Kailash Chandra Purohit vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 20 February, 2026
inkinccorporation@gmail.com
Bombay High Court
Kailash Chandra Purohit vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr on 20 February, 2026
2026:BHC-AS:9202-DB
1/39 WP-1927-2016 and WP-1928-2016.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 1927 OF 2016
1. Sanjay Sanyal,
Occupation-General Manager (H.R.) of
Nuclear Power Corporation of India
Limited, a Government Company, having its
office at Tarapur, Maharashtra Side, TAPS 3
& 4,
P. O. TAPP, Boisar, District Palghar. ...Petitioner
Versus.
1. The State of Maharashtra,
through Office In-charge,
Tarapur Police Station,
District Palghar.
2. Dr. Sreeramappa Chinnappa,
House No. Type-IV, G-2,
TAPS Colony, Via-Boisar,
Taluka -Palghar, Thane, Maharashtra. ...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 1928 OF 2016
1. Kailash Chandra Purohit,
Chairman and Managing Director of
Nuclear Power Corporation of India
Limited, a Government Company, having its
office at Nabhikiya Urja Bhavan,
Anushaktinagar, Mumbai, 400 094 ...Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra,
through Office In-charge, Tarapur Police
Station,
District Palghar.
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2. Dr. Sreeramappa Chinnappa,
House No. Type-IV, G-2,
TAPS Colony, Via-Boisar,
Taluka -Palghar, Thane, Maharashtra. ...Respondents
---
Mr. A. P. Mundargi, Senior Advocate, as Amicus Curiae.
Dr. Sreeramappa Chinnappa, Respondent No. 2 appearing
through VC.
Mr. Sunip Sen, Senior Advocate a/w Ms. Loopa Munim,
Mr. Jagdish Rajgor and Ms. Khushbu Dedavat i/b M/s. Rajesh
Kothari & Co. for the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 1927 of 2016
and Writ Petition No. 1928 of 2016.
Mr. Tanveer Khan, APP for the Respondent - State.
Mr. Anandrao Maruti Pawar, PSI, SDPO, Boisar, District Palghar is
present.
-------
CORAM : ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.
DATED : 20th FEBRUARY, 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT:
1. These proceedings are recorded in accordance with the
decision of this Court in Hema Suresh Ahuja & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr.1, as the subject matter pertains to an offence
under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, “Atrocities Act,
1989”).
2. The Committee constituted in terms of the Notification
No. P.1602, dated 09.09.2015, regarding Rules for the
presentation and conduct of proceedings in person by parties,
1
2024 SCC OnLineBom 784
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vide Office Report dated 31.01.2026, declined permission to
Respondent No. 2 (Sreeramappa Chinnappa) to appear in
person. On 06.02.2026, Respondent No. 2 appeared through VC
and declined the appointment of an Advocate from the Legal Aid
Panel. However, Respondent No. 2 pleaded for the appointment
of an Advocate to assist this Court. Mr. A. P. Mundargi, learned
Senior Counsel, was therefore requested to appear in this matter
as an Amicus Curiae.
3. Heard Mr. A. P. Mundargi, learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. Sunip
Sen, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners in both these
petitions, and Mr. Tanveer G. Khan, learned APP for the Respondent
– State.
4. Mr. A. P. Mundargi, learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. Sunip
Sen, learned Senior Counsel, and Mr. Tanveer Khan submit that
the subject matter of both these petitions is the FIR bearing No.
II-1 / 2016 dated 24.05.2016 (for short “impugned FIR”),
registered with the Tarapur Police Station, District Palghar,
under Section 3(1) (viii) {i.e. Section 3(1)(p) of the amended
Act} of the Atrocities Act, 1989. Accordingly, they request that
both these petitions be taken up together and disposed of by a
common order. Both these petitions are taken up together.
5. Kailash Chandra Purohit (Petitioner in Writ Petition No.
1928 of 2016) is Accused No. 1, whereas Sanjay Sanyal
(Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1927 of 2016) is Accused No. 2
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in the impugned FIR.
6. Rule in both these petitions was issued on 05.02.2024, and
the interim order dated 03.06.2026, granting a stay of the
impugned FIR, was confirmed as the interim relief.
7. Material facts relevant to the present petitions, as derived
from the petitions, are that Kailash Chandra Purohit was the
Chairman and Managing Director of Nuclear Power Corporation
of India Ltd. (NPCIL), whereas Sanjay Sanyal was the General
Manager (H.R.) at NPCIL.
8. Respondent No.2 joined NPCIL at the Kaiga Generating
Station, Karnataka, as a General Duty Medical Officer (GDMO)
in the Grade of Medical Officer ‘C’ on 12.09.1994. Respondent
No.2 was promoted thrice during his career in NPCIL under the
Merit Promotion Scheme of the Department of Atomic Energy,
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, applicable to Scientific and
Technical Personnel, including Medical Professionals.
9. A report was received by the Director (H.R.), NPCIL, from
the Site Director, NPCIL Tarapur, regarding serious acts of
misconduct by Respondent No. 2 on the premises of TAPS
Hospital on 21.08.2013. The reported misconduct included
preventing the Acting Medical Superintendent of TAPS Hospital
from performing his official duties; calling the Police from the
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nearby Panchmarg Police Station to the Acting Medical
Superintendent’s chamber and stating that Respondent No. 2’s
life was under threat; and Respondent No. 2 using offensive
language towards the Acting Medical Superintendent. Along
with the said Report, the Site Director recommended stern
action against Respondent No. 2.
10. The Director (H.R.) had the said Report examined by the
Disciplinary Cell of NPCIL and forwarded it to the Disciplinary
Authority of NPCIL, with a recommendation that Respondent
No.2 be suspended and that disciplinary proceedings be initiated
against Respondent No.2.
11. Respondent No. 2 was accordingly placed under
suspension on 23. 08.2013 in accordance with the extant Rules
of NPCIL.
12. Respondent No.2 appealed against the said order of
suspension to the Appellate Board, i.e. the Board of Directors of
NCPIL. The appeal was rejected. The suspension of Respondent
No.2 was reviewed from time to time by the Suspension Review
Committee comprising three Director-level officers, and
subsistence allowance was paid in accordance with the
provisions.
13. Memorandum dated 10.09.2019 under Rule 12 of the
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NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, containing the charges,
the statement of imputation of misconduct/misbehavior, the list
of documents, and the list of witnesses, was issued to
Respondent No. 2.
14. As a counterblast to the disciplinary proceedings initiated
against the Respondent No. 2 under the NPCIL (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, the Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint on
24.05.2016 at the Tarapur Police Station, pursuant to which the
impugned FIR under Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act,
1989, was registered with the Tarapur Police Station, District
Palghar. Paragraph No. 12 of the impugned FIR reads as
follows:
ता. म. वेळी व जागी आरोपीत यांनी आपसात संगनमत
करून फि यादी यांनी न्युफि अर पॉवर कॉप रेशन इंडि!या
लि#. च्या भ्रष्टाचार व्यवस्थेमधी# अफिनयफिमतता, गैरव्यवहार
तसेच माफिहती अडिधकारा माफिहती माफिगत#ी तसेच
एस.सी/एस.टी असोसिसएशनच्या अडिधकारासाठी तक्रार
केल्यामुळे तसेच फि यादी हे अनुसूडिचत जाती प्रवगाती#
असल्याचे त्यांना माहीत असल्याने त्यांनी फि यादीस टाग7ट
करून फि यादीस फिन#ंबन करून आज पावेतो फि यादीचा
मानसिसक आर्थिथक सामासिजक छळ के#ा म्हणून गुन्हा
English translation of the above text, as furnished by the Advocate on
record for the Petitioners.
“12, F.I.R. contents (Attach separate sheets, if required):
At the said time and place, the Accused in connivance with each other
since the complainant pointed out about the corrupt and improper
management of Nuclear Power Corporation Limited, and had asked
information under RTI and had complained regarding the rights of SC /
ST Association and since the complainant being the Scheduled Caste,
the said fact being known to the Accused, The Accused targeted the
complainant and suspended the complainant, thereby causing mental
and financial agony, therefore offence.”
15. Reference is made to the names of the Petitioners and the
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statement/allegations against the Petitioners as found in the
impugned FIR, are extracted herein below:
मी फिन#ंफिबत झाल्यानंतर अनुसूडिचत जाती/ जमाती असोसिसएशन#ा सुफिवधा
फिमळण्यासाठी मी नॅशन# कफिमशन#ा तक्रार के#ी नंतर नॅशन# कफिमशन फिदल्ली यांनी
माझी तक्रारीनुसार सुफिवधा देणे बाबत सांफिगतल्याने तारापूर अणुशक्ती केंद्र
प्रशासनाक!ू न अनुसूडिचत जाती/जमाती असोसिसएशन#ा सुफिवधा फिदल्या त्यामुळे
वास्तफिवक पाहता माझे फिन#ंबन यामुद्द्यावर रद्द होणे गरजेचे होते ते झा#े नाही त्याच
फिदवशी सी एम. !ी. के. सी पुरोफिहत व श्री संजय सन्या# जनर# मॅनेजर (एस. आर)
यांनी ऑ# युफिनट्स ऑ एस. सी/ एस. टी कॉर्डि!नेशन चे चेअरमन पदावरून म#ा
दबाव आणून काढू न टाक#े.त्यानंतर ऑ# युफिनट्स ऑ एस.सी / एस.टी.
कॉर्डि!नेशन कफिमटीच्या दोन मीटिंटग झाल्या त्यात म#ा बो#ावणे आवश्यक असताना
मी फिवनंती करूनही म#ा बो#ाव#े नाही. उद्या फिद.२५/५/२०१६ रोजी के.सी
पुरोफिहत सी.एम.!ी न्यु ीयर पॉवर कॉप रेशन ऑ इंडि!या लि#. यांनी ऑ# युफिनटस
ऑ एस.सी/एस.टी कोऑ!ीनेशन कफिमटीची फिमटिंटग बो#फिव#ी असल्याने मी
फिमटींग#ा हजर राहणेची परवानगी माफिगत#ी परंतु म#ा परवानगी फिद#ी नाही.
तारापुर अणुशक्ती केंद्र हॉस्पीट# मधुन दोन ए#.सी.!ी टी.व्ही चोरी झाल्या बाबत
एन.पी.सी.आय.ए# फिवज#न्स यांचेक!े तक्रार के#ी होती त्याची चौकशी झा#ी त्या
परत फिमळाल्या परंतु त्याची पो#ीस ठाण्यात तक्रार के#ी नाही
मी न्यु ीयर पॉवर काप रेशन इंडि!या लि#.च्या ‘भ्रष्टाचार, व्यवस्थेमधी# अफिनफिमतता,
गैरव्यवहार, तसेच माफिहतीचे अडिधकारात माफिहती माफिगत#ी तसेच एस.सी/एस.टी
असोशिशएनच्या अडिधकारासाठी मी तक्रारी केल्यामुळे तसेच मी अनुसुडिचत जाती
प्रवगाती# असल्याचे त्यांना माफिहत असल्याने त्यांनी म#ा टाग7ट करुन माझे फिन#ंबन
करुन तसेच माझा मानसिसक छळ के#ा त्यामुळे म#ा व माझे कंु टू फिबयांनाही आज
पावेतो आर्थिथक, सामासिजक, मानसिसक छळा#ा सामोरे जावे #ाग#े आहे
तरी सन २०१० ते आज पावेतो तारापुर अणुशक्ती केंद्र हॉस्पीट# मध्ये वैद्यकीय
अडिधकारी म्हणून कायरत असुन न्यु ीयर काप रेशन ऑ इंडि!याचे चेअरमन
अॅॅन्! मॅनेजिंजग !ायरेक्टर के.सी पुरोफिहत व तारापुर अणुशक्ती केंद्र १ ते ४ चे
जनर# मॅनेजर संजय सन्या# यांनी आपसात संगनमत करुन मी न्यु ीयर पॉवर
काप रेशन इंडि!या लि#.च्या भ्रष्टाचार, व्यवस्थेमधी# अफिनफिमतता, गैरव्यवहार, तसेच
माफिहतीचे अडिधकारात माफिहती माफिगत#ी तसेच एस.सी/एस.टी असोशिशएनच्या
अडिधकारासाठी मी तक्रारी केल्यामुळे तसेच मी अनुसुडिचत जाती प्रचगानी# अगल्याचे
त्यांना माफिहत असल्याने त्यांनी म#ा टाग7ट करुन माझे फिन#ंबन करुन आज पावेतो
माझा मानसिसक आर्थिथक, सामासिजक छळ के#ा म्हणून माझी त्याचे फिवरुध्द फि याद
आहे.
माझी वरी# फि याद माझे फिमत्र सुरश
े जाधव यांचे समक्ष टिंहदीतुन फिवचारुन मराठीतुन
लि#हुन टिंहदीतुन वाचुन समजावुन सांफिगत#ी ती माझे सांगणे प्रमाणे बरोबर आहे.
English translation of the above text, as furnished by the Advocate on
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:
After my suspension I made a complaint to National
Commission in respect of giving facilities and amenities
to Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe and as per my
complaint National Commission Delhi directed to
management to provide facilities and amenities to us and
accordingly Tarapur Atomic Centre Management
provided facilities and amenities to Schedule Caste/Tribe
Association. Therefore it was proper and fit to reinstate
me by cancelling my suspension order but it was not
done. On the same day, CMD KC Purohit and Shri Sanjay
Sanyal, General Manager, HR, removed me from post of
Chairman, All Units SC/ST Co-Ordination under
pressure.
Thereafter there were two meeting of all units of SC/ST
Co_Ordination Committee. It was necessary to call me for
the meeting but I was not called for. Tomorrow dated
25th May 2016, KC Purohit CMD, NPCIL had called
meeting of all units of SC/ST Co-Ordination Committee. I
had requested permission to attend the meeting but I was
not given permission.
The theft took place in Tarapur Atomic Energy Centre
Hospital in respect of 2 LCD TV. A complaint was made to
NCPCIL Vigilance. Inquiry was made in that respect but
no complaint was given to concerned police station.
I discovered the corruption, malpractices, irregularities
and various scams of management of NPCIL and for
rights of SC/ST Association I made complaints. they also
know that I am coming from same class they have
targeted me and caused my suspension from services.
Since then I and my family are facing and suffering from
financial, social, mental agony and harassment.
Hence since the year 2010 till this date, Tarapur Atomic
Centre Hospital being a medical officer, Nuclear
Corporation Chairman and Managing Director KC Purohit
and Tarapur Atomic Energy Unit I to IV General Manager
Sanjay Sanyal both have conspired with each other
disclosed their irregularities, mal practices, financial
scams under RTI Act and I made a complaint in the
interest of SC/ST Association for facilities and amenities
and they were knowing well that I am from Schedule
Caste class they have targeted me suspended me from
service and caused me mental, financial, social
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them.
My above complaint is recorded in presence of my friend
Suresh Jadhav by asking in Hindi and writing in Marathi
and read over and explained to me in Hindi is correct as
per my statement.
16. Disciplinary Authority found Respondent No. 2 guilty of
misconduct and imposed a penalty of a reduction in salary.
Respondent No. 2’s appeal under the NPCIL (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules was dismissed by the Appellate Authority.
Respondent No. 2 took premature retirement.
17. Mr. A. Mundargi, learned Amicus Curiae, submits that the
sum and substance of the allegations made by the Respondent
No. 2 in the complaint relate to the Respondent No. 2’s
suspension and the disciplinary proceedings that allegedly
targeted him because he was a whistleblower, even though the
parties knew him as a member of the Scheduled Caste. He
submits that, according to the impugned FIR, the acts and
omissions alleged against the Petitioners, as well as the other
persons named in the complaint, were committed because the
Respondent No. 2 belongs to the Scheduled Caste. He submits
that the allegations in the FIR indicate that the Petitioner had a
grievance regarding the denial of promotion and the
disciplinary proceedings held against him. He submits that,
although the offence alleged is under Section 3(1)(viii) of the
Atrocities Act, 1989 (now Section 3(1)(p)), the ingredients of
the offence charged would not be attracted, and it is difficult to
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fit the case alleged by the Respondent No. 2 under the said
provisions. He submits that the disciplinary proceedings would
not fall within the words “other legal proceedings”. He relies on
the decision of this Court in the case of Prabhakar Ramchandra
Desai V/s the State of Maharashtra and Anr.2
18. Mr. Sunip Sen, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner,
submits that the allegations in the disciplinary proceedings
initiated by NPCIL against Respondent No. 2 were based on
material constituting misconduct against Respondent No. 2. He
submits that the misconduct proceedings against Respondent
No. 2 were initiated in 2013. He further submits that Respondent
No. 2 was suspended on 23.08.2013 and a chargesheet was
issued on 10.09.2013. He further submits that the complaint was
filed on 24.05.2016, just prior to the date of retirement of
Kailash Chandra Purohit, which was due on 31.05.2016. He
further submits that the disciplinary proceedings concluded
with a finding of guilt against Respondent No. 2 and a salary
reduction. He further submits that an appeal filed by
Respondent No. 2 against the said order was dismissed, as was
the review. He further submits that the charges and the
punishment imposed on Respondent No. 2 were maintained and
upheld by the Appellate Authority under the Rules. He further
submits that Respondent No. 2 alleges that the suspension and
chargesheet are the result of a report by third parties. He
2
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1081
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further submits that in his complaint dated 28.05.2016,
Respondent No. 2 made allegations against A S. Shinde (H.R.),
Dr. Mary Kutty, Dr. Uma Gupta and Dr. R. M. Wankhede in the
context of the disciplinary proceedings, but they were not joined
as Accused. He further submits that Respondent No.2 does not
allege that the factual matrix of the disciplinary proceedings is
malicious or vexatious. He further submits that the provisions of
Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, now Section 3(1)
(p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended), are not attracted.
He further submits that the complaint dated 24.05.2016 was
filed on account of a service-related grievance of Respondent
No.2, namely, either the denial of a promotion or the initiation
of disciplinary proceedings against him for his misconduct. He
submits that the complaint dated 24.05.2016 is mala fide,
mischievous and an abuse of the process of law. He relies on the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Keshaw
Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto v. State of Bihar & Anr. 3 in
support of his contention that knowledge of a person belonging
to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is not sufficient to
invoke the provisions of the Atrocities Act, 1989.
19. Mr. T. G. Khan, learned APP for the Respondent – State,
submits that the allegations in the complaint dated 24.05.2016
constituted an offence, and therefore the Respondent No. 1
registered the impugned FIR.
3
Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petiton (Crl.) No. 12144 of
2025.
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20. Arguments heard. Records perused with the assistance of
the learned Senior Counsels and the learned APP.
21. Considering the facts of these petitions, the question for
consideration is whether the allegations and contents of the
complaint dated 24.05.2016/impugned FIR disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence and satisfy the ingredients
of Section 3(1)(viii), now Section 3(1)(p), of the Atrocities Act,
1989 (as amended)?
22. Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, as originally
enacted, reads as follows:
3. Punishments for offences atrocities.–[(1) Whoever,
not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe,
(viii) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit
or criminal or other legal proceedings against a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe;
23. Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended)
reads as follows:-
3. Punishments for offences atrocities.–[(1) Whoever,
not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe,
(p) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or
criminal or other legal proceedings against a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;
24. On a plain reading of Section 3(1) (viii) or, for that
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matter, 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended), to
make out an offence, the following would be necessary:
(a) whoever is not a member of the Scheduled Castes or
the Scheduled Tribes;
(b) institutes a false, malicious, or vexatious suit against a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe; or
(b) institutes false, malicious, or vexatious criminal
proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe; or
(c) institutes false, malicious or vexatious other legal
proceedings against a member of a Scheduled Caste or a
Scheduled Tribe.
25. The case at hand concerns the institution of false, malicious
or vexatious “other legal proceedings” against a member of a
Scheduled Caste.
26. The facts that the Respondent No.2 is an employee of the
NPCIL; that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
Respondent No.2 under the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules; and that the Respondent No.2 availed of the remedies
under the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules by filing an
appeal against the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary
Authority, as available, and also filing a Revision / Review
Application (Page 192 of the paper book), are not in dispute.
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27. Useful reference can be made to the pronouncement of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of West Bengal State
Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray.4 In paragraph nos. 15 to
21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:
15. Malice and malicious prosecution as
stated in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn.
by P. Ramanatha Aiyar read as follows:
“Malice.–Unlawful intent.
Ill will; intent to commit an unlawful
act or cause harm. Express or actual malice
is ill will or spite towards the plaintiff or
any indirect or improper motive in the
defendant’s mind at the time of the
publication which is his sole or dominant
motive for publishing the words
complained of. This must be distinguished
from legal malice or malice in law which
means publication without lawful excuse
and does not depend upon the defendant’s
state of mind.
(1) The intent, without justification
or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. (2)
Reckless disregard of the law or of a
person’s legal rights. (3) Ill will;
wickedness of heart. This sense is most
typical in non-legal contexts.
‘Malice means in law wrongful
intention. It includes any intent which the
law deems wrongful, and which therefore
serves as a ground of liability. Any act done
with such an intent is, in the language of
the law, malicious, and this legal usage has
etymology in its favour. The Latin malitia
means badness, physical or moral–
wickedness in disposition or in conduct–
not specifically or exclusively ill will or
malevolence; hence the malice of English
law, including all forms of evil purpose,
design, intent, or motive. [But] intent is of
two kinds, being either immediate or
4
(2007) 14 SCC 568
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ulterior, the ulterior intent being commonly
distinguished as the motive. The term
malice is applied in law to both these forms
of intent, and the result is a somewhat
puzzling ambiguity which requires careful
notice. When we say that an act is done
maliciously, we mean one of the two
distinct things. We mean either that it is
done intentionally, or that it is done with
some wrongful motive.’
‘Malice in the legal sense imports (1)
the absence of all elements of justification,
excuse or recognised mitigation, and (2)
the presence of either (a) an actual intent
to cause the particular harm which is
produced or harm of the same general
nature, or (b) the wanton and wilful doing
of an act with awareness of a plain and
strong likelihood that such harm may
result….
The Model Penal Code does not use
“malice” because those who formulated the
Code had a blind prejudice against the
word. This is very regrettable because it
represents a useful concept despite some
unfortunate language employed at times in
the effort to express it.’
‘MALICE’, in the legal acceptance of the
word is not confined to personal spite
against individuals but consists in a
conscious violation of the law to the
prejudice of another. In its legal sense it
means a wrongful act done intentionally
without just cause or excuse.
‘Malice’, in its legal sense, does not
necessarily signify ill will towards a
particular individual, but denotes that
condition of mind which is manifested by
the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse. Therefore the
law implies malice where one deliberately
injures another in an unlawful manner.
Malice means an indirect wrong
motive.
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‘… “malice” in its legal sense means, malice
such as may be assumed from the doing of
a wrongful act intentionally but without
just cause or excuse, or for want of
reasonable or probable cause.’
Malice, in ordinary common
parlance, means ill will against a person,
and in legal sense, a wrongful act done
intentionally, without just cause or reason.
It is a question of motive, intention or
state of mind and may be defined as any
corrupt or wrong motive or personal spite
or ill will.
‘Malice’ in common law or acceptance
means ill will against a person, but in legal
sense it means a wrongful act done
intentionally without just cause or excuse.
It signifies an intentional doing of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse
or an action determined by an improper
motive.
‘ “Malice”, in common acceptation,
means, ill will against a person; but in its
legal sense, it means, a wrongful act done
intentionally without just cause or excuse’
… Malice in its common acceptation, is a
term involving some intent of the mind and
heart, including the will; and has been said
to mean a bad mind; ill will against a
person; a wicked or evil state of the mind
towards another; an evil intent or wish or
design to vex or annoy another; a wilful
intent to do a wrongful act; a wish to vex,
annoy or injure another person or an intent
to do a wrongful act; a condition of the
mind which shows a heart regardless of
social duty and fatally bent on mischief.
‘ “Malice” means wickedness of
purpose, or a spiteful or malevolent design
against another; a purpose to injure
another; a design of doing mischief, or any
evil design or inclination to do a bad thing,
or a reckless disregard to the rights of
others, or absence or legal excuse, or any
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other motive than that of bringing a party
to justice.’
‘The meaning of the term malice in
English law, has been a question of much
difficulty and controversy; and those who
made through the many disquisitions on
the subjects in textbooks and judicial
opinions are almost tempted to the
conclusion that the meaning varies almost
infinitely, and that the only sense which the
term can safely be predicated not to have
in any given legal context is that which it
has in popular language viz. spite or ill
will. It certainly has different meanings
with respect to responsibility for civil
wrongs and responsibility for crime; and
even with respect to crime it has a different
sense according as it is used with reference
to murder, libel, or the capacity of an infant
to commit crime, expressed by the rule
malitia supplet act item.’ (Ency. of the Laws
of England.) Ordinarily, the absence of
reasonable and probable cause in
instituting a proceeding which terminates
in favour of the plaintiff, would give rise to
the inference of malice.
Malice has been said to mean any
wrong or indirect motive but a prosecution
is not malicious merely because it is
inspired by anger. However, wrong-headed
a prosecutor may be, if he honestly thinks
that the accused has been guilty of a
criminal offence he cannot be initiator of a
malicious prosecution.
Malice means the presence of some
improper and wrongful motive–that is to
say an intent to use the legal process in
question for some other than its legally
appointed and appropriate purpose. It
means an improper or indirect motive
other than a desire to vindicate public
justice or a private right. It need not
necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or
ill will; it may be due to a desire to obtain
a collateral advantage.
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* * *
Malice in fact is malue animus indicating
that action against a party was actuated by
spite or ill will against him or by indirect or
improper motives.
MALICE : HATRED : AVERSION :
ANTIPATHY : ENMITY : REPUGNANCE :
ILL WILL : RANCOUR : MALEVOLENCE :
MALIGNITY : MALIGNANCY. Hatred is a
very general term. Hatred applies properly
to persons. It seems not absolutely
involuntary. It has its root in passion, and
may be checked or stimulated and
indulged. Aversion is strong dislike.
Aversion is a habitual sentiment, and
springs from the natural taste or
temperament which repels its opposites, as
an indolent man has an aversion to
industry, or a humane one to cruelty.
Antipathy is used of causeless dislike, or at
least one of which the cause cannot be
defined. It is found upon supposition or
instinctive belief, often utterly gratuitous.
Enmity is the state of personal opposition,
whether accompanied by strong personal
dislike or not; as ‘a bitter enemy’.
Repugnance is characteristically employed
of acts or courses of action, measures,
pursuits, and the like. Ill will is a settled
bias of the disposition. It is very indefinite,
and may be of any degree or strength.
Rancour is a deep-seated and lasting
feeling of ill will. It preys upon the very
mind of the subject of it. While enmity may
be generous and open, rancour is
malignant and private. Malice is that
enmity which can abide its opportunity of
injuring its object, and pervert the truth or
the right, or go out of its way, or shape
course of action, to compass its ends.
‘Malevolence commences with some idea
or evil belonging to and connected with the
object; and it settles into a permanent
hatred of his person and of everything
relative to him’ — (Gogan). Malignity is
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for the sake of doing it. It is malice the
most energetic, inveterate, and sustained.
* * *
Malice in fact.–‘Malice in fact’ means
express malice.
Malice in fact or actual malice,
relates to the actual state or condition of
the mind of the person who did the act.
Malice in fact is where the malice is
not established by legal presumption or
proof of certain facts, but is to be found
from the evidence in the case.
Malice in fact implies a desire or
intention to injure, while malice in law is
not necessarily inconsistent with an honest
purpose.
Malice in law.–‘Malice in law’ means
implied malice.
‘Malice in law’ simply means a
depraved inclination on the part of a
person to disregard the rights of others,
which intent is manifested by his injurious
acts.
* * *
Malice in its legal sense means malice such
as may be assumed from the doing of a
wrongful act intentionally but without just
cause or excuse, or for want of reasonable
or probable cause. S.R. Venkataraman v.
Union of India [(1979) 2 SCC 491 : 1979
SCC (L&S) 216 : AIR 1979 SC 49] , AIR at
p. 51.
*
Malicious.–Done with malice or an evil
design; wilful; indulging in malice,
harboring ill will, or enmity malevolent,
malignant in heart; committed wantonly,
wilfully, or without cause, or done not only
wilfully and intentionally, but out of
cruelty, hostility of revenge; done in wilful
neglect of a known obligation.
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20/39 WP-1927-2016 and WP-1928-2016.docx‘Malicious’ means with a fixed hate,
or done with evil intention or motive; not
the result of sudden passion.
* * *
Malicious abuse of civil proceedings.
–In general, a person may utilise any form
of legal process without any liability, save
liability to pay the costs of proceedings if
unsuccessful. But an action lies for
initiating civil proceedings, such as action,
presentation of a bankruptcy or winding-up
petition, an unfounded claim to property,
not only unsuccessfully but maliciously and
without reasonable and probable cause and
resulting in damage to the plaintiff.
(Walker)
Malicious abuse of legal process.–A
malicious abuse of legal process consists in
the malicious misuse or misapplication of
process to accomplish a purpose not
warranted or commanded by order of court
— the malicious perversion of a regularly
issued process, whereby an improper result
is secured.
There is a distinction between a
malicious use and a malicious abuse of
legal process. An abuse is where the party
employs it for some unlawful object–not
the purpose which it is intended by the law
to effect; in other words, a perversion of it.
Malicious abuse of process.– Wilfully
misapplying court process to obtain object
not intended by law. The wilful misuse or
misapplication of process to accomplish a
purpose not warranted or commanded by
the writ. An action for malicious abuse of
process lies in the following cases. A
malicious petition or proceeding to
adjudicate a person an insolvent, to declare
a person lunatic or to wind up a company,
to make action against legal practitioner
under the Legal Practitioners Act,
maliciously procuring arrest or attachment
in execution of a decree or before
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appointment of receiver, arrest of a ship,
search of the plaintiff’s premises, arrest of a
person by police.
Malicious abuse of process of court.–
* * *
Malicious act.–Bouvier defined a
malicious act as ‘a wrongful act,
intentionally done, without cause or
excuse’.
A malicious act is one committed in a
state of mind which shows a heart
regardless of social duty and fatally bent on
mischief–a wrongful act intentionally
done, without legal justification or excuse.
* * *
‘A malicious act is an act
characterised by a pre-existing or an
accompanying malicious state of mind. …’
Malicious prosecution–Malice.–
Malice means an improper or indirect
motive other than a desire to vindicate
public justice or a private right. It need not
necessarily be a feeling of enmity, spite or
ill will. It may be due to a desire to obtain
a collateral advantage.
The principles to be borne in mind in
the case of actions for malicious
prosecutions are these:–Malice is not
merely the doing of a wrongful act
intentionally but it must be established that
the defendant was actuated by malus
animus, that is to say, by spite or ill will or
any indirect or improper motive. But if the
defendant had reasonable or probable
cause of launching the criminal prosecution
no amount of malice will make him liable
for damages. Reasonable and probable
cause must be such as would operate on
the mind of a discreet and reasonable man;
‘malice’ and ‘want of reasonable and
probable cause,’ have reference to the state
of the defendant’s mind at the date of the
initiation of criminal proceedings and the
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Other definitions of ‘Malicious
Prosecution’.–‘A judicial proceeding
instituted by one person against another,
from wrongful or improper motive and
without probable cause to sustain it.’
‘A prosecution begun in malice,
without probable cause to believe that it
can succeed and which finally ends in
failure.’
‘A prosecution instituted wilfully and
purposely, to gain some advantage to the
prosecutor, or through mere wantonness or
carelessness, if it be at the same time
wrong and unlawful within the knowledge
of the actor, and without probable cause.’
‘A prosecution on some charge of
crime which is wilful, wanton, or reckless,
or against the prosecutor’s sense of duty
and right, or for ends he knows or is bound
to know are wrong and against the dictates
of public policy.’
The term ‘malicious prosecution’
imports a causeless as well as an ill-
intended prosecution.
Malicious prosecution is a
prosecution on some charge of crime which
is wilful, wanton, or reckless, or against the
prosecutor’s sense of duty and right, or for
ends he knows or its bound to know are
wrong and against the dictates of public
policy.
In malicious prosecution there are
two essential elements, namely, that no
probable cause existed for instituting the
prosecution or suit complained of, and that
such prosecution or suit terminated in
some way favorably to the defendant
therein.
1. The institution of a criminal or
civil proceeding for an improper purpose
and without probable cause. 2. The cause
of action resulting from the institution of
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23/39 WP-1927-2016 and WP-1928-2016.docxsuch a proceeding. Once a wrongful
prosecution has ended in the defendant’s
favor, he or she may sue for tort damages–
Also termed (in the context of civil
proceedings) malicious use of process.
(Black’s, 7th Edn., 1999)
‘The distinction between an action for
malicious prosecution and an action for
abuse of process is that a malicious
prosecution consists in maliciously causing
process to be issued, whereas an abuse of
process is the employment of legal process
for some purpose other than that which it
was intended by the law to effect–the
improper use of a regularly issued process.
For instance, the initiation of vexatious civil
proceedings known to be groundless is not
abuse of process, but is governed by
substantially the same rules as the
malicious prosecution of criminal
proceedings.’ 52 Am. Jur. 2dMalicious
Prosecution S. 2, at 187 (1970).
The term ‘malice,’ as used in the
expression ‘malicious prosecution’ is not to
be considered in the sense of spite or
hatred against an individual, but of malus
animus, and as denoting that the party is
actuated by improper and indirect motives.
As a general rule of law, any person is
entitled though not always bound to lay
before a judicial officer information as to
any criminal offence which he has
reasonable and probable cause to believe
has been committed, with a view to
ensuring the arrest, trial, and punishment
of the offender. This principle is thus stated
in Lightbody case [1882, 9 Rettie,
934] :’When it comes to the knowledge of
anybody that a crime has been committed a
duty is laid on that person as a citizen of
the country to state to the authorities what
he knows respecting the commission of the
crime, and if he states, only what he knows
and honestly believes he cannot be
subjected to an action of damages merely
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because it turns out that the person as to
whom he has given the information is after
all not guilty of the crime. In such cases to
establish liability the pursuer must show
that the informant acted from malice i.e.
“not in discharge of his public duty but
from an illegitimate motive,” and must also
prove that the statements were made or the
information given without any reasonable
grounds of belief, or other information
given without probable cause; and Lord
Shand added (p. 940):”He has not only a
duty but a right when the cause affects his
own property.” ‘
Most criminal prosecutions are
conducted by private citizens in the name
of the Crown. This exercise of civic rights
constitutes what with reference to the law
of libel is termed a privileged occasion; but
if the right is abused, the person injured
thereby is, in certain events, entitled to a
remedy. (See H. Stephen, Malicious
Prosecution, 1888; Bullen and Leake, Prec.
P1., Clerk and Lindsell. Torts, Pollock,
Torts; LQR, April 1898; Vin., Abr., tit.
‘Action on the Case’ Ency. of the Laws of
England.)
Malicious prosecution means that the
proceedings which are complained of, were
initiated from a malicious spirit i.e. from an
indirect and improper motive, and not in
furtherance of justice. (Sri Nath Shaha v.
L.E. Ralli [(1905-06) 10 CWN 253 (FB)] )
[The performance of a duty imposed
by law, such as the institution of a
prosecution as a necessary condition
precedent to a civil action, does not
constitute ‘malice’. (Abbott v. Refuge
Assurance Co. [(1962) 1 QB 432 : (1961) 3
All ER 1074 : (1961) 3 WLR 1240 (CA)] )]
[‘malicious prosecution thus differs
from wrongful arrest and detention, in that
the onus of proving that the prosecutor did
not act honestly or reasonably, lies on the
person prosecuted’ (per diplock, l.j. in
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dallison v. Caffery [(1965) 1 QB 348 :
(1964) 2 All ER 610 : (1964) 3 WLR 385
(CA)] )]. (Stroud, 6th Edn., 2000)”
(emphasis in original)
16. “[‘Malice’ means and implies spite or ill
will.] Incidentally, be it noted that the
expression ‘mala fide’ is not meaningless
jargon and it has its proper connotation.
Malice or mala fides can only be
appreciated from the records of the case in
the facts of each case. There cannot
possibly be any set guidelines in regard to
the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where
it is alleged, depends upon its own facts
and circumstances.” (See Prabodh Sagar v.
Punjab SEB [(2000) 5 SCC 630 : 2000 SCC
(L&S) 731] , SCC p. 640, para 13.)
17. “12. The legal meaning of malice
is ‘ill will or spite towards a party and any
indirect or improper motive in taking an
action’. This is sometimes described as
‘malice in fact’. ‘Legal malice’ or ‘malice in
law’ means ‘something done without lawful
excuse’. In other words, ‘it is an act done
wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable
or probable cause, and not necessarily an
act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a
deliberate act in disregard of the rights of
others.’ ” (See State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal
Pitti [(2003) 4 SCC 739] , SCC p. 744, para
12.)
18. “[T]he word ‘malice’ … in
common acceptation means and implies
‘spite’ or ‘ill will’. One redeeming feature in
the matter of attributing bias or malice and
is now well settled that mere general
statements will not be sufficient for the
purposes of indication of ill will. There
must be cogent evidence available on
record…. In Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd.
v. Stevens [(1955) 1 QB 275 : (1954) 3 All
ER 677 : (1954) 3 WLR 953 (CA)] the
Court of Appeal has stated upon reliance
on the decision of Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2
E&B 216 : 22 LJQB 463 : 118 ER 749] as
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26/39 WP-1927-2016 and WP-1928-2016.docxbelow : (Stevens case [(1955) 1 QB 275 :
(1954) 3 All ER 677 : (1954) 3 WLR 953
(CA)] , All ER pp. 679 H-680 A)
‘For this purpose maliciously
means no more than knowingly. This was
distinctly laid down in Lumley v. Gye
[(1853) 2 E&B 216 : 22 LJQB 463 : 118 ER
749] where Crompton, J. said that it was
clear law that a person who wrongfully and
maliciously, or, which is the same thing,
with notice, interrupts the relation of
master and servant by harbouring and
keeping the servant after he has quitted his
master during his period of service,
commits a wrongful act for which he is
responsible in law. Malice in law means the
doing of a wrongful act intentionally
without just cause or excuse–Bromage v.
Prosser [(1825) 1 C&P 673 : 171 ER 1362
and 4 B&C 247 : 107 ER 1051] .
“Intentionally” refers to the doing of the
act; it does not mean that the defendant
meant to be spiteful, though sometimes, as
for instance to rebut a plea of privilege in
defamation, malice in fact has to be
proved.’ ” (See State of Punjab v. V.K.
Khanna [(2001) 2 SCC 330 : 2001 SCC
(L&S) 1010] , SCC p. 336, para 5)
19. “[Malice in law.] Malice in law
is, however, quite different. Viscount
Haldane described it as follows in Shearer
v. Shields [1914 AC 808 : 83 LJPC 216 :
111 LT 297 (HL)] :
‘A person who inflicts an injury upon
another person in contravention of the law
is not allowed to say that he did so with an
innocent mind; he is taken to know the
law, and he must act within the law. He
may, therefore, be guilty of malice in law,
although, so far the state of his mind is
concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that
sense innocently.’
Thus malice in its legal sense means
malice such as may be assumed from the
doing of a wrongful act intentionally but
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27/39 WP-1927-2016 and WP-1928-2016.docxwithout just cause or excuse, or for want of
reasonable or probable cause.” (See S.R.
Venkataraman v. Union of India [(1979) 2
SCC 491 : 1979 SCC (L&S) 216 : AIR 1979
SC 49] , SCC p. 494, para 5.)
20. “21. [Malice per common law.]
Malice in common law or acceptance
means ill will against a person, but in the
legal sense it means a wrongful act done
intentionally without just cause or excuse.”
(See Chairman and MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.P.
Gururaja [(2003) 8 SCC 567 : JT 2003
Supp (2) SC 515] , SCC p. 580, para 21.)
21.”11. While it is true that legitimate
indignation does not fall within the ambit
of malicious act, in almost all legal
inquiries, intention, as distinguished from
motive is the all-important factor. In
common parlance, a malicious act has been
equated with intentional act without just
cause or excuse.” [See Jones Bros.
(Hunstanton) v. Stevens [(1955) 1 QB
275 : (1954) 3 All ER 677 : (1954) 3 WLR
953 (CA)] , Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam
Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant [(2001) 1 SCC
182 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 189] , SCC p. 190,
para 11.]
28. Intriguingly, it is not the case of Respondent No. 2 that
any of the allegations in the disciplinary proceedings are false or
malicious. Mr. Sunip Sen, learned Senior Advocate for the
Petitioners, has submitted that in the full-fledged inquiry
conducted against Respondent No. 2 pursuant to the
memorandum dated 10.09.2013, the Petitioner was punished
by a salary reduction. Respondent No. 2 failed in the appeal
filed challenging the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority,
which right of appeal was availed of by Respondent No. 2 in
terms of the NPCIL (Discipline and Appeal) Rules governing his
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employment. The decision of the Disciplinary Authority, NPCIL,
attained finality. Respondent No. 2 accepted the decision of the
Disciplinary Authority, NPCIL, and subsequently applied for
premature retirement. The request for premature retirement
was allowed, and Respondent No. 2 was relieved of his services
with NPCIL with effect from 06.05.2021 (Page 195 of the paper
book).
29. The contents of the complaint dated 24.05.2016 and the
impugned FIR do not satisfy the ingredients or the test for the
disciplinary proceedings initiated against the Respondent No.2
to be either false, malicious, or vexatious.
30. The issue is whether disciplinary proceedings initiated
against Respondent No. 2 under the NPCIL (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules would fall within the expression “other legal
proceedings” in Section 3(1)(viii) of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as
amended), now Section 3(1)(p).
31. This Court, in Prabhakar Ramchandra Desai (supra), had
occasion to consider the expression “other legal proceedings” in
3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, 1989. In that decision, after
framing a specific question, “Are the departmental proceedings
‘other legal proceedings’ under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities
Act?”, this Court held that departmental proceedings are not
“legal proceedings”. Paragraph nos. 67 to 84 of the decision are
reproduced below:
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67. Are the Departmental Proceedings “other legal
proceedings” under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities
Act?
Disciplinary Proceedings:
68. We will revisit Section 3(1)(p) of the
Atrocities Act:
Section 3 – Punishments for offences of
atrocities:
(1) Whoever, not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-(a) . . . . . .
(p) (p) institutes false, malicious or vexatious
suit or criminal or other legal proceedings against a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;
…
(zc) imposes or threatens a social or economic
boycott of any person or a family or a group
belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than six months but which
may extend to five years and with fine.
…
69. If a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or
a Scheduled Tribe institutes a false, malicious, or
vexatious suit, or criminal or other legal proceedings
against a member of either community, he shall face
imprisonment for not less than six months,
extendable to five years and with fine. Indeed, the
right to legal recourse is not only a facet of common
law remedies but also a constitutional imperative.
The concept of ‘access to justice’ as an invaluable
human right, also recognized in most constitutional
democracies as a fundamental right, has its origin in
common law, as well as Article 8 of the Universal
Declaration of Rights, 1948 and Article 2 of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1966. So holds the Supreme Court in Anita Kushawa
v. Pushap Sudan18. It has further held that the right
is so basic and inalienable that no system of
governance can possibly ignore its significance, leave
alone denying it to its citizens. Then, when will that
basic right–that of judicial recourse to legal
remedies–become an offence?
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70. If a person institutes a false, malicious, or
vexatious suit or criminal or “other legal
proceedings” against a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe, he commits an offence–an
offence under Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act.
To categorise what a Civil or a Criminal proceeding
is, we face no decisional problems. Then, to attract
Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act, all that we need
to see is that a civil or a criminal proceeding must
have been instituted “falsely, maliciously, or
vexatiously”. Granted, falsity, maliciousness, and
vexatiousness are matters of adjudication, depending
on the facts and circumstances of each proceeding.
That felicity of categorisation, however, is
unavailable with “other legal proceedings.”
71. To know about “other legal proceedings”, first
we should conceptually know what legal proceedings
are. In Black’s Law Dictionary a “legal proceeding” is
defined as any proceeding authorized by law and
instituted in a court or tribunal to acquire a right or
to enforce a remedy. Judicially interpreted, ‘legal
proceedings’ means proceedings regulated or
prescribed by law in which a judicial decision may be
given. It means proceedings in a court of justice by
which a party pursues a remedy which law provides.
But those proceedings do not include administrative
and departmental proceedings. So held the Supreme
Court in S.V. Kondaskar, Official Liquidator v. V.M.
Deshpande, I.T.O., as quoted in General Officer
Commanding v. CBI. We will discuss this latter
decision in a while.
72. An employee in the Archaeology Department of
Gujarat State went on leave without prior sanction.
That has led to the disciplinary authority’s initiating
disciplinary proceedings. Initially, he was suspended;
later, suspension revoked, he was asked to discharge
other functions than what he had already been
discharging. In the disciplinary proceedings, he was
charged with misconduct. Ultimately, the disciplinary
proceedings resulted in a “warning” on the
employee. In that background, the employee lodged
a complaint against his superior officer, for offences
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under Sections 166 and 114 of IPC and Section 3(1)
(p, q, r, u, zc) of the Atrocities Act. He contended
that to harass him, the officer concerned made him
face disciplinary proceedings on false, vexatious
charges, supported by bogus witnesses. He also
maintained that, even after revoking his suspension,
the officer continued to harass him.
73. The Departmental Head wanted the High Court
of Gujarat to quash the criminal proceedings against
her. Then, a learned Single Judge of the Court, in
Madhulika Samanta v. State of Gujarat, has held that
“the institution of the disciplinary proceedings will
definitely fall” under the expression “legal
proceedings”. The disciplinary proceedings though
will fall under the expression “legal proceedings” the
same do not attract the rigours of the “criminal
proceedings” or “suit”, but stand on a different
pedestal, meant for the departmental concerns
governed by the service rules. Then, on facts,
Madhulika Samanta found no grounds to hold that
the disciplinary proceedings were instituted for a
false reason with vexatious intention to humiliate the
first informant. Besides that, Madhulika Samanta has
cautioned that “[i]f such allegations are allowed to
be maintained then each and every misconduct
committed by the member of the schedule caste and
schedule tribe will be encompassed by the provisions
of Section 3(1)(p) of the Atrocities Act.”
74. That said, I must note that Madhulika Samanta,
with great respect, contains no elaboration on what
“legal proceedings” are and how the disciplinary
proceedings amount to legal proceedings. So let us
examine other precedents. In Assistant Collector of
Central Excise, Guntur v. Ramdev Tobacco Company,
(“Assistant Collector of Central Excise“), fell for
consideration the expression “other legal
proceedings”. And that was in the context of Central
Excise Act.
75. A proprietary concern, with a misnomer of a
“Company”, dealt in tobacco, having a licenced
warehouse at Guntur. It was liable to pay duty on the
tobacco received at its warehouse and transported to
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another dealer. In course of time, after following the
due process, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise
demanded duty and penalty from the dealer. Then,
the dealer filed a writ petition. It contended that the
penalty proceedings were barred by time. In fact, the
unamended Section 40(2) of the Central Excises and
Salt Act lays down that “no suit, prosecution or other
legal proceeding” could be instituted beyond six
months from the date the cause of action arises.
76. Under these Circumstances, the Supreme Court
in Assistant Collector of Central Excise has
interpreted “other legal proceedings.” The question,
in that case, is whether issuing a show cause notice
and initiating the consequential adjudication can be
termed ‘other legal proceedings’ within the meaning
of Sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Act. Assistant
Collector of Central Excise, to begin with, has
acknowledged that there can be little doubt that the
phrase ‘other legal proceeding’ is wide enough to
include adjudication and penalty proceedings under
the Act. But it has accepted the appellant’s
contention that “this wide expression is preceded by
particular words of a certain genus; namely, words
indicating reference to proceedings taken in Courts
only. So, the wide words must be limited to things
ejusdem generis and must take colour from the
preceding words. They should, therefore, receive a
limited meaning to exclude proceedings of the type
in question : departmental proceedings. There can be
no doubt that ‘suit’ or ‘prosecution’ are those judicial
or legal proceedings which are lodged in a Court of
law and not before any executive authority, even if a
statutory one. The expression ‘instituted’ in Section
40(2), Assistant Collector of Central Excise felt,
strengthens this belief.
77. A departmental proceeding like penalty
proceedings, further holds Assistant Collector of
Central Excise, are placed outside the scope of
Section 40(2). According to that decision, calling
upon the dealer to show cause why duty should not
be demanded, why penalty should not be imposed,
and also the “consequential adjudication proceedings
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by the appellate authority” would not be called
“other legal proceedings”, in the context of that
statute.
78. Moving ahead, we may examine another
decision : General Officer Commanding v. CBI. In a
village in Jammu & Kashmir, terrorists killed about
two scores of people. In the combing operations that
immediately followed, five persons, purported to be
terrorists, were killed by Rashtriya Rifles (RR)
personnel in an “encounter”. The earlier massacre
was attributed to those five slain terrorists. Then the
RR personnel came to face the charge of staging a
fake encounter. The CBI investigated the crime and
filed a chargesheet. The Army officers applied to the
CJM, asserting that they could not be prosecuted
except with the previous sanction of the Central
Government because of Section 7 of the Armed
Forces J & K (Special Powers) Act, 1990. On CJM’s
rejecting to entertain that objection, the matter
eventually reached the Supreme Court.
79. To begin with, Section 7 of the Act 1990 protects
the persons acting in good faith under that Act : No
prosecution, suit or “other legal proceeding” shall be
instituted, except with the previous sanction of the
Central Government, against any person regarding
anything done or purported to be done in exercise of
the powers conferred by this Act. In General Officer
Commanding, the Supreme Court has exhaustively
analysed the expression “other legal proceedings”. It
has held that the phrase ‘legal proceeding’ connotes
a term which means the proceedings in a court of
justice to get a remedy which the law permits to the
person aggrieved. It includes any formal steps or
measures employed; it is not synonymous with the
‘judicial proceedings’. Every judicial proceeding is a
legal proceeding but not vice-versa, because there
may be a ‘legal proceeding’ which may not be
judicial at all. There are, as examples, the statutory
remedies like assessment under Income Tax Act,
Sales Tax Act, or arbitration proceedings. Thus, the
ambit of expression ‘legal proceedings’ is much wider
than ‘judicial proceedings’.
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80. The expression ‘legal proceeding’ is to be
construed, according to General Officer
Commanding, in its ordinary meaning. But it quite
differs from the departmental and administrative
proceedings; for example, proceedings for
registration of trademarks, etc. The terms used in
Section 7-– that is, suit, prosecution, and legal
proceedings–are neither inter-changeable nor do
they convey the same meaning. The phrase ‘legal
proceedings’ is to be understood in the context of the
statutory provision applicable in a particular case,
and considering the preceding words used. After
referring to Assistant Collector of Central Excise with
approval, General Officer Commanding has further
held that ‘Legal proceedings’ do not include the
administrative proceedings.
81. The combined holding of Assistant Collector of
Central Excise and General Officer Commanding
precedentially establish these aspects : (1) If
particular words of a certain genus precede a wide
expression, that wide expression must be limited to
things ejusdem generis; that is, it takes colour from
the preceding words. It must receive a limited
meaning. (2) ‘Suit’ or ‘prosecution’ are those judicial
or legal proceedings before a Court of law–but not
before any executive authority, even if a statutory
one. (3) The phrase ‘legal proceedings’ is to be
understood in the context of the statutory provision
applicable in a particular case, and by considering
the preceding words if any. (4) A departmental
proceeding stands outside the scope of “legal
proceedings.” (5) In the departmental proceedings,
the “consequential adjudication proceedings by the
appellate authority” would not fall within the
expression “other legal proceedings”. (6) The ‘legal
proceedings’ are the proceedings in a court of justice
to get a remedy which the law permits to the person
aggrieved. (7) And the legal proceedings quite differ
from the departmental and administrative
proceedings.
82. Here, the employee is not a public servant; he
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has no protection of Article 311 of the Constitution
of India. He does, however, have statutory protection
under the Maharashtra University Act, 1994. Section
58 of that Act mandates that there shall be one or
more university and college Tribunals to adjudicate
the disputes between the employees and the
employer university, and between the employees of
the affiliated colleges or recognised institutions and
their respective managements. The appeal must
concern the matters specified in sub-section (1) of
section 59.
83. Section 59 provides for the appellate remedy.
Any employee, both teaching and non-teaching, in
any university, college, or recognised institution can
file an appeal before the University and Colleges
Tribunal. As preconditions, first, the recognised
institutions must not be under the management of
the State Government, Central Government or local
authority. Second, the aggrieved employee must
have been dismissed, or removed, or reduced in
rank, or had his or her services otherwise
terminated.
84. Thus, once we hold that the departmental
proceedings are not “other legal proceedings”, the
“consequential adjudication proceedings by the
appellate authority” would not fall within the
expression “other legal proceedings”, either.”
32. The next issue would be whether the knowledge of
Respondent No. 2, belonging to a Scheduled Caste, would be
sufficient to invoke the provisions of the Atrocities Act, 1989.
33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Keshaw Mahto
(supra), while dealing with a case under Sections 3(1) (r) and
3(1) (s) of the Atrocities Act, 1989, in Paragraph Nos. 13 and
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14, observed as follows:
13. To put it briefly, first, the fact that the complainant
belonged to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe
would not be enough. Secondly, any insult or
intimidation towards the complainant must be on the
account of such person being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.
14. With a view to dispel any doubt and lend clarity,
we deem it appropriate to mention that even mere
knowledge of the fact that the complainant is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is
not sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(r).
34. Applying the above principle, mere knowledge that
Respondent No. 2 is a member of the Scheduled Caste is not
sufficient to attract Section 3(1)(viii), now Section 3(1)(p), of
the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended). To attract the said
provisions, Respondent No. 2 had to show that the Petitioners
had instituted proceedings that would fall under the expression
“other proceeding” and that such proceedings were false,
malicious or vexatious, on account of the Petitioner being a member
of the Scheduled Caste. No case to that effect is disclosed in the
complaint dated 24.05.2016 / impugned FIR.
35. The impugned FIR refers to the following:
त्यामुळे मी फिदनांक २१/०८/२०१३ रोजी मी तारापूर अणुशक्ती
केंद्र कॉ#नी हॉस्पिस्पट# चे मेडि!क# सुफिप्रटें!ंट !ॉ. पी. के. यादव
यांचं ऑफि स मध्ये जाऊन बस#ा व त्यांना म#ा सी. एम. !ी.
यांना भेटण्यासाठी जाऊन द्या नाही तर तुम्ही माझे प्रश्न सो!वा
असे सांफिगत#े तेव्हा माझे #क्षात आ#े की, म#ा फिन#ंफिबत
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37/39 WP-1927-2016 and WP-1928-2016.docxकरणेसाठी अगोदरच प्#ान बनफिव#ा असून तेथे सिसफिनयर मॅनेजर
एच. आर. ए. एस. शिंशदे, तसेच !ॉ. मेरीकुट्टी, !ॉ. उमा गुप्ता, !ॉ.
आर. एम. वानखे!े यांनी फिमळू न माझा चुकीचा रिरपोट बनवून
पाठफिव#ा त्यामुळे फिदनांक २३/०८/२०१३ रोजी म#ा फिन#ंफिबत
के#े बाबत म#ा आदेश फिमळा#ा त्या नंतर फिद. १०/९/२०१३
रोजी म#ा माझे वरी# दोषारोप फिमळा#ा .
English translation of the above text, as furnished by
the Advocate on record for the Petitioners.:
Therefore on 21st August 2013, I went to
Office of Medical Superintendent Dr P K Yadav
of Tarapur Atomic Energy Centre and sat
there. I told them that I may be allowed to
meet CMD or solve my questions/problems.
Then I came to know that plan was prepared
to dismiss me Senior manager HRA S Shinde,
Dr. Mary Kutty, Dr. Uma Gupta, Dr. R M
Wankhede all made my adverse report and
sent to higher authorities Therefore on 23rd
August 2013, I received Order regarding my
suspension and therefore on 10th September
2013, I received charge sheet against me
36. Respondent No.2, though alleges in his complaint dated
24.05.2016 that the disciplinary proceedings against him were
initiated pursuant to a conspiracy by HR A S. Shinde, Dr. Mary
Kutty, Dr. Uma Gupta and Dr. R. M. Wankhede, who made an
adverse report and sent it to the higher authorities, has not
insisted on making the said persons as accused in the impugned
FIR. Apparently, Respondent No.2 has been selective in
choosing the accused. This conduct of Respondent No.2 speaks
volumes.
37. At face value, the allegations in the impugned FIR do not
disclose the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(viii),
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now Section 3(1)(p), of the Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended),
against the Petitioners. The present case squarely falls within
the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal5 for the exercise of
powers under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Surakhsa
Sanhita, 2023, to quash the impugned FIR to prevent abuse of
the process of law.
38. Mr Sunip Sen, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners,
would be right in his submissions that the present case is a
glaring example of the harassment and humiliation of the
Petitioners at the instance of an employee seeking to settle a
score with them on account of his grievance that he was denied
a promotion or that disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against him.
39. Accordingly, Rule in both these petitions is made absolute
in terms of the prayer clause (a). Consequently, the impugned
FIR bearing No. II-1/2016, dated 24.05.2016, registered with
Tarapur Police Station, District Palghar, is quashed.
40. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be
no orders as to costs.
41. This Court acknowledges the assistance rendered by
5
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
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learned Senior Counsel Mr. A. P. Mundargi, learned Senior
Counsel Mr. S. Sen, and Mr. T. G. Khan, learned APP..
[ASHWIN D. BHOBE, J.]
Digitally
signed by
ARJUN
ARJUN KRISHNA
KRISHNA RODGE
RODGE Date:
2026.02.23
20:58:53
+0530Arjun
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