Madhya Pradesh High Court
Jitendra Shrivastava vs Jai Laxmi Freight Forwa4Rders Pvt. Ltd. … on 16 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:5143
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT G WA L I O R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMIT SETH
WRIT PETITION No. 7499 of 2016
JITENDRA SHRIVASTAVA
Versus
JAI LAXMI FREIGHT FORWARDERS PVT. LTD. THR.
Appearance:
Shri Alok Kumar Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Jay Nandan Singh Sengar and Kuldeep Bhargava- Advocate for
the respondent.
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Reserved for orders on: 09/02/2026
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ORDER
(Passed on 16/02/2026)
1. The instant writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, takes exception to the award dated 01.06.2016 passed by the Labour Court
No.1, Gwalior in Case No. COC 31/A/I.D. Act/2013 (Reference) whereby, the
claim submitted by the petitioner challenging the order of termination from
service passed by the respondent has been dismissed.
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2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
since was working as Documentation Executive in the establishment of
respondent w.e.f 02.08.2007.Through order dated 01.11.2012 (Annexure P/3),
the petitioner was placed under suspension for a period of 10 days for alleged
negligence in performance of duty and his 5 days of salary was also deducted. He
submits that under the standing orders governing the service condition of the
petitioner, there cannot be an order of suspension beyond the period of 3 days.
When the petitioner approached the Managing Director of the respondent for
ventilation of his grievance regarding illegal suspension and deduction of his
salary, he was allegedly threatened, assaulted and manhandled by the
management. Therefore, written complaint to the police was made by the
petitioner vide Annexure P-4 and feeling offended by the same, vide order dated
8.12.2012 (Annexure P-5), the services of the petitioner were terminated without
holding any inquiry as contemplated in law.
3. Aggrieved by the illegal termination, the petitioner moved the
reconciliation authority and the dispute was referred to the Labour Court on
16.09.2013. Before the Labour Court, petitioner filed his statement of claim.
Initially, the filing of reply by the respondent was delayed and their right to file
reply was also closed. The same was subsequently set aside and the respondent
was permitted to file the reply. An application for amendment in pleadings was
also filed during the pendency of the proceedings before Labour Court, which
came to be rejected vide order dated 5.02.2015 and the said order was affirmed
by this Court in WP No. 1391/2015. He submits that after closure of evidence of
the respondent, they again moved an application for amendment which came to
be allowed by the Labour Court vide order dated 06.01.2016 (Annexure P-2) and
ultimately, by misappreciation of the evidence led by the petitioner as well as the
respondent, the claim of the petitioner has been rejected vide award dated
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01.06.2016. The aforesaid award dated 01.06.2016 as well as the interlocutory
order dated 06.01.2016 (Annexure P-2) allowing the application for amendment,
are both under challenge in the instant writ petition.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits that the
foundation of order of termination is the illegal order dated 01.11.2012 which
placed the petitioner under suspension and, therefore, all further action stands
vitiated. It was incumbent upon the respondents to hold a domestic inquiry and
without there being any leave from the competent authority, the respondent could
not have been permitted to lead evidence on the issue of misconduct. He
submits that learned Trial Court had erred in law in shifting the burden on the
petitioner to establish that the petitioner was innocent which also cannot be
countenanced in the eyes of law. Accordingly, he submits that the award
impugned deserves to be set aside and reliefs claimed deserves to be granted.
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondent while
supporting the order impugned submits that the petition filed under Article 227
of the Constitution of India invokes supervisory jurisdiction of this court. Unless
palpable illegality or perversity in the Impugned Award is pointed out, the award
is not required to be interfered. In support of his contention, he places reliance
on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Ors. v.
Rajendra Shankar Patil; (2010) 8 SCC 329 and the judgment in the case of
Mohammad Yunus v. Mohammad Mustaqim and Ors; (1983) 4 SCC 566. That
apart, he submits that even on merits, the petitioner is having no case in his
favour. The petitioner misbehaved with the Managing Director. Since the order
of termination was passed without holding any inquiry, then in terms of settled
law, the evidence was led by the employer to establish the factum of misconduct
and the reply filed by them before the Labour Court in paras 5 and 7 clearly
pleads the factum of misconduct of the petitioner. In support of the said
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proposition, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents places reliance on
the judgment by the Apex Court in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. V.
N.B. Narawade; (2005) 3 SCC 134.
6. Learned counsel for respondent further submits that in so far as the
alleged procedural irregularity as regards Labour Court permitting the
respondent to lead the evidence on the question of misconduct is concerned, the
petitioner was permitted to cross-examine the Managing Director who appeared
in the witness box and no objection in the said regard was ever taken by the
petitioner during trial before the Labour Court. He submits that Labour Court has
recorded a finding of fact that there existed no enmity between the petitioner and
the persons who signed the Panchnama recording the incident of misbehaviour
by the petitioner with Managing Director. In view whereof, the petition does not
call for any interference.
7. No other point has been pressed by the learned counsel for the parties.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. In view of the admitted fact that the services of the petitioner were
terminated on the ground of misconduct without holding a domestic inquiry,
whether it was open for the respondent to lead evidence and prove the
misconduct on the part of the petitioner before the Labour Court is required to be
considered. The similar aspect came up for consideration in the case of State of
Uttarakhand and Ors. v. Sureshwati; (2021) 3 SCC 108; relevant paras of the
said judgment reads as under:-
“18. This Court has in a catena of decisions held that where an
employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissal or discharge
of a workman, it is open for him to justify the action before the
Labour Court by leading evidence before it. The entire matter would be
open before the tribunal, which would have the jurisdiction to satisfy
itself on the evidence adduced by the parties whether the dismissal or
discharge was justified.
19. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Workmen v. Motipur Sugar
Factory (P) Ltd. [Workmen v. Motipur Sugar Factory (P) Ltd., AIR 1965
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“11. It is now well settled by a number of decisions of this Court that
where an employer has failed to make an enquiry before dismissing or
discharging a workman it is open to him to justify the action before
the tribunal by leading all relevant evidence before it. In such a case
the employer would not have the benefit which he had in cases where
domestic enquiries have been held. The entire matter would be open
before the tribunal which will have jurisdiction not only to go into the
limited questions open to a tribunal where domestic enquiry has been
properly held (see Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Workmen [Indian Iron
& Steel Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130] ) but also to satisfy
itself on the facts adduced before it by the employer whether the
dismissal or discharge was justified. We may in this connection refer to
Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan [Sasa Musa Sugar
Works (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, AIR 1959 SC 923] , Phulbari Tea
Estate v. Workmen [Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1111]
, and Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Workmen [Punjab National Bank
Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 160] . These three cases were further
considered by this Court in Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Jai Singh [Bharat
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Jai Singh, (1962) 3 SCR 684] , and reference was
also made to the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Ram
Swarath Sinha v. Belsund Sugar Co. [Ram Swarath Sinha v. Belsund
Sugar Co., 1954 LAC 697] It was pointed out that ‘the important effect
of omission to hold an enquiry was merely this : that the tribunal would
not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case but
would decide for itself on the evidence adduced whether the charges
have really been made out’. It is true that three of these cases, except
Phulbari Tea Estate case [Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1959
SC 1111] , were on applications under Section 33 of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. But in principle we see no difference whether the
matter comes before the tribunal for approval under Section 33 or on a
reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In
either case if the enquiry is defective or if no enquiry has been held as
required by Standing Orders, the entire case would be open before the
tribunal and the employer would have to justify on facts as well that its
order of dismissal or discharge was proper. Phulbari Tea Estate case
[Phulbari Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1111] was on a
reference under Section 10, and the same principle was applied there
also, the only difference being that in that case there was an inquiry
though it was defective. A defective enquiry in our opinion stands on the
same footing as no enquiry and in either case the tribunal would have
jurisdiction to go into the facts and the employer would have to satisfy
the tribunal that on facts the order of dismissal or discharge was
proper.”
20. Subsequently in Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh
Singh [Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, (1972) 1
SCC 595] this Court held that : (SCC pp. 615-16, para 61)
“60. … (1) If no domestic enquiry had been held by the management,
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or if the management makes it clear that it does not rely upon any
domestic enquiry that may have been held by it, it is entitled to
straightway adduce evidence before the Tribunal justifying its action.
The Tribunal is bound to consider that evidence so adduced before it,
on merits, and give a decision thereon. In such a case, it is not
necessary for the Tribunal to consider the validity of the domestic
enquiry as the employer himself does not rely on it.
(3) When the management relies on the enquiry conducted by it, and
also simultaneously adduces evidence before the Tribunal, without
prejudice to its plea that the enquiry proceedings are proper, it is the
duty of the Tribunal, in the first instance, to consider whether the
enquiry proceedings conducted by the management, are valid and
proper. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the enquiry proceedings have
been held properly and are valid, the question of considering the
evidence adduced before it on merits, no longer survives. It is only
when the Tribunal holds that the enquiry proceedings have not been
properly held, that it derives jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the
dispute and in such a case it has to consider the evidence adduced
before it by the management and decide the matter on the basis of such
evidence.”
21. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in Workmen v.
Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd. [Workmen v. Firestone
Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973 SCC
(L&S) 341] wherein the broad principle regarding holding of the
enquiry were spelt out as : (SCC pp. 827-29 & 831-32, paras 32 & 40-
41)
“32. From those decisions, the following principles broadly
emerge:
‘(1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon
the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a
dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of
the employer is justified.
(2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to
conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the
Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The
enquiry should not be an empty formality.
(3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and
the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the
evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction
to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate
body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be
justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse
or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or
mala fide.
(4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the
enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to
satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an
opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before
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justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce
evidence contra.
(5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the
Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima
facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of the
impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the
Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to
decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such
cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not
arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as
no enquiry.
(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence
placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken
only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry conducted by
an employer is found to be defective.
(7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should
straightaway, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a
dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no domestic
enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective.
(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the
opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the
Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate
stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power
to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce
evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of
both the management and the employee and to enable the Tribunal
itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct.
(9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry
conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a
Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered
with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so
harsh as to suggest victimisation.
(10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of
dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid
compensation is, as held by this Court in Panitole Tea Estate v.
Workmen [Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmen, (1971) 1 SCC 742] within
the judicial decision of a Labour Court or Tribunal.
40. Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases
where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the
Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for
the first time, the satisfaction under Section 11-A, about the guilt or
otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to
consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other.
Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a
finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from
that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved.
41. We are not inclined to accept the contentions advanced on
behalf of the employers that the stage for interference under Section
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11-A by the Tribunal is reached only when it has to consider the
punishment after having accepted the finding of guilt recorded by an
employer. It has to be remembered that a Tribunal may hold that the
punishment is not justified because the misconduct alleged and found
proved is such that it does not warrant dismissal or discharge. The
Tribunal may also hold that the order of discharge or dismissal is not
justified because the alleged misconduct itself is not established by the
evidence. To come to a conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to
reappraise the evidence for itself. Ultimately it may hold that the
misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved does not
warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge. That is why,
according to us, Section 11-A now gives full power to the Tribunal to
go into the evidence and satisfy itself on both these points. Now the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reappraise the evidence and come to its
conclusion enures to it when it has to adjudicate upon the dispute
referred to it in which an employer relies on the findings recorded by
him in a domestic enquiry. Such a power to appreciate the evidence
and come to its own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was
always recognised in a Tribunal when it was deciding a dispute on the
basis of evidence adduced before it for the first time. Both categories
are now put on a par by Section 11-A.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
10. The enunciation of law as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Sureshwati (Supra) clearly indicates that since the services of the petitioner
were terminated by the respondent without holding domestic inquiry, it was open
for the respondent to lead evidence before the Labour Court to establish the
factum of misconduct.
11. A perusal of the impugned award dated 01-06-2016 and the evidence
brought on record by the petitioner as well as the respondent clearly indicates
that the suspension of the petitioner vide order dated 01-11-2012 on account of
him being negligent in discharging duties was duly established. The incident of
the petitioner forcefully entering the office of MD of the respondent and
misbehaving with him by threatening and use of abusive language was duly
established before the Labour Court through Panchnama (Exhibit-D-3) signed by
a number of employees working along with the petitioner and the petitioner
admitted that he was not having any previous animosity or ill-will with the
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signatories of Panchnama so that they would put their signatures on the
Panchnama to falsely implicate the petitioner. The MD of the respondent,
namely, Vijayan Madhavan, appearred in the witness box and the petitioner was
afforded due opportunity to cross-examine him. However, the evidence led by
the MD, Sri Vijayan Madhavan, remained unrebutted even in the cross-
examination. Learned Labour Court recorded a finding of the fact that use of
abusive language and threat given by the petitioner to the MD, stood duly
proved, whereas the complaint made by the petitioner to the police authorities
(Exhibit P-1) did not mention use of any abusive language against the petitioner
by the MD. Learned Labour Court, on due marshalling of evidence led by the
parties, reached to the conclusion that the respondent has successfully
established through evidence the misconduct committed by the petitioner-
workman, and the explanation tendered by the petitioner regarding his
unauthorized absence on earlier occasion as well was found to be untrustworthy
by the Labour Court.
12. Insofar as allowing the amendment application filed by the respondent
vide order dated 6.1.2016 after the closure of evidence by the respondent is
concerned, by the said amendment, the respondent intended to plead the factum
of gainful employment of the petitioner after passing of the order of termination
and said order also granted liberty to the petitioner herein to rebut the said
contentions. In the considered opinion of this Court, no prejudice was caused to
the petitioner by allowing the said application for amendment filed by the
respondent.
13. Since the termination of petitioner was on the ground of misconduct
and his dues were sought to be settled by sending cheques on the last known
address of the petitioner through registered post and there is a finding recorded
by the Labour Court as regards refusal of the petitioner to accept the same, it is
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now not open for the petitioner to complain of non-settlement of dues.
14. In the considered opinion of this court, the award impugned in the
instant writ petition being based upon proper appreciation of evidence brought
on record by the rival parties, cannot be said to be palpably illegal, or suffering
from any jurisdictional error so as to warrant interference in exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The Apex
Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) held that in case, the view
taken by the Subordinate Court/ Tribunal is a probable view, then the same is
ordinarily not required to be interfered while exercising jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
15. In view of the above considerations, the petition filed by the petitioner
being bereft of merits is hereby dismissed.
16. All pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.
17. Original record of the Labour Court be sent back.
(AMIT SETH)
JUDGE
ar
ABDUR
Digitally signed by ABDUR RAHMAN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH AT
GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=d604b5a66b413c436e6af99c6fe547304e1bc26d2b510
cc133f1b56faa63e77b, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
RAHMAN
BENCH AT GWALIOR,CID – 7063577, postalCode=474001,
st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=1b0ea1b496c965067285a628b81ae07b60d3420
48b7853e6108263f1ddcc0f50, cn=ABDUR RAHMAN
Date: 2026.02.18 05:36:29 -08’00’
