Delhi High Court
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd vs Adarsh Nobel Corporation Ltd on 27 March, 2026
$~11
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 27th March, 2026
+ ARB.P. 93/2026
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. .....Petitioner
Through: None.
versus
ADARSH NOBEL CORPORATION LTD. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. A.K. Thakur, Mr. Rishi Raj, Mr.
Sujeet Kumar, Mr. Ningthem Oinam,
Advocates (M:9810141402)
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
MINI PUSHKARNA, J (ORAL):
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act“) seeking
appointment of a sole arbitrator, for adjudication of disputes arising between
the parties out of the Contract Agreement dated 06th January, 2018.
2. The facts, as culled out from the pleadings, are as follows:
I. The petitioner, being engaged in the activities of refining, production,
etc., of natural gas and petrochemicals, had awarded the work of “Provision
of Additional VR Tank at Paradip Refinery” to the respondent, vide Letter of
Award dated 29th November, 2017 (“LOA”), which was to be completed
within a period of 18 months from the date of the LOA.
II. The respondent, on 11th June, 2018, stopped the work on the site in
question. Further, despite multiple notices dated 29th June, 2018, 23rd July,
2018 and 11th August, 2018 sent by the petitioner to the respondent, no
visible action for resuming the work at the site in question was undertakenSignature Not Verified
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by the respondent.
III. The petitioner issued a termination notice dated 13th December, 2018
to the respondent, thereby, terminating the awarded Contract Agreement in
terms of the Clause 7 of the General Conditions of Contract (“GCC”).
IV. The petitioner, to protect its interests and for recovery of the
expenses, on account of the failure of the respondent to complete the
awarded work, had sent a communication dated 22 nd March, 2023, to the
respondent. By way of the said communication, the petitioner claimed
provisional liability of Rs. 4,88,06,932.83/-, against risk and expense
recovery, from the respondent.
V. In response to the aforesaid communication, the respondent
approached the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (“MSEF
Council”), Orissa at Cuttack, by way of the petition bearing MSEFC Case
No. 56/2022, under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 (“MSMED Act“).
VI. The MSEF Council passed an arbitral award dated 10th July, 2023,
thereby, directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 2,43,14,318/- to the
respondent, along with future interests.
VII. Subsequently, the respondent filed an enforcement petition bearing
EXP. No. 585/2023 before the Senior Civil Judge, Commercial Court,
Bhubaneshwar, seeking enforcement of arbitral award dated 10th July, 2023,
wherein, the Executing Court dismissed the objections filed by the
petitioner, and proceeded to issue warrant of attachment vide order dated
14th July, 2025.
VIII. Being aggrieved by the arbitral award dated 10th July, 2023, the
petitioner filed writ petitions being, W.P.(C) 30966/2024 and W.P.(C)Signature Not Verified
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20210/2025 before the Orissa High Court, whereby, the Orissa High Court
by way of the judgments dated 20th September, 2025 and 10th October, 2025,
respectively, set aside the arbitral award dated 10th July, 2023, on the ground
of having been passed in lack of inherent jurisdiction.
IX. The petitioner invoked the Arbitration Clause, i.e., Clause 9 of the
GCC, by sending a Notice dated 30th June, 2025, to the respondent.
X. Pursuant to the Notice dated 30th June, 2025, the respondent vide
reply dated 27th July, 2025, refused the proposal of appointment of
arbitrator, by relying upon the arbitral award dated 10th July, 2023, passed
by MSEF Council in MSEFC Case No. 56/2022. Therefore, the present
petition has been filed.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has handed over to this
Court a copy of the judgment dated 12th February, 2026, passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, in appeals being
W.A. No. 1677/2025 and W.A. No. 1856/2025, whereby, judgments dated
20th September, 2025 and 10th October, 2025, have been set aside.
4. This Court takes note of the submission made by learned counsel for
the respondent that the respondent is a Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises (“MSME”), and was entitled to invoke the jurisdiction under the
MSEF Council.
5. It is to be noted that upon the respondent approaching the MSEF
Council, an arbitral award dated 10th July, 2023 came to be passed. The
petitioner herein filed objections to the said award by filing a petition under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in the District Court of Orissa.
Subsequently, the petitioner herein unconditionally withdrew the said
challenge on 21st October, 2024.
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6. It is to be noted that the present petition has been filed by the
petitioner before this Court, seeking appointment of an arbitrator on the
ground that the arbitral award dated 10th July, 2023, passed by the MSEF
Council has been set aside by the Orissa High Court in W.P.(C) 30966 of
2024 and W.P. (C) No. 20210 of 2025, vide judgments dated 20th September,
2025 and 10th October, 2025, respectively.
7. This Court, however, notes that the aforesaid judgments have been set
aside by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in W.A. No.
1677/2025 and W.A. No. 1856/2025, as being devoid of merit and it has
further directed the Executing Court to proceed with the execution process,
within an outer limit of six months. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment
dated 12th February, 2026 of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court,
read as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
4. Having heard counsel for the parties and having perused the appeal
papers, we are inclined to grant indulgence in the matter as under and
for the following reasons:
4.1. Appellant was the contractor and his contract had been
terminated eventually resulting into him filing MSEFC Case
No.56/2022 u/s 18 of MSMED Act, 2006. Respondents having entered
appearance through their counsel, had filed Written Statement
wherein lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, was not a plea.
Battle lines came to be drawn on the basis of pleadings. Evidence was
led and Award was made on 10.07.2023. It is not in dispute that the
Appellant happens to be an MSME entity. Had the plea of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction been raised, the Appellant would have
answered the same and that the Facilitation Council would have
treated it in its accumulated expertise. This apart, whether the
contract in question was a „works contract‟ or otherwise is
essentially a question of fact on which parties could lead evidence.
That being the position, it was not open to the Respondents to
contend that the Award was a nullity and therefore, that plea can be
set up wherever the Award is sought to be executed. The Apex Court
decision in A.V. Parayya Sastri v. Government of A.P., (2007) 4 SCC
221 could not come to the rescue of Respondents since it was a case of
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demonstrable fraud. At paragraphs-21 & 22, it is observed as under:
“21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any
judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to
be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief
Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal.”
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment,
decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court,
tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the
law. Such a judgment, decree or order-by the first court or by
the final court-has to be treated as nullity by every court,
superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any
time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral
proceedings.”
It hardly needs to be stated that a decision is an authority for the
proposition that is laid down in a given fact matrix, and not for all that
which logically follows from what has been so laid down vide Lord
Halsbury in Quinn v. Letham, [1901] AC 495 (HL).
4.2. Respondents had filed ARBP No.11/2024 u/s 34 of the A and C
Act, 1996. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondents very fairly
stated that the ground of lack of jurisdiction was not taken up in this
challenge. Subsequently, they unconditionally withdrew the said
challenge on 21.10.2024. Here too, they had not taken up the plea
that the Award itself was a nullity and therefore, they were
withdrawing the challenge. Nor had they sought liberty to take up
plea of the kind before the Executing Court. However, they resisted
execution of the Award on the ground of lack of jurisdiction merely on
the basis of a stray sentence in the pleadings of the Appellant, before
the Facilitation Council. In the pleadings, it is averred “the
respondents have utilized the supply and execution of work”. That is
not the way pleadings of parties should be construed. In fact, such a
construction was not placed on the said sentence when the Respondents
had filed their Written Statement or in their challenge to the Award u/s.
34 of the A and C Act, 1996. It was Aristotle who said „one single
swallow makes not the summer‟ in Nicomachean Ethics. The same
applies to the case of Respondents.
4.3. It hardly needs to be stated that where jurisdiction of a Court or
Tribunal depends upon fact matrix, the party resisting the claim on
the ground of lack of jurisdictional facts, has to plead it adequately
and with fair degree of certainty. In the Written Statement filed by the
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Respondents in the Arbitral Proceedings, not even a whisper is made
in this regard. Jurisdiction is one thing and jurisdictional facts are
another. To put it in other way, one can say that, absence of
jurisdiction makes its exercise non-productive and therefore
Award/order in such circumstance would be a nullity/non est.
However, the question of absence of jurisdictional facts stands on a
different footing. Such absence cannot be inferred by a litigant by his
self-judgment, despite suffering an adverse order. The remedy
provided by Special Law has to be invoked for invalidation of such
order. Respondents in fact had invoked Sec. 34 of A and C Act 1996,
rightly. Sub-Section 3 of this Section prescribes a specific period of
limitation. The said challenge came to be unilaterally withdrawn
without mentioning that the Award was a nullity. Has the ground of
nullity been mentioned in the application for withdrawal of challenge,
different considerations would have arisen. The Appellant had neither
occasion nor opportunity to have his say on that aspect of the matter.
Tribunal too did not have. The proposition that, where an Award is a
nullity, its enforcement can be resisted even in collateral proceedings,
is too broad to be accepted. It is not that nullity cannot be a ground
for laying a challenge u/s 34, to the Award. Even in cases wherein
invalidity is plainly visible, the Apex Court has taken the view that
challenge has to be mounted.
4.4. The Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, AIR 1992 SC
111, has observed as under:
“…the impugned dismissal order has at least a de facto
operation unless and until it is declared to be void or nullity by
a competent body or Court. In Smith v. East. Elloe Rural
District Council, [1956] AC 736 at 769 Lord Redcliffe
observed:
“An order even if not made in good faith, is still an act
capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of
invalidity upon its fore- head. Unless the necessary
proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of
invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will
remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most
impeccable of orders.”
Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states: “the principle
must be equally true even where the ‘brand’ of invalidity’ is
plainly visible; for their also the order can effectively be
resisted in law only by obtaining the deci-sion of the Court
(See: Administrative Law 6th Ed. p. 352). Prof. Wade sums up
these principles:
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“The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an
order only if ‘the right remedy is sought by the right
person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The
order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may
refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff’s lack of
standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary
remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some
other legal reason. In any such case the ‘void’ order
remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an
order may be void for one purpose and valid for another,
and that it may be void against one person but valid
against another.”…
The above observations should be a complete answer to the question
of jurisdiction raised by learned counsel appearing for the
Respondents.
4.5. The conduct of the Respondents who happen to be an entity
under Article 12 of the Constitution of India falls short of fairness
standards obtaining in the realm of Public Law, to say the least. It
did not take up the plea of lack of jurisdiction in the Arbitration
proceedings before the Facilitation Council nor before the
Commercial Court when Award was challenged u/s. 34 of the A and
C Act, 1996. Nor did they tell the said Court whilst withdrawing the
said challenge. Added, they had not sought for liberty at the hands of
the Commercial Court, to take up such a plea in the Execution
Proceedings. Article 12 entity has to conduct itself as a model litigant
vide Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 130. It cannot
play the nefarious game of hide & seek in the legal battles. The
culpable conduct of Respondents in delaying the payment under the
Award is calculated to defraud the Appellant who has secured a just
result at the hands of statutory arbitral authority. The culpable
conduct disentitles them to go scathe-free. They were not entitled to
any relief at the hands of learned Single Judge in writ jurisdiction.
4.6. The above aspects have not been considered by the Writ Court
while examining the claim of Respondents, who happened to be
petitioners before the learned Single Judge. That has occasioned
enormous injustice to the Appellant. Thus, the impugned orders suffer
from errors apparent on their face warranting interference in these
appeals for setting the injustice at naught.
4.7. The other contention of learned panel counsel appearing for
Respondents that the impugned order is made by the Single judge only
u/a 227 as distinguished from Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and
therefore, intra-court appeal is incompetent, does not merit
acceptance. The subject Writ Petitions were filed by invoking both the
Articles. The very impugned orders on their forehead mention bothSignature Not Verified
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these Articles. Even the subject matter of the dispute by its very nature
attracts Art. 226. The finding of Executing Court that the Award does
not require any stamping under the provisions of the Indian Stamp
Act, 1899 is not demonstrated to be wrong. Which provision of the
said Act makes Award of the kind to be stamped, is not particularized.
In the above circumstances, these appeals succeed; the
impugned orders of the learned Single Judge are set at naught;
Respondents‟ W.P.(C) No. 30966/2024 & W.P.(C) No. 20210/2025
being devoid of merits are dismissed with a cost of Rs.50,000/-
(Rupees Fifty Thousand) only to be remitted to the Appellants within
eight weeks. The Executing Court shall accomplish the execution
process within an outer limit of six months vide Periyammal v. V.
Rajamani, 2025 INSC 329.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
8. Thus, it is clear that as far as arbitral award dated 10 th July, 2023,
passed by the MSEF Council is concerned, the same has attained finality.
9. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this
Court in the case of Idemia Syscom India Private Limited Versus
Conjoinix Total Solutions Private Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 1023,
wherein, this Court while dealing with a petition filed under Section 11 of
the Arbitration Act, delved into the purpose of Arbitration Act as well as of
the MSMED Act, and had held that the MSMED Act, being specific law,
prevails over the general law, i.e., Arbitration Act. Thus, it was held as
follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
11. MSMED Act has been enacted for the facilitating the promotion
and development and enhancing the competitiveness of micro, small
and medium enterprises and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto. Section 17 of the MSMED Act provides for the
recovery of dues of the supplier from the buyer for goods supplied or
services rendered. Section 18 (1) of the MSMED Act contains a non-
obstante clause and provides that for any amount due under Section
17, any party to the dispute may make a reference to the Micro and
Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. Thereafter, the facilitation
council would either conduct conciliation itself or refer the matterSignature Not Verified
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for conciliation to any institution or centre providing alternate
dispute resolution services. Only upon failure of such conciliation
proceedings, arbitration proceedings are initiated, either by itself or
by reference to any institution.
12. While the A&C Act is the general law governing the field of
arbitration, MSMED Act governs a very specific nature of disputes
concerning MSME’s and it sets out a statutory mechanism for the
payment of interest on delayed payments. MSMED Act being the
specific law, and A&C Act being the general law, the specific law
would prevail over the general law. Even otherwise. MSMED Act
has been enacted subsequent to the A&C Act and the legislature is
presumed to have been aware about the existence of A&C Act when
the act was enacted. Sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 18 contain
non obstante clauses which have the effect of overriding any other
law for the time being in force. Section 24 of the Act states that the
provisions of sections 15 to 23 shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the
time being in force. Thus, the legislative intent is clear that MSMED
Act would have an overriding effect on the provisions of A&C Act.
The provisions of MSMED Act would become ineffective if, by way
of an independent arbitration agreement between the parties, the
process mandated in Section 18 of the MSMED Act is sidestepped.
Moreover, the fact that the petitioner has approached the Court under
Section 11 of the A&C Act first would be of no help to him as the
MSMED Act does not does not carve out any such exception to the
non-obstante clause.
13. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of Supreme
Court in Silpi Industries v. Kerala SRTC, (2021) 18 SCC
790 wherein it was held as under:–
“39. Thus, it is clear that out of the two legislations, the
provisions of the MSMED Act will prevail, especially when it has
overriding provision under Section 24 thereof. Thus, we hold that
the MSMED Act, being a special statute, will have an overriding
effect vis-Ã -vis the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which
is a general Act. Even if there is an agreement between the
parties for resolution of disputes by arbitration, if a seller is
covered by Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development
Act, 2006, the seller can certainly approach the competent
authority to make its claim. If any agreement between the parties
is there, same is to be ignored in view of the statutory obligations
and mechanism provided under the 2006 Act…”
14. It is also deemed apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods
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(P) Ltd., (2023) 6 SCC 401, wherein the Court, while affirming the
decision in Silpi Industries (Supra), held as under:–
“42. Thus, the Arbitration Act, 1996 in general governs the law of
Arbitration and Conciliation, whereas the MSMED Act,
2006 governs specific nature of disputes arising between specific
categories of persons, to be resolved by following a specific
process through a specific forum. Ergo, the MSMED Act, 2006
being a special law and the Arbitration Act, 1996 being a general
law, the provisions of the MSMED Act would have precedence
over or prevail over the Arbitration Act, 1996. In Silpi Industries
case [Silpi Industries v. Kerala SRTC, (2021) 18 SCC 790] also,
this Court had observed while considering the issue with regard to
the maintainability and counter-claim in arbitration proceedings
initiated as per Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 that
the MSMED Act, 2006 being a special legislation to protect
MSMEs by setting out a statutory mechanism for the payment of
interest on delayed payments, the said Act would override the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 which is a general
legislation. Even if the Arbitration Act, 1996 is treated as a special
law, then also the MSMED Act, 2006 having been enacted
subsequently in point of time i.e. in 2006, it would have an
overriding effect, more particularly in view of Section 24 of
the MSMED Act, 2006 which specifically gives an effect to the
provisions of Sections 15 to 23 of the Act over any other law for
the time being in force, which would also include the Arbitration
Act, 1996.
xxx
44. The submissions made on behalf of the counsel for the buyers
that a conscious omission of the word “agreement” in sub-section
(1) of Section 18, which otherwise finds mention in Section 16 of
the MSMED Act, 2006 implies that the arbitration agreement
independently entered into between the parties as contemplated
under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 was not intended to
be superseded by the provisions contained under Section 18 of
the MSMED Act, 2006 also cannot be accepted. A private
agreement between the parties cannot obliterate the statutory
provisions. Once the statutory mechanism under sub-section (1) of
Section 18 is triggered by any party, it would override any other
agreement independently entered into between the parties, in view
of the non obstante clauses contained in sub-sections (1) and (4)
of Section 18. The provisions of Sections 15 to 23 have also
overriding effect as contemplated in Section 24 of the MSMED
Act, 2006 when anything inconsistent is contained in any other
law for the time being in force. It cannot be gainsaid that while
interpreting a statute, if two interpretations are possible, the oneSignature Not Verified
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which enhances the object of the Act should be preferred than the
one which would frustrate the object of the Act. If submission
made by the learned counsel for the buyers that the party to a
dispute covered under the MSMED Act, 2006 cannot avail the
remedy available under Section 18(1) of the MSMED Act,
2006 when an independent arbitration agreement between the
parties exists is accepted, the very purpose of enacting the
MSMED Act, 2006 would get frustrated.
xxx
52. The upshot of the above is that:
52.1. Chapter V of the MSMED Act, 2006 would override the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
52.2. No party to a dispute with regard to any amount due under
Section 17 of the MSMED Act, 2006 would be precluded from
making a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises
Facilitation Council, though an independent arbitration
agreement exists between the parties.
52.4. The proceedings before the Facilitation
Council/institute/centre acting as an arbitrator/Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act, 2006 would
be governed by the Arbitration Act, 1996.
52.5. The Facilitation Council/institute/centre acting as an
Arbitral Tribunal by virtue of Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act,
2006 would be competent to rule on its own jurisdiction as also
the other issues in view of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act,
1996.”
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
10. Further, reference may also be made to the judgment passed by the
Supreme Court in the case of K.V. George Versus Secretary to
Government, Water and Power Department, Trivandrum and Another,
(1989) 4 SCC 595, wherein, the Supreme Court has held that principles of
res judicata shall also apply to the proceedings held under the Arbitration
Act. The relevant paragraphs, in this regard, are reproduced as follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
16. With regard to the submission as to the applicability of the
principles of res judicata as provided in Section 11 of the Code ofSignature Not Verified
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Civil Procedure to arbitration case, it is to be noted that Section 41
of the Arbitration Act provides that the provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure will apply to the arbitration proceedings. The
provisions of res judicata are based on the principles that there shall
be no multiplicity of proceedings and there shall be finality of
proceedings. This is applicable to the arbitration proceedings as
well. It is convenient to refer to the decision in Daryao v. State of
U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1457 : (1962) 1 SCR 574,582-83] wherein it has
been held that the principles of res judicata will apply even to
proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India. It
has been observed that:
“Now, the rule of res judicata as indicated in Section 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects,
for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may be said to
be technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is
founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of
the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding
decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, and it
is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed
twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two
principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata
they cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in
dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article
32.”
17. In Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar [AIR 1970 SC 833 : (1969) 2
SCR 244 quoting from an unreported judgment in Uttam Singh Dugal
& Co. v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1962, dated 11-10-
1962 (SC)] it has been observed that:
“The true legal position in regard to the effect of an award is
not in dispute. It is well settled that as a general rule, all claims
which are the subject-matter of a reference to arbitration
merge in the award which is pronounced in the proceedings
before the arbitrator and that after an award has been
pronounced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect
of the said claims can be determined only on the basis of the
said award. After an award is pronounced, no action can be
started on the original claim which had been the subject-
matter of the reference…. This conclusion, according to the
learned Judge, is based upon the elementary principle that, as
between the parties and their privies, an award is entitled to
that respect which is due to judgment of a court of last resort.
Therefore, if the award which has been pronounced between
the parties has in fact, or can, in law, be deemed to have dealtSignature Not Verified
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with the present dispute, the second reference would be
incompetent. This position also has not been and cannot be
seriously disputed.”
18. Considering the above observations of this Court in the aforesaid
cases we hold that the principle of res judicata or for that the
principles of constructive res judicata apply to arbitration
proceedings and as such the award made in the second arbitration
proceeding being Arbitration Case No. 276 of 1980 cannot be
sustained and is therefore, set aside. The High Court has rightly
allowed the FMA No. 304 of 1982 holding that the appellant
contractor was precluded from seeking the second reference. No other
points have been raised before us by the appellant.
xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
11. Therefore, as a sequitur to the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that
once there is a valid arbitration award passed after following the due process
by the MSEF Council, second invocation of the arbitration on the same
dispute by the petitioner, would not be maintainable.
12. Thus, no merit is found in the present petition. The same is
accordingly dismissed.
MINI PUSHKARNA, J
MARCH 27, 2026/auSignature Not Verified
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