice, or
arbitrariness so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise
of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. It is well settled that the scope of judicial review under
Article 226 of the Constitutiion of India is limited to examining the
decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself
41
unless the action complained of is shown to be patently illegal,
arbitrary, or without jurisdiction. In the present batch of cases,
none of these contingencies are made out. The petitioners have
not been able to demonstrate that the impugned action suffers
from any perversity or illegality warranting interference by this
Court.
51. Accordingly, all the writ petitions (WPS Nos.1363/2023, 2468/2023
and 2505/2023), being bereft of substance, are hereby
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
The date when the The date when the The date when the judgment is
judgment is judgment is uploaded on the website
reserved pronounced
Operative Full
11.03.2026 15.04.2026 —— 15.04.2026
42
Head-Note
Mere procedural modification uniformly applied to all candidates
does not vitiate the selection in the absence of demonstrated prejudice,
and a challenge to the recruitment process after unsuccessful
participation, without impleading the selected candidates, is not
maintainable.