Bombay High Court
Kausalya Bhujangrao Telang vs The State Of Maharashtra And Another on 26 February, 2026
2026:BHC-AUG:8483
Cri**-Appeal-37-2026.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 37 OF 2026
Kausalyabai W/o Bhujangrao Telang
Age:- 50 years, Occu: Household,
R/o. Vaibhav Nagar, HUDCO, Nanded ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. The State of Maharashtra
Through Itwara Police Station,
Nanded, Dist:- Nanded,
2. Ramdas S/o Rohidas Gajale,
Age:- 65 years, Occu:- Labour,
R/o. Gopalchawadi, Nanded,
Tq & Dist. Nanded ... RESPONDENTS
(Resp.No.2 Ori. Informant)
....
Mr. Vaibhav B. Dhage, Advocate for the Appellant
Mr. K. S. Patil, APP for Respondent No.1 - State
Mr. Arvind Gangadhar Jadhav and Ms Sanjivani B. Kadam,
Advocates for Respondent No.2
....
CORAM : Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J.
RESERVED ON : February 23, 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : February 26, 2026
JUDGMENT :
–
1. Admit.
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2. Heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant, learned APP and the learned counsel
appearing for respondent No.2.
3. By the present appeal under Section 14-A of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
the appellant/accused takes exception to the order dated 26.12.2025,
passed in Criminal Bail Application No.1042 of 2025 by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-1/Special Judge, Nanded, thereby declined
to enlarge the appellant/accused on anticipatory bail in connection
with Crime No.357 of 2025, registered with Itwara Police Station,
Nanded on 25.11.2025, for the offence punishable under Sections
108, 352, 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, under Sections 3(1)
(r), 3(2)(va), 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
4. On the face of the record, it appears that on 25.11.2025,
the informant/respondent No. 2 lodged an oral report with Itwara
Police Station, Nanded, alleging that his son Deepak was working as a
contract labourer with Krushi Udyog, Chandasingh Corner, Nanded,
and to overcome financial crisis, his son had obtained a loan of
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Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh) from one Lakhan Thakur by
mortgaging sale-deed of the plot approximately one and half years
prior thereto. However, said Lakhan Thakur was lodged in jail in
some other crime. The said mortgage period was to expire in the
month of February 2025. At that time, he paid Rs.2,00,000/- to said
Ranveer Thakur towards repayment of said loan and got sale-deed of
the plot. After release from jail, Lakhan Thakur visited in front of the
informant’s house and abused on his caste by demanding an amount
of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees Three Lakh) towards loan interest. The
respondent No.2 / informant further alleged that, on 23.11.2025, at
about 10.00 a.m., one villager Smt. Manebai gave a phone call to his
son Deepak and demanded refund of loan amount. Prior to one year,
his son Deepak borrowed loan amount of Rs.70,000/- on interest
from the present appellant- Kausalyabai Telang but said loan was still
not paid. Therefore, since past seven months, the appellant / accused
was continuously visiting him and was also abusing on his caste. It is
further alleged that the accused Lakhan Thakur, Manebai and the
present appellant Kausalyabai Thakur, were having knowledge that
the respondent No.2 and his son belong to Scheduled Caste and they
were continuously harassing the complainant’s son Deepak and also
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abused him in public view on his caste because of non-refund of loan
amount. So also, all the accused had issued life threat to his son on
failure of repayment of loan. Hence, on 23.11.2025 at about 22.00
hours, his son Deepak committed suicide by plunging in Godavari
riverbed. On the basis of said report, Crime No.357 of 2025 was
registered with Itwara Police Station, Nanded for the offence
punishable under Sections 108, 352, 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(va), 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
5. The appellant/accused filed Criminal Bail Application
No.1042 of 2025 and prayed for anticipatory bail. However, on
26.12.2025, the learned Additional Sessions Judge-1, Nanded, passed
the impugned order and declined to grant anticipatory bail to the
present appellant / accused.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has filed written
notes of argument and also argued the matter for a considerable
period. The learned counsel for the appellant canvassed that as per
the contents of the F.I.R., there were loan transactions between the
deceased Deepak and Shivshankar Bhujangrao Telang, the son of
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present appellant and Smt. Mangalabai Ramdas Gajale, the mother of
the deceased. The present appellant is not signatory to the said bond
and she is involved in said alleged loan transaction. Further, the F.I.R.
does not reveals any allegation against the present appellant about
cheating, criminal breach of trust, extortion or forgery as against the
present appellant/accused and no offence is registered for
contravention of provisions of Bombay Money Lending Act. So also,
the appellant is ready and willing to prodeuce the bond allegedly
executed between Shivshankar Bhujangrao Telang, the appellant’s son
and Manglabai Ramdas Gajale, the deceased’s mother before the
Investigating Officer. Therefore, recovery of said Bond custodial
interrogation of the appellant is not required.
7. In support of these submissions the learned counsel for
the appellant placed reliance on the case of Vasant Kerba Shinde Vs.
State of Maharashtra and another, (Criminal Appeal No.796 of 2021,
decided on 09.08.2021), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed that, the documents are relied upon to submit that there
were no money transactions between the present appellant and the
complainant and that the transaction referred to in the F.I.R. was
actually with Hari Kerba Shinde, who is no more. Therefore, the
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learned counsel for the appellant submits that in the case in hand, the
alleged unregistered bond was executed between the son of the
appellant and mother of the deceased. Therefore, there were money
transactions between the appellant and the deceased. The dispute
was predominantly financial in nature and it does not disclose any
grave criminal intent requiring custodial interrogation of the present
appellant.
8. It further relied on the case of Keshav Reddy s/o Ramlu
Yeltiwar & Ors. Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2019) NearLaw
(Bombay HC Aurangabad) Online 2723, Criminal Appeal No.1024 of
2019, decided on 03.12.2019), wherein, this Court observed in
paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13, as under:-
“11. Moreover, in order to attract the offence under Section
3(1) or 3(2) of the Act of 1989, it is essential to demonstrate
that the appellants committed the present crimes under the Act
of 1989, not being a members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled
Tribe. The opening sentence of Section 3(1) or Section 3(2) of
the Act of 1989, itself shows, “whoever not being a member of
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe”. It means that there must
be prima facie affirmation or say in the FIR / complaint that the
appellants-accused are not the member of Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe. In the instant case, there are no whisper or
averment in the FIR that appellants are not the members of
Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or they are from higher
caste. There is also no reference in the FIR that the appellants-
accused were aware or they had an knowledge about the caste
of first informant. These are the primary ingredients of offence6 of 19
(( 7 )) Cri**-Appeal-37-2026under Section 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act of 1989 for appreciation
at this initial stage relating to grant of relief of pre-arrest bail
under section 438 of Cr.P.C.
12. Taking into consideration all the circumstances discussed
above, there is no impediment to conclude that in spite of bar
under Section 18 of the Act of 1989, for invocation of powers
under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. it is still open to this Court to
find out by looking to the recitals of FIR of the case itself, as to
whether prima facie case is made out or not by the first
informant against present appellants. As referred supra, the
scrutiny of factual aspects reveals that there are no sufficient
material available on record prima facie to arrive at the
conclusion that the allegations nurtured on behalf of
prosecution constitute the offence under the Act of 1989
against appellants. Therefore, there is no impediment to
entertain the application filed under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. for
relief of pre-arrest bail on behalf of appellants.
13. In regard to offences levelled against the appellants
under Sections 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC, it
is to be noted that the custodial interrogation of the appellants
is not essential as well as there would not be any recovery from
appellants for the sake of investigation. However, the appellants
has shown inclination to co-operate with the Investigating
Officer during the course of investigation. In such
circumstances, it would justifiable to allow the bail application
filed before learned trial Court on behalf of the appellants.”
9. The learned counsel for the appellant further relied on
the case of Sushila Aggarwal and others Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and
another, AIR 2020 SC 831, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid
down the guiding principles while dealing with the applications under
Section 438 of Cr.P.C., as under:-
“(a) As held in Sibbia, when a person apprehends arrest and
approaches a court for anticipatory bail, his apprehension (of
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general allegations) relatable a specific offence or particular of
offences. Applications for anticipatory bail should contain clear
and essential facts relating to the offence, and why the
applicant reasonably apprehends his or her arrest, as well as his
version of the facts. These are important for the court which
considering the application, to extent and reasonableness of the
threat or apprehension, its gravity or seriousness and the
appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed.
It is not a necessary condition that an application should be
moved only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long
as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for
apprehending arrest.
(b) The court, before which an application under Section 438,
is filed, depending on the seriousness of the threat (of arrest) as
a measure of caution, may issue notice to the public prosecutor
and obtain facts, even while granting limited interim
anticipatory bail.
(c) Section 438 Cr. PC does not compel or oblige courts to
impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing
of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police,
during investigation or inquiry, etc. While weighing and
considering an application (for grant of anticipatory bail) the
court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the
person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of
investigation, or tampering with evidence (including
intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as
leaving the country), etc. The courts would be justified – and
ought to impose conditions spelt out in Section 437 (3), Cr. PC
[by virtue of Section 438 (2)]. The necessity to impose other
restrictive conditions, would have to be weighed on a case by
case basis, and depending upon the materials produced by the
state or the investigating agency. Such special or other
restrictive conditions may be imposed if the case or cases
warrant, but should not be imposed in a routine manner, in all
cases. Likewise, conditions which limit the grant of anticipatory
bail may be granted, if they are required in the facts of any case
or cases; however, such limiting conditions may not be
invariably imposed.
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(d) Courts ought to be generally guided by the considerations
such nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to
the applicant, and the facts of the case, while assessing whether
to grant anticipatory bail, or refusing it. Whether to grant or
not is a matter of discretion; equally whether, and if so, what
kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed)
are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion
of the court.
(e) Anticipatory bail granted can, depending on the conduct
and behavior of the accused, continue after filing of the charge
sheet till end of trial. Also orders of anticipatory bail should not
be “blanket” in the sense that it should not enable the accused
to commit further offences and claim relief. It should be
confined to the offence or incident, for which apprehension of
arrest is sought, in relation to a specific incident. It cannot
operate in respect of a future incident that involves commission
of an offence.
(f) Orders of anticipatory bail do not in any manner limit or
restrict the rights or duties of the police or investigating agency,
to investigate into the charges against the person who seeks
and is granted pre-arrest bail.
(g) The observations in Sibbia regarding “limited custody” or
“deemed custody” to facilitate the requirements of the
investigative authority, would be sufficient for the purpose of
fulfilling the provisions of Section 27, in the event of recovery
of an article, or discovery of a fact, which is relatable to a
statement made during such event (i.e. deemed custody). In
such event, there is no question (or necessity) of asking the
accused to separately surrender and seek regular bail. Sibbia
(supra) had observed that “if and when the occasion arises, it
may be possible for the prosecution to claim the benefit of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a discovery of facts
made in pursuance of information supplied by a person
released on bail by invoking the principle stated by this Court
in State of U.P. v Deoman Upadhyaya.”
(h) It is open to the police or the investigating agency to move
the court concerned, which granted anticipatory bail, in the
first instance, for a direction under Section 439 (2) to arrest the
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accused, in the event of violation of any term, such as
absconding, non-cooperating during investigation, evasion,
intimidation or inducement to witnesses with a view to
influence outcome of the investigation or trial, etc. The court –
in this context is the court which grants anticipatory bail, in the
first instance, according to prevailing authorities.
(i) The correctness of an order granting bail, can be considered
by the appellate or superior court at the behest of the state or
investigating agency, and set aside on the ground that the court
granting it did not consider material facts or crucial
circumstances. (See Prakash Kadam & Etc. Etc vs Ramprasad
Vishwanath Gupta & Anr52; Jai Prakash Singh (supra) State
through C.B.I. vs. Amarmani Tripathi53 ). This does not
amount to “cancellation” in terms of Section 439 (2), Cr. PC.
(j) The judgment in Mhetre (and other similar decisions)
restrictive conditions cannot be imposed at all, at the time of
granting anticipatory bail are hereby overruled. Likewise, the
decision in Salauddin and subsequent decisions (including K.L.
Verma, Nirmal Jeet Kaur) which state that such restrictive
conditions, or terms limiting the grant of anticipatory bail, to a
period of time are hereby overruled.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed as under:-
“(8) The observations in Sibbia regarding “limited custody” or
“deemed custody” to facilitate the requirements of the
investigative authority, would be sufficient for the purpose of
fulfilling the provisions of Section 27, in the event of recovery
of an article, or discovery of a fact, which is relatable to a
statement made during such event (i.e deemed custody). In
such event, there is no question (or necessity) of asking the
accused to separately surrender and seek regular bail. Sibbia
(supra) had observed that “if and when the occasion arises, it
may be possible for the prosecution to claim the benefit of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a discovery of facts
made in pursuance of information supplied by a person
released on bail by invoking the principle stated by this Court
in State of U.P. v Deoman Upadhyaya.”
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(9) It is open to the police or the investigating agency to move
the court concerned, which grants anticipatory bail, for a
direction under Section 439 (2) to arrest the accused, in the
event of violation of any term, such as absconding, non
cooperating during investigation, evasion, intimidation or
inducement to witnesses with a view to influence outcome of
the investigation or trial, etc.
(10) The court referred to in para (9) above is the court which
grants anticipatory bail, in the first instance, according to
prevailing authorities.”
10. Mr. Prashant Madanrao Shinde, the Sub-Divisional Police
Officer, Sub-Division, Itwara, Nanded, has filed affidavit-in-reply and
strongly opposed the appeal. The learned APP canvassed that the
Investigating Officer conducted the investigation in connection with
Crime No.357 of 2025 and drawn inquest panchanama on the dead
body of Deepak and referred it for autopsy. The Investigating Officer
drawn spot panchanama and recorded the statements of the
witnesses, namely, Vaibhav Dnyanoba Waghmare, Mangalbai Ramdas
Gajale, mother of the deceased. Dinkar Ramdas Gajale, brother of the
deceased, Swapna Deepak Gajale, wife of the deceased etc.,under
Section 161 of Cr.P.C.. The statements of all the witnesses show that
deceased Deepak was continuously harassed for refund of loan
amount and he was also abused on caste and insulted in public at he
hands of the present appellant/accused which due to which the
deceased committed suicide. The learned APP further canvassed that
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as per the recital of F.I.R., the present appellant / accused advanced
loan of 70,000/- without necessary license under the Bombay Money
Lending Act obtained the bond from the deceased for Rs.2,00,000/-
(Rupees Two Lakh), therefore, custodial interrogation of the present
appellant/accused is required for seizure of said bond. Further, the
appellant/accused abused the deceased Deepak on his caste in public
view, therefore, offence is registered under Sections 108, 352, 351(3)
of the B.N.S. and under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(va) and 3(2)(5) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
hence, as per the provisions of Section 18 of the Act, bar is created for
exercising power for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of
Cr.P.C.. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
11. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that
Crime No.357 of 2025 is registered against the present appellant /
accused and others for the offence punishable under Sections 108,
352, 351(3) of the B.N.S. and under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(va) and
3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act. Therefore, as per the provisions of Section 18 of the
Act, 1989, bar is created for grant of anticipatory bail under Section
438 of Cr.P.C..
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12. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for
respondent No.2 relied on the case of Kiran Vs. Rajkumar Jivraj Jain
and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1886, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that if the offence of abusement on caste has
occurred within the public view, it constitutes an offence under
Section 3 of the SC/ST Atrocities Act. Therefore, Section 18 of the
Act, creates bar for enlarging the appellant / accused on anticipatory
bail under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the present appellant is
not entitled for anticipatory bail, hence prayed for dismissal of the
appeal.
13. After hearing both the sides at length, I have gone
through the record. In the case in hand, at the instance of respondent
No.2, Crime No.357 of 2025 registered against the present appellant/
accused and others for the offences punishable under Sections 108,
352, 351(3) of the B.N.S. and under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(va) and
3(2)(5) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act. On perusal of the F.I.R., it appears that, on
23.11.2025, at about 22.00 hours, Mr. Deepak Ramdas Gajale, the
son of present respondent No.2 committed suicide by plunging from
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bridge in Godavari riverbed. Respondent No.2 alleged that on
23.11.2025, at about 10.00 a.m., a phone call was received on mobile
of his deceased son Deepak from one villager Smt. Manebai, who
demanded refund of hand loan and issued life threat, if his son fail to
repay said loan. The respondent No.2 further alleged that his son
Deepak had obtained an amount of Rs.70,000/- on interest prior to
one year from the present appellant / accused Kausalya Telang and
the appellant had obtained bond of Rs.2,00,000/- in lieu of said loan.
Since the loan amount was not repaid within time, since past seven
months, the present appellant was continuously visiting at his house
and was abusing him and his on their caste. Therefore, due to mental
harassment and insult at the hands of the present appellant and other
accused his son committed suicide.
14. Needless to say, the contents of the F.I.R. do not disclose
the date on which the present appellant/accused allegedly visited the
house of respondent No. 2/informant. The Respondent no.2
Informant has not specified exact word of casteist slur and specific
abused words at the hands of the present appellant. Merely stating
that the appellant/accused abused the informant on the basis of caste
is not sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, 1989.
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15. In the case of Virendra Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan
[ 2000 Cri. Law Journal 2899], the Full Bench of the Rajasthan High
Court held that it must be borne in mind that if a person is even
alleged to have committed an offence under the S.C./S.T. Act, 1989,
the intention of Section 18 is clearly to debar him from seeking the
remedy of anticipatory bail. It is only in circumstances where there is
absolutely no material to infer why Section 3 has been applied to
implicate a person for an offence under the Act of 1989 that the
courts would be justified, within a very limited sphere, in examining
whether the application can be rejected on the ground of its
maintainability. It is further held that any other interpretation would
go against the letter and spirit of the clear provision of Section 18 of
the Act of 1989 which has already stood the test of reasonableness
and constitutional validity up to the level of the Apex Court.
16. In the case of Ratnakala Martandrao Mohite Vs. The State
of Maharashtra and anr., 2020 ALL MR (Cri) 334, this Court held that
the issue of applicability of Section 18 of the Act elaborately and held
that the provisions of Section 18 as well as newly amended Section
18 of the Act of 1989 create a bar for exercising jurisdiction under
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Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. However, it would not preclude the
concerned Court from examination of allegations made in the F.I.R.
on its face value to determine whether prima facie case is made out or
not.
17. The main grievance of the prosecution is that if the
appellant / accused is granted anticipatory bail, in that circumstance,
it would amount to interference with the investigation and the bond
as alleged by respondent No.2 while lodging the F.I.R. would remain
unseized and the investigation may hamper. However, it is submitted
that as per the law laid down in the case of Sushila Aggarwal and
others, cited (supra), “limited custody” or “deemed custody” to
facilitate the requirement of the investigating authority, would be
satisfied for the purpose of fulfilling the provisions of Section 27 of
the Evidence Act, in that event, recovery of articles, disclosure of a
fact, which is relatable to a statement made during such event, is
deemed to be custody.
18. In the case in hand, the appellant /accused has filed
written notes of argument and annexed xerox copy of agreement to
sale of plot between Mangalbai Ramdas Gajale, the deceased’s mother
and Shivshankar Bhujangrao Telang, the Appellant’s son. The
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appellant further agreed to produce original Agreement To Sale dated
13.05.2025 before the Investigating Officer. Therefore, the custodial
interrogation of the present appellant / accused is not required for
recovery of the Bond u/s 27 of the Evidence Act.
19. Nonetheless, the contents of the F.I.R., does not satisfy the
requirement to constitute an offence under Section 3 of the Act of
1989. Therefore, as per the ratio laid down in the case of Kiran Vs.
Rajkumar Jivraj Jain and another, cited (supra), I am of the view that,
the present appellant / accused has made out a prima facie case to
enlarge the appellant/accused on anticipatory bail during the
pendency of trial in Crime No. 357 of 2025, registered with Itwara
Police Station, Nanded. In view of above discussion, the impugned
order dated 26.12.2025, passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge-1, Nanded, in Criminal Bail Application No.1042 of 2025,
needs to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the
following order:-
ORDER
(i) The Criminal Appeal is allowed.
(ii) In the event of arrest, the present appellant/accused Smt.
Kausalyabai Bhujangrao Telang, be released on17 of 19
(( 18 )) Cri**-Appeal-37-2026anticipatory bail in connection with Crime No. 357 of
2026, registered with Itwara Police Station, District
Nanded, for the offence punishable under Sections 108,
352, 351(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, under
Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(va), 3(2)(5) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, on execution of P. R. bond of Rs.25,000/- with two
solvent sureties of the like amount.
(iii) The appellant/accused shall produce Original Bond
executed on 13.05.2025 with the Investigating Officer as
well as any other bond which have been executed
between her and the deceased Deepak or his family
members in connection with plot No.26 out of Gat No.35
of Sahyadri Sahakari Grunirman Sanstha Maryadit,
Gopalchawdi, Taluka District Nanded and for the purpose
of recovery of bond custody of the appellant shall be
considered u/s 27 of the Evidence Act.
(iv) The appellant shall not induce, threat or pressurize the
prosecution witnesses.
(v) The appellant shall not commit similar offence in future
and cooperate the Investigating Officer.
(vi) The appellant is directed to attend the concerned police
station on every Monday between 9.00 a.m. and 11.00
a.m. till completion of investigation.
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(vii) The appellant is directed not to leave the territorial
jurisdiction of Nanded Taluka, till completion of
investigation, without prior permission.
[ Y. G. KHOBRAGADE, J. ]
SMS
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