Chattisgarh High Court
Kanchan Sonwani Minor vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Anr on 12 March, 2026
YOGESH Digitally signed by
YOGESH TIWARI
TIWARI 17:42:41 +0530
Date: 2026.03.17
1
2026:CGHC:11820
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1208 of 2014
Shobhit @ Choti S/o . Prem Singh Aged About 22 Years R/o. Vill.
Machabhata P.S. Bhatapara Rural Distt. Baloda Bazar C.G.,
Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Bhatapara Rural, Distt. Baloda
Bazar C.G., Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
ACQA No. 35 of 2015
Kanchan Sonwani Minor D/o Amarnath Sonwani Aged About 16 Years
Through Her Mother Smt. Rajni, W/o Amarnath Sonwani, Aged About
36 Years, R/o Village Machabhata, P.S. Bhatapara, Tahsil Simga,
District Baloda Bazaar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
--- Appellant
Versus
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Bhatapara Rural,
District Baloda Bazaar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
2 - Shobhit Alias Choti S/o Prem Singh Aged About 22 Years R/o
Village Machabhata, P.S. Bhatapara Rural, District Baloda Bazaar-
Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
2
For Appellant in : Mr. Neelkanth Malivya and Mr. Arvind Dubey,
CRA No.1208/2014 Advocates
For State : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Deputy Advocate
General
Hon'ble Shri Sanjay S. Agrawal, Judge
Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
Judgment on Board
12.03.2026
Per Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
1. Since both the Criminal Appeal filed on behalf of the
accused/appellant and the Acquittal Appeal preferred by the
complainant arise out of the same judgment passed by the
learned Second Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge
(POCSO Act), Balodabazar, C.G., and as the issues involved in
both the appeals are interconnected and based on the same set
of facts and evidence, it was considered appropriate and in the
interest of justice to hear them together. Accordingly, both the
appeals have been clubbed, heard analogously, and are being
disposed of by this common judgment.
2. Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 has been preferred on behalf of
the accused/appellant, whereas Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 has
been filed by the complainant/victim, assailing the legality, validity
and propriety of the judgment dated 22.11.2014 passed by the
learned Second Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge
(POCSO Act), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara
3
(C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 30/2014. By the said
judgment, the learned trial Court acquitted the appellant/accused,
namely Shobhit @ Choti, of the charges punishable under
Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC“) and
Sections 4 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “POCSO Act“). However, the
appellant was convicted and senteced for the offences
punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC, as
follows :-
Conviction Sentence
Under Section 354 of the : Rigorous imprisonment for
IPC three years with a fine of
₹1,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, additional
rigorous imprisonment for
three months.
Under Section 506 Part-II : Rigorous imprisonment for
of the IPC two years with a fine of
₹1,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, additional
rigorous imprisonment for
three months.
Both the sentences shall run concurrently.
3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 14.06.2014 the
victim lodged a report at Police Station Bhatapara Rural alleging
that on the said date she had returned to Bhatapara by train from
Tilda and was proceeding from the railway station towards her
village on the motorcycle of the accused. When they reached a
4
secluded place near village Pendri, the accused allegedly
stopped the motorcycle, caught hold of her hand and attempted
to drag her towards a nearby field with the intention of outraging
her modesty. When the victim protested and told the accused that
she would disclose the incident to her parents, the accused
threatened to kill her and warned her not to disclose the incident
to anyone. Thereafter, the accused again made her sit on the
motorcycle and dropped her near her house.
4. It is further the case of the prosecution that after reaching home,
the victim informed her parents, namely the father of the victim
and the mother of the victim, about the incident and thereafter the
matter was reported to the police. On the basis of the said report,
a case was registered against the accused for the offences
punishable under Sections 354 and 506 of the IPC. During the
course of investigation, the spot map of the place of occurrence
was prepared in the presence of the victim and the father of the
victim on 15.06.2014, which has been exhibited as Ex.P-2.
5. Thereafter, on 16.06.2014 the victim submitted a written
complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Balodabazar,
which has been exhibited as Ex.P-3. On the same day, the father
of the victim also submitted a written report at Police Station
Bhatapara Rural alleging that the accused had forcibly committed
sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on the date of the
incident and had threatened her with dire consequences if she
5
disclosed the incident to anyone. The said written complaint has
been exhibited as Ex.P-5, wherein the father of the victim also
requested that the victim be medically examined.
6. During the course of investigation, the accused was arrested and
his arrest memo was prepared vide Ex.P-7. The underwear worn
by the accused was seized under seizure memo Ex.P-4 and was
sent for examination by issuing requisition Ex.P-11. Another
seizure memo relating to the undergarments was prepared as
Ex.P-6 and the same was also sent for examination through
requisition Ex.P-13.
7. The victim was medically examined and the doctor handed over
sealed samples including vaginal swab, slides, pubic hair and
undergarments, which were produced before the Investigating
Officer by the Lady Constable Manju Tandon and were seized
vide seizure memo Ex.P-12.
8. On 18.06.2014 the statement of the victim was recorded during
investigation, wherein she stated that the accused had taken her
on a motorcycle from Bhatapara and had stopped the vehicle
near a deserted field at village Pendri. It was alleged that the
accused dragged her towards the field, forcibly removed her
clothes and, despite her resistance, committed sexual intercourse
with her. The victim further stated that due to the threats
extended by the accused she did not initially disclose the entire
incident but later informed her grandmother when she
6
experienced pain the next morning. The statements of other
witnesses including the grandmother of the victim and the father
of the victim were also recorded during investigation, who
supported the version narrated by the victim. The statements of
PW-6 and other witnesses were also recorded on 22.06.2014.
9. After completion of investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet
against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections
354, 506B, 376 and 511 of the IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the
POCSO Act.
10. In order to prove the above charges against the accused, a total
of 9 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution being
PW-1 to PW-9 and 15 documents have been exhibited as Ex. P-1
to Ex. P-15, contrary to which, on behalf of the defence, one
defence witness has been examined and he has exhibited 2
documents marked as Ex. D-1 and Ex. D-2. In his statement
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short, ‘Cr.P.C.’), the accused denied all allegations, asserted his
innocence, and stated that he had been falsely implicated.
11. The learned trial Court after hearing counsel for the parties and
appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment
convicted and sentenced the accused / appellant – Shobhit @
Choti for the offence punishable under Sections 354 and 506
Part-II of the IPC and acquitted him for the offence punishable
under Section 376 of the IPC as well as Sections 4 and 8 of the
7
POCSO Act, against which, aforementioned Criminal Appeal and
Acquittal Appeal have been filed by the respective parties i.e. the
accused and the complainant/victim.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal
No.1208/2014 would submit that the impugned judgment passed
by the learned trial Court is contrary to law and the evidence
available on record. It is contended that the prosecution has
failed to prove the allegations against the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt and the conviction recorded by the learned trial
Court for the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506
Part-II of the IPC is not sustainable in law.
13. Learned counsel would further submit that the statement of the
victim suffers from material inconsistencies and improvements. It
is argued that the version given by the victim in the initial report is
materially different from the statement subsequently recorded
during investigation, particularly with regard to the allegation of
sexual assault. It is contended that such material discrepancies
create serious doubt about the veracity and reliability of the
prosecution case. It is also submitted that the prosecution has
failed to produce any independent witness to support the alleged
incident. Learned counsel would argue that the place of
occurrence is not shown to be so secluded that no independent
witness could have been available. Furthermore, the medical
evidence and other documentary evidence brought on record do
8
not conclusively corroborate the allegations made against the
appellant, and therefore the benefit of doubt ought to have been
extended to him.
14. Learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that the
learned trial Court itself found the evidence insufficient to
establish the charges under Section 376 of the IPC and Sections
4 and 8 of the POCSO Act and acquitted the appellant of the said
charges. It is submitted that once the more serious allegations
were disbelieved, the conviction of the appellant for the offences
under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC on the same set of
evidence is not justified and the appellant deserves to be
acquitted of the said charges as well.
15. Alternatively, learned counsel would submit that even if the
conviction recorded by the learned trial Court is maintained, the
sentence awarded to the appellant is on the higher side. It is
submitted that the appellant is a young person with no prior
criminal antecedents and has already undergone a substantial
period of incarceration during the pendency of the proceedings.
Therefore, it is prayed that the sentence imposed upon the
appellant be reduced to the period already undergone in the
interest of justice.
16. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State would
support the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court
to the extent it records the conviction of the appellant for the
9
offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the
IPC. It is submitted that the learned trial Court has properly
appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on
record and has rightly come to the conclusion that the
prosecution has succeeded in proving the said offences against
the appellant. He would further submit that the testimony of the
victim is natural, cogent and trustworthy and there is no reason to
disbelieve her version. It is contended that the victim has
consistently stated about the conduct of the appellant in catching
hold of her hand, dragging her towards the field and threatening
her with dire consequences. Such conduct clearly attracts the
ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 354 and
506 Part-II of the IPC.
17. It is also submitted that the evidence of the victim is duly
supported by the statements of other prosecution witnesses
including the father of the victim and other witnesses examined
during trial. The documentary evidence such as the spot map and
seizure memos further corroborate the prosecution case.
Therefore, the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court does
not call for any interference by this Court. He would also submit
that the sentence imposed by the learned trial Court is
proportionate to the gravity of the offence and has been awarded
after due consideration of the facts and circumstances of the
case. As such, no case is made out either for interference with
the conviction or for reduction of the sentence awarded to the
10
appellant. Accordingly, it is prayed that Criminal Appeal
No.1208/2014 filed by the appellant be dismissed.
18. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumspection.
19. The pivotal question that arose for consideration before the
learned trial Court was whether the prosecution had been able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had
committed rape upon the victim and thereby made himself liable
for punishment under Section 376 of the IPC as well as Sections
4 and 8 of the POCSO Act, or whether the evidence on record
only established the commission of the offences punishable
under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of the IPC.
20. The learned trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, first
examined whether the victim could be held to be a “child” within
the meaning of the POCSO Act. In this regard, the Court noticed
that though the prosecution had claimed that the victim was about
15 years of age at the time of the incident, no documentary
evidence such as a birth certificate, school admission register, or
any other reliable record was produced before the Court to
establish her age. The investigating officer also admitted in his
cross-examination that no document regarding the age of the
victim was collected during investigation. In absence of such
11
reliable evidence, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution
had failed to conclusively prove that the victim was below 18
years of age on the date of the incident.
21. The learned trial Court thereafter examined the allegation of rape
in light of the medical evidence. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9), who had
conducted the medical examination of the victim, deposed that
upon examination of the private parts of the victim there were no
signs of recent injury, no bleeding, and the hymen was found
intact. The doctor further opined that there were no medical
indications of recent sexual intercourse. The trial Court found that
this medical evidence did not corroborate the allegation of forcible
sexual intercourse made by the victim.
22. The trial Court further observed that although the victim had
stated in her evidence that the accused had committed rape upon
her, the medical findings did not support the allegation of
penetrative sexual assault. The Court therefore held that the
prosecution had failed to establish the essential ingredients
required for constituting the offence of rape under Section 376 of
the IPC or penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act.
23. The learned trial Court also considered the arguments advanced
on behalf of the defence that the statements of the victim and her
parents contained certain omissions and improvements when
compared with the contents of the First Information Report.
However, the Court observed that minor discrepancies in the
12
statements of witnesses were not sufficient to discard the entire
prosecution case, particularly when the core allegation regarding
the conduct of the accused remained consistent.
24. The trial Court found that the testimony of the victim regarding the
conduct of the accused in stopping the motorcycle at a secluded
place, dragging her towards a field, and using criminal force upon
her was supported by the statements of other prosecution
witnesses including the father of the victim and her grandmother.
The Court further noted that the presence of scratch marks near
the buttock of the victim, as noticed by the medical officer, lent
some corroboration to her version that she had resisted the
accused and had struggled during the incident.
25. The defence had also attempted to suggest that the accused had
been falsely implicated due to some prior dispute. However, the
learned trial Court found that no cogent evidence had been
produced to substantiate the alleged enmity between the parties.
The defence witness examined on behalf of the accused also
failed to establish any circumstance that could probabilize the
defence theory of false implication.
26. Upon cumulative appreciation of the entire evidence available on
record, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that
although the prosecution had failed to prove the allegations of
rape and penetrative sexual assault beyond reasonable doubt,
the evidence clearly established that the accused had used
13
criminal force against the victim with the intention of outraging her
modesty and had also threatened her with dire consequences if
she disclosed the incident to anyone.
27. Accordingly, the learned trial Court held that the prosecution had
not succeeded in proving the charges under Section 376 of the
IPC and Sections 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act beyond reasonable
doubt and the accused was entitled to acquittal in respect of
those charges. However, the evidence on record was found
sufficient to establish the offences punishable under Sections 354
and 506 Part-II of the IPC.
28. Consequently, the learned trial Court convicted the accused for
the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II of
the IPC. While considering the question of sentence, the trial
Court took into account the fact that the father of the victim had
reposed trust in the accused by asking him to drop the victim at
her home, but the accused had misused the said trust and had
taken the victim to a secluded place where he committed the
aforesaid acts. Considering the nature and gravity of the offence,
the learned trial Court sentenced the accused as detailed in the
preceding paragraph of the judgment.
29. We shall first deal with the appeal filed by the complainant/victim
being Acquittal Appeal No.35/2015.
30. The acquittal appeal challenges the acquittal by the learned trial
Court under Section 372 Cr.P.C. While exercising appellate
14
jurisdiction, the Court must act with caution, recognizing that the
trial Court has the advantage of observing witness demeanour
and assessing credibility firsthand. The accused is entitled to the
benefit of doubt, but only if it is real and substantial, such as a
doubt a reasonable person would honestly entertain. Mere
theoretical doubts or minor discrepancies not affecting the core
prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. The appellate Court
must ensure the trial Court properly appreciated all evidence and
extended the benefit of doubt in line with settled principles.
31. As held by the Supreme Court in C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair,
AIR 2003 SC 182, and Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha,
AIR 2004 SC 1053, an appellate Court should not substitute its
own view unless the trial Court’s findings are perverse or
relevant, convincing evidence has been unjustifiably ignored,
providing compelling reason for interference.
32. The principles in Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab,
AIR 1987 SC 1083, clarify that while an appellate Court can
examine an acquittal, it must do so cautiously. The trial Court has
the advantage of observing witnesses and assessing credibility.
Interference is warranted only if the trial Court committed a
manifest error, ignored material evidence, or reached a
conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation. Minor
discrepancies cannot outweigh the core, consistent, and credible
testimony unless they go to the root of the case. Interference is
15
justified only in exceptional circumstances where failure to do so
would result in a miscarriage of justice and held in para 6 as
under:-
“……….the mere fact that the Appellate Court is
inclined on a re-appreciation of the evidence to
reach a conclusion which is at variance with the
one recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the
Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient
ground for setting aside the acquittal. The
jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an
appeal against an order of acquittal is
circumscribed by the limitation that no interference
is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the
approach made by the lower Court to the
consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated
by some manifest illegality or the conclusion
recorded by the Court below is such which could
not have been possibly arrived at by any Court
acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore,
liable to be characterised as perverse. Where two
views are possible on an appraisal of the evidence
adduced in the case and the Court below has taken
a view which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court
cannot legally interfere within an order of acquittal
even if it is of the opinion that the view taken by the
Court below on its consideration of the evidence is
erroneous.”
33. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC
984, the Supreme Court held that an appellate Court must
exercise extreme caution before interfering with an acquittal. The
trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour and trial
conduct cannot be lightly disregarded. Interference is warranted
only in exceptional cases–where the trial Court committed a
manifest error, overlooked material evidence, relied on
conjecture, or reached a palpably perverse conclusion. Minor
16
contradictions or inconsistencies not affecting the core
prosecution case cannot justify acquittal. Thus, while an appellate
Court may review an acquittal, it must do so circumspectly,
extending the benefit of doubt only when a reasonable and
substantial doubt exists and has held as follows:-
“8. The scope of interference in an appeal against
acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the
view taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it
is not permissible to interfere with the finding of
acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not
permissible to set aside an order of acquittal,
merely because the Appellate Court finds the way
of conviction to be more probable. The interference
would be warranted only if the view taken is not
possible at all.”
34. Further, in the matter of Jafarudheen and others v. State of
Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440, the Supreme Court held as under:-
“25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal
by invoking Section 378 of the Cr.PC. the Appellate
Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view
can be termed as a possible one, particularly when
evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason
is that an order of acquittal adds up to the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.
Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in
reversing the order of the trial court rendering
acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of
the accused does not get weakened but only
strengthened. Such a double presumption that
enures in favour of the accused has to be disturbed
only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted legal
parameters.”
35. While exercising appellate jurisdiction against an acquittal, this
Court is entitled to re-appreciate the evidence in its entirety,
17
including both oral testimony and documentary material. The
purpose is not merely to review whether the trial Court followed
procedural formalities, but to examine whether the evidence, as a
whole, supports the conclusions reached. The appellate Court
must assess whether the trial Court properly weighed the
evidentiary value of each piece of material, evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, and provided cogent and valid reasons
for its findings. Where the conclusions of the trial Court are found
to be unsustainable, manifestly erroneous, or perverse, the
appellate Court is not only empowered but obliged to arrive at its
own independent conclusion based on the cumulative
assessment of the evidence.
36. Applying these principles, we have undertaken a comprehensive
examination of the prosecution’s case. Each witness statement
has been scrutinized for credibility, internal consistency, and
corroboration with other evidence. Documentary exhibits have
been evaluated for their probative value, authenticity, and
relevance. Inferences drawn from the facts have been examined
for logical coherence and alignment with established legal
principles. The ultimate task is to ensure that justice is done, not
merely to defer to the trial Court’s judgment. The appellate
scrutiny is, therefore, both thorough and independent, aimed at
determining whether the acquittal was justified or whether the
cumulative evidence necessitates a different conclusion.
18
37. In the present case, the victim’s deposition, recorded as PW-2,
requires careful scrutiny. She claimed that on the day of the
incident, the accused forcibly attempted sexual intercourse.
However, her testimony, when compared with other evidence,
reveals several material contradictions, omissions, and
improvements, which materially affect her credibility.
38. PW-2, the victim, in her examination-in-chief, provided a detailed
account of the alleged incident, claiming that on the day in
question, she had accompanied the accused under the pretext of
traveling a familiar route within the village. According to her
testimony, at a point which she described as relatively secluded,
away from the view of other villagers, the accused stopped the
motorcycle and forcibly restrained her movements. She stated
that the accused grabbed her arm and attempted to pull her into a
nearby open field, which, in her words, was “isolated and hidden
from the main path leading to the village.” She further alleged that
the accused forcibly removed her clothing, including her upper
garments, and forcibly attempted sexual intercourse. PW-2
emphasized that despite her repeated protests and resistance,
the accused overpowered her. She described the struggle in her
own words, noting that she tried to push him away and called out
for help, but the accused allegedly threatened her with dire
consequences, including harm to her person and her family,
should she reveal the incident to anyone. She explicitly stated
19
that these threats induced a fear of immediate harm, which
prevented her from raising an alarm or escaping at that moment.
39. PW-2 further deposed that the accused’s conduct continued until
he had allegedly satisfied his intentions, after which he released
her and allowed her to return home. She described the emotional
and psychological impact of the incident, noting that she felt
terrified, humiliated, and coerced, which contributed to her delay
in approaching the authorities. According to her testimony, the
accused repeatedly warned her not to disclose the events to her
family or the police, asserting that any disclosure would result in
serious consequences, including threats to her life and well-
being. In addition to her verbal testimony, PW-2 stated that the
scene of occurrence was isolated, and that no other person was
present in the vicinity. She claimed that she was conscious of the
potential witnesses nearby but felt compelled by fear and
intimidation not to resist openly or seek immediate help. She also
elaborated that she did not preserve her clothing or other items
for forensic evidence immediately after the incident due to fear
and confusion, which she admitted later complicated the
collection of material evidence.
40. During cross-examination, however, several aspects of her
narrative revealed material contradictions. She admitted that the
path to the borewell and surrounding garden was frequented by
other villagers, and she had continued visiting the accused’s
20
premises even after the alleged incident. She also acknowledged
that she did not see the accused taking any video or
photographs, although she claimed that such recordings existed.
Furthermore, no external or internal injuries were identified during
the medical examination conducted shortly thereafter, and the
forensic reports did not corroborate her allegations of sexual
assault. Taken together, PW-2’s testimony presents a detailed,
emotive, and narrative account of the alleged assault,
emphasizing coercion, threats, and fear. However, her version
also contains inconsistencies and omissions, particularly
regarding the timing, location, subsequent conduct, and absence
of corroborative medical or forensic evidence, which have been
critically examined by the trial Court.
41. On the other hand, the medical and forensic evidence on record
presents a significant divergence from the allegations of forcible
sexual assault. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9), who medically examined
the victim on 15.06.2014, provided detailed testimony regarding
the physical condition of the victim at the time of examination.
She deposed that no external injuries, abrasions, contusions, or
marks of violence were observed on any part of the victim’s body,
including the private areas. The doctor specifically noted the
absence of signs indicative of physical struggle or restraint, which
would ordinarily accompany a forcible sexual assault. Further, the
medical examination revealed no evidence of bleeding, trauma,
or inflammation suggestive of recent sexual intercourse. The
21
hymen was found intact, and the uterus was of normal size. Dr.
Verma also testified that no semen or other biological material
typically associated with sexual assault was detected on the
garments or through laboratory analysis.
42. The absence of corroborative forensic evidence is particularly
material when considered in the context of the gravity of the
allegations made by the victim. The prosecution’s case rests
heavily on the assertion of forcible sexual intercourse, which
would ordinarily produce some observable or detectable physical
evidence, especially given that the victim alleged a struggle and
coercion. However, the medical findings do not corroborate such
a scenario. The petticoat and other garments examined showed
only whitish stains, which the medical officer clarified could be
naturally present in a married woman and were not indicative of
sexual assault. The forensic report did not detect the presence of
semen, spermatozoa, or any other biological material that could
link the accused to the act alleged. In sum, the medical and
forensic findings are neutral or non-corroborative, which
materially weakens the prosecution case.
43. In addition to the forensic and medical evidence, the conduct of
the victim following the alleged incident further casts serious
doubt on the veracity of the allegations. PW-2 admitted during her
cross-examination that she delayed lodging the FIR for nearly six
months, providing fear of the accused as the reason for the delay.
22
While delay in reporting may be explainable in cases of
intimidation, the substantial passage of time without complaint,
coupled with continued interactions with the accused, undermines
the credibility of the narrative of sustained fear and coercion.
Specifically, she acknowledged that she continued to visit the
accused’s premises to fetch water from the borewell even after
the alleged incident, which suggests a level of comfort and
freedom inconsistent with her claim of terror and immediate
threat. Further, despite claiming to have been forcibly restrained
in a public area, she did not raise any alarm, call for help, or seek
assistance from other villagers, even though she admitted that
the borewell and surrounding premises were frequently visited by
other members of the community. This conduct, in conjunction
with the absence of corroborative medical evidence, is highly
material and casts serious doubt on the reliability of her account.
44. Taken together, the totality of the medical, forensic, and
behavioral evidence indicates that the victim’s testimony, while
detailed and specific, suffers from significant inconsistencies and
lacks independent corroboration. The trial Court was, therefore,
justified in observing that the prosecution had failed to establish
the essential ingredients of forcible sexual assault beyond
reasonable doubt. The absence of injury, the neutral forensic
report, and the victim’s post-incident conduct collectively weaken
the prosecution’s version and lend substantial plausibility to the
acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
23
45. The testimony of other witnesses examined by the prosecution
fails to provide independent corroboration of the alleged sexual
assault, and largely relies on what the victim had narrated to
them after the alleged incident. PW-1, the mother of the victim,
corroborated that the victim had been threatened by the accused
and that she had communicated her ordeal to him. However, his
evidence was entirely based on what he was told by the victim
months after the incident, and he did not witness any physical
assault, struggle, or coercion himself. Similarly, PW-3, the
grandmother of the victim, deposed that the victim had narrated
the incident to her, yet she could not identify any direct act of
assault or threat. Other family members or witnesses, including
PW-4 (father of the victim) and PW-5, largely provided statements
based on hearsay, without firsthand knowledge of the incident,
and could not offer any independent or contemporaneous
confirmation of the alleged conduct of the accused.
46. Material discrepancies were also noted when the FIR, the initial
written complaint, and the statement recorded during
investigation were compared. The sequence of events narrated
by the victim varied across these documents, particularly
regarding the precise location to which she was taken, the
manner in which her clothes were removed, and the form and
content of the threats allegedly made by the accused. Such
inconsistencies, while not always fatal, erode the reliability and
precision of the prosecution narrative. Further, during cross-
24
examination, the victim admitted that she washed and reused the
same clothes for several months after the alleged incident, which
contradicts the standard expectation that garments worn during a
sexual assault would be preserved for forensic examination to
detect seminal stains or other biological evidence. In addition,
while she alleged that the accused recorded a video and
circulated it, she admitted that she did not personally see the
video being made, thereby weakening reliance on electronic
evidence purportedly supporting the prosecution case.
47. The documentary evidence adduced during trial also does not
materially strengthen the prosecution’s case. The spot map
(Ex.P-2) and Patwari map (Ex.P-3) show the layout of the village
and the surrounding areas near the borewell, indicating that the
location where the incident allegedly occurred was not completely
isolated, with other villagers routinely accessing the borewell,
casting doubt on the claim of absolute seclusion. Other exhibits,
including the medical examination consent form (Ex.P-5), seizure
memos (Ex.P-6), and related documents, confirm procedural
compliance but do not substantively corroborate the occurrence
of forcible sexual intercourse. No physical or forensic evidence
was recovered directly from the scene that could unequivocally
link the accused to the alleged sexual assault, leaving the
prosecution case heavily dependent on inconsistent and largely
hearsay testimony.
25
48. Taken together, the witness testimony and documentary evidence
fail to establish the essential elements of sexual assault or
coercion beyond reasonable doubt. While minor discrepancies or
omissions in the victim’s statements could be explained, the
cumulative absence of independent eyewitnesses, corroborative
medical evidence, forensic proof, and reliable electronic evidence
renders the prosecution version doubtful and justifies the trial
Court’s decision to acquit the accused of the offences under
Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act.
49. Applying the principles of law, including C. Antony (supra),
Ramanand Yadav (supra), Tota Singh (supra), and
Jafarudheen (supra), interference in acquittal appeals is
warranted only in exceptional circumstances where the trial
Court’s view is perverse, manifestly illegal, or wholly untenable.
An appellate Court must not reverse an acquittal simply because
it might have arrived at a different view; it can interfere only when
the trial Court ignored cogent evidence or misappreciated the
facts.
50. In the present case, the learned trial Court undertook a
meticulous and comprehensive scrutiny of all evidence, including
oral testimony, documentary exhibits, and forensic reports. The
trial Court carefully examined the statements of the victim (PW-2)
and other prosecution witnesses (PW-1, PW-3 and PW-5), noting
26
areas of consistency, contradictions, and potential
embellishments
51. The trial Court carefully considered the minor discrepancies and
omissions in the testimony of the victim, such as variations in the
sequence of events, the handling and reuse of clothing, and the
description of threats. While such minor inconsistencies do not
automatically discredit a witness, the Court rightly observed that
they must be considered alongside other factors, particularly in
cases alleging sexual assault, where corroboration is essential.
52. Equally important, the Court evaluated the absence of medical
corroboration and forensic evidence. Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9)
found no external or internal injuries, no signs of trauma, and an
intact hymen, while the petticoat examined only showed whitish
stains that could naturally occur in a married woman. No semen
or other biological evidence suggestive of sexual assault was
detected. The Court noted that the victim continued visiting the
accused’s premises after the alleged incident, delayed lodging
the FIR for nearly six months, and did not raise an alarm despite
the presence of other villagers using the same borewell. These
factors collectively cast serious doubt on the veracity of the
prosecution case.
53. The trial Court also weighed documentary evidence, including the
spot map (Ex.P-2), Patwari map (Ex.P-3), seizure memos (Ex.P-
6), and consent forms (Ex.P-5), in light of the village layout and
27
routine activity in the area. It concluded that the alleged site of the
incident was not entirely secluded, undermining the claim that no
independent witness could have observed the occurrence.
Furthermore, the purported electronic evidence, including
references to a video allegedly recorded by the accused, was
unsupported by seizure of the original device or Section 65-B
certification, and thus lacked probative value.
54. Taking all these factors together, the trial Court balanced the
minor discrepancies in the statements, the absence of
corroborative medical and forensic evidence, the delay in
reporting, and the inconsistent conduct of the victim, and
concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the
offences under Section 376 IPC or Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO
Act beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied settled legal
principles, including the presumption of innocence, the need for
corroboration in sexual assault cases, and the high threshold of
proof required for conviction.
55. On a comprehensive review, it is manifestly clear that the trial
Court’s conclusion is plausible, reasoned, and supported by
evidence. There is no evidence of perversity, misappreciation of
facts, or illegality in the trial Court’s approach. The trial Court
meticulously evaluated witness credibility, analyzed
contradictions and omissions in testimony, assessed
28
documentary and forensic evidence, and applied the correct legal
standards in reaching its conclusion.
56. For all these reasons, the acquittal of the accused under Section
376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the POCSO Act is affirmed. The
Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 filed by the complainant/victim is
hereby dismissed.
57. Now, we shall proceed to deal with appeal filed by the appellant
being Criminal Appeal No.1208/2014.
58. Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 has been filed by the
accused/appellant, challenging both the conviction and sentence
imposed by the learned trial Court under Sections 354 and 506
Part-II IPC. The appellant contends that the conviction is
unsustainable and, in the alternative, seeks reduction of sentence
on grounds of being a first-time offender, absence of prior
criminal history, and the disproportionate nature of the sentence
imposed.
59. A detailed and careful re-appreciation of the evidence adduced at
trial clearly demonstrates that the prosecution has successfully
established the essential elements of the offences under Sections
354 and 506 Part-II IPC, namely:
(a) Use of criminal force with intent to outrage the modesty
of the victim (Section 354 IPC):
29
• The victim (PW-2) deposed that on 14.06.2014, she was
taken by the accused on a motorcycle from the railway
station towards her village. During the course of this
journey, she stated that the accused forcibly restrained her
movement, attempted to drag her to a secluded field, and
physically handled her clothes and body in a manner which
caused her fear and distress.
• Though minor discrepancies exist regarding the sequence
of events or the exact manner in which the clothes were
removed, the core allegation that the accused applied
criminal force intending to outrage her modesty remains
consistent throughout her statements, including her
examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and statement
under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
• The testimony of PW-1 (mother of the victim) and PW-3
(grandmother) corroborates that the victim conveyed to
them the intimidating conduct of the accused, including
threats and forcible restraint, thereby lending indirect
support to the essential elements of Section 354 IPC.
• Documentary evidence, such as Ex.P/2 (spot map) and
Ex.P/3 (Patwari map), illustrates that the accused
deliberately led the victim to a relatively secluded location,
reinforcing the deliberate nature of his actions and the intent
to outrage the modesty of the victim.
30
• The fact that the victim continued to face coercion, fear, and
threat during this encounter satisfies the statutory
requirement of intent under Section 354 IPC, as it
demonstrates that the accused’s actions were not
accidental or incidental but carried a clear mens rea to
outrage modesty.
(b) Criminal intimidation by threatening the victim with dire
consequences (Section 506 Part-II IPC):
• The victim (PW-2) deposed in her examination-in-chief that
the accused repeatedly threatened her with severe and dire
consequences if she revealed the incident to anyone,
including her parents, neighbors, or other villagers. She
stated that these threats were specific, credible, and
instilled a genuine fear of harm, both to herself and
potentially to her family. The victim further explained that
this fear was so overwhelming that it directly influenced her
decision to delay lodging the FIR for nearly six months,
which underscores the effectiveness and coercive nature of
the threats. Her testimony also highlighted that the threats
were accompanied by gestures and conduct which made
her feel powerless and constrained, demonstrating the
intentional use of intimidation to enforce silence.
• PW-1 (mother of the victim) corroborated that the victim had
narrated the threats to him in detail, including the nature
31and intensity of the consequences the accused had warned
her about. PW-3 (grandmother of the victim) similarly
confirmed that the victim had described being threatened,
emphasizing the psychological impact and fear generated
by the accused’s conduct. While neither PW-1 nor PW-3
witnessed the actual acts of restraint or force, their
testimonies provide independent corroboration of the
communicated threats and demonstrate the real effect on
the victim, satisfying a key requirement under Section 506
Part-II IPC.
• The spot map (Ex.P/2) and Patwari map (Ex.P/3) provide
additional corroboration regarding the location where the
accused allegedly carried out the acts. The maps indicate
that the area was relatively secluded and partially enclosed,
supporting the victim’s account that she was isolated during
the incident, which amplifies the credibility and deliberate
nature of the threats. The maps, when considered with the
testimonies, illustrate that the accused’s actions were
calculated to instill fear and ensure compliance, as the
victim had little opportunity to seek immediate help from
nearby villagers.
• Taken together, the evidence demonstrates that the
accused’s threats were real, deliberate, and aimed at
coercing the victim into silence. The cumulative effect of the
32threats, the physical restraint, and the isolated location
establish beyond reasonable doubt that the victim
reasonably feared that disclosing the incident could result in
serious harm to herself or her family. This satisfies the
statutory requirement for criminal intimidation under Section
506 Part-II IPC, as the accused intentionally created a
credible apprehension of injury, thereby fulfilling the mens
rea and actus reus of the offence.
60. Considering the detailed testimony of the victim (PW-2), coupled
with the corroborative accounts of PW-1 (mother of the victim)
and PW-3 (grandmother of the victim), it is evident that the
prosecution has successfully established both the use of criminal
force to outrage the modesty of the victim and criminal
intimidation by threats of dire consequences, thereby fulfilling the
essential elements of Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC. The
victim’s account provides a vivid narration of the accused forcibly
restraining her, attempting to drag her to a secluded location, and
issuing repeated threats designed to instill fear and compel
silence. PW-1 and PW-3 independently corroborate that the
victim communicated these threats to them, demonstrating the
real and lasting impact of the accused’s coercive conduct, even
though they did not personally witness the physical acts.
61. The spot map (Ex.P/2) and Patwari map (Ex.P/3) reinforce the
victim’s testimony, indicating that the location of the incident was
33sufficiently secluded to allow the accused to carry out his threats
and apply criminal force without interference from bystanders.
The procedural documentation, including the FIR, written
complaint, seizure memos, and medical examination records,
collectively confirm the formal steps taken by the authorities and
substantiate the context in which the offences occurred.
62. While minor discrepancies exist in peripheral details such as the
exact sequence of movements, handling of clothing, and precise
timing, these do not detract from the reliability of the core
allegations. The deliberate actions of the accused, the isolation of
the victim, and the clear communication of threats all point to
intentional and unlawful conduct aimed at outraging the victim’s
modesty and coercing her through intimidation. Taken
cumulatively, the evidence satisfies the statutory requirements for
both offences and demonstrates that the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is criminally liable
under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC.
63. The victim, PW-2, deposed that on 14.06.2014, she was taken by
the accused on his motorcycle from the railway station towards
her village. She stated that the accused forcibly restrained her
movement, attempted to drag her to a secluded field near the
village, and repeatedly threatened her with severe consequences
should she disclose the incident to anyone, including her family
members or neighbors. While there were minor variations in her
34
statements regarding the exact sequence of events and the
handling of her clothing, the central allegation of criminal force
and intimidation remained consistent throughout the FIR (Ex.P/1),
written complaints, and statements recorded during investigation.
The testimony of PW-2 demonstrates that she experienced fear
and coercion, which directly influenced her decision to delay
lodging a formal complaint for several months, highlighting the
efficacy and impact of the threats made by the accused.
64. PW-2’s account finds some corroboration in the procedural and
documentary records. The FIR lodged at the relevant police
station provided a contemporaneous account of the incident,
establishing the temporal and factual context. The spot map
(Ex.P/2) illustrates the location of the alleged incident, showing
that while the area was somewhat secluded, it was not
completely inaccessible, thereby demonstrating that the
accused’s act of taking the victim to this location was deliberate
and not incidental. The Patwari map (Ex.P/3) further confirms the
layout of the village, aiding in visualizing the movements alleged
by the victim. The consent form for medical examination (Ex.P/5)
and the seizure memo pertaining to the victim’s clothing (Ex.P/6)
indicate procedural compliance in preserving evidence, although
forensic corroboration was limited, as the victim had washed and
reused the clothes in the months following the incident.
Additionally, PW-2 admitted that she could not personally observe
35
any alleged video recordings referenced in her statements,
casting doubt on electronic evidence mentioned.
65. PW-1, the mother of the victim, testified that the victim narrated
the threats and coercive conduct of the accused to him. Although
he did not witness any physical assault personally, his testimony
provides indirect corroboration of criminal intimidation, as it
demonstrates that the accused’s threats were communicated and
caused the victim genuine fear. PW-3, the grandmother of the
victim, similarly confirmed that the victim narrated the incident to
her. While she could not personally identify any act of sexual
assault, her testimony reinforces the element of intimidation and
forced restraint, consistent with the victim’s account. PW-4 father
of the victim and PW-5, other family member, largely provided
hearsay evidence about the incident and could not independently
verify any physical assault; nevertheless, their statements
contribute to the overall narrative of coercion and intimidation,
supporting the prosecution’s claim that the accused intentionally
used force and threats to control the victim.
66. The medical examination conducted by Dr. Anita Verma (PW-9)
on 15.06.2014 revealed that there were no external or internal
injuries on the victim’s body, no signs of bleeding or trauma
indicative of forcible sexual intercourse, and the hymen was intact
with a uterus of normal size. No semen or other biological
material suggestive of sexual assault was detected. The petticoat
36
examined showed only whitish stains, which the doctor clarified
could naturally occur. While the absence of medical corroboration
contradicts allegations of penetrative sexual assault, it does not
detract from the offences under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC,
which relate to the application of criminal force, intent to outrage
modesty, and intimidation, all of which are sufficiently established
by oral testimony and documentary evidence.
67. The Court has also considered the documentary evidence in its
entirety. The spot map (Ex.P/2) and the Patwari map (Ex.P/3)
corroborate the victim’s account regarding the movement to a
somewhat secluded field, highlighting the deliberate nature of the
accused’s actions to isolate and threaten the victim. The consent
form for medical examination (Ex.P/5) and seizure memo
(Ex.P/6) establish procedural compliance but do not
independently substantiate forcible sexual assault. Other seizure
documents (Ex.P/4, Ex.P/11, Ex.P/12, Ex.P/13) reflect the chain-
of-custody of the victim’s clothing and other samples, although
forensic testing did not yield evidence supporting sexual assault.
These documents, however, confirm that the victim was in the
custody of the accused and subjected to coercion, and they
support the victim’s narrative of being forcibly restrained and
threatened.
68. A comprehensive review of all evidence demonstrates that the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that the
37
accused applied criminal force intending to outrage the modesty
of the victim and threatened her with dire consequences, thereby
satisfying the essential elements of Sections 354 and 506 Part-II
IPC. The core acts of restraint, intimidation, and threats are
consistently supported by the testimony of the victim,
corroborative accounts of PW-1 and PW-3, and documentary
evidence showing the location and circumstances of the incident.
Minor discrepancies, such as variations in the sequence of
events, handling of clothing, or the victim’s inability to observe
certain electronic evidence, do not dilute the established facts.
On the contrary, the cumulative evidence demonstrates that the
accused acted deliberately, used coercion effectively, and caused
the victim to reasonably fear serious consequences, fulfilling the
statutory requirements for criminal force and criminal intimidation.
69. Therefore, the conviction under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC
is fully justified, as the evidence establishes beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused forcibly restrained the victim, attempted to
isolate her, and threatened her with serious consequences. The
oral testimony, corroborative witness accounts, procedural
documentation, and location evidence collectively form a reliable
and coherent narrative, sufficient to sustain the conviction even in
the absence of medical corroboration of sexual assault.
70. In the present case, minor discrepancies were noted in the
evidence, including variations in the sequence of events as
38
narrated in the FIR, written complaint, and statement recorded
during investigation. There were also differences regarding the
handling and washing of the victim’s clothing, which limited the
scope for forensic verification, as well as slight variations in the
description of the exact location and route taken by the accused
and victim. These differences, however, are peripheral and do not
affect the core elements of the offences, namely the use of
criminal force with intent to outrage modesty and the act of
threatening the victim with dire consequences. The Court concurs
with the trial Court’s finding that the prosecution has successfully
established the essential ingredients of Sections 354 and 506
Part-II IPC beyond reasonable doubt, and that the accused’s
actions were deliberate, coercive, and intended to intimidate the
victim.
71. Turning to the question of sentence, the trial Court had imposed
rigorous imprisonment of three years for the offence under
Section 354 IPC with a fine of ₹1,000/-, and rigorous
imprisonment of two years for the offence under Section 506
Part-II IPC, also with a fine of ₹1,000/-. In default of payment, the
trial Court directed that the accused undergo additional rigorous
imprisonment for three months on each count. Upon careful
examination, this Court finds the sentence to be disproportionate
to the circumstances of the case. While the offences are
undoubtedly serious and demand deterrence, several mitigating
factors must guide the assessment of the appropriate sentence.
39
Notably, the accused is a first-time offender with no prior criminal
antecedents. Further, there was no physical injury caused to the
victim, and the accused’s age, social background, and general
circumstances warrant consideration in accordance with the
principles of proportionality and reformative justice. Excessively
harsh sentences in such circumstances would not serve the
rehabilitative objectives of criminal law effectively, nor would they
promote societal interests in a measured and balanced manner.
72. Taking all these factors into account, including the nature of the
offence, the evidence of restraint, threats, and criminal force, as
well as the mitigating circumstances of first-time offender status,
this Court finds it just and equitable to modify the sentence while
upholding the conviction. Accordingly, the sentence for the
offence under Section 354 IPC is reduced to rigorous
imprisonment for one year instead of rigorous imprisonment for
three years, with a fine of ₹20,000/-. In default of payment of the
fine, the accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for six
months. Similarly, for the offence under Section 506 Part-II IPC,
the sentence is reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year
instead of rigorous imprisonment for two years, with a fine of
₹10,000/-, and in default, rigorous imprisonment for six months.
Both sentences shall run concurrently, ensuring that the
punishment is proportionate to the gravity of the offences while
also reflecting the principles of deterrence, reformative justice,
and proportionality.
40
73. It is stated at Bar that the appellant – Shobhit @ Choti in CRA
No.1208/2014 is on bail, he is directed to surrender forthwith to
serve the remaining part of the sentence.
74. In conclusion, the conviction of the accused under Sections 354
and 506 Part-II IPC is maintained, as the prosecution has proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused applied criminal force
with intent to outrage the modesty of the victim and threatened
her with dire consequences, satisfying all statutory elements of
the offences. At the same time, the modification of sentence
ensures that justice is served in a measured and balanced
manner, upholding both the seriousness of the offences and the
principles of proportionality, deterrence, and reformative justice.
The Court is thus satisfied that the modified sentence adequately
addresses the objectives of criminal punishment without imposing
an excessive or unduly harsh penalty on a first-time offender.
75. In the result:
(i) Acquittal Appeal No. 35/2015 filed by the
complainant/victim is dismissed, and the acquittal of the
accused under Section 376 IPC and Sections 4 & 8 of the
POCSO Act is confirmed;
(ii) Criminal Appeal No. 1208/2014 filed by the
accused/appellant is allowed in part, with the conviction
under Sections 354 and 506 Part-II IPC maintained, the
sentence modified to one year rigorous imprisonment for
41
each offence with a fine of ₹20,000/- for the offence
punishable under Section 354 of the IPC and ₹10,000/-
for the offence punishable under Section 506 Part-II of
the IPC, in default six months’ rigorous imprisonment for
each offence, both sentences to run concurrently, and the
appellant is directed to surrender for undergoing the
remaining part of the sentence.
76. The fine amount deposited shall be paid to the victim as
compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, under the head of victim compensation.
77. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along
with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned
forthwith for necessary information and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Yogesh