Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Jai Narayan Vyas University vs M/S Sawai Engineers … on 16 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:17649-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 412/2025
1. Jai Narayan Vyas University, Through Its Registrar,
Jodhpur.
2. Chief Engineer (Building Cell), Jai Narayan Vyas
University, Jodhpur.
----Appellants
Versus
M/s Sawai Engineers, Through Its Proprietor, Sawai Ram Jangid,
S/o Lt Bhoora Ram Jangid, Age About 67 Years, R/o 202,
Mahadeo Temple, Vaishnav Nagar, 1St, OppB.r.Bidla School,
Jodhpur.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Ms. Adwaita Sharma
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Himanshu Maheshwari
Mr. Bharat Maheshwari
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL
Order
Reportable
16/04/2026
Per: Arun Monga, J.
1. Assailed herein is a judgment and order dated 06.11.2024
passed by the Commercial Court, Jodhpur Metropolitan, whereby
the petition filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, “1996 Act”)
was dismissed, and the Arbitral Award dated 31.12.2021 was
upheld.
2. The dispute originates from a work order dated 22.09.2008
between the parties for construction of a Guest House of Academic
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Staff for a total work order of Rs.71,57,743/-. The work was to be
completed within ten months, i.e., by 05.08.2009. Subsequently,
an additional work order dated 18.09.2010 worth Rs.25 lakhs was
issued for completion of the remaining work, extending the
timeline up to 27.09.2010 without imposing any penalty.
2.1 However, due to lack of funds the University was unable to
clear the bills. Consequently, the respondent stopped the work.
The respondent also sent various communications to clear the
outstanding dues. The matter was placed before the University’s
Building Committee and Syndicate, wherein it was decided to pay
the respondent for the work executed. The respondent was asked
to submit his final bills. The respondent submitted final bills, and
payments were made in parts. The respondent also submitted 14 th
running bill dated 29.06.2011 amounting to Rs.5,90,397/-. The
appellant made part-payment of the said bill which was accepted
by respondent under protest, leading to a dispute over a balance
sum of Rs.2,26,617/-.
2.2 On 14.12.2015, respondent invoked arbitration under Clause
23 of the agreement. Upon failure of the University to appoint an
arbitrator, the respondent approached this Court under Section
11(6) of 1996 Act, resulting in the appointment of a sole arbitrator
on 15.05.2019. Arbitration proceedings were conducted, and by
award dated 31.12.2021, the Arbitrator ruled in favour of the
respondent. The appellants objected to the award under Section
34 of 1996 Act; however, the award was upheld by the
Commercial Court on 06.11.2024.
2.3 Hence, the instant appeal.
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3. Ms. Adwaita Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants
vehemently contends that the impugned judgment dated
06.11.2024, as well as the Arbitral Award dated 31.12.2021, are
contrary to the settled principles of law and the facts borne out
from the record. Being perverse, patently illegal, and in conflict
with the public policy, the same deserve to be set aside. It is
submitted that the learned Commercial Court failed to exercise the
jurisdiction vested in it under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, having
mechanically observed that the scope of interference is limited,
without duly adjudicating upon the specific objections raised by
the appellants. Such failure to consider material issues strikes at
the very root of the matter and renders the impugned judgment
wholly unsustainable.
3.1 It is further contended that the learned Arbitrator gravely
erred in interpreting Clause 6 of the agreement by importing
conditions such as obtaining consent of the contractor and
recording reasons for re-measurement, which are not
contemplated under the contract. The clause clearly provides that
measurements determined by the Engineer-in-Charge are final
and binding, and only requires reasonable notice. The Arbitrator,
therefore, not only misinterpreted the contractual terms but also
travelled beyond the scope of reference by deciding issues not
raised by the parties, thereby vitiating the award on grounds of
patent illegality.
3.2 Learned counsel also submits that both the learned Arbitrator
and the Commercial Court failed to appreciate that the appellants
had already paid the entire amount due for the work executed,
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along with the security deposit, and it was the respondent who
abandoned the project midway. This compelled the appellants to
engage another contractor and incur additional financial burden.
Despite this, the Arbitrator erroneously allowed multiple claims,
including amounts towards idle machinery, rental charges, and
salaries, without any cogent evidence and in direct contravention
of the terms of the agreement, particularly Clauses 6 and 18.
3.3 It is further argued that the claims were ex facie barred by
limitation, as the cause of action admittedly arose in May 2012,
whereas arbitration was invoked after an inordinate delay of
several years. The Arbitrator adopted inconsistent dates for
limitation while adjudicating different claims and ignored material
facts, including suppression by the claimant regarding prior
rejection of the arbitration request and non-impleadment of a
necessary party, namely the University Engineer. In these
circumstances, it is submitted that the impugned award and
judgment are liable to be set aside in toto.
3.4 Learned counsel for the appellant relies on a judgment
rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in BSNL and Anr. Vs.
Nortel Networks India Private Limited.1
4. Au contraire, M/s Maheshwari, learned counsels for the
respondent, in unison, emphatically oppose the present appeal.
They submit that the same is wholly devoid of merit and liable to
be dismissed for the reasons duly recorded in the impugned
judgment. It is contended that the findings returned therein are
well-reasoned, based on the material available on record, and
1 (2021) 5 SCC 738
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warrant no interference by this Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
4.1. Qua limitation, it is urged that having sifted through the
corresponding evidence adduced by both the sides, learned
Arbitrator found the claims to be within the period of limitation.
Similar was the view expressed by the learned Commercial Court.
Moreover, 14th running bill dated 29.06.2011 submitted by the
claimant before the appellant was finally rejected on 19.12.2012.
After approving part-payment and basis thereof, alleged final
payment was made on 07.01.2013. Thus, it is argued by the
learned counsel for the respondent that being a running account,
the limitation period would reckon from the date of rejection of
part claim and the date of last payment remitted thereof.
5. In the aforesaid backdrop, we have heard the rival
contentions and perused the material available on record as well
as the impugned judgment and the arbitral award.
6. Before we proceed to render our opinion, let us see as to
what primarily transpired on the mind of the learned Commercial
court Judge. Qua that, the translated relevant extract of the
impugned judgment is reproduced herein below:
“12. The principal objection raised by the petitioner is
that the claim application of the respondent firm was
barred by limitation, yet the arbitral award in question
was passed in favour of the respondent firm by the
Arbitral Tribunal. In this regard, upon perusal of the
impugned award, it is evident that the petitioner had
raised an objection before the Sole Arbitrator regarding
the claim being time-barred. The Sole Arbitrator, after
considering the evidence available on record and after
affording due opportunity of hearing to both parties, held
that the claim application was within limitation and
accordingly passed the award. In such circumstances, in
light of the views expressed by the Hon’ble Constitutional
Courts, this Court cannot re-examine or re-analyse the
findings of the Arbitral Tribunal on this issue. Moreover,(Uploaded on 21/04/2026 at 01:00:49 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JD:17649-DB] (6 of 11) [CMA-412/2025]the question as to whether the claim was within the
prescribed limitation period is essentially within the
domain of the Arbitrator to adjudicate.
X-X-X-X-X
15. In view of the judicial precedents laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, the determination made by the
Arbitrator in this regard does not suffer from any
illegality and is hereby affirmed. Further, the petitioner
has failed to demonstrate before this Court as to how the
present case falls within the scope of interference under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Therefore, interference with the reasoned order passed by
the Arbitrator on the issues in dispute is not warranted.
16. Ordinarily, if an arbitral award is found to be in
violation of the fundamental policy of Indian law or is in
conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice,
such an award cannot be sustained.
17. However, where the Arbitral Tribunal, while passing
the award, has not violated the provisions of law
prevailing in India, and the award is not against the basic
notions of morality or justice, is not induced or affected
by fraud or corruption, does not contravene public policy,
and is based on the conscious application of mind by the
Tribunal, then such an award must be upheld. This is
because the powers of the Court while dealing with an
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act are limited and circumscribed.
18. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to substantiate
the grounds pleaded in the application for setting aside
the award with any cogent material or evidence. The
petitioner has merely made allegations without
demonstrating how the award is arbitrary, biased, or
predetermined. A mere assertion that the award is not
based on facts or law is insufficient, particularly when
nothing on record indicates that the Arbitrator acted with
bias or in contravention of the expected standards of
conduct.
19. In the process of adjudication, a decision-maker
often experiences multiple internal considerations before
arriving at a conclusion. Where the matter is
straightforward, such deliberations are minimal; however,
in complex cases, it is natural for multiple considerations
to arise in the mind of the adjudicator. Ultimately, after
due deliberation, the adjudicator arrives at a decision.
The recording of such internal thought processes in the
award is neither necessary nor expected. Even if such
reflections are mentioned, it cannot be a ground to
conclude that the award is imaginary or biased. Hence,
the argument advanced by the petitioner in this regard is
untenable.
20. The Arbitral Tribunal has passed the award after
affording an opportunity of hearing to both parties and
after considering the oral and documentary evidence as
well as the terms and conditions of the contract executed
between the parties.
21. The role of the Court while deciding an application
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
is supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court.
Unlike a regular civil appeal where the appellate court
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[2026:RJ-JD:17649-DB] (7 of 11) [CMA-412/2025]under Section 34 cannot re-evaluate the findings of the
Arbitral Tribunal or substitute its own conclusions.
22. It is pertinent to note that under Section 28(3) of the
Act, the Arbitrator is required to decide in accordance
with the terms of the contract. If the award is contrary to
the contractual terms, it may be held to be unsustainable.
Similarly, under Section 34(2A), an award may be set
aside if it is vitiated by patent illegality.
23. As already discussed, the powers and limitations of
this Court under Section 34 have been delineated. This
Court cannot re-analyse the factual findings of the
Arbitral Tribunal, nor can it act as an appellate forum.
The Court cannot substitute its own view for that of the
Tribunal. Only in cases where there is a manifest error in
the award can interference be justified. Therefore, in the
interest of brevity and in view of the limited jurisdiction of
this Court, the detailed findings and reasoning of the
Arbitral Tribunal are not being reproduced herein and are
instead affirmed.
24. The Sole Arbitrator has passed a well-reasoned
award based on the oral and documentary evidence on
record, and no illegality is found therein. The award does
not fall within any of the grounds for interference under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The petitioner has failed to establish that the impugned
award is contrary to public policy or public interest.
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion and
conclusions, the application filed by the petitioner under
Section 34(2) of the Act deserves to be rejected, and the
arbitral award dated 31.12.2021 is liable to be upheld.”
7. At the outset, while we duly appreciate the strenuous effort
and perseverance with which, Ms. Sharma, learned counsel for the
appellant has advanced her submissions in an earnest endeavour
to dissuade us from the view taken by the learned Commercial
Court and the learned Arbitrator, but we are unable to persuade
ourselves to accept the position canvassed by her. Upon due
consideration, we find ourselves in agreement with the reasoning
adopted by the learned Commercial Court, read in conjunction
with the findings recorded in the award rendered by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. We proceed to examine the matter accordingly in
the succeeding part.
8. We commence with the caveat that the present proceedings
arise from an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
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Conciliation Act, 1996, directed against an order passed under
Section 34 of the Act whereby the Arbitral Award has been upheld.
Our appellate jurisdiction in such matters is, therefore, even more
narrowly circumscribed than the already limited scope of
interference exercisable under Section 34 of the Act. In an
arbitration appeal, though technically first appeal, this Court does
not sit as a court of appeal over the arbitral award so as to re-
appreciate evidence, reassess factual findings, or substitute its
own interpretation merely because another view may also be
possible. Interference is warranted only where the award, or the
order under section 34, ibid, refusing to set it aside, is shown to
suffer from patent illegality, perversity going to the root of the
matter, jurisdictional error, or conflict with the limited grounds
recognised under the Act.
9. The submission that the learned Commercial Court
mechanically dismissed the objections without considering the
specific grounds raised is not borne out from the record. A perusal
of the impugned judgment reveals that the Commercial Court was
conscious of the objections regarding limitation, interpretation of
contractual clauses, alleged excess of jurisdiction, and
maintainability of the claims. Having examined the award in the
backdrop of the settled parameters under Section 34, it concluded
that none of the objections disclosed any ground warranting
interference. Merely because the learned commercial Court did not
accept the appellants’ submissions, it cannot be said that the
objections were not considered.
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10. Equally untenable is the challenge founded upon
interpretation of Clause 6 of the agreement. Construction of
contractual terms falls primarily within the domain of the Arbitral
Tribunal. Unless the interpretation adopted is one that no
reasonable person could take, or is plainly contrary to the express
language of the contract, the commercial or appellate Court ought
not to interfere. We find that the view taken by the learned
Arbitrator while construing Clause 6 cannot be said to be irrational
or impossible. At the highest, the learned counsel for the appellant
seeks to propound an alternative interpretation of the clause,
which by itself is no ground to set aside an award.
11. The contention that the learned Arbitrator travelled beyond
the scope of reference is also devoid of substance. The award
reflects adjudication of disputes arising out of execution of the
contract, measurements, payments, and consequential claims
between the parties. These were matters directly connected with
the contractual relationship and squarely within the ambit of the
disputes referred to arbitration. No material has been shown to
establish that the Arbitral Tribunal adjudicated an issue wholly
foreign to the reference.
12. The argument that the respondent had abandoned the work
and that the appellants had already discharged all dues pertains
essentially to disputed questions of fact. These issues were placed
before the learned Arbitrator, who, upon appreciation of the oral
and documentary evidence, returned findings adverse to the
appellants. Likewise, the grievance regarding grant of claims
towards idle machinery, rentals, salaries, and allied heads does
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not merit acceptance. Assessment of entitlement and
quantification of damages or compensation lies within the fact-
finding jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. Unless it is established that
such claims were awarded in the complete absence of evidence or
in express disregard of a contractual prohibition, no case for
interference arises. The appellants have failed to establish any
such manifest infirmity.
13. Once such findings, as above, are based on material available
on record and are plausible, the same cannot be reopened in
proceedings under Sections 34 or 37, ibid. Re-appreciation of
evidence under the guise of exercising power under section 37 is
ordinarily impermissible, unless, in a fit case it is so deemed
appropriate by stating the reasons thereof.
14. As regards limitation, both the learned Arbitrator and the
Commercial Court have concurrently held the claims to be within
time after considering the relevant dates, including the running
bills, part payments, rejection of bills, and final payments
exchanged between the parties. Limitation in the facts of the
present case involved mixed questions of fact and law. Once the
conclusion reached is based on appreciation of the record and
represents a possible view, this Court would not interfere in
appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 and we find no grounds to
interfere on that count as well.
15. Reliance placed upon BSNL and Another v. Nortel
Networks India Private Limited (supra) is also misplaced. In
that case, the claim was found to be ex facie and hopelessly
barred by limitation after an unexplained delay of several years (5
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and ½ years). The present matter stands on a different factual
footing, where the claims have been held to be within limitation
upon consideration of subsequent payments and continuing
transactions between the parties. The said decision, therefore,
does not advance the appellants’ case.
16. Appeal is accordingly, dismissed.
17. All pending applications stand disposed of.
(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (ARUN MONGA),J
97-ajayS/-
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