Jharkhand High Court
Jaiki Paradhi @ Jaiki @ Jk vs The Union Of India Through National … on 10 April, 2026
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2026:JHHC:10397-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.170 of 2026
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Jaiki Paradhi @ Jaiki @ JK, S/o Patamidi Paradi, Aged- 35
years, R/0 village- Hirapur, P.O. & P.S.- Barhi, District -
Katni, State- Madhya Pradesh
... Appellant
Versus
The Union of India through National Investigation Agency
... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellant : Mr. Ankit Apurva, Advocate
Ms. Arti Kumari, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
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C.A.V on 06.04.2026 Pronounced on 10/04/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. The instant appeal, preferred under Section 21(4) of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, is directed against
the order dated 10.10.2025 passed by learned AJC-XVI-
cum-Spl. Judge, NIA, Ranchi in Misc. Criminal Application
No.1719 of 2025, [Special (NIA) Case No.02/2021]
corresponding to R.C. No.02/2021/NIA/RNC, arising out of
Toklo P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 registered for the offence
under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353, 120B, 121, 121A, 307,
302 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4
of Explosive Substances Act, Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act
1908 and under Sections 16, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful
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Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, whereby and whereunder,
the prayer for regular bail of the appellant has been
rejected.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the prosecution case leading to this
Criminal Appeal is that the superintendent of Police
Chaibasa, West Singhbhum, received information from
various sources regarding the movement of Anal Da @
Toofan Da @ Patriram Manjhi and Maharaj Pramanik @
Raj Pramanik, both senior cadres of Central committee
of CPI Maoist, along with other cadres of their groups
were roaming in the hilly area of Lanji Mountain, under
Toklo Police Station, District- West Singhbhum and
planning to execute a big incident against security
forces and disrupt the development and direction of
Superintendent of Police, Chaibasa and senior officials,
accordingly one special operation was launched from
the Darkada (Jharjhara) base camp by the troops of
Jharkhand Jaguar AG-II and C/197 CRPF BN.
3. It is further alleged that when informant along with
search parties reached near slope of Lanji Hill, the
troops of Jharkhand Jaguar AG II were on front and
leading the operation and troops of CRPF/ 197 BN was
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moving behind the Jharkhand Jaguar AG-II. Suddenly,
at about 8.30 hours a heavy blast took place from the
left flank approx. 100-150 meters on the hill from the
base of Lanji Hill. In retaliation to the blast six rounds
were fired by Constable Vijay Yadav of Jharkhand
Jaguar towards the hill for his self-defence when the
troops heard the sound of blast all the operation team
took position for a while.
4. In the meantime, Section Commander of the
Jharkhand Jaguar informed through wireless set that
an IED blast has taken place and five jawans of his
team and one Jawan of CRPF got injured and out of
them three become martyred and rest injured were
rescued to Medica hospital Ranchi. Later on, one head
constable also attained martyrdom after reaching
Medica hospital, Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. Accordingly, a case was registered on the basis of
written report made by Sub-inspector of police Ramdeo
Yadav as Toklo P.S. Case No.09 of 2021 under Sections
147, 148, 149, 353, 120B, 121, 121A, 307, 302 and
333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4 of
Explosive Substances Act, Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act
1908 and under Sections 16, 20, 38 & 39 of the
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Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (UA(P) Act
1967) against the thirty three named accused persons
along with 20-25 unknown members of banned
terrorist Organisation i.e. CPI (Maoist).
6. Later on, considering the gravity of the offence,
Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India vide
order dated 20.03.2021 directed National Investigation
Agency (NIA), Ranchi to take over the investigation of
the Toklo P.S.Case No.09 of 2021.
7. In compliance to the directions of the Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India, (Order No.
F.No.11011/25 dated 20.3.3021), NIA, Ranchi re-
registered the aforesaid case as RC-02/2021/ NIA/RNC
dated 24.03.2021 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353,
120B, 121, 121A, 307, 302 and 333 of the Indian Penal
Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4 of Explosive Substances Act,
Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act 1908 and under Sections
16, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act 1967 (UA(P) Act 1967) against the accused persons.
8. After obtaining the administrative approval of the
competent authority the case docket and case exhibits
were transferred to the NIA by the Investigating agency
and accordingly investigation was taken up by the NIA.
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9. Later on, it is surfaced that the present appellant was
arrested in connection with another case being
Kharsawa P.S. Case no. 105/2020 and he was in jail.
Accordingly, the present appellant was produced and
remanded in the instant case on 31.07.2021.
10. On 07.09.2021 charge-sheet was submitted
against 19 accused persons and investigation
continued further against the two remanded accused
persons including the present appellant.
11. The appellant had preferred Misc. Cr.
Application No.308 of 2022 before the NIA Special
Court, Ranchi but the same has been rejected vide
order dated 04.05.2022 against which the Appellant
preferred Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 383 of 2023 before
this Court but the same was dismissed as withdrawn
on 12.04.2023.
12. Consequently, the above-named appellant had
again preferred the regular bail application vide Misc.
Cr. Application No.1284 of 2023 before the NIA Special
Court, Ranchi for regular bail but the same had been
rejected vide order dated 10.05.2023 against which the
present appellant has preferred an appeal being
Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023 has been filed
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but vide order dated 10.01.2024 the same has also
been rejected on merit by this Court.
13. Thereafter, the present appellant had again
preferred an application being Criminal Misc.
Application No.2127 of 2024 for bail before the Special
Court which was again dismissed on 29.07.2024
against which the present appellant had preferred
Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1277 of 2024 but vide order
dated 22.10.2024 the same had also been dismissed by
this Court on merit.
14. Thereafter, the present appellant had again
preferred an application being Criminal Misc.
Application No. 1719 of 2025 for bail before the Special
Court which was again dismissed on 10.10.2025,
against which the present appellant had preferred the
instant Criminal Appeal.
Argument on behalf of the learned counsel for the
appellant:
15. It has been contended on behalf of appellant that
earlier the prayer for regular bail of the appellant has been
rejected by this Court on merit in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141
of 2023 vide order dated 10th January, 2024 and Cr. Appeal
(DB) No. 1277 of 2024 vide order dated 22.10.2024.
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16. Prayer for regular bail has been renewed before the
learned trial court on the ground of prolonged custody and
delay trial. According to the appellant, altogether 169
witnesses are to be examined but still only 37 witnesses
have been examined and as such by making reference of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the prayer has been
made for renewal of regular bail, before the learned AJC-
XVI-cum-Spl. Judge, NIA, Ranchi but the same was
dismissed vide order dated 10.10.2025 without taking into
consideration the aforesaid facts.
17. The order passed by learned AJC-XVI-cum-Spl.
Judge, NIA, Ranchi is under challenge by filing the instant
appeal.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant has further
submitted that altogether 169 witnesses are to be examined
out of which only 37 witnesses, the day when the instant
appeal was filed, has been examined and as per
instruction, and as such there is no likelihood of
conclusion of the trial at an early date, hence keeping the
appellant in judicial custody since 31.07.2021, it will
amount to violation of principle as laid down under Article
21 of the Constitution of India.
19. Submission has been made that the impugned
order passed by the learned trial court is against the weight
of evidence collected during the investigation and without
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application of judicial mind and as such the same deserves
to be set aside. The name of the appellant has come only on
the confessional statement of co-accused and this appellant
has been involved by way of threat and torture, which has
no evidentiary value in the eye of law.
20. It has been submitted that the appellant is in
custody since year 2021 and, as such, taking into
consideration the long custody and probable delay in
conclusion of trial, it is a fit case where the impugned order
may be interfered with.
Argument by the learned counsel for the respondent-
NIA:
21. While on the other hand, Mr. Amit Kumar Das,
learned counsel being assisted by Mr. Saurav Kumar,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent-NIA has
vehemently opposed the prayer for renewal of regular bail.
22. It has been submitted by referring to the order 10th
January, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023
and order dated 22.10.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.
1277 of 2024 by this Court that the prayer for bail of the
appellant on earlier occasion was rejected considering the
facts on merit and no new development has occurred so as
to consider the case of the appellant for renewal of bail.
23. It has been submitted by referring to paragraph 57
of the order dated 10th January, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal
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(DB) No. 1141 of 2023, wherein the culpability of the
appellant has been shown to be direct since it has been
referred therein that there is direct and serious allegation
against the appellant that in connivance with A-11
Sukhram Ramtai, he supplied potash, explosive chemical at
Chakradharpur station to CPI Maoist A-7, which
subsequently was handed over to A-3, A-33, A-34 and A-42
to deliver the same to the armed cadres of CPI A-13, A-14
and A-42, who used the said Potash in IED blast on
04.3.2021 when armed troops were moving on the forward
slope of Lanji forest hills under PS Toklo, in which three
security personnel were killed and few became seriously
injured. The same fact has been taken into consideration
while considering the prayer for renewal of bail in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024 and thereafter the prayer for
bail was rejected by passing reasoned order dated
22.10.2024.
24. It has further been contended by referring to
paragraphs 58 & 59 wherein this Court, distinguishing the
case of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713,
has considered the number of witnesses in the present
case, i.e., only 169 witnesses, which is very much less in
comparison to 276 witnesses in Union of India vs. K.A.
Najeeb (Supra), therefore, principle laid down therein will
not apply in the instant case.
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25. Further submission has been made that the present
appellant is having two criminal antecedents of like nature.
26. So far as the contention of the appellant regarding
the probable delay in conclusion of the trial is concerned, it
has been submitted on behalf of respondent-NIA that the
trial is in progress and and number of witnesses have been
pruned from 169 to 78 and since the 37 witnesses have
already been examined therefore, the trial will be concluded
expeditiously.
27. Further, the learned Special Judge is now having
exclusive Court to deal with the NIA cases and as such it is
incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground
that there is no likelihood of conclusion of trial in near
future.
28. It has further been submitted that since the trial is
in progress and if at this moment the appellant will be
released on bail, there is every likelihood of hindrance to be
caused in conclusion of early trial as also there are chances
of tampering with the evidence of witnesses since in the NIA
matters the protected witnesses are to be examined and
there is every likelihood of disclosure of their identity which
ultimately will be fatal to the prosecution.
29. Learned counsel for the respondent-NIA on the
aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned order
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requires no interference by this Court and hence the
instant appeal is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis
30. This Court has heard learned counsel for the
parties, gone across the finding recorded in the impugned
order as also the allegations made and available in the FIR
and the material collected in course of investigation as also
the pleadings made in the memo of appeal and the counter
affidavit.
31. This Court has already dealt with the case of the
appellant in detail on merit while dealing with the prayer
for bail of the appellant on earlier occasion in Cr. Appeal
(DB) No. 1143 of 2023 and Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of
2024 which were dismissed vide order dated 10th January,
2024 and 22.10.2024 respectively.
32. It is evident therefrom as per the reference of the
prosecution story that the superintendent of Police
Chaibasa, West Singhbhum, received information from
various sources regarding the movement of Anal Da @
Toofan Da @ Patriram Manjhi and Maharaj Pramanik @ Raj
Pramanik, both senior cadres of Central committee of CPI
Maoist, along with other cadres of their groups were
roaming in the hilly area of Lanji Mountain, under Toklo
Police Station, District- West Singhbhum and planning to
execute a big incident against security forces and disrupt
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the development and direction of Superintendent of Police,
Chaibasa and senior officials, accordingly one special
operation was launched from the Darkada (Jharjhara) base
camp by the troops of Jharkhand Jaguar AG-II and C/197
CRPF BN.
33. When informant along with search parties reached
near slope of Lanji Hill, the troops of Jharkhand Jaguar AG
II were on front and leading the operation and troops of
CRPF/ 197 BN was moving behind the Jharkhand Jaguar
AG-II. Suddenly, at about 8.30 hours a heavy blast took
place from the left flank approx. 100-150 meters on the hill
from the base of Lanji Hill. In retaliation to the blast six
rounds were fired by Constable Vijay Yadav of Jharkhand
Jaguar towards the hill for his self-defence when the troops
heard the sound of blast all the operation team took
position for a while.
34. In the meantime, Section Commander of the
Jharkhand Jaguar informed through wireless set that an
IED blast has taken place and five jawans of his team and
one Jawan of CRPF got injured and out of them three
become martyred and rest injured were rescued to Medica
hospital Ranchi. Later on, one head constable also attained
martyrdom after reaching Medica hospital, Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
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35. Accordingly, a case was registered being Toklo P.S.
Case No.09 of 2021 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353,
120B, 121, 121A, 307, 302 and 333 of the Indian Penal
Code (I.P.C.), Section 3/4 of Explosive Substances Act,
Section 17 of the C.L.A. Act 1908 and under Sections 16,
20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967
(UA(P) Act 1967) against the thirty three named accused
persons along with 20-25 unknown members of banned
terrorist Organisation i.e. CPI (Maoist).
36. Later on, considering the gravity of the offence,
National Investigation Agency (NIA), Ranchi has taken over
the investigation of the Toklo P.S.Case No.09 of 2021 and
the case was re-registered as RC-02/2021/ NIA/RNC dated
24.03.2021.
37. Later on, it is surfaced that the present appellant
was arrested in connection with another case being
Kharsawa P.S. Case no. 105/2020 and he was in jail.
Accordingly, the present appellant was produced and
remanded in the instant case on 31.07.2021.
38. On 25.01.2022 NIA filed the 1st supplementary
Charge-sheet against two accused persons including the
present appellant under sections 120B read with 307, 302
and 333 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), Section 4/6 of
Explosive Substances Act, and under Sections 16, 18, 20,
38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967.
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39. The appellant had preferred Misc. Cr. Application
No.308 of 2022 before the NIA Special Court, Ranchi but
the same has been rejected vide order dated 04.05.2022
against which the Appellant preferred Criminal Appeal (DB)
No. 383 of 2023 before this Court but the same was
dismissed as withdrawn on 12.04.2023.
40. Consequently, the above-named appellant had
again preferred the regular bail application vide Misc. Cr.
Application No.1284 of 2023 before the NIA Special Court,
Ranchi for regular bail but the same has been rejected vide
order dated 10.05.2023 against which the Criminal Appeal
being Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.1141 of 2023 had been
preferred but the same was dismissed vide order dated 10th
January, 2024 by this Court.
41. For ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the
order dated 10th January, 2024 are quoted as under:
“24. At this juncture, it will be purposeful to discuss the
core of Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which mandates
that the person shall not be released on bail if the court is
of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusations made are prima facie true
apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of
committing offences as stipulated under chapter IV and VI
of UA(P) Act, 1967.
25. The reason of making reference of the provision of
Section 43D(5) of the Act that in course of investigation, the
investigating agency has discovered the material against
the appellant attracting the offence under various Sections
of UA(P) Act. Since, this Court is considering the issue of
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bail based upon now also under the various sections of
UA(P) Act and hence, the parameter which has been put
under the provision of Section 43D(5) of the Act is also
required to be considered.
26. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of
the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail
fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
case of National Investigation Agency Vrs. Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali, reported in [(2019) 5 SCC 1]
wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting
the expression “prima facie true” as stipulated under
Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigation agency in
reference to the accusation against the accused concerned
in the First Information Report, must prevail until
contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence,
and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused
in the commission of the stated offence. It has further been
observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face to
establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the
stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree
of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that
the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the
opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as
required under the other special enactments. For ready
reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is
required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-
“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the
duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation against the
accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention
was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had
an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA
and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may
have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in
relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well.
Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA,
MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
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Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its
opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence.
There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to
be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of
such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the
purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable 11
grounds for believing that the accusation against such
person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the
expression “prima facie true” would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in
reference to the accusation against the accused concerned
in the first information report, must prevail until
contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence,
and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused
in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good
and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the
chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless
rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of
satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the
accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the
opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as
required under the other special enactments. In any case,
the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for
opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true,
is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for
considering a discharge application or framing of charges
in relation to offences under the 1967 Act….”
27. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National
Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali
(Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its
mind to examine the entire materials on record for the
purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is
made out against the accused or not.
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36.It is evident from the perusal of charge-sheet that NIA in
his investigation found that cadre of the CPI (Maoist)
hatched conspiracy with the help of the supplied potash by
the appellant which is mentioned in para 17.10.2 of the
chargesheet. For ready reference the aforesaid para is
being quoted herein under:-
“17.10.2: Offences established against the arrested
accused Jaiki Paradhi @ Jaiki @ JK (A-12) :
It is established from the investigation that A-
12 is an associate of CPI(Maoist), a banned terrorist
organization declared Government of India. Accused A-12
procured potash from one Nyaz Ahamad, aged about 28
years, son of Mustaq Ahamad, resident of Beohari, PS
Beohari, District Shahdol, Madhya Pradesh, a fire cracker
shop owner. On receiving the potash from Nyaz, A-12
delivered the same to A-11 & A-7 at Chakradharpur,
West Singhbhum, Jharkhand. A total of approximately
700 Kgs of potash has been procured by A- 12 on
multiple occasions. The whole network of obtaining
Potash was functioning on the directions and supervision
of charge sheeted absconding accused persons A-13, A-
14 and A-43. The said Potash was used by the armed
cadres of CPI (Maoist) as an explosive chemical in IED
blasts. Therefore, as per averments made in Pre-Paras, it
is established that A-12 became a member of CPI
(Maoist). A-12 had procured and provided Potash which
was used in the incident at Lanji, resulting in the killing
of 03 police personnel and causing serious injuries to 03
others. Thereby, accused A-12 has committed offences
u/s. 120B (Substantively) of IPC & Sections 16, 18, 20,
38 & 39 of UA(P) Act, 1967 and Sections 4 & 6 of
Explosive Substance Act”.
49. Thus, from perusal of the various annexures and
paragraphs of the charge sheet, it prima facie appears that
the appellant has associated himself with terrorist
organisation CPI (Moist) knowingly and aided the said
organisation voluntarily to further its terrorist activities.
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Recently, the Hon‟ble Apex Court has also held in the case
of Arup Bhuyan Vrs. State of Assam & Anr., reported
in (2023) 8 SCC 745 that being a member of the banned
organization is also an offence under the UA(P) Act.
57. Considering the above facts and circumstance and
after going through the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, case diary, chargesheet and other documentary
evidence recorded by the NIA it is evident that there is
direct and serious allegation against the appellant that in
connivance with A-11 Sukhram Ramtai, the present
appellant supplied potash, explosive chemical at
Chakradharpur station to CPI Maoist A-7 and further it
was handed over to A-3, A-33, A-34 and A-42 to deliver
the same to the armed cadres of CPI A-13, A-14 and A-42
who used the said Potash in IED blast on 04.3.2021 when
armed troops were moving on the forward slope of Lanji
forest hills under PS Toklo in which three security
personnel were killed and few became seriously injured.
Therefore, allegation against petitioner appears to be very
serious in nature and a prima facie case is made out
against him.
58. So far as the argument regarding reliance having been
placed upon the judgment of Union of India vs. K.A.
Najeeb (Supra) is concerned, this Court is of the view that
in the facts and circumstances the aforesaid judgment will
not be applicable herein since in the said case altogether
276 charge-sheeted witnesses were to be examined and
on the pin-pointed question by the Hon‟ble Apex Court, the
investigating agency has submitted that there is no
question of reducing the number of charge-sheeted
witnesses and in view thereof and considering the period
of custody, i.e., more than 5 and half years and also
taking into consideration the spirit of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India the Hon‟ble Apex Court has not
interfered in the order by which the bail was granted to
respondent-accused.
59.While, the fact of the instant case is that there are only
169 witnesses which is very much less in comparison to
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276 witnesses of aforesaid case and the present appellant
is having two criminal antecedents of like nature.
60.Further, in the instant case it has been submitted by
the learned counsel appearing for the state on instruction
that in course of trial, the number of charge-sheeted
witnesses may also be reduced depending upon the
situation and trial may be concluded in shortest time
period.”
42. It is evident from the aforesaid paragraphs that
while dismissing the said appeal this Court has also
considered the applicability of Section 43D(5) of the Act,
1967, as also the judgment rendered in the case of
National Investigation Agency Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad
Shah Watali, reported in [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein the
requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the
UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for
consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court.
43. This Court has also considered the judgment
rendered in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb
reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713.
44. This Court has already given its finding
regarding applicability of Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act,
1967 in the matter of consideration of bail to an accused,
against whom material has been found in course of
investigation regarding the commission of crime under the
UA(P) Act, 1967.
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45. This Court has already expressed its view that
parameter as has been laid down under Section 43D(5) of
the UA(P) Act, 1967 i.e., if the allegation is not found to be
prima facie true then only the consideration of bail is to be
there.
46. This Court has come to the conclusion that on the
basis of material collected in course of investigation, as had
dealt with at paragraph 57 of order dated 10th January,
2024 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2023 that the
allegation against the appellant is direct and serious and
the appellant in connivance with A-11 Sukhram Ramtai,
supplied potash, explosive chemical at Chakradharpur
station to CPI Maoist A-7 and further it was handed over to
other accused persons i.e., A-3, A-33, A-34 and A-42 to
deliver the same to the armed cadres of CPI A-13, A-14 and
A-42 who used the said Potash in IED blast on 04.3.2021
in which three security personnel were killed and few
became seriously injured.
47. This Court has also considered the principle as has
been laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union
of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) as would be evident from
paragraph 58 to 60 of order dated 10th January, 2024
passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2024 and
accordingly, the case of the appellant has been
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distinguished to that of case of appellant in K.A. Najeeb
(supra).
48. Thereafter, again the appellant renewed the
prayer for bail by filing appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB)
No. 1277 of 2024 which was rejected vide order dated
22.10.2024 considering the case on merit as also
taking note of the fact that earlier vide order dated 10th
January, 2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1141 of 2024
the case of the appellant has been considered and rejected
the prayer for bail.
49. Thus, this Court in its earlier order considering
the proposition of law as laid down in the case of
National Investigation Agency Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad
Shah Watali (supra) has found ample material against the
appellant and as such come out with the opinion of
availability of material against the appellant and as such
the case has been prima facie found to be true against the
appellant. Accordingly, prayer for regular bail was rejected
vide order dated 10th January, 2024 in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.
1141 of 2023 and vide order dated 22.10.2024 in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No. 1277 of 2024.
50. The question, which has been raised that as of now
37 witnesses were examined and now the number of
witnesses has been pruned to 78, as has been submitted
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on behalf of learned counsel for the NIA, that now the
learned Special Judge has exclusive jurisdiction to try the
cases of the nature of UA(P) Act, 1967 and the trial is at
progress.
51. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder
Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another reported in 2024
SCC OnLine SC 109 wherein while dealing with the
principle that „bail is rule‟, the same has been differed so far
as ingredient if attracted under the offence as stipulated
under the UA(P) Act, 1967 is concerned.
52. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court
in a very recent judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs
State of Punjab and Another (supra) while taking in to
consideration of the judgment as rendered in the National
Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali
(Supra) has observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of
Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the
Special Court to release an accused on bail and lays down
that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case diary or the report
made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusation, against such
person, as regards commission of offence or offences under
Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie
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true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or
on his own bond.
53. In the aforesaid background, the Hon’ble Apex
Court has held that the test for rejection of bail is quite
plain and Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing
the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or
Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are
prima facie true. It has further been observed that it is only
if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied – that the
Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in
accordance with the ‘tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing
witnesses, tampering with evidence).
54. For ready reference following paragraphs of the
aforesaid Judgment are being quoted herein under:
“27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D
shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a
Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without
affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard
on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the
proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete
embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an
accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, „on perusal of
the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure‟, is of the opinion that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation,
against such person, as regards commission of offence or
offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act
is prima facie true, such accused person shall not
be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to
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note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any
other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP
Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted
therein remains unique to the UAP Act.
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis
ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt
in favour of the oft-quoted phrase – „bail is the rule, jail is the
exception‟ – unless circumstances justify otherwise – does not
find any place while dealing with bail applications under
UAP Act. The „exercise‟ of the general power to grant bail
under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form
of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)– „shall not be
released‟ in contrast with the form of the words as found in
Section 437(1) CrPC – „may be released‟ – suggests the
intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and
jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive
task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP
Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification
to reject bail. The „justifications‟ must be searched from the
case diary and the final report submitted before the Special
Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, „prima
facie‟ standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction,
to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications
[materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted with
the standard of „strong suspicion‟, which is used by Courts
while hearing applications for „discharge–”
55. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position of
law and the factual aspect as has been gathered against the
appellant is now proceeding to examine as to whether the
prayer of the instant appeal is fit to be allowed or not.
56. Since no fresh ground or change in circumstance is
available herein therefore, the learned counsel for appellant
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has taken the ground of long custody and probable delay in
conclusion of trial has also been taken as one of the
grounds.
57. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer
herein that only the long incarceration is not the ground to
be looked into for enlarging the accused on bail rather the
accusation so made against the accused persons as also
societal impact is also to be taken care of.
58. As per the settled proposition of law as discussed
referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraph the test for
rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a
‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after
perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at
a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusations are prima facie true. This
position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D,
which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail
specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the
restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any
other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.
59. In the present case, it is apparent from the
appellant/accused has been charged for offences
punishable under Sections of the UA(P)Act 1967, having
maximum punishment of imprisonment for life.
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60. Although, the culpability of the present
accused/appellant has already been dealt with by this
Court on two occasions while rejecting the prayer for bail
but at the cost of repetition same has been reiterated herein
in precise form.
61. So far as the fact of the present case is concerned,
the nature of the allegation is quite serious and sufficient
material has surfaced in course of investigation in which
the appellant has been found to supply potash, the
explosive chemical which was subsequently handed over to
other accused persons and they used the said Potash in
IED blast, when armed troops were moving on the forward
slope of Lanji forest hills under PS Toklo, in which three
security personnel were killed and few became seriously
injured. Further the present appellant is also having two
criminal antecedents.
62. The learned counsel for the appellant has renewed
the prayer for bail mainly on the ground of long
incarceration and probable delay in trial but it is settled
position of law that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave
offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used
as a ground to grant bail,
63. It requires to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of
Punjab(supra) taking into consideration the ratio of
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judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb, (supra) has
observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave
offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used
as a ground to grant bail, for ready reference, the relevant
paragraph is being quoted as under:
“46. As already discussed, the material available on record
indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of
terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist
organisation involving exchange of large quantum of money
through different channels which needs to be deciphered and
therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on
bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key
witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of
justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave
offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used
as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on
behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.”
64. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court in its recent
judgment in the case of Gulfisha Fatima versus State
(Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 while
appreciating the implication of Article 21 vis-vis Section
43D (5) of the Act 1967 and taking into the consideration
the ratio laid down in the case of Gurwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab (supra) has categorically observed that if
prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the
sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does
not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces
statutory restraint, for ready reference, the relevant
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paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as
under:
“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a
constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory
restrictions cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee
of personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial is
not likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable
period, constitutional courts retain the jurisdiction to grant
bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus
operates as a protection against unconscionable detention
and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying
down a mechanical rule under which the mere passage of
time becomes determinative in every case arising under a
special statute. The jurisprudence of this Court does not
support a construction whereby delay simpliciter eclipses a
statutory regime enacted by Parliament to address offences
of a special category.
35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not
whether Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper
question is how Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament
has expressly conditioned the grant of bail in relation to
offences alleged to implicate national security. The law does
not contemplate an either-or approach. Nor does it
contemplate an unstructured blending of statutory and
constitutional considerations. What is required is disciplined
judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to both.
47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the
accused. Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying
degrees of participation, ranging from peripheral acts to
strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality. The
constitutional significance of prolonged incarceration cannot
be assessed uniformly for all accused regardless of role.
Where the attribution suggests a central or organising role in
the alleged design, the need for circumspection before
constitutional intervention displaces a statutory embargo is
correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is
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peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more
readily assume a punitive character.
56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the
governing approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which
implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State,
delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically
displaces statutory restraint. Rather, delay serves as a
trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The outcome of such
scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and contextual
balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i) the
gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the
role attributed to the accused within the alleged design or
conspiracy, (iii) the strength of the prima facie case as it
emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under the
special statute, and (iv) the extent to which continued
incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the case,
has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend
the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.
58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court
expressly cautioned against the mechanical invocation of
prolonged incarceration as a ground for bail in cases
involving serious offences under special enactments. The
judgment reiterates that the gravity of the offence, the
legislative context, and the prima facie material on record
cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken time.
59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato reiterated that
while Article 21 remains paramount, it does not operate in a
vacuum divorced from competing constitutional interests. The
Court emphasized that claims to liberty must be examined in
the totality of circumstances, particularly where allegations
implicate organised criminality or matters of public interest.
Delay, though undoubtedly significant, was held not to
assume the character of an absolute or solitary determinant.
The emphasis, once again, was on structured judicial
reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes.”
65. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position
of law, it is evident that mere delay in trial pertaining to
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grave offences, as one involved in the instant case, cannot
be used as a ground to grant bail.
66. There is no dispute and it cannot be disputed that
the jurisprudence of Article 21 has, as it develops,
recognised various facets to be intrinsic to the right to life
and liberty such as speedy trial, timely completion of
investigation, fair trial etc. but at the same time
circumspection in granting the relief of bail in offences that
harmful to society such as in this case, stems from a place
of concern, understandably legitimate at that, about public
order, societal security, overall peace and the general
deterrent force in criminal law.
67. The scales of justice must balance on the one hand-
the constitutionally consecrated and jealously guarded
right under Article 21 and on the other, the recognition that
individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to just
exceptions i.e. the paramount considerations of national
interest and societal interest.
68. There can be no manner of doubt on the proposition
that Article 21 rights are placed on a pedestal, and rightly
so, at the same time, though, the individual cannot always
be the centre of attention. We observe, therefore, that while
Article 21 rights must always be protected, but however, in
cases where the security of the society and nation is called
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into question, the long incarceration cannot be the sole
ground of consideration.
69. The act of the accused persons must be looked at,
on the whole, and all relevant factors must be given due
consideration while granting or denying bail. Needless to
add, any Court seized of bail application(s) arising out of
such offences must record, in their order the reasons and
factors that weighed with them in the ultimate outcome.
70. In view of the discussion made above it is the
settled fact that the rights of an individual are always
subservient to the nation/societal interest.
71. Further, in the case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State
of Punjab (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
expressed its concern to the threat raised by terrorist
organizations and held that where the accusations against
the respondents are prima facie true, the mandate
contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act
would become applicable and the accused would not be
released on bail.
72. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent has
submitted at Bar that 37 witnesses have already been
examined and number of witnesses have been pruned from
169 to 78 and all endeavor has been taken for expeditious
conclusion of the trial therefore taking into consideration
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the aforesaid submission, the apprehension of appellant in
probable delay in trial is not fit to be accepted.
73. Further it has been submitted by the respondent
that if the present appellant is allowed to be released on
bail, then, he will get all opportunities to tamper with the
evidence as well as influence the witnesses or he may
abscond.
74. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is evident
that the nature of the allegation against the appellant is
quite serious and sufficient material has surfaced in course
of investigation in which the appellant has been found to
supply potash, the explosive chemical which was
subsequently handed over to other accused persons and
they used the said Potash in IED blast, when armed troops
were moving on the forward slope of Lanji forest hills under
PS Toklo, in which three security personnel were killed and
few became seriously injured. Further the present appellant
is also having two criminal antecedents, therefore, it is
considered view of this Court that prayer for bail of the
appellant on the ground of custody or delay in trial, is not
fit to be accepted.
75. This Court on the basis of discussion made
hereinabove is of the view that the Constitution of India
mandates to maintain core of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the matter of commission of crime but the issue
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of national integrity is also to be taken care of so as to
maintain the balance.
76. Herein the nature of allegation is serious and
sufficient material has been found in course of investigation
by the investigating agency and also the appellant is having
two criminal antecedents of the like nature i.e., under the
U.A. (P) Act, 1967 and further on earlier two occasion, the
prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected by this Court
on merit after due consideration of the culpability of the
present appellant, therefore it is considered view of this
Court the prayer for bail of the appellant is not fit to be
accepted.
77. Further, this Court has gone through the order
passed by the learned Special Judge and found therefrom
that the learned Special Judge has considered the fact in
entirety along with the allegation as per the first
information report and the charge-sheet and rejected the
bail application on the parameter as stipulated under
Section 43(D)(5) of the U.A.(P) Act, 1967.
78. The learned Special Judge has also considered the
complicity of the appellant as available in the evidences of
the prosecution witnesses, case diary and other
documentary evidences collected by the investigating
agency.
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79. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussions, we find
no illegality in the impugned order dated 10.10.2025
passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.1719 of 2025 by AJC-
XVI-cum-Spl. Judge, NIA, Ranchi rejecting the application
of the appellant, as such order impugned requires no
interference by this Court.
80. In the result, we find no merit in instant appeal,
hence, the same is dismissed.
81. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also
stands dismissed.
82. We make it clear that the prima-facie findings
recorded in this judgment/order are only for considering
the prayer for bail. The reasons are confined to the case of
the appellant. The same will have no bearing on the trial
and cases of the co-accused.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.)
10/04/2026
Alankar/ A.F.R.
uploaded on 10.04.2026
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