Patna High Court
Jagnnath Sah vs The State Of Bihar on 31 January, 2026
Author: Purnendu Singh
Bench: Purnendu Singh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1329 of 2026
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Jagnnath Sah Son of Shiv Sah, Resident of Village Piprahan, PS Kanti,
District Muzaffarpur, Bihar 843109.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, The Revenue and Land
Reforms Department, The Government of Bihar, Patna, Bihar.
2. The District Magistrate, Muzaffarpur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Muzaffarpur.
4. The Sub Divisional Officer, Muzaffarpur.
5. The Block Development Officer, Block Minapur, Muzaffarpur.
6. The Circle Officer, Block Minapur, Muzaffarpur.
7. The Block Education Officer, Block Minapur, Muzaffarpur.
8. The O.P In Charge, Panapur O.P, PS Minapur, Muzaffarpur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Mritunjay Kumar Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Ms. Sushmita Sharma, AC to SC (9)
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 31-01-2026
Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner and learned APP for the State.
2. The petitioner in paragraph no. 1 of the present writ
petition has sought, inter alia, the following relief(s), which is
reproduced hereinafter:-
“(i) For issuance of appropriate
writ in nature of Mandamus commanding the
respondent’s authorities to be remove the
encroachment from Rajkiya Uttkarmit Middle
School, Piprahan Hindi, premise, which situated
at Village Piprahan under Circle Thana-56,
Mouza-Piprahan Asali, Circle- Minapur, District
Muzaffarpur land of question bearing Khata no.
622, Khesra no. 1642, 2690, 2691, 2692, 2696,
2741 Rakwa 2 acres 56 dismals as such approx
56 dismals land encroached by villagers/Local
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people’s.
(ii) For any other relief or reliefs as
your lordships may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case.”
3. The brief facts of the case are that the Head Teacher
of Rajkiya Uttkarmit Middle School, Piprahan, repeatedly
submitted representations before the respondent authorities,
namely Respondent Nos. 2 to 8, during the years 2022 to 2024,
highlighting serious issues affecting the interest of the school
and its students; however, despite such representations, no
effective steps were taken by the authorities (Annexure P/1
series). It is further stated that the petitioner again submitted a
representation dated 09.12.2025 before Respondent No. 2
regarding his genuine grievance for maintaining a healthy
educational environment in the school, but the same has
remained unattended till date, a true copy whereof is annexed as
Annexure P/2. It is alleged that due to illegal encroachment over
the school land, the school premises are suffering from serious
inconvenience, adversely affecting the development of students
and obstructing construction of the boundary wall, thereby
creating daily administrative difficulties. It is further stated that
certain persons have illegally constructed shops and huts over
the school land. Reliance has also been placed on the directions
of the Hon’ble Court passed in CWJC No. 2290 of 1990 vide
Patna High Court CWJC No.1329 of 2026 dt.31-01-2026
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dated 16.10.1998, directing removal of encroachments from
public land and roads, a true copy of which is annexed. Due to
inaction on the part of the respondent authorities, the school
administration has been compelled to run the institution in an
unsafe and unconducive educational environment.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner
informs that a representation has already been filed before the
District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Muzaffarpur (Annexure- P/2)
which has not been entertained till date and seeks to file a fresh
representation before the District Collector- cum – Magistrate,
Muzaffarpur for the relief(s) as prayed for in the present writ
petition in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in
CWJC No.2290 of 1990 (Arun Kumar Mukherjee & Ors. vs.
The State of Bihar & Ors.).
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State submitted that the petitioner himself is responsible for
not receiving due compensation. Petitioner has himself delayed
and has directly approached this Hon’ble Court. Accordingly, the
writ petition is not maintainable.
6. Heard the parties.
7. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi
judicial power on their administrative side often delay in
Patna High Court CWJC No.1329 of 2026 dt.31-01-2026
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considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or
they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where
they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled
principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an
effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into the
circumstances of the present case where
fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this
Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
8. It is also well settled principle of law that every
administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has
been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
“47. Summarising the above discussion,
this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-
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judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as the
judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about his/her
decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is
faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid
decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges
and decision-makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
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fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of
human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
vs. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya
v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving
reasons for the decision is of the essence and is
virtually a part of “due process”.
9. The law in this regard has been laid down by the
Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.
Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,
paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,
which is as under:-
” 19. While a High Court would normally not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy
is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not
by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction
in certain contingencies. This principle has been
crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai19 and Harbanslal Sahni
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd20. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors21 a
two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the
High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This
Court has observed:
“28. The principles of law which emerge are
that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii)
The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
Patna High Court CWJC No.1329 of 2026 dt.31-01-2026
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rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been
a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed
questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy
requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)
10. Now question arises whether this Court can
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents
have acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well
settled by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499 this
Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the
High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope
of their jurisdiction. This Court observed:
“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of
infringement of fundamental rights or when on the
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assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the
grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to
adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355:
AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a
petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard
the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for
the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-
exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court
finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be
desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”
11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A
of the Constitution of India tends to safeguard the invaluable
right to property.
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”
12. As per the constitutional mandate also, the State
cannot disposes a citizen of his property except in accordance
with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay
compensation is not expressively included in Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law
in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya
Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in
2020(2) SCC 569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and
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12.2 of the said judgment, which are inter alia reproduced
hereinafter;
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a
welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of
his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1″
13. The above proposition of law has again been
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal
No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases
605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:-
” 16. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human
right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”
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14. In such circumstances, when the question of right
to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the
Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this
Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to
forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner
is redressed well within a period of one week in accordance
with law from the date of communication of this order.
15. Considering the aforesaid information, the
District Collector- cum – Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, is directed to
dispose of the representation filed by the petitioner for the
relief(s) as prayed for in the present writ petition expeditiously
in accordance with law.
16. Accordingly, the present application stands
disposed of.
17. Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
Ashishsingh/-
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