Punjab-Haryana High Court
Karnail Singh vs The State Of Punjab And Others on 12 February, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
113
CWP-4102-2026
Date of Decision : 12.02.2026
Karnail Singh .....Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and others ....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Present : Mr. Hari Om Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Surya Kumar, A.A.G., Punjab.
****
NAMIT KUMAR, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking
issuance of a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to treat the
petitioner as promoted to a still higher post, over and above
Superintendent Grade-I, as a necessary consequence as per order dated
16.04.2012 (Annexure P-3) passed by this Court in CWP-4129-1990
(Karnail Singh, Assistant, Deputy Commissioner’s Office Faridkot Vs.
State of Punjab through Secretary to Government, Punjab Revenue
Department, Chandigarh and others) and to increase pecuniary benefits
insofar as they are relevant for the computation of the terminal benefits
only, and to fix the pay/salary of the petitioner to the post of
Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982 along with all consequential
benefits including difference of arrears after revision of pay and pension
and to release the arrears with interest @ 12% per annum.
1 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:11 :::
CWP-4102-2026 2
2. Brief facts, as have been pleaded in the petition, are that
while working as an Assistant in the D.C. Office, Faridkot, the
petitioner was promoted to the post of Superintendent Grade-IV, w.e.f.
24.03.1981 and Superintendent Grade-II on adhoc basis w.e.f.
04.11.1982 and the adhoc period of promotion was extended for six
months more, vide order dated 19.05.1983 (Annexure P-1) issued by
respondent No.3. On promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-IV,
the petitioner was posted at Ferozepur, vide order dated 24.03.1981
issued by respondent No.3. Thereafter, vide order dated 28.10.1987,
passed by respondent No.3, the petitioner was reverted to the post of an
Assistant without any reason and was posted in the office of Deputy
Commissioner, Faridkot. Aggrieved against the said order, the petitioner
submitted representation before respondent No.3, which was rejected,
vide order dated 08.03.1988, on the ground that the promotion to the
post of Assistant Superintendent was to be made amongst the officials
only from the same District and the promotion of the petitioner to
another District was impermissible. Pursuant to the said order, the
petitioner joined the post of Assistant at the office of Deputy
Commissioner, Faridkot on 17.11.1989. Thereafter, on 08.09.1993, the
petitioner was appointed as Tehsildar and retired as such on 31.10.2007.
During his service tenure, the petitioner approached this Court by filing
CWP No.2860 of 1990 and CWP No.4129 of 1990 (Karnail Singh,
Assistant in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Faridkot, Punjab Vs.
State of Punjab through Secretary to the Government of Punjab,
Department of Revenue at Chandigarh and another) seeking promotion
2 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 3
to the post of Tehsildar from the date when his juniors were promoted
and quashing the order of reversion from the post of Superintendent
Grade-II, respectively. Both the petitions were disposed of by this Court
vide order dated 16.04.2012 (Annexure P-3), whereby the reversion
order of the petitioner was quashed and the respondent-department was
directed to pay the petitioner salary from 11.03.1988 to 16.11.1989 with
interest @ 6% per annum from the date when the amount fell due. It
was further directed that the petitioner shall be considered as promoted
to a still higher post as a necessary consequence to the quashing of the
order of reversion. The increase in pecuniary benefits shall be calculated
notionally insofar as they are relevant for the computation of the
terminal benefits only. The said consideration shall be made and arrears
of the terminal benefits shall also be calculated and released to the
petitioner within a period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy
of the order. During the pendency of the abovesaid writ petitions, a
notification dated 30.05.1991 of President of India was issued by the
Revenue Department, vide endorsement dated 05.06.1991 (Annexure P-
15) that the post of Superintendent Grade-II in the State of Punjab in the
offices of the Deputy Commissioners was upgraded to the
Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 23.01.1989. Pursuant to the said
notification, respondent No.4, vide order dated 08.07.2013 (Annexure
P-9), fixed the pay of the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f.
23.01.1989. Thereafter, the petitioner approached respondent No.2 to
consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the higher post as
per the judgment dated 16.04.2012 (Annexure P-3), passed by this
3 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 4
Court in CWP-4129-1990 and respondent No.2 passed an order dated
25.06.2013 (Annexure P-4), rejecting the claim of the petitioner.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed contempt petition bearing COCP No.1167
of 2013 (Karnail Singh Vs. N.S. Kang and others) which was disposed
of by this Court as having been rendered infructuous, vide order dated
13.08.2013 (Annexure P-5). Thereafter, the petitioner again approached
respondent No.2 to pass an appropriate order qua re-fixation of his pay
and payments of arrears. On which, respondent No.2, vide his order
dated 09.04.2014 (Annexure P-6), directed respondent No.4 to fix the
pay and pension of the petitioner by collecting excess and surrender
statements in a time bound manner. Since the respondents were still not
releasing due amounts and pensionary benefits to the petitioner, he
again approached this Court by filing CWP No.3756 of 2014 (Karnail
Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others) which was disposed of by this
Court, vide order dated 18.07.2014 (Annexure P-7), with a direction to
respondent No.3, to look into the matter, consider the grievance of the
petitioner and pass the final order in accordance with law and also
keeping in view the order dated 09.04.2014 passed by respondent No.2.
Thereafter, the petitioner again filed CWP No.9167 of 2015 (Karnail
Singh Vs. State of Punjab and others) seeking interest on the delayed
payments of pensionary benefits. The said writ petition was disposed of
by this Court vide order dated 15.02.2019, with directions to the
respondents to pay interest @ 9% per annum on the payments which
have been released to the petitioner from the date it became due till the
disbursement of the same and liberty was also granted to the petitioner
4 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 5
to submit a representation to the respondents to release of any other
payment, to which petitioner is entitled for. Pursuant to the said order,
respondent No.4 passed order dated 23.12.2022 (Annexure P-11)
releasing the interest @ 9% per annum on the delayed payment of
pensionary benefits of the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner served a
notice dated 17.11.2024 (Annexure P-12) upon the respondents with the
request to promote him as Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982 and
to grant all consequential benefits arising thereof. Upon receipt of the
said notice, respondent No.4 sent a letter dated 17.12.2024 (Annexure
P-13) to respondent No.3 stating therein that whatever was due has been
paid to the petitioner and nothing remains to be paid. Hence, the instant
petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that vide order
dated 16.04.2012 (Annexure P-3) passed in CWP No.2860 of 1990 and
CWP No.4129 of 1990, the reversion order of the petitioner was
quashed and the respondent-department was directed to pay the
petitioner salary from 11.03.1988 to 16.11.1989 with interest @ 6% per
annum from the date when the amount fell due. It was further directed
that the petitioner shall be considered as promoted to a still higher post
as a necessary consequence to the quashing of the order of reversion.
The increase in pecuniary benefits shall be calculated notionally insofar
as they are relevant for the computation of the terminal benefits only.
The said consideration shall be made and arrears of the terminal benefits
shall also be calculated and released to the petitioner within a period of
12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. However, in
5 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 6
view of the notification dated 30.05.1991 (Annexure P-15), the
respondents fixed the pay of the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-I
w.e.f. 23.01.1989 instead of 04.11.1982 i.e. the date of promotion of the
petitioner to the post of Superintendent Grade-II. He further submits
that the petitioner has repeatedly visited the respondent-department and
submitted various representations for fixing his pay as Superintendent
Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982, but no action was taken by the respondents
till date.
4. On receipt of advance copy of the petition, learned State
counsel submits that in view of the notification dated 30.05.1991
(Annexure P-15), the pay of the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-I
has already been fixed w.e.f. 23.01.1989 and all the necessary benefits
including arrears and interest have been paid to the petitioner. He further
submits that the present petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground
of delay and laches as the petitioner is claiming fixation of his pay as
Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982 and now more than a period
of 43 years have been passed.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
relevant documents.
6. The present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on two
counts i.e. delay and laches and res judicata.
DELAY AND LACHES
7. The grievance of the petitioner is that in view of the
judgment dated 16.04.2012 (Annexure P-3) passed by this Court in
CWP-2860-1990 and CWP-4129-1990, he is entitled for fixation of pay
6 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 7
as Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982 i.e. the date of his
promotion to the post of Superintendent Grade-II, however, in view of
the notification dated 30.05.1991 (Annexure P-15), the respondents
fixed the pay of the petitioner as Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f.
23.01.1989. Earlier, the petitioner approached this Court by filing
contempt petition bearing COCP No.1167 of 2013 for implementation
of the judgment dated 16.04.2012. In the reply filed by the respondents
to the said contempt petition, it was submitted that the entire amount
payable to the petitioner stands already released and in view of the said
reply, the contempt petition was disposed of by this Court as having
been rendered infructuous, vide order dated 13.08.2013 (Annexure P-5).
Thereafter, the petitioner filed CWP No.3756 of 2014 seeking necessary
financial benefits and the said petition was disposed of by this Court
vide order dated 18.07.2014 with direction to respondents No.3 to look
into the matter, consider the grievance of the petitioner and pass the
final order in accordance with law. The petitioner again approached this
Court by filing CWP-9167-2015 seeking grant of interest on the delayed
release of the payments/pensionary benefits. The said petition was also
disposed of by this Court, vide order dated 15.02.2019, with direction to
the respondents to grant interest @ 9% per annum on the delayed
payment of necessary/pensionary benefits of the petitioner and liberty
was also granted to the petitioner to submit a representation to the
respondents to release of any other payment, to which petitioner is
entitled for. Thereafter, the petitioner served a notice dated 17.11.2024
(Annexure P-12) upon the respondents with the request to promote him
7 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 8
as Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982 and to grant all
consequential benefits arising thereof. Upon receipt of the said notice,
respondent No.4 sent a letter dated 17.12.2024 (Annexure P-13) to
respondent No.3 stating therein that whatever was due has been paid to
the petitioner and nothing remains to be paid. Now, the petitioner is
seeking fixation of his pay as Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982
and since then, period of more than 43 years have been elapsed. Even
vide order dated 15.02.2019 passed by this Court in CWP-9167-2015
liberty was granted to the petitioner to submit representation to the
respondents if any amount still remains to be paid and after a lapse of
period of more than 05 years the petitioner served a legal notice dated
17.11.2024 to the respondents seeking promotion to the post of
Superintendent Grade-I w.e.f. 04.11.1982, with all consequential
benefits. Since there is an undue and unexplained delay in approaching
this Court, therefore, the instant petition deserves to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yunus (Baboobhai) A
Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra Through its Secretary and
others : 2009 (2) SCT 24, while referring to the issue of delay and
laches, had held as follows:-
“8. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the ‘Constitution’). In an appropriate
case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary
powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with
the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice
to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is8 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 9involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court
as pointed out in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 769). Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
9. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock
in Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurde etc., (1874) 5 PC 221 at page 239 was approved by
this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Courts, (AIR
1967 SC 1450) and Maharashtra State Transport
Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service (AIR 1969
Supreme Court 329), Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy either because the
party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where
by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place
him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in
either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most
material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon
mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a
bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice
in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates
to the remedy.”
10. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation
with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what
has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N Bose v. Union
of India (AIR 1970 Supreme Court 470) that no relief can
be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable
explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after
inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself
a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the
intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should
9 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 10
disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.
11. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR 1987
Supreme Court 251) that the High Court in exercise of
its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the
indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such
delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a
number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily
permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its trail new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it
may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was
pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
12. In view of the aforesaid position we are not inclined to
interfere in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.”
9. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Uttaranchal and another Vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and
others, 2013(12) SCC 179, while considering the issue regarding delay
and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, opined that
repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a
dead issue/dispute cannot be revived even if such a representation has
been decided either by the authority or got decided by getting a
direction from the court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be
decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference
to any such order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government
servant may disentitle him from receiving the benefit that had been
10 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 11
granted to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not be
attracted as it is well established principle that the law favours those
who are alert and vigilant. Even equality has to be claimed at the right
juncture and not on expiry of reasonable time. Even if there is no period
prescribed for filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet it should be filed within a reasonable time.
Though it is not a strict rule, the courts can always interfere even
subsequent thereto, but relief to a person, who allows things to happen
and then approach the court and puts forward a stale claim and try to
unsettle settled matters, can certainly be refused on account of delay and
laches. Anyone who sleeps over his rights is bound to suffer the
consequences. An employee who remains dormant like a ‘Rip Van
Winkle’ and awakens from his slumber at his own convenience,
cannot claim relief, as such conduct justifies denial on the ground of
delay and latches. Relevant paragraphs from the aforesaid judgment are
extracted below:
“13. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could
have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do
so for six years and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given representations at the
relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting
to note that when the regular selection took place, they
accepted the position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of the
tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the cause
of action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior
employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15.11.1983. In
C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and another,
2008(4) SCT 604 : (2008) 10 SCC 115, a two-Judge Bench
11 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 12
was dealing with the concept of representations and the
directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider the
representations and the challenge to the said rejection
thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus:-
“Every representation to the Government for relief,
may not be replied on merits. Representations
relating to matters which have become stale or
barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground
alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In
regard to representations unrelated to the
Department, the reply may be only to inform that the
matter did not concern the Department or to inform
the appropriate Department. Representations with
incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of
action or revive a stale or dead claim.”
14. xx xx xx xx
15. xx xx xx xx
16. xx xx xx xx
17. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Ghanshyam
Dass (2) and others, 2011(2) SCT 712 : (2011) 4 SCC 374,
a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish Lal Vs. State of
Haryana, 1998(1) SCT 26: (1997) 6 SCC 538 and
proceeded to observe that as the respondents therein
preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the
tribunal in 1997, they would not get the benefit of the order
dated 07.07.1992.
18. In State of T. N. v. Seshachalam, 2007(4) SCT 472 :
(2007) 10 SCC 137, this Court, testing the equality clause
on the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of
service benefit, has ruled thus:-
“… filing of representations alone would not save
the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
factor for a court of law to determine the question as
to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of the benefit
which had been given to others. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that
nature, be attracted as it is well known that law
leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.
19. xx xx xx xx
12 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 13
20. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and
others, 2007(2) SCT 601 : (2007) 9 SCC 278, the Court
has opined that though there is no period of limitation
provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a writ petition should
be filed within a reasonable time. In the said case the
respondents had filed the writ petition after seventeen
years and the court, as stated earlier, took note of the delay
and laches as relevant factors and set aside the order
passed by the High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction.”
10. In a recent judgment by a Division Bench of this Court in
Ram Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others : 2022 (3) SCT 346,
while rejecting the claim of the petitioner for counting of his ad hoc
service, for the purpose of seniority/pension and regularization in
service on completion of 02 years as per policy, held that the petition
filed by him suffered from gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in
approaching the High Court. In the said judgment, it has been held as
under:-
“10. What we wish to emphasize, in particular, is that
services of the appellant were regularized w.e.f.
01.04.1997. And, he was assigned a specific seniority
position in the cadre. Whereafter, he continued to serve the
department for nearly twenty five years, before attaining
the age of superannuation in January, 2022. Needless to
assert that during all these years, he availed all admissible
benefits, promotions, and retired as Inspector. Thus, it
rather appears that institution of the petition by the
appellant was speculative and an attempt to resurrect a
stale and dead claim. The Supreme Court, in New Delhi
Municipal Council v. Pan Singh & Ors., 2007(9) SCC
278, observed:
“15. There is another aspect of the matter which
cannot be lost sight of. Respondents herein filed a
Writ Petition after 17 years. They did not agitate
their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed
herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at13 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 14the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference
made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is
not their case that after 1982, those employees who
were employed or who were recruited after the cut-
off date have been granted the said scale of pay.
After such a long time, therefore, the Writ Petitions
could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary
jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those
who approach the Court after a long time. Delay
and laches are relevant factors for exercise of
equitable jurisdiction. See Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K.
Roy And Others [(2004) 1 SCC 347], Chairman,
U.P. Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh And Anr.
[2006 (12) SCALE 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman & Managing
Director and Another v. K. Thangappan and
Another [(2006) 4 SCC 322]”
11. Similarly, in Jagdish Lal & Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538, it was held by the
Supreme Court:
“That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the
delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief
under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. It is not
necessary to reiterate all catena of precedents in this
behalf. Suffice it to state that the appellant kept
sleeping over their rights for long and elected to
wake up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal
Chauhan and Ajit Singh’s ratios…………………
Therefore, desperate attempts of the appellants to re-
do the seniority had by them in various
cadres/grades though in the same services according
to 1974 Rules or 1980 Rule, are not amenable to
judicial review at this belated stage….”
12. In the wake of the position as sketched out above, we
are dissuaded to interfere with the impugned order and
judgment rendered by the learned single Judge. The appeal
being bereft of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.”
11. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Prem Nath Vs.
State of Punjab : 2018(2) SCT 687, while rejecting the claim of
14 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 15
additional increments on acquisition of higher qualifications has held as
under:-
“3. It is the case set up on behalf of the petitioners that
they had all been appointed before 19.02.1979 and had
even improved/acquired higher qualifications before
19.02.1979 and as such there would be no difference
between the employees working with the Punjab
Government, holding corresponding post and the
employees like the petitioners who have worked for Punjab
Privately Managed Recognised Aided Schools. It is also
the assertion made by counsel representing the petitioners
that their claim would be covered in terms of decision
dated 02.07.2013 rendered by this Court in a bunch of writ
petitions including CWP No.8083 of 1989 titled as Radha
Krishan Narang and others vs. State of Punjab and
others.
4. Having heard counsel for the petitioners at length,
this Court is of the considered view that the claim of the
petitioners would not require any consideration on merits
and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole
ground of delay and laches.
5. Placed on record and appended at Annexure P-1 are
the particulars of the petitioners. The tabulation at
Annexure P-1 would show that all the petitioners stand
retired on various dates between the years 1995 to 2012.
Out of 32 petitioners in all, 22 petitioners superannuated
more than 10 years back.
6. There is no justification coming forth as regards the
inordinate delay in having approached the Writ Court.
There is also no explanation put forth by the petitioners as
to why the claim raised in the instant petition was not
agitated by the petitioners while they were in service. The
entire thrust of the submissions advanced by counsel is that
similarly situated employees had approached this Court
and have been granted releif.
7. The issue regarding delay in invoking the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India was considered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another
v. Jaswant Singh and another, 2007(1) SCT 224 :
(2006)11 SCC 464. In such case, certain employees raised
the issue that they were not liable to be retired at the age of
15 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 16
58 years but should be permitted to continue in service till
they attain the age of 60 years. Such employees were still
in service when the writ petitions were filed. The writ
petitions were ultimately allowed. Placing reliance upon
such judgment, some of the employees, who had already
superannuated, filed writ petitions seeking the same
benefit. Even such petitions were allowed by the High
Court in terms of following the earlier judgment. The
judgment of the High Court was challenged before the
Apex Court and wherein while referring to earlier
judgments in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India, (1989)2
SCC 356; Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) S.C.T.
26 : (1997)6 SCC 538 and Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy, 2004(1) SCT 78 : (2004)1 SCC 347, it was
opined that persons who approached the Court at a
belated stage placing reliance upon the order passed in
some other case earlier, can be denied the discretionary
relief on the ground of delay and laches. The relevant
observations made by the Supreme Court are contained in
Paras 5, 6 and 16 of the judgment and are extracted here
under:-
“5. So far as the principal issue is
concerned, that has been settled by this court.
Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal
proposition. But the only question is grant of relief to
such other persons who were not vigilant and did not
wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted
the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of
this court in Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer,
Karmik, 2006(1) SCT 541 : (2005) 13 SCC 300.
Whether they are entitled to same relief or not?
Therefore, a serious question that arises for
consideration is whether the employees who did not
wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted
the same, collected their post-retirement benefits,
can such persons be given the relief in the light of
the subsequent decision delivered by this court?
6. The question of delay and laches has
been examined by this court in a series of decisions
and laches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a
person who is not vigilant of his rights and
acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be16 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 17heard after a couple of years on the ground that
same relief should be granted to him as was granted
to person similarly situated who was vigilant about
his rights and challenged his retirement which was
said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been
pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by
the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between
30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005. Two writ petitions were
filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate
of writ petitions followed in which employees who
retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006
much after their retirement. Whether such persons
should be granted the same relief or not?
xx xx xx
16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if
similar relief is to be given to the persons who have
not approached the court that will unnecessarily
overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will
completely collapse with the liability of payment to
these persons in terms of two years’ salary and
increased benefit of pension and other consequential
benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the court
after their retirement. Only those persons who have
filed the writ petitions when they were in service or
who have obtained interim order for their
retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand
to benefit and not others.
(Emphasis Supplied).”
8. The issue of delay was also dealt with by this Court
in Tarsem Pal vs. Punjab State Power Corporation
Limited and others, 2013 (3)SLR 314. In the case of
Tarsem Pal(supra), the petitioner was serving as a Clerk
with the respondent-Corporation and had retired on
31.03.2005. Claim in the writ petition was to grant to him
the benefit of proficiency set up in the pay scale on
completion of 23 years of service from the due date as per
policy of the Corporation. During the service career, he
had not agitated the claim for increments. For the first
17 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 18
time, such claim had been made on 28.02.2005 i.e. just one
month prior to superannuation. While non-suiting the
petitioner on account of delay and laches it was held as
follows:-
“11. In the aforesaid judgments, it has been
clearly laid down that discretionary relief in a writ
jurisdiction is available to a party who is alive of
his rights and enforces the same in court within
reasonable time. The judgment in another case does
not give a cause of action to file a writ petition at a
belated stage seeking the same relief. Such petitions
can be dismissed on account of delay and laches.
As has already been noticed above in the present
case as well, the petitioner joined service in the
year 1965 and retired in the year 2005, but raised
the issue regarding benefit of proficiency step up in
the pay scale on completion of 23 years of service
from the due date more than five years after his
retirement referring to a judgment of this court and
filed the petition claiming the same relief.
12. The petitioner retired from service on
31.3.2005 and the claim pertaining to the benefit of
proficiency step up, which may be admissible to the
petitioner during his service career, was sought to be
raised more than five years after his retirement, the
claim made at such a late stage deserves to be
dismissed on account of delay and laches only. The
petitioner could raise a grievance about the pay
scales admissible to him or the last pay drawn by
him within a reasonable time after his retirement. He
cannot be permitted to raise the same at any time on
the plea that the same is recurring cause of action.
13. Considering the enunciation of law, as
referred to above, in my opinion, the petitioner
herein is not entitled to the relief prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed merely on account
of delay and laches.”
9. At this stage, counsel appearing for the petitioners
would make an attempt to overcome the obstacle of delay
by placing reliance upon a Full Bench Judgment of this
Court in Saroj Kumar vs. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT
664. Counsel would argue that as per dictum laid down in
Saroj Kumar‘s case(supra), matters of pay fixation involve
18 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 19
a recurring cause of action and as such, writ petitions for
such claim cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the Court at the most, may restrict the arrears
upto 38 months from the date of filing of the petition and
disallow the arrears for the period for which even a suit
had become time barred.
10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in
Saroj Kumar‘s case, is wholly misplaced. The observations
and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar‘s case, were in the light
of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta vs.
Union of India and others, 1996(1) SCT 8 : 1995(4) RSJ
502. In M.R. Gupta‘s case(supra), it had been
categorically held that so long as an employee “is in
service” a fresh cause of action arises every month when
he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
calculation made contrary to rules. It was further held that
the claim to be awarded the correct salary on the basis of a
proper pay fixation “is a right which subsists during the
entire tenure of service”.
11. In the present case, however the petitioners choose
not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much
subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken
up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that
may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated
employees.
12. Considering the dictum of law as laid down in
Chariman, U.P. Jal Nigam‘s case (supra), the petitioners
herein are not entitled to any releif as prayed for and the
petition deserves to be dismissed on the sole ground of
delay and laches.
13. Ordered accordingly.”
12. A Division Bench of this Court in H.S. Gill vs Union of
India and others, 2016(2) SCT 477, has held that an employee cannot
claim the revised pay scale after retirement once he has been receiving
the pay scale granted by the employer for the last 09 years. The relevant
portion from the said judgment, reads as under:-
“14. The petitioner is also not entitled to any relief on
account of principle of delay and laches. He has been
receiving the pay in the pay scale of Rs.6500-10500 right
from his transfer to CSIO, Chandigarh i.e. 2.7.2002. For19 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 20the first time, he moved the representation on 29.8.2011,
so, he kept mum for about 9 years. Thus, the claim of the
petitioner is highly belated and stale.”
13. In view of the abovesaid discussion and the settled legal
position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition
is liable to be dismissed on the ground of gross delay and laches. The
petitioners have approached this Court after an inordinate and
unexplained delay/lapse of time, thereby allowing the cause of action, if
any, to become stale. Such belated invocation of the writ jurisdiction,
without furnishing any satisfactory explanation for the prolonged
silence, defeats the very object of equitable relief and disentitles the
petitioners from any discretionary relief under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The law is well settled that equity aids the vigilant
and not those who sleep over their rights.
RES JUDICATA
14. Since the relief which is claimed by the petitioner in the
present writ petition was available to him when he filed earlier writ
petition bearing CWP-9167-2015 (Karnail Singh Vs. State of Punjab
and others) which was disposed of by this Court, vide order dated
15.02.2019 (Annexure P-8) with direction to the respondents to give
interest @ 9% per annum to the petitioner on the delayed payment of
necessary/retiral benefits and liberty was also granted to the petitioner to
submit representation before the respondents to grant of interest or
release of any other payment, to which petitioner is entitled for,
therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to agitate the same issue in
the present proceedings.
20 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 21
15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case M. Nagabhushana
versus State of Karnataka and others : 2011 (3) SCC 408 has explained
the doctrine/principles of res judicata qua its applicability to the writ
petitions and after considering the various judgments, has held that “the
principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in explanation IV to
Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, are also applicable to the writ
petitions”. The relevant paras of the said judgment explaining the
doctrine/principles of res judicata, read as under:-
“xx xx xx xx xx
14. The principles of Res Judicata are of universal
application as it is based on two age old principles,
namely, `interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ which means
that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation and the other principle is `nemo debet his
ve ari, si constet curiae quod sit pro un aet eademn cause’
meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a
litigation if it appears to the Court that it is for one and the
same cause. This doctrine of Res Judicata is common to all
civilized system of jurisprudence to the extent that a
judgment after a proper trial by a Court of competent
jurisdiction should be regarded as final and conclusive
determination of the questions litigated and should for ever
set the controversy at rest.
15. That principle of finality of litigation is based on
high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a
principle great oppression might result under the colour
and pretence of law in as much as there will be no end of
litigation and a rich and malicious litigant will succeed in
infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive suits and
actions. This may compel the weaker party to relinquish his
right. The doctrine of Res Judicata has been evolved to
prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived that
the plea of Res Judicata is not a technical doctrine but a
fundamental principle which sustains the Rule of Law in
ensuring finality in litigation. This principle seeks to
promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to
prevent abuse in the matter of accessing Court for
21 of 22
::: Downloaded on – 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
CWP-4102-2026 22
agitating on issues which have become final between the
parties.
xx xx xx xx xx
30. In the premises aforesaid, it is clear that the attempt
by the appellant to re-agitate the same issues which were
considered by this Court and were rejected expressly in the
previous judgment in All India Manufacturers Organisation
(supra), is a clear instance of an abuse of process of this
Court apart from the fact that such issues are barred by
principles of Res Judicata or Constructive Res Judicata
and principles analogous thereto.
xx xx xx xx xx”
16. In view of the above, there is no merit in the present
petition and the same is hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs.
12.02.2026 (NAMIT KUMAR)
Kothiyal JUDGE
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
22 of 22
::: Downloaded on - 27-02-2026 23:21:12 :::
