Delhi High Court – Orders
Jasdan Energy Private Limited & Anr vs Inox Wind Limited & Anr on 20 March, 2026
$~40
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 56/2026
JASDAN ENERGY PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
.....Decree Holders
Through: Mr. Amit Sibal, Senior
Advocate along with Mr.
Amardeep Singh, Ms. Ashima
Obhan, Ms. Yogita Rathore,
Mr. Ankit Handa, Mr. Darpan
Sachdeva and Mr. Aiman Klee,
Advocates.
versus
INOX WIND LIMITED & ANR. .....Judgement Debtors
Through: Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Senior
Adv. along with Mr. Sonal
Kumar Singh, Mr. Ratik
Sharma, Ms. Muskan Agarwal
and Mr. Yashvardhan Singh
Gohil, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
ORDER
% 20.03.2026
EX. APP. NO. 371/2026 (For Disclosure of Assets by the JDs)
1. The present Application has been filed under Order XXI Rule
41 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
[“CPC“], seeking a direction to the Judgment Debtors to disclose their
assets on affidavit.
2. For the reasons stated in the Application, the same is allowed.
3. The Judgment Debtors are directed to file affidavit disclosing
their list of assets as per Form 16 Appendix E under Order XXI Rule
OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 56/2026 Page 1 of 10
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41(2) of the CPC, within a period of six (06) weeks from today.
4. The Application stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
EX. APP. NO. 372/2026 (For Summoning of the Entire Record
filed by the parties)
1. The present Application has been filed under Section 151 of the
CPC, 1908, seeking directions for summoning the entire record filed
by the parties before the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
2. For the reasons stated in the Application, the same is allowed.
3. Registry is directed to requisition the entire Arbitral record,
which shall be indexed and bookmarked, including documents
consisting thereof, and be placed in the Court’s record, before the next
date of hearing.
4. The Application stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
EX. APP. NO. 373/2026 (For Exemption)
1. The present Application has been filed under Section 151 of the
CPC, seeking exemption from filing the synopsis and list of dates
within the permissible page limit of five (05) pages.
2. The reasons stated in the application fail to disclose sufficient
ground to allow this application; accordingly, the same stands
dismissed.
3. The Decree Holder is directed to take the necessary steps to
place on record the synopsis and list of dates adhering to the Delhi
High Court Rules (Original Side), 2018, before the next date of
hearing.
4. The present Application stands disposed of in the above terms.
OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 56/2026
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 36 of the
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Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“Act”], read with Order XXI
and Section 151 of the CPC, 1908, on behalf of the Decree Holders
seeking enforcement of the arbitral Award dated 11.12.2025 passed by
the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
2. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Judgment
Debtors, on advance notice, raises a preliminary objection to the
maintainability of the present Petition. It is submitted that an
application under Section 33 of the Act is presently pending
adjudication before the learned Arbitral Tribunal and, therefore, the
present Petition under Section 36 of the Act is premature and not
maintainable. In support of the said submission, reliance is placed on
certain judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
3. In particular, learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. v.
Sandeep Gaurav1, and draws the attention of this Court to paragraphs
25, 26, 30, 32, 34 and 35 thereof, to contend that until the application
under Section 33 of the Act is adjudicated upon by the Arbitral
Tribunal, the arbitral award cannot be said to have attained finality for
the purposes of enforcement.
4. It is thus urged by the learned senior counsel for the Judgement
Debtors that, in view of the legal position as laid down in the aforesaid
judgment, the present petition under Section 36 of the Act would not
be maintainable at this stage. The relevant paragraphs of Geojit
Financial Services (supra) are reproduced hereinunder:
“25. The natural corollary of the aforesaid is that unless and until a
decision on the request under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is made,
which may or may not have culminated into any correction or1
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1811OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 56/2026 Page 3 of 10
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interpretation or rendition of an additional award, there can be no
effective occasion for a party otherwise aggrieved by the said
award to apply for the setting aside of the same under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act.
26. Thus, what is material for the purpose of computation of
limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3) of the 1996 Act, where
a request was made in terms of Section 33, is not whether such
request fell within the purview of the said provision or not, but
only the factum that such request was made in the manner
delineated under Section 33 i.e., it was made “within thirty days
from the receipt of the arbitral award” and “with notice to the
other party”.
*****
30. The aforesaid may be looked at from one another angle. Even if
we assume for a moment, that where an application under Section
33 of the 1996 Act, is not entertained for want of maintainability or
for reason of falling beyond the parameters of the provision, the
same, in such scenario, would not amount to passing of an award in
terms of Section(s) 31 read with 33 of the 1996 Act, and thus there
would be no distinct award in existence from what was originally
passed by the arbitral tribunal prior to the making of the request
under Section 33, even then, the interpretation that found favour
with the High Court in the impugned order, to our minds, cannot be
regarded to have laid down the correct proposition of law.
32. In consonance with this principle, it must be said that the
reason for dismissal of an application filed under Section 33 of the
1996 Act cannot form a yardstick for determining when limitation
would commence. Therefore, as provided in sub-section (3) of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act, in a case where a request or an
application is made under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, the
limitation period to later seek the setting aside of the award can
only commence from the date when the application is disposed of,
for whatever reasons.
*****
34. However, we are of the considered opinion that the decision
of Damani Construction (supra) is not applicable and is
distinguishable. A close reading of the aforesaid decision would
reveal that in the said case, the appellant therein had never formally
moved an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, but rather
had only addressed a letter to the arbitrator, requesting it inter-alia,
to review the award passed by it and seeking ancillary
clarifications which did not concern the contents of the award so
passed. It is in this background that this Court in Damani
Construction (supra), in the absence of any formal application or
any prayer contemplated under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, refused
to treat the letter addressed by the appellant therein as an
application thereunder. It however, does not mean that where a
party moves an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act
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within the limitation period prescribed therein and with notice to
the other party, that the same would nevertheless not be treated as
an application under the said provision, merely because what is
sought under the guise of ‘correction’ or ‘modification’ is outside
the ambit of the Section 33. It would still continue to be an
application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act for the limited extent
of computation of the period of limitation under Section 34, as long
as it fulfils the two conditions prescribed under Section 33, as
already discussed by us.
CONCLUSION
35. We summarize our conclusion as under: –
(i) Where an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act has not
been filed, the legislature was conscious enough to state that it
would be the date of the receipt of the award which would earmark
the commencement of limitation for an application for setting aside
of an award in terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Whereas, in the
case where an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act has
been filed, the legislature was conscious enough to lay down that it
would be the date of disposal of such request or application, that
would be the starting point for calculation of limitation.
(ii) Where such an application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is
filed, irrespective of whether the arbitral tribunal upon considering
such application, either makes or does not make any correction or
modification or choose to render or to not render an additional
award in terms of Section 33 of the Act, 1996, the starting point for
the period of limitation for challenging the same under Section 34
as per sub-section (3) would be the date of disposal of such
application under Section 33 by the arbitral tribunal, as long as the
application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act had been filed within
the prescribed period of limitation under sub-section (1)
thereto AND with notice to the other party. Any other
interpretation to the contrary, would do violence to plain and
unambiguous language used in Section 34 sub-section (3) of the
Act, 1996.
(iii) In the aforesaid scenario, neither the date of passing of the
original award or date of receipt of the same by the party nor the
date of receipt of the corrected award or date of receipt of the
decision of the arbitrator disposing the application under Section
33 of the 1996 Act is of any significance. What is of significance,
under Section 34 sub-section (3) of the Act, 1996 is the date on
which the application or request under Section 33 came to be
disposed by the arbitral tribunal.
(iv) In the same breath, where a request is made under Section 33
of the 1996 Act, it is immaterial for the purpose of computation of
limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3) whether such request
fell within the purview of the said provision or not. What is
material is only that such request was made in the manner
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delineated under Section 33 i.e., it fulfilled the twin conditions of
being made; (I) “within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral
award” and (II) “with notice to the other party” stipulated therein.”
5. Per contra, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
Decree Holder firstly relies upon the judgment rendered by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court in Sushil Pandit & Anr. v. Adsert
Web Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.2, particularly paragraph nos. 3, 14, 15
and 33, which read as under:
3. Section 33(1)(b) in express terms states that within 30 days from
the rcceipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time has
been agreed upon by the parties and if so agreed by the parties, a
party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral
tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the
award. It is, therefore, clear and this position is not even contested
by the respondent that an application under Section 33(1)(b) of the
Act to seek interpretation of a specific point or a part of the award
can be made only by the agreement of the parties, and not
otherwise. When the said application dated 23.06.2008 was moved
by the respondent, the petitioner responded vide a letter dated
25.06.2008. The said letter addressed to the learned arbitrator, with
copy to the respondent, stated as follows:
“Dear Madam,
With respect to the captioned matter, on 23.06.2008 we
have been served with a copy of an application under
Section 33(1)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 (hereinafter “the Act”) filed by the counsel for the
respondents.
At the very outset we humbly submit that the instant
application filed by the respondents is not
maintainable as the respondents have failed to comply
with the procedure stipulated under Section 33(1)(b) of
the Act. In this regard, we wish to state that the instant
application is not filed with the agreement of the
claimants and that the claimants do not agree to the
filing of the same by the respondents. As such the
instant application merits rejection at the threshold.
Without prejudice to the foregoing, in case the learned
arbitrator decides to consider the instant application
dated 23.06.2008 filed by the respondents, the claimants
humbly crave leave to file their reply to the application2
2011 SCC OnLine Del 3452.
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and also make appropriate submissions in a hearing before
the learned arbitrator.
We shall be ever obliged to comply with the directions of
the learned arbitrator on the present application.
Thanking you
Yours sincerely,
Sd/-
For New Delhi Law Offices (South)”
(emphasis supplied)
*****
14. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel and
perused the impugned order and the documents relied upon by the
parties and considered their respective submissions, I am of the
view that the present petition is maintainable and the impugned
order is patently illegal and cannot be sustained.
15. As I have already noticed, an application under Section
33(1)(b) of the Act could not be moved without the consent of all
the parties concerned. The learned arbitrator decided to entertain
the respondent’s application under Section 33(1)(b) vide order
dated 02.07.2008 without addressing the express objection raised
by the petitioner to its maintainability (as the petitioner had not
given and was not willing to give his consent) and only on account
of the reason that a specific point had been raised by the
respondent as to whether compensation has to be paid by the
respondent to the claimant upon transfer of their entire
shareholding or otherwise. According to her, that was a reason
good enough to grant a clarification. This clearly shows that the
arbitrator, while deciding to grant the clarification sought by the
respondent, completely misdirected herself and brushed aside the
specific objection of the petitioner without even considering the
same in her order dated 02.07.2008.
*****
33. Mr. Chaudhary also sought to defend the order dated
11.10.2008 passed by the learned arbitrator by attempting to make
submissions on merits. Mr. Hazarika also had his own submissions
to make in response to the said endeavour made by Mr. Chaudhary.
However, I have not entered into that controversy at all, as, in my
view, the learned arbitrator had no jurisdiction at all to proceed to
entertain and deal with the respondent’s application under Section
33(1)(b) of the Act, as the petitioner had expressly denied consent
to vest jurisdiction in the tribunal to entertain the respondent’s
application to grant clarification/interpretation in respect of the
award.”
6. Further reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in
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CMI Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr.3, particularly
paragraph nos. 8 and 18 thereof, which read as under:
“8. Firstly, the petitioner has failed to point out that it had been agreed
by the parties that either of them may request the arbitral tribunal to give
interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. Such an agreement is
necessary to move an application before the arbitral tribunal under section
33(1)(b) of the Act. This is so evident from the opening words of clause
(b), which reads “if so agreed by the parties … … … “. Pertinently, the
requirement of a specific agreement to invoke section 33(1)(b) stands out
in contradistinction with the absence of any such requirement for a party to
invoke clause (a) of section 33(1) of the Act. The arbitration agreement
between the parties has not been placed before me. However, I have called
for the record of Arbitration Application No.135/1999 (preferred under
Section 11 of the Act by the petitioner) and perused clause 20 of the
General (Commercial) Conditions of Contract, which contains the
Arbitration Agreement between the parties. No right has been conferred on
the parties to invoke Section 33(1)(b) of the Act. No subsequent agreement
in terms of Section 33(1)(b) has been pleaded or produced by the
petitioner. Consequently, the application preferred by the petitioner before
the arbitral tribunal under section 33(1)(b) of the Act was not maintainable
at all.
*****
18. A party cannot seek to extend the period of limitation for preferring
the objections merely by filing a belated application under Section 33 of
the Act before the Arbitrator, or by filing an application under Section 33
of the Act which is not maintainable in the facts of a given case. If the
submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner were to be accepted, it
would lead to an absurd result, as is evident from the facts of this case as
well. A party who has failed to file its objections within the period of
limitation prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act, would then move an
application under Section 33 of the Act before the learned Arbitrator even
when there may be no justification for it and wait for its disposal and soon
after its disposal, the party may move an application for setting aside the
award, which otherwise has got time barred, as has been done in the
present case. Therefore, the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel
for the petitioner is rejected.”
7. It is also submitted by the learned Senior counsel for the Decree
Holder that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Geojit
Financial Services Ltd. (supra) lays down a general proposition and
does not specifically address the applicability of Section 33(1)(b) of
the Act. Learned senior counsel contends that, in light of the aforesaid
3
2010:DHC:3342
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judgments of the Coordinate Benches of this Court, an application
purportedly filed under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act, which falls
beyond the scope of the provision, may itself be treated as not
maintainable, non-est, and without jurisdiction. Consequently, it is
contended that the mere pendency of such an application would not
operate as a bar to the maintainability of the present petition under
Section 36 of the Act.
8. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and has
also perused the material as well as the judgments relied upon by
them.
9. At the outset, this Court is of the opinion that the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. (supra)
does not specifically advert to the scope and import of Section
33(1)(b) of the Act in a scenario which would be applicable to the
present facts and circumstances.
10. At this juncture, this Court finds it apposite to reproduce the
portion of Section 33(1)(b) of the Act, as the same is necessary for the
proper adjudication of the present case:
“33. Correction and interpretation of award; additional award.
–
(1) Within thirty days from the receipt of the arbitral award, unless
another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties–
(a) ***
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other
party, may request the arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a
specific point or part of the award.
***”
(emphasis added)
11. A plain reading of Section 33(1)(b) of the Act indicates that a
request for interpretation of a specific point or part of the award is
maintainable only where the parties have agreed to such a course. The
OMP (ENF.) (COMM.) 56/2026 Page 9 of 10
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provision thus contemplates a prior meeting of minds between the
parties, pursuant to which, upon notice to the other party, a request
may be made to the Arbitral Tribunal seeking interpretation of a
particular portion of the award.
12. In the present case, the aforesaid aspect does not appear to have
been considered in the judgment relied upon by the Judgment Debtor
in Geojit Financial Services Ltd. (supra). In these circumstances, and
having regard to the judgments rendered by the Coordinate Benches of
this Court in Sushil Pandit & Anr. (supra) and CMI Ltd. (supra), this
Court is inclined to follow the view taken therein.
13. This Court is therefore of the considered opinion that the
pendency of a unilateral application under Section 33(1)(b) of the Act
without agreement by the other party would not render the present
Petition under Section 36 of the Act non-maintainable.
14. The preliminary objection raised by the Judgment Debtors is,
accordingly, rejected.
15. Since the arbitral Award in question is in the nature of a money
decree, this Court is of the view that the Decree Holder ought not to be
deprived of the fruits of the award.
16. Accordingly, the Judgment Debtors are directed to deposit the
entire awarded amount, along with up-to-date interest, within a period
of six (06) weeks from today.
17. Accordingly, list on 13.05.2026.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MARCH 20, 2026/JYH/kr/sg
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