Punjab-Haryana High Court
Baru Ram vs Surinder Singh And Others on 5 February, 2026
Author: Amarinder Singh Grewal
Bench: Amarinder Singh Grewal
RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
102 RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M)
Date of Decision:
Decision:05.02.2026
Baru Ram (since deceased) through LRs ... Appellant
Versus
Surender Singh and others ... Respondents
Respondent
2. RSA No.2531 of 1995 (O&M)
Baru Ram (since deceased) through LRs ... Appellant
Versus
Surender Singh and another ... Respondents
Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL
Present: Mr. Pardeep Solath, Advocate
Mr. Satbir Mor, Advocate
for the appellant in both cases.
Mr. S.M. Sharma, Advocate
for respondent No.1.
Respondents No.2 to 9, service dispensed with.
***
AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL)
1. This order of mine shall dispose of two regular second appeals
bearing Nos.55 of 1995 and 2531 of 1995 as they arise out of same cause of
action. Both the appeals have beenn preferred by the appellant
appellant-defendant
defendant No.1.
No.1
challenging the concurrent findings
finding of fact rendered by both the learned Courts
below whereby the suit of respondent No.1-plaintiff
No.1 plaintiff seeking possession by way
of pre-emption
emption has been decreed.
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -2-
2. For the sake of convenience, facts are being enumerated from RSA
No.55 of 1995
95 and the parties are being described as per their status before the
learned trial
rial Court.
3. In brief, the facts are that the plaintiff filed the suit for possession
by way of pre-emption
emption in respect of the suit land measuring 16 kanals 3 marlas
of land i.e. 323/364
323/364 share of land measuring 18 kanals 4 marlas, comprised in
Killa No.88/11(8-0),
No.88/11(8 89//14/1(2-4), 89//15(8-0),
0), Khewat and Khata No.61/86 to
88 situated in village Sainthali, as per jambandi for the year 1984
1984-85
85 by pleading
therein that defendants No.2 to 9, being owners in possession over the suit land,
sold the same to defendant No.1 vide registered sale deed 15.05.1989 for a
consideration of Rs.28,000/-,
Rs.28,000/ , while mentioning a fictitious consideration of
Rs.60,000/- in the sale deed, without any notice of aforesaid sale to the plaintiff.
plaintiff
The plaintiff claimed his superior/preferential
superior right of pre-emption
emption being a co-
co
sharer and asked defendant No.1 to acknowledge his right and when he denied to
do so, suit was filed.
4. The subject matter of challenge in R
RSA
SA No.2531 of 1995 is the suit
property admeasuring 2 kanals 1 marla i.e. 41/364 share in the total land
measuring 18 kanals 4 marlas comprised in comprised in Killa No.88/11(8
No.88/11(8-0),
0),
89//14/1(2-4),
4), 89//15(8-0),
89//15(8 Khewat and Khata No.61/86 to 88 situated in vil
village
lage
Sainthali, Tehsil Narwana, as per jambandi for the year 1984
1984-85 with respect to
which possession was sought by plaintiff by way of pre
pre-emption
emption on the ground
that defendant No.2 therein, being a co-sharer
co sharer in the entire land had sold the suit
property for a consideration of Rs.5000/- vide registered sale deed No.631 dated
09.06.1989 to defendant No.1 without notice.
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -3-
5. Both the suits were contested by defendant No.1 by denying the
status of the plaintiff as a co-sharer
co and further asserting that defendant No.2 had
sold specific numbers (86 to 88) out of khata No.61. It was also asserted in the
written statement that the suits were filed by the plaintiff in collusion with
defendant Nos.2
.2 to 9.. The consideration of Rs.60,000/
Rs.60,000/- was actually paid to the
vendor as well as the stamp and registration expenses were borne by defendant
No.1 at the time of registration of sale deed. Further, it was stated that the
plaintiff had purchased specific killa numbers
number from other co
co-sharer and as such,
ch,
vendee cannot become co-sharer
co sharer along with other co
co-sharers.
6. On appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence, the
learned trial Court decreed the suit and in appeal preferred by defendant No.1,
the findings rendered by the learned trial Court stand affirmed.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the plaintiff had
purchased the land in some other khata/khewat with specific killa numbers and
thus, he could not be a co-sharer
co sharer in the suit land. In the absence of any cogent
evidence, much less, any sale deed to show that the plaintiff was a co
co-sharer in
the suit land, the findings rendered by both the learned Courts below are
perverse. A pre-emptor
pre emptor must step into the shoes of the original vendee and
acquired the entire property sold, not just a portion, meaning thereby, partial pre-
pre
emption is impermissible. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment
passed by a Coordinate Bench
Bench of this Court in Ajit Singh Vs. Waryam Singh
passed in RSA No.218 of 1992 decided on 27.02.2025 (2025 NCPHHC 27624).
8. It is further contended that respondent No.1
No.1-plaintiff
plaintiff has already
withdrawn the amount of Rs.48,000/-
Rs.48,000/ deposited by him in terms of the judgment
and decree passed by the learned trial Court as is evident from order dated
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -4-
11.01.1996 passed by this Court and thus, he has lost the right of pre
pre-emption.
emption.
In support of his contention, he relies upon the judgment passed by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh (deceased) through his Legal
Representatives Vs. Chuhar Singh alias Ajmer Singh (since deceased) through
his Legal Representatives 2022 (3) RCR (Civil) 584. It is also contended that
the status of the vendee was changed as
a to a co
co-sharer
sharer before filing of the suit
owing to subsequent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 vide which he had purchased
another parcel of the land,
land, as the suit was filed thereafter on 09.05.1990.
Reliance is placed upon the judgments rendered by Coordinate Benche
Benchess of this
Court in Bagha Ram Vs. Vidya Devi passed in RSA No.2495 of 1988 on
04.09.2025 and Jagdish Kumar and another Vs. Lachhman passed in RSA
No.2006 of 1989 on 30.04.2019.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1
No.1-plaintiff
plaintiff
submits that the respondent No.1-plaintiff
No.1 plaintiff duly proved vide jamabandi for the
year 1984-85 that he was a co-sharer
sharer and thus, being a co
co-sharer,
sharer, had a
preferential right over the suit land. It is further contended that a co-sharer
sharer has
interest in every parcel
pa of the joint property and possession of joint property by
one co-owner
owner is possession of all in the eye of law, even if all but one are
actually out of possession. What a vendee gets in the transfer from a co
co-sharer
sharer is
i
the right of that co-sharer
co and not exclusive ownership of any portion of joint
land. It is also contended that the right of pre
pre-emption
emption is available not only
when a co-sharer
sharer sells the whole of his share but also when sells a portion
thereof. In support of his contention, he relies up
upon
on the judgment passed by a
Full Bench of this Court in Bhartu Vs. Ram Sarup 1981 PLJ 204 to contend
that the sale of a specific portion of land described by particular khasra numbers
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -5-
by a co-owner
owner out of the joint khewat would be a sale of share out of th
thee joint
land and pre-emptible
emptible under Section 15(1) (b) of the Punjab Pre
Pre-emption Act.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
paper book as well as the case laws cited with their able assistance.
11. Historically,
istorically, the right of pre-em
pre emption
ption traces its origin to the
Mohammedan rule, where it emerged from customary practices that were later
recognized and enforced by courts, particularly in northern India. Judicial
decisions have consistently held that a pre-emptor
pre emptor possesses two distinct rights.
The first is the inherent or primary right, namely the right to receive an offer of
property before it is sold. The second is the secondary or remedial right, which
allows the pre-emptor
emptor to follow the property after it has been sold and to
te himself in place of the original vendee. This secondary right is
substitute
essentially a right of substitution, and its exercise requires the pre
pre-emptor
emptor to
demonstrate that his right is not only equal to, but superior to, that of the vendee
at the time the right is asserted. The pre-emptor
emptor must establish the existence of
the right to pre–empt on three crucial dates; (i) the date of the sale
sale, (ii) the date of
filing the suit and (iii) the date on which the court of first instance passes its
decree. Additionally, the
the claimant must prove that this right subsisted
continuously from the date of sale until the passing of the decree. If, during the
pendency of the suit, the claimant loses this right or the vendee acquires an equal
or superior right before adjudication, the
the suit for pre
pre-emption is liable to fail.
12. In the judgment passed in Bishan Singh and others vs. Khazan
Singh & another AIR 1958 SC 838, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has set-forth
forth
the contours of the right of pre-emption
pre emption as under:
under:-
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -6-“11…..
11…..To summarize: (1) The right of pre
pre-emption
emption is not a right to
the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold.
This right is called the primary or inherent right. (2) The pre-
pre
emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing
sold. (3) It
It is a right of substitution but not of re
re-purchase
purchase i. e., the
pre emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the
pre-emptor
original vendee. (4) It is a right to acquire the whole of the property
sold and not a share of the property sold. (5) Prefer
Preference
ence being the
essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that
of the vendee or the person substituted in his place. (6) The right
being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate
methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or
equal right being substituted in his place.”
13. Admittedly, as per jamabandi for the year 1984
1984-85,
85, respondent
No.1-plaintiff
plaintiff had purchased 169/578 share in the land comprising khewat and
khatauni No.61/90 and Khasra No.89//18/1, 19/2/1, 20/1 from Pritam Singh etc.
along
long with other co-sharers
co sharers and thus, the vendor ha
had not ceased to be co-sharer
sharer
at the time of transferring the land in favour of the plaintiff. In other words, the
respondent-No.1
No.1-plaintiff by purchasing a fraction of share of vendor (though a
specific portion of land described by particular khasra numbe
numbers),, who was still a
co-sharer,
sharer, had also stepped into the shoe of the co-sharer (vendor). A Full
Bench of this Court in Bhartu’s case (supra) while answering the question
posed “whether
whether the sale of a specific portion of land described by particular
khasra numbers by a co-owner
owner out of the joint khewat would be a sale of share
out of the joint land and pre-emptible
pre emptible under Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre-
Pre
emption Act?”has held as under:-
“6.
6. Take another example where ‘A’ and ‘B’ jointly own a khewat in
equa shares measuring 200 bighas
equal bighas.. ‘B’ is in separate possession of6 of 15
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -7-100 bighas of land comprised of specific khasra numbers and
transfers it to ‘C’. This is not disputed that in spite of this sale, ‘A’
continues to be a co-sharer
co sharer in the land transferred by ‘B’
‘B’.. If that is
so how can it be disputed that ‘C’ would necessarily be a co
co-sharer
sharer
in the remaining 100 bighas of land in possession of ‘A’ as
otherwise it would mean that ‘A’ is exclusively owner of
100 bighas of land in his possession and also a co
co-sharer with ‘C’ in
the remaining 100 bighas which obviously is not possible. The
matter can further be illustrated by another example. ‘A’ and ‘B’ are
co–sharers in the joint khewat,, say of 100 bighas of land in equal
shares. ‘B’ who is in exclusive possession of land measuring
40 bighas of land comprised of khasra Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 transfers
two khasra numbers, that is, 1 and 2 measuring 20 bighas to ‘C’
specifically stating in the deed that he is in possession of
these khasra numbers as a co-sharer
sharer and is trans
transferring
ferring his interest
as such. Can it be said on these facts that ‘C’ had purchased
anything except a co-sharer’s
co sharer’s interest in khasra Nos.1 and 2 in spite
of the fact that the sale is of specific numbers and of the specified
area. The answer obviously would be in the negative and if so then
the sale is obviously of a share by the co
co-sharer
sharer out of the joint land
and nothing else.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
8. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, relying
on Radhakrishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar
Ramchandra Alshi and others, AIR 1960 Supreme Court
1368, and Bishan Singh and others v. Khazan Singh and another,
AIR 1958 Supreme Court 838, contended that the right of pre-
pre
emption being piratical in nature is a very weak right and can be
defeated by all legitimate means. He, therefore, argued that the
defeated
interpretation of the said clause as enunciated in Mst. Gurnam
Kaur’s case (supra) cannot be rejected on the ground that the rights
of the co-sharer
co sharer can be defeated by describing the land purchased
purchase
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -8-certainly a right to do so and he cannot be denied this right on the
consideration that it would defeat the purpose of the Legislature.
The argument, on the face of it, is quite attractive but has, in fact,
no substance. What has been accepted by the Courts is the right of
the vendee to defeat the claim of pre
pre-emption
emption of an individual but
not the purpose of the Legislature. The purpose of the Legislature in
accepting the right of a co-share
co sharerr obviously is to prevent the
fragmentation of the holding, preserve the harmony amongst the co-
co
sharers and avoid introduction of an undesirable person as a co-
co
sharer. The legitimate means of a vendee to defeat the right of pre-
pre
emption of a co-sharer
co so farr recognised by the Courts is that he
may transfer the land purchased by him prior to the suit to another
co–sharer
sharer having an equal right of pre
pre-emption
emption with the pre-
pre
emptor. By doing so, no doubt, the right of the pre
pre-emptor
emptor is
defeated but not the purpose of the Legislature because the land
reverts back to another co-sharer
co sharer in the joint khewat and it serves
all the purposes referred to above. Consequently, howsoever weak
the right of pre-emption
pre emption may be, it cannot be accepted that it is so
illusory that it can be defeated simply by describing the land
purchased in terms of specific khasra numbers instead of fractional
share. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and
hold that the sale of a specific portion of land described by
particular khasra numbers by a co
co-owner
owner out of the
joint khewat would be a sale of share out of the joint land and pre-
pre
emptible under section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre
Pre-emption
emption Act. As
the learned counsel for the appellant intends to argue the appeal on
other points, this
this case would now go back to the learned Single
Judge for final disposal.”
14. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant with respect to
partial pre-emption
emption and reliance on the judgment passed by this Court in Ajit
Singh’s case (supra) has no merit. In the
he said case, the plaintiff had excluded
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -9-
certain khasra numbers from the suit land while claiming his pre
pre-emptory
emptory rights
and thus, it was held by this
th Court that the suit was bad for partial pre-emption.
emption.
Secondly, the argument that respondent No.1-plaintiff
plaintiff has already withdrawn the
decretal amount vide order dated 11.01.1996 and reliance upon judgment passed
by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh’s case (supra) has also no
merit. In the case of Bachan Singh, the plaintiff did not depo
deposit
sit the decretal
amount as directed by the learned trial Court on or before 01.04.1969 and the
learned 1st Appellate Court had extended the time for payment till 02.08.1969
without granting stay in favour of the plaintiffs
plaintiffs-respondents
respondents therein. However,
in the present case, it is nowhere the case of the appellant
appellant-defendant
defendant No.1 that
respondent No.1-plaintiff
No.1 plaintiff had not deposited the decretal amount as directed by
the learned trial Court. Rather, the amount so deposited was allowed to be
withdrawn by orders of
of this Court, keeping in view the fact that execution of the
judgment and decree was stayed and the appeal, being admitted, was not likely
to be heard in near future.
15. Lastly, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the
status of the appellant
ppellant-defendant
defendant No.1 (vendee) was changed as to a co
co-sharer
sharer
owing to subsequent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 vide which he had purchased
another parcel of the land, much prior to the filing of the suit on 09.05.1990,
09.05.1990
though at the first blush seems impressive
impressive but ultimately, falls flat. The
judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Jagdish Kumar (supra) as
relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the aforesaid
argument is also distinguishable
distinguish on the facts of the present cas
case. In the case of
Jagdish Kumar, the vendee before filing of the suit seeking pre
pre-emptory
emptory rights
by the plaintiff therein had purchased another parcel of the land out of the joint
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -10-
holding from the original vendor and thus, improved his status as equal to that of
a co-sharer.
sharer. In the said judgment, reliance was placed upon the observation
made by a Coordinate Bench (see Krishan Lal and another v. Himta Ram 2006
(3) RCR (Civil) 117),
117 , based on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Garib
Singh v. Harnam Singh 1971 PLJ 578 wherein provisions of Section 21
21-A
A of
the Punjab Pre-emption
Pre emption Act, 1913 were interpreted, to hold that a vendee
acquiring land prior to institution of a ‘pre-emptory
‘pre emptory suit’ by a co
co-sharer,
sharer, would be
deemed to have improved his status equal to th
that of the co-sharer,
sharer, thereby
defeating the co-sharers’
co right of pre-emption.
emption. However, the Coordinate Bench
in the judgment passed in Krishan Lal‘s case (supra) has observed as under:-
“10. The facts as have been noticed by the two Courts below
clearly show that the sale which is sought to be pre
pre-empted
empted by the
plaintiff is dated December 15, 1988, vide which Shakuntla had
sold 32 kanals of land in favour of the defendant
defendant-appellants for a
sale consideration of Rs.1,17,000/-
Rs.1,17,000/-.. It also emerges from the record
that through a sale deed Ex.D3 Shakuntla had sold some other land
on May 2, 1989 to the defendant-
defendant-appellants
ants for a consideration of
Rs.
Rs.1,21,312/-,
, therefore, it is undisputed that the def
defendants
endants had
become co-sharers
co sharers alongwith other co
co-sharers
sharers in the joint khata
and khewat. Their rights in the joint khata and khewat have become
equal to that of the plaintiff. It is also apparent that they had
acquired the aforesaid status much prior to the filing of the present
suit by the plaintiff-respondent.
plaintiff . Therefore, the only question which
arises for consideration is as to whether the aforesaid
improvement in the status of defendants was liable to be ignored.
ignored
Prior to the year 1944, there was some con
confusion
fusion as to the stage
upto which the vendee-defendant
vendee defendant could improve his status for
defeating the claim of a pre-emptor.
pre emptor. However, Vide Punjab Act 1 of
1944, an amendment was made in the Principal Act and Section
21 A was inserted to the following effect :
21-A
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -11-
“21-A.
A. Any improvement, otherwise than through
inheritance or succession, made in the status of a vendee
defendant after the institution of a suit for pre
pre-emption,
emption,
shall not affect the right of preemption of plaintiff in such
suit.”
A perusal of the aforesaid
esaid provision would show that the
legislature provided that any improvement, otherwise than through
inheritance or succession made in the status of a vendee
vendee-defendant
defendant
after the institution of a suit for pre
pre-emption
emption was liable to be
ignored and could not affect the right of pre
pre-emption
emption claimed by the
plaintiff. The said provision came to be interpreted by a Full Bench
of this Court in the case of Garib Singh v. Harnam Singh and
others, 1971 PLJ 579. It was held by the Full Bench as follows :
“Prior to the introduction of Section 21
21-A
A by Amending
Act 1 of 1944, there was an unhealthy race going on the
part of vendee to defeat the right of preemption by
making improvement in his position by voluntary and
volitional efforts upto the date of getting decree. By
introducing this new provision the scope of the race to
improve his status on the part of the vendee was
circumscribed upto the date of institution of the suit and
not thereafter except where the improvement in the status
of the vendee is not a result of hhis
is efforts or volition but
because of inheritance or succession. Section 21
21-A
A was
added to counter-act
act the view taken in ILR 1942 Lahore
15 and ILR 1942 Lahore 190 and 473.
Because of the amendment of the Punjab Pre
Pre-emption
emption Act
by introduction of Section 221-A,
A, the authorities in which
it had been ruled that a vendee by voluntary acquisition
can improve his position even after the institution of the
suit are no longer good law. Section 21
21-A
A specifically
prohibits such voluntary improvements after the suit, aand
nd
it was enacted to nullify the effect of those authorities.
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -12-
By introducing Section 21
21-A
A by the Amending Act 1 of
1944, the Legislature clearly intended to recognise no
voluntary improvement in the status of a vendee after the
institution of the suit, but only those resulting from
inheritance or succession.”
In view of the provisions of Section 21
21-A
A and in view of
interpretation thereof in Garib Singh‘s case (supra), it is clear that
any improvement of the status of a vendee after the institution of the
suit
uit was liable to be ignored
ignored and the claim of a plaintiff/
plaintiff/pre-emptor
emptor
could not be defeated by any such improvement. In these
circumstances, the natural corollary would be that if an
improvement had been made in the status of vendee prior to the
institution of the suit, then the vendee defendant would always be
entitled to take protection of the aforesaid improvement. Ignoring
the aforesaid improvement, even if made prior to the filing of the
suit, would be contrary to the spirit of Section 21
21-A. A similar view
iew
was taken in the case of Mala Ram v. Subash Chander and others,
1990(1) RRR 72 : 1989 PLJ 445.
11. The question which now arises is as to whether the provisions of
Section 28-A
28 A of the Act come to the rescue of the plaintiff to claim
that since the sale dated May 21, 1989 was subject matter of a pre-
pre
emption suit, therefore, improvement in status was liable to be
ignored because of the aforesaid provisions. In my considered
opinion, the answer has to be in the negative.
12. Provisions of Section 28-A
28 A have already been reproduced
above. A bare reading thereof would show that the aforesaid
provision is only attracted to non–suit
suit the plaintiff/preemptor when
he bases his claim on the strength of some sale deed in his favour to
claim that he had acquired a right of co
co-sharer-ship
ship when the
aforesaid sale deed itself is still liable to be pre
pre-empted.
empted. The
aforesaid provisions, by any stretch of imagination, cannot be
aforesaid
interpreted to defeat the claim of a defendant who has improved his
status by a subsequent sale deed and has acquired the right of co-
co
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -13-
sharership, similar to that of the plaintiff. Even if the subs
subsequent
equent
sale deed is subject of any pre
pre-emption
emption suit, the rights of a
defendant do not fall within the parameters of Section 28
28-A
A of the
Act and such the defence of improvement of status cannot be denied
to him. As a matter of fact, the question of any impr
improvement
ovement or
otherwise of the status of the defendant
defendant-vendee
vendee has to be examined
in the light of Section 21-A
21 A only and the provisions of Section 28
28–A
of the Act are not attracted at all to the case.
13. Faced with the aforesaid difficulty, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff respondent has relied upon a judgment in Smt. Maya Devi
plaintiff-respondent
and another v. Rameshwar,
Rameshwar, 1992(2) RRR 623 : 1992(1) PLR
688 On the first impressions the said judgment seems to support
688.
the case of the plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the said judgment has
been relied upon by both the Courts below. However, on a deeper
consideration of the aforesaid
aforesaid authority, it is apparent that in
Maya Devi‘s case (supra) the sale was sought to be pre
pre-empted
empted by
the pre-emptor
pre emptor on the basis of his co
co-sharership.
sharership. Prior to the date
of filing of the suit, the vendee defendants had acquired the right
of co-sharership
co ip in the suit property through a subsequent sale.
The subsequent sale in favour of vendee
vendee-defendants
defendants was also
sought to be pre-empted
pre empted by the preemptor by filing a separate suit.
Both the said suits were heard together by the trial Court. The
appeals arising
arising out of the said litigation were also heard together
by the Appellate Court. Two Regular Second Appeals arising out
of the aforesaid two suits were also being heard together by the
High Court. It was in these circumstances that this Court came to
the conclusion
conclusion that the new status acquired by the vendee after
the first sale, which was sought to be pre
pre-empted,
empted, would not
improve the status of the vendee in any manner, since the
subsequent sale itself was subject matter of a pre
pre-emption
emption suit,
which was being decided together with the first suit. Because of
the aforesaid peculiar facts, the improved status of the vendee was
ignored and the claim of the preemptor was upheld.
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -14-
14. However, the facts in the present case are totally
distinguishable. It is apparent that the sale which was sought to be
pre
pre-empted by the pre-emptor
emptor Himta Ram is dated December 15,
1988. The vendees had improved their status vide a subsequent sale
deed dated May 2, 1989. In these circumstances, the controversy in
the present case is only with regard to the status of the vendees vis-
vis
a-vis
vis the pre-emptor
pre qua the sale deed dated December 15, 1988. It
has to be examined as to whether the vendee
vendee-defendants
defendants had
acquired the right of co-sharership
co sharership and, therefore, Himta Ram,
plaintiff who was also
als a co-sharer
sharer could not be treated to have any
preferential right to file the present suit in question. I am fully
supported by the judgment rendered in Mala Ram’s case (supra). In
these circumstances, it has to be held that the vendee
vendee-defendants
defendants
had improved
improved their status through the subsequent sale deed dated
May 2, 1989, when Shakuntla had sold some other land to them and
the vendee-defendants
vendee defendants had become co
co-sharers
sharers in the joint khata and
khewat and had acquired the status similar to the plaintiffs. The
ratio
tio of the judgment in Garib Singh‘s case (supra) is also fully
attracted to the present case and, therefore, the plaintiff
plaintiff-pre-emptor
emptor
cannot claim any right of pre-
pre-emption
emption against the defendant-
defendant
vendee.
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the case in hand, the subsequent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 on
the basis of which, a contention was raised by learned counsel for the appellant
qua acquisition of status of the vendee/appellant
vendee/appellant-defendant No.1 as a co-sharer
sharer
before filing of the suit for pre-emption
pre hass also been challenged by respondent
No.1-plaintiff
plaintiff by way of separate suit and both suits were decided by the learned
trial Court vide judgments and decrees dated 20.08.1992 and 22.07.1992.
Appeals against the aforesaid judgments and decrees of the learne
learned
d trial Court
filed by the appellant-defendant
appellant No.1 were registered on the same day i.e.
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RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -15-
07.10.1994 and the regular second appeals filed by him before this Court are
also being disposed of together. Thus, improved status of the vendee/appellant-
vendee/appellant
defendant No.1 as a co-sharer
co sharer is liable to be ignored in terms of observations
made by this Court in para 13 of the judgment passed in Krishan Lal‘s case
(supra) .
17. In view of the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Pankajakshi (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. Chandrika
and others (2016) 6 SCC 157, Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and others
(2019) 17 SCC 71 and Gurbachan Singh (dead) through LRs Vs. Gurcharan
875, questions of
Singh (dead) through LRs and others (2023) SCC Online SC 875
law are not required to be framed in second appeal before the Punjab and
Haryana High Court whose jurisdiction is circumscribed by provisions of
Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.
18. As an upshot of above, this
this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in
the concurrent findings of fact rendered by both the Courts below and the same
are hereby upheld.
upheld The amounts withdrawn by the respondent No.1
No.1-plaintiff
plaintiff vide
orders passed by this Court in both the appeals sha
shall
ll be deposited by him within
a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order, as
was done in compliance of judgment and decree passed by the learned trial
Court. Resultantly, both the regular second appeals are dismissed.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(AMARINDER
AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL
GREWAL)
JUDGE
February 05,, 2026
Pankaj* Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : Yes
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