inkinccorporation@gmail.com Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jarnail Singh vs Kulbir Singh on 27 February, 2026
Author: Anoop Chitkara
Bench: Anoop Chitkara
CRR-3495-2018 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRR-3495-2018
JUDGEMENT JUDGEMENT OPERATIVE UPLOADED ON
RESERVED ON PRONOUNCED PART PRO-
ON NOUNCED OR
FULL
06.02.2026 27.02.2026 FULL PRO- 27.02.2026
NOUNCED
Jarnail Singh ......Petitioner
Vs.
Kulbir Singh ......Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present: Mr. Kirpal Singh Thakur, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Kashav Chadha, Advocate and
Ms. Tamana Singla, Advocate
for the respondent.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA J.
Criminal No. 61 of 12.05.2012
Complaint NACT 121 of 2014
Date of order: 02.02.2015
Criminal No.RT-37/03.03.2015/08.07.2015
Appeal CIS No.CRA/98/2015
CNR No.PBSA01-001054-2015
Date of decision: 11.09.2018
1. The petitioner, who stands convicted by the trial court as well as the Sessions court,
for the commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881, (NIA) has come up before this Court under Section 482, Code of Criminal
Procedure, (CrPC) for quashing the proceedings because the parties have compromised the
matter.
2. The petitioner faced criminal prosecution by the private respondent because of the
dishonor of the cheque in question.
3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that matter stands compromised between the
parties and refer to compromise dated 01.10.2018.
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4. Counsel for the respondent submits that nothing is due towards petitioner and he
has no objection if the judgment of conviction and order of sentence are set aside.
5. The jurisprudence behind the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is that the business
transactions are to be honoured. The legislative intention is not to make people suffer
incarceration only because their cheques bounced. These proceedings are to recover the
cheque amount by showing teeth of a penal clause. Now, as per the above-mentioned
report, the parties have settled their disputes and have compromised the matter.
6. It would be relevant to refer to the judicial precedents where based on the
compromise, the convictions were set aside:
a). In Mohd. Rafi v. State of U.P., 1998(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 455, Supreme
Court, the convict had gone to Hon’ble Supreme Court against his conviction by
the trial Court under Sections 323 and 325 of IPC, which was upheld by Sessions
and High Court. After that, the convict and the victim entered into an out-of-court
compromise. Hon’ble Supreme Court analyzed the parties’ affidavits filed in
support of the compromise and observed that parties had willingly and voluntarily
settled the matter. To maintain good relations, Hon’ble Supreme Court granted
permission to them to compound the said offenses and order the acquittal.
b). In Parameswari v. Vennila, (2000) 10 SCC 348, the appellants before
Hon’ble Supreme Court had been convicted under Section 494 read with Section
109 of IPC. After that, they arrived at a settlement with the complainant, in the
presence of panchayatdars of their village, and placed on record the duly signed
compromise, and parties filed a joint application for permission to compound the
offences. While observing that the offence involved was compoundable with the
wife’s consent and permission of the Court, Hon’ble Supreme Court granted
permission to compound the offence, and resultantly the appellants stood acquitted
of the offence for which they have been held guilty.
c). In Ramachandra Singh v. State of Bihar, 2003(10) SCC 234, Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[5]. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and the state and
taken into, consideration the fact and circumstances of the case. In
view of the compromise it appears that grievance, if any, of the
complainant KamleshKumari Devi is over. Indeed in view of the
compromise the accused appellants stand acquitted of the offence
under Section 323 Indian Penal Code. In such circumstances the
sentence passed by the trial Court and maintained by the High Court
deserves to be modified so far as offence under Section 498A Indian
Penal Code is concerned.
[6]. The appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of appellant Nos. 1
and 2 under Section 498A Indian Penal Code is maintained, but the
sentence of imprisonment passed on them for offence under Section
498-A is reduced to the period already undergone. In so far as
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appellant No. 3 is concerned, in our opinion, it will meet the ends of
justice if he is dealt with under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders
Act, 1958, and released on probation of good conduct. The sentence
of imprisonment passed on appellant No. 3 is set aside and it is
directed that he shall be released on his entering into a bond with one
surety in an amount of Rs. 5000/- to appear before the trial Court and
receive sentence on being called upon during a period of one year and
in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
d). In K. Kandasamy v. K.P.M.V.P. Chandrasekaran, (2005) 4 SCC 349, based
on the compromise, Hon’ble Supreme Court acquitted the appellants/convicts of
the offence under Section 500 Indian Penal Code.
e). In Khursheed and others v. State of U.P, Appeal (crl.) 1302 of 2007, decided
on 28-9-2007, the appellants were convicted by Trial Court under sections 325, 323
read with 34 IPC. Their appeal against conviction was dismissed by the Sessions
Court and revision petition was also dismissed by High Court. The convicts
approached the Apex Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court held,
[12]. An offence of causing grievous hurt punishable under Section 325
IPC is covered by sub- section (2) of Section 320 of the Code. It is thus
clear that an offence punishable under Section 325 IPC is also
compounded with the permission of the Court.
[13]. The parties have compounded the offences. As stated in the
compromise deed, Gurfan Ahmad, complainant and his mother
Kulsoom @ Bhoori (injured) did not want any action against the
appellants (accused). The parties are neighbours, their houses are
situated adjacent to each other and they have been living peacefully
for last many years and there is no dispute among them. It is further
stated that to continue sweet relationship and harmony, complainant
side does not want to take any action against the accused. A prayer is,
therefore, made to accept the compromise.
[14]. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and
considering the Deed of Compromise and having heard learned
counsel for the parties, in our opinion, ends of justice would be met if
we grant necessary permission for compounding an offence
punishable under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC as required
by sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code. The offence punishable
under Section 323 IPC has already been compounded by the parties.
[15]. Sub-section (8) of Section 320 states that the compounding of
offence under the section shall have an effect of acquittal of the
accused with whom the offence has been compounded. The resultant
effect of compounding of offences would be that the accused should
be acquitted. In other words, once the offences have been
compounded and the requisite permission is granted by the Court, the
accused must be acquitted.
f). In Dr. Arvind Barsaul etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 794, after the
conviction under section 498-A IPC, the victim wife and the convict husband had
compromised their disputes and sought setting aside of conviction based on the
compromise. Hon’ble Supreme Court holds as follows,
[10]. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The parties have
compromised and the complainant Smt. Sadhna Madnawat categorically
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submitted that she does not want to prosecute the appellants. Even otherwise
also, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of
justice, in our opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse
of the process of law. We, in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the
Constitution, deem it proper to quash the criminal proceedings pending against
the appellants emanating from the FIR lodged under section 498A Indian Penal
Code. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
g). In Manoj & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr. A No. 1530 of 2008,
Hon’ble Supreme Court, based on compromise, accepted the compounding of the
offence under section 324 IPC and acquitted the appellants.
h). In Md. Abdul Sufan Laskar v. State of Assam, (2008) 9 SCC 333, based on
a compromise, Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence under
section 324 IPC. Hon’ble Supreme Court took similar views in Mathura Singh v.
State of U.P., 2009(13) SCC 420 and in Gampa Govindu v. State of Andhra Pradesh
thr. Public Prosecutor, 2008(sup) Cri. L.R. 440: Law Finder Doc Id # 521064.
i). In Hirabhai Jhaverbhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 6 SCC 688, permitting
the parties to compromise the conviction under section 324 IPC, Hon’ble Supreme
Court holds, “The injured complainant and two other injured are permitted to
compound the offence punishable under Section 324 Indian Penal Code. In view of
sub-section (8) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the composition
of offence under section 324 Indian Penal Code shall have the effect of an acquittal
of the appellant with whom the offence has been compounded.”
j). In Surat Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (Now Uttarakhand), 2012(12) SCC
772, Hon’ble Supreme Court, based on compromise, permitted the parties to
compound their offences under section 354 and 506 IPC.
k). in Jeetu Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 11 SCC 489 it is the duty of the
appellate Court to arrive at its own independent conclusion after examining the
material on record. This exercise has however to be conducted after considering the
material on record. There is no power conferred by the Code either on the appellate
Court/revisional Court to acquit an accused convicted for a commission of a non-
compoundable offence only on the ground that compromise has been entered into
between the convict and the informant/complainant.
l). In Padmalayan v. Sarasan, (2014) 13 SCC 798, Hon’ble Supreme Court
permitted post-conviction compromise for offence under section 324 IPC.
m). In Sathiyamoorthy v. State, 2014(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 867, after observing
that after the compromise they have been staying peacefully in the village. It is in
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the interest of both sides to bury the hatchet and lead a peaceful life, Hon’ble
Supreme Court holds,
[6]. Offences under Sections 341 and 325 are compoundable. In view
of the settlement they can be permitted to be compounded. However,
offences under Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC are not
compoundable. Hence, permission to compound them cannot be
granted. However, since the accused and the victim have entered into
a compromise, we feel that it would be in the interest of both sides to
reduce the sentence awarded to the accused under Sections 325 and
341 of the IPC to the sentence already undergone.
[7]. In Ram Lal and anr. v. State of J & K, 2000(1) R.C.R.(Criminal)
92 : (1999)2 SCC 213 the accused were convicted for offence under
Section 326 of the IPC, which is non-compoundable. Looking to the
fact that the parties had arrived at a settlement and victim had no
grievance, this Court reduced the sentence for the offence under
Section 326 to sentence already undergone by the appellants-accused.
We are inclined to follow similar course.
8. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The offences under
Sections 341 and 325 of the IPC, for which the appellants are
convicted, are permitted to be compounded because they are
compoundable. The appellants are acquitted of the said offences. The
appellants are stated to have undergone more than six months
imprisonment. So far as offences under Sections 148 and 149 of the
IPC are concerned, the conviction of the appellants for the said
offences is reduced to the sentence already undergone by them subject
to the appellants paying L 30,000/- as compensation to victim-
Murugesan. Compensation be paid within three months from the date
of this judgment.
n). In Deva Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2014:INSC:505 [Para 5], (2014) 13
SCC 275, the appellant was convicted by Trial Court under section 420 IPC. His
appeal against conviction was dismissed by the Sessions Court and revision petition
was also dismissed by High Court. The convict approached the Apex Court and
Hon’ble Supreme Court held,
[5]. We are informed that out of two years imprisonment the appellant
has undergone six months imprisonment. Offence under Section 420
of the IPC is compoundable with the permission of the court by the
person who is cheated. Since the parties are related to each other and
they have decided to accord a quietus to their disputes and live
peacefully, we permit them to compound the offence. Hence, the
offence under Section 420 of the IPC for which the appellant was
convicted is compounded because it is compoundable with the
permission of the court. The appellant is acquitted of the said charge.
o). In Ravinder Kaur v. Anil Kumar, 2015:INSC:301, (2015) 8 SCC 286,
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a matter arising out of conviction, permitted the
compounding of offence under section 494 IPC.
p). In Shankar Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, Cr.A 982 of 2017 Law Finder
Doc Id # 877762, Hon’ble Supreme Court while permitting post-conviction
compromise, by holding the offence to fall under section 324 IPC, held,
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[8]. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see
no reasons to refuse permission to the parties who have compromised
the offences which were compoundable under the Code as it stood in
1998. If it is so, compounding can be permitted and the appellants-
accused can be acquitted in view of Section 320 (8) of the Cr.P.C.,
which expressly enacts that where the composition of an offence
under this section is recorded by the court, it shall have effect of an
acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been
compounded. We order accordingly.
q). In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, 2013:PHHC:026805-DB [Para 17, 21], 2013
(4) RCR (Cri) 102, a Division Bench of this Court holds,
[17]. The magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High
Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code with a view to
prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice, however, is
wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation
to not only the non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar
under Section 320 Criminal Procedure Code but such a power, in our
considered view, is exercisable at any stage save that there is no
express bar and invoking of such power is fully justified on facts and
circumstances of the case.
[21]. In the light of these peculiar facts and circumstances where not
only the parties but their close relatives (including daughter and son-
in-law of respondent No. 2) have also supported the amicable
settlement, we are of the considered view that the negation of the
compromise would disharmonize the relationship and cause a
permanent rift amongst the family members who are living together
as a joint family. Non-acceptance of the compromise would also lead
to denial of complete justice which is the very essence of our justice
delivery system. Since there is no statutory embargo against invoking
of power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code after conviction
of an accused by the trial Court and during pendency of appeal against
such conviction, it appears to be a fit case to invoke the inherent
jurisdiction and strike down the proceedings subject to certain
safeguards.
7. The present matter relates to an economic offence and the penal teeth are with an
end object of recovery of legally enforceable debt or admitted liability.
8. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642,
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when
parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
9. This Court has powers under Code of Criminal Procedure/BNSS 2023 to interfere in
this kind of matter. In the entirety of the case and judicial precedents, I am of the considered
opinion that the continuation of these proceedings will not serve any fruitful purpose
whatsoever. Given above, because of the compromise, this is a fit case where this Court
under BNSS (CrPC) supported by Section 147 of the NIA is invoked to disrupt the
prosecution and quash the proceedings mentioned above, as such, offence is compoundable,
judgment of conviction and order of sentence is set aside. Petitioner is acquitted of the
charges.
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10. Given the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Damodar S.
Prabhu v Sayed Babalal, (2010) 5 SCC 663, the law is well settled that when the entire
money is paid, then the complainant cannot have any objection to such compromise, and
15% of the cheque amount is to be paid by the accused to the concerned State Legal
Services Authority.
11. Ld. counsel submits that in case the 15% compensation amount could not be
deposited, then in such a situation, the time to do so may be extended and prayed that in
case it is beyond the financial capacity of the petitioner to pay the 15% amount. It may be
dispensed with or reduced after considering the petitioner’s paying capacity, family, and
financial liabilities.
12. The amount of cheque in question was Rs. 8,75,000/- and 15% of which comes out
to be Rs. 1,31,250/-. This compounding is subject to the petitioner depositing the amount
of Rs. 1,31,250/- on or before 31.03.2026, with the concerned wing of High Court Legal
Aid, failing which this entire order, including compounding, shall automatically stand
recalled under Section 403 and Section 528 BNSS 2023, and this petition shall be posted
for hearing on merits.
13. In case, after taking into account the family and financial liabilities, it is beyond the
petitioner’s financial capacity to pay the 15% amount, then in such a situation, it shall be
open for the petitioner to apply to section 482 CrPC by placing on record the bank
statements from 01.04.2025 till the date of all bank accounts, all fixed deposits, DEMAT
account numbers, the current market value of jewelry, sovereign metals, all precious
articles, held either individually or jointly, and cash-in-hand. After analyzing the petition’s
paying capacity, the court shall consider reducing or dispensing with 15% of the amount
mentioned earlier.
14. In extraordinary circumstances, the petitioner may approach this Court for an
extension of time to deposit the compounding fee. Petitioner to file the proof of deposit
before the trial Court within the aforementioned time. The bail bonds of the petitioner shall
stand accordingly discharged subject the compliance. On failure to comply with the
conditions mentioned above, the petition shall be listed for a final hearing, and the quashing
order shall automatically stand recalled without any further reference to this Court.
15. Petition allowed. Judgment of conviction/order of sentence dated 02.02.2015, are set
side. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
27.02.2026
Anju rani
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: No.
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