inkinccorporation@gmail.com Madhya Pradesh High Court
Harminder Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr on 27 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
1 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AMIT SETH
WRIT PETITION No. 21095 of 2018
HARMINDER SINGH AND ANOTHER
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------
Appearance:
Shri Rajnish Sharma and Shri Mudit Goswami - Advocates
Advocate for the
petitioners.
Shri Sanjay Singh Kushwaha - Government Advocate for the respondents
No.1 to 4/State.
None for respondents No. 5 to 7, though served.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------
Reserved on : 02.02.2026
Pronounced on : 27.02.2026
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------
ORDER
1. With the consent of the parties, the matter is finally heard.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 2 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018
2. The instant writ petition filed under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India seeks
s following reliefs:
“a. That, the condition for registration of the decree be modified and
the same be delete
deleted from the judgment and decree as the same is in
violation of the state notification and in alternate the respondent No.1
– 3 may kindly be directed to permit the petitioner for registration of
the decree as directed by the trial Court in the notified village as per
the condition of judgment decree passed by the learned civil court in
the case of 32A/2016.
b. That, the conditi
condition
on put by the learned court below be set aside.
c. That, any other just and proper relief, warranting under the facts
and circumstances of the case be also given to the petitioners,
including cost, in the ends of justice.
justice.”
3. The brief facts leading to fi
filing
ling of the present writ petition,
petition as
discernible from the pleadings and submissions advanced by the leaned
counsel appearing for the petitioner
petitioners, are as under:
3.1. The grandfather of the petitioners,
petitioners Late Shri Dharshan Singh,
Singh waspermanent resident of Vi
Village Mahneked, Tahsil Patti, District Tarn Taran(Punjab), who moved to Village Chitahri, Tehsil Narwar, District Shivpuri
(M.P.) in the year 19883.
3. He purchased some lands in the name of his son.
After
fter the death of Late Shri Darshan Singh, certain dispute
disputes arose between
the legal heirs which led to the filing of a civil suit by the petitioners
bearing Civil Suit No.32A/2016
No.32A/2016 seeking declaration and permanent
injunction in respect of the suit land.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 3 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018
3.2. The said civil suit was disposed of by a compromise judgment
ju and
decree dated 08.08.2017
8.08.2017 (Annexure P/1). Learned trial Court
Court, in the
compromise decree, enumerated the condition that the decree shall come
into force only after its registration under the Registration Act, 1908 and
upon payment of adequate
dequate stamp duty. Thereafter, the parties to the decree
would be entitled to get their names mutated. It appears that the land in
question forming the subject matter of the compromise judgment and
decree dated 08.08.2017
8.08.2017 was hit by notifications dated 15.02.2000 and
18.02.2000 issued under Section 18 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act,
1972 (hereinafter referred as to “the Act of 1972″)
1972”), falling within Village
Chitahri forming notified area at Son Chiraiya National Park.. Therefore, in
view of the bar contained in Sect
Section 20 of the Act of 1972, the petitioners
petitioners,
apprehending denial of registration of the compromise judgment and
decree dated 08.08.2017
8.08.2017 challenged the same in a first appeal to the extent
that the said decree imposed a condition for coming into effect only
on after
its registration. The First
irst Appellate
ppellate Court rejected the first appeal preferred
by judgment
udgment and decree dated 23.09.2017 on the ground that the challenge
is not sought to be made to the compromise judgment and decree dated
08.08.2017 on merits but onl
only a finding is sought to be challenged whi
which
may not be permissible. The F
First
irst appellate Court also noted that the
ground of challenge to the compromise judgment and decree did not fall
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
4 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
within the ambit of Order 43 Rule 11-A of CPC and hence, declined
interference. Thereafter,
hereafter, the instant writ petition has been filed by the
petitioners claiming the reliefs as stated hereinabove.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that in view of
the provisions contained in Section 17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act,
1908,, the compromise decree in question is not required to be registered.
registered
Accordingly, the conditions for its registration for the same being given
effect as imposed by the learned trial Court is illegal and unenforceable
and therefore, deserves to be quashed. Learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner, in support of his contentions,
contentions places reliance on the judgment of
the Apex Court in the case of Mukesh v. State of M.P., reported in 2024
SCC Online SC 3836..
5. Learned counsel
el appearing for the petitioners, in the alternative,
submits that the bar as contained in Section 20 of the Act of 1972
regarding non-accrual
accrual of rights after issuance of notification under Section
18 of the Act 1972 would not come in the way of the petitioners
petitioners for getting
the compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017
8.08.2017 registered as the
said compromise judgment and decree does not confer any fresh rights on
the petitioners and in fact, the pre
pre-existing rights of succession vesting on
the petitioners in
n respect of the land in question is only recognized by the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
5 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017
8.08.2017 and therefore, even
otherwise, the registration of the compromise decree dated 08.08.2017
cannot be denied to the petitioners by the state authorities and accordingly,
a mandamus deserves to be issued to the state authority to register the
compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing
appearing for the State by
referring to the return filed
filed, submits that the petitioners were well aware as
regards the bar of accrual of rights as provided under Section 20 of the Act
of 1972 being in force since the year 2000, i.e., the date of issuance
notification
ion under Section 18 of the Act of 1972 yet, in order to bypass
by the
statutory bar, the petit
petitioners have devised a mechanism by way of a
compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017.
8.08.2017. He submits that the
compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017 doess not confer any
pre-existing
existing rights or the rights flowing from succession qua the lands
land in
question and therefore, the state authority cannot be compelled to register
the judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017.
7. No other point is argued by the learned counsel for the parties.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 6 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018
9. In view of the rival contentions advanced by the parties, the
following issues arise for consideration before this Court are as under:
under
(i). Whether, in thee given facts and circumstances of the
case, the condition imposed by the learned trial Court in
the compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08. 8.08.2017
passed in Civil Suit No.32A/2016
No.32A/2016 directing that the said
judgment and decree shall be effective only after its
registration can be said to be illegal or violative of
provisions contained in Section 17 (2) (vi) of the
Registration
tion Act, 1908 ?
(ii). Whether, in the given facts and circumstances of the
case, in view of the bar on accrual of rights contained
tained in
Section 20 of the Act of 1972, a mandamus is required to
be issued to the respondents authorities for registration of
the compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017
8.08.2017 ?
Answer to issue no. (i):-
(i)
10. The question as rega
regards
rds the registration of a compromise judgment
and decree came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of
Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major and Others
Others, reported in 1995 (5) SCC
709 and the said judgment was later on considered by the Apex Court in
the case of Mukesh (supra),
(supra), relied upon by the petitioners as well and by
considering the earlier judgment and law on the point, the Apex Court in
the case of Mukesh (supra) considered and held as under:-
“7. There are two issues involved herein viz., Registration of the
document and payment of stamp duty, which are separate and distinct
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:69357 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018concepts. As regards the issue of registration, we may refer to
Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, which deals with the t
documents of which registration is compulsory and the same reads as
follows:
“17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.–(1)
compulsory The
following documents shall be registered, if the property to which
they relate is situate in a district in which, an
and
d if they have been
executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or
the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act,
1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or
comes into force, namely:
namely:–
(a) instrumen
instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b) other non
non-testamentary
testamentary instruments which purport
or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right,
title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the
value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in
immovable property;
(c) non
non-testamentary
testamentary instruments which acknowledge
the receipt or payment of any consideration on account
of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or
extinction of any such right, title
t or interest; and
(d) leases of immovable property from year to year, or
for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly
rent;
[(e) non-testamentary
non testamentary instruments transferring or
assigning any decree or order of a Court or any award
when such decree or order or award purports or
operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish,
whether in present or in future, any right, title or
interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of
one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable
property
roperty : ]
Provided that the [State Government] may,
by order published in the [Official
Gazette], exempt from the operation of this
sub
sub-section
section any lease executed in any
district, or part of a district, the terms
granted by which do not exceed five year
yearss
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
8 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
and the annual rents reserved by which do
not exceed fifty rupees.
[(1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for
consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of
section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of
1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after
the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws
(Amendment) Act, 2001 (48 of 2001) and if such documents are
not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall
have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A.]
(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub
sub-section
section (1) applies to–
to
(i) any composition deed; or
(ii) any instrument relating to shares in a joint stock
Company, notwithstanding that the assets of such
Company consist in in whole or in part of immovable
property; or
(iii) any debenture issued by any such Company and
not creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or
extinguishing any right, title or interest, to or in
immovable property except in so far as it entitles the
holder
der to the security afforded by a registered
instrument whereby the Company has mortgaged,
conveyed or otherwise transferred the whole or part of
its immovable property or any interest therein to
trustees upon trust for the benefit of the holders of such
debentures;
ebentures; or
(iv) any endorsement upon or transfer of any debenture
issued by any such Company; or
(v) [any document other than the documents specified
in sub
sub-section
section (1A)] not itself creating, declaring,
assigning, limiting or extinguishing any right, title or
interest of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards to or in immovable property, but merely
creating a right to obtain another document which will,
when executed, create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish any such right, title or interest; or
(vi) any decree or order of a Court [except a decree or
order expressed to be made on a compromise and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
9 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
comprising immovable property other than that which
is the subject-matter
subject matter of the suit or proceeding]; or
(vii) any grant of immovable property by
[Government];
overnment]; or
(viii) any instrument of partition made by a Revenue-
Revenue
Officer; or
(ix) any order granting a loan or instrument of
collateral security granted under the Land
Improvement Act, 1871, or the Land Improvement
Loans Act, 1883; or
(x) any order ggranting a loan under the Agriculturists
Loans Act, 1884, or instrument for securing the
repayment of a loan made under that Act; or
[(xa) any order made under the Charitable
Endowments Act, 1890 (6 of 1890), vesting any
property in a Treasurer of Charitable
Charitable Endowments or
divesting any such Treasurer of any property; or]
(xi) any endorsement on a mortgage-deed mortgage
acknowledging the payment of the whole or any part of
the mortgage-money,
mortgage money, and any other receipt for
payment of money due under a mortgage when the
receipt
eceipt does not purport to extinguish the mortgage; or
(xii) any certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of
any property sold by public auction by a Civil or
Revenue
Revenue-Officer.
[Explanation.
[Explanation.–A A document purporting or operating to
effect a contract for the sale of immovable property
shall not be deemed to require or ever to have required
registration by reason only of the fact that such
document contains a recital of the payment of any
earnest money or of the whole or any part of the
purchase money.]
(3)) Authorities to adopt a son, executed after the 1st day
of January, 1872, and not conferred by a will, shall
also be registered.”
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 10 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018
It is thus, clear from the above that Section 17(1) of the Act,
1908 specifies the documents for which Registration is
compulsory.
lsory. Sub-section
Sub section (2) of Section 17 carves out the
exceptions. The documents/instruments enumerated in sub- sub
section (2) of section 17 are not compulsorily registerable. The
exemption for decree or order of the Court is covered under
section 17 (2) (vi) of the Act, 1908 with a rider. Under the said
provision, any decree or order of a Court (except the decree or
order expressed to be made on compromise and comprising
immovable property other than that which is the subject
subject-matter
of the suit or proceedings) wouldwould not require compulsory
registration. Section 17 (2) (vi) carves out the distinction
between the property which forms subjectsubject-matter
matter of the suit
and the property that was not the subject
subject-matter
matter of the suit, but
for which a compromise has been arrived at. at. It would be
relevant to point out that the provision permitting the
compromise between the parties to include in the compromise
decree, the subject matter not forming part of the suit property
was introduced with effect from 01.02.1977. Prior to that, the th
compromise decree can be passed only with respect to properties
or subject matter of suit. If a compromise decree involves
immovable property other than the property for which a decree
is prayed for, such a property would not be exempted and
would requir
require registration. This condition or the exclusion
clause was introduced in the Registration Act, 1908 by Act 21 of
1929 by substituting for “and any award”. To avail the
exemption from the mandate of compulsory registration of
documents conveying immovable property
property of a value of more
that Rs. 100/
100/-,, the compromise decree arrived must be only in
respect of the property that is the subject
subject-matter
matter of the suit. The
compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat and the award
passed by the Lok Adalat thereto assume tthe he character of a
decree passed under Order XXIII Rule 3 and would also come
within the ambit and purview of sub-section
sub section (2) of section 17 of
the Act, 1908.
8. In the present case, seemingly, the appellant preferred Civil Suit
No. 47-A/2013
A/2013 against the respondents for declaration and permanent
injunction claiming ownership and continuous possession over the
subject land, and the same came to be decreed in favour of him, in
view of the compromise arrived at between the appellant and the
Respondent No. 2 on on 30.11.2013. For better appreciation, the order
passed in the said suit is extracted below:
Order Dt. 30.11.13
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:693511 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018Both parties having presented an application have requested
to take up the case in National Lok Adalat for disposal.
On the request of both parties this case was taken up today
in National Lok Adalat. Sh. M.P. Sharma Advocate is
present with the plaintiff.
Defendant is present in person.
Compromise application presented on behalf of both parties
was taken into consideration.
Both parties wer
weree identified by Sh. M.P. Sharma Advocate.
Case record was perused.
It appears from the perusal of case records that according to
compromise application, this suit is admitted by Def. No. 1.
Plaintiff is in possession over Land Survey No.
2087/2088/9/1/1/
2087/2088/9/1/1/measuring
measuring 0.076 Ares situated at Village
Kheda. Defendant shall not interfere with the possession of
plaintiff over aforesaid lands. Plaintiff shall be entitled to
get his name recorded in revenue records over aforesaid
lands in place of defendant.
Both parties
arties have expressed to have voluntarily entered into
this compromise.
Therefore, this compromise is hereby allowed as per Ex.P-1.
Ex.P
In context of compromise, both parties have got their
statements recorded. Decree be prepared in accordance with
compromise
compromise.. Compromise shall be an integral part of this
decree….”
In view of the above, the appellant is entitled to possession of the
subject land and the Respondent No. 2 shall not interfere with the
same; and the appellant is entitled to get his name recorded in the
revenue records in respect of the subject land in the place of the
Respondent No. 2. Pertinently, it is to be pointed out that the said
compromise decree has not been challenged by the Respondent No. 1
before any Court of law and hence, the same att
attained
ained finality and is
binding on the parties.
9. It is further seen that on the strength of the compromise decree
passed by the civil court, the appellant approached the Tehsildar for
mutation of the subject land in his favour. However, the Tehsildar
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
12 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
referred
rred the case to the Collector of Stamps, who after examination,
determined the stamp duty under Article 22 of Schedule IA of
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and directed the appellant to pay a sum of
Rs. 6,67,500/- in the Government Treasury. The said order of the
Collector of Stamps was affirmed by the Board of Revenue, in the
revision filed by the appellant. The High Court has also upheld the
orders so passed by the authorities below, by order dated 06.12.2019,
which is impugned in this appeal.
10. Evidently,, the High Court passed the impugned order by observing
that the compromise decree needs registration and stamp duty is also
required to be paid for mutation of the subject land. While so, reliance
was made on its earlier order dated 24.07.2019 in M.P. No. 3634 of
2019 (Siddhulal case), in which, two decisions were referred to, viz.,
(i) the order of this Court in Bhoop Singh (supra) and (ii) the order
passed by the High Court dated 13.02.2017 in W.P. No. 2170 of 2015
in Mohd. Yusuf (supra). It is worth men
mentioning
tioning at this juncture that the
said order of the High Court dated 13.02.2017 in W.P. No. 2170 of
2015 was subsequently, challenged by filing Civil Appeal No. 800 of
2020 and this Court vide judgment dated 05.02.2010, after having
found that pre-existing
existing right through adverse possession existed, has
categorically held that a compromise decree does not require
registration and accordingly, set aside the said order of the High
Court. While so, the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh (supra) was
also elaborately
rately discussed. The relevant portions of the said judgment
are reproduced below for ready reference:
“6. Under Section 17(1)(b), nonnon-testamentary
testamentary instruments
which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or
interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property
requires registration. The word “instrument” is not defined
in the Registration Act, but is defined in the Stamptamp Act,
1899 by Section 2(14).
7. A compromise decree passed by a court would ordinarily
be covered by Section 17(1)(b) but sub-section
sub section (2) of Section
17 provides for an exception for any decree or order of a
court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a
compromise and comprising immovable property other than
that which is the subject-matter
subject matter of the suit or proceeding.
Thus, by virtue of sub-section
sub section (2)(vi) of Section 17 any
decree or order of a court does not require registration. In
sub-clausee (vi) of sub
sub-section
section (2), one category is excepted
from sub-clause
clause (vi) i.e. a decree or order expressed to be
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:693513 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018made on a compromise and comprising immovable property
other than that which is the subject-matter
subject matter of the suit or
proceeding. Thus, by conjointlyy reading Section 17(1)(b)
and Section 17(2)(vi), it is clear that a compromise decree
comprising immovable property other than which is the
subject-matter
matter of the suit or proceeding requires
registration, although any decree or order of a court is
exempted from registration by virtue of Section 17(2)(vi).
17(2)(vi) A
copy of the decree passed in Suit No. 250-A
250 A of 1984 has been
brought on record as Annexure P P-2,
2, which indicates that
decree dated 4-10-1985
4 1985 was passed by the Court for the
property, which was subject
subject-matter
ter of the suit. Thus, the
exclusionary clause in Section 17 (2) (vi) is not applicable
and the compromise decree dated 44-10-1985 1985 was not
required to be registered on plain reading of Section 17 (2)
(vi). The High Court referred to judgment of this Court
in >Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, (1995) 5 SCC 709, in
which case, the provision of Section 17(2)(vi) of Registration
Act came for consideration. This Court in the above case
while considering clause (vi) laid down following in
paragraphs 16, 17 and 18:
18:–
“16. We have to view the reach of clause (vi), which
is an exception to subsection (1), bearing all the
aforesaid in mind. We would think that the exception
engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a
court, including a decree or order expressed to be
made on a compromise, which declares the pre- pre
existing right and does not by itself create new right,
title or interest in praesenti in immovable property
of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards. Any other view
would find the mischief of avoidance of registration,
registration,
which requires payment of stamp duty, embedded in
the decree or order.
17. It would, therefore, be the duty of the court to
examine in each case whether the parties have prepre-
existing right to the immovable property, or whether
under the order or decree of the court one party
having right, title or interest therein agreed or
suffered to extinguish the same and created right,
title or interest in praesenti in immovable property
of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards in favour of other
party for the first
first time, either by compromise or
pretended consent. If latter be the position, the
document is compulsorily registrable.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 14 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018
18. The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the
basis of the aforesaid discussion, be summarised as
below:
(1) Compromise decree if if bona fide, in the sense that
the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of
stamp duty and frustrate the law relating to
registration, would not require registration. In a
converse situation, it would require registration.
(2) If the compromise de
decree
cree were to create for the
first time right, title or interest in immovable
property of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards in
favour of any party to the suit the decree or order
would require registration.
(3) If the decree were not to attract any of the
clauses
auses of sub
sub-section
section (1) of Section 17, as was the
position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this
Court’s cases, it is apparent that the decree would
not require registration.
(4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of
compromise, as was the posi position
tion in Lahore case,
benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be
derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because
of the compromise in question.
(5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the
“subject
“subject-matter of the suit or proceeding”, clause
lause
(vi) of sub
sub-section
section (2) would not operate, because of
the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929,
which has its origin in the aforesaid decision of the
Privy Council, according to which the original
clause would have been attracted, even if it wewere
re to
encompass property not litigated.”
8. In the facts of that case, this Court held that the first suit
cannot really be said to have been decreed on the basis of
compromise, as the suit was decreed “in view of the written
statement filed by the defend
defendant
ant admitting the claim of the
plaintiff to be correct”. Further, the earlier decree was held
to be collusive. Two reasons for holding that the earlier
decree in the above said case required registration have
been mentioned in paragraph 19 of the judgment, which is to
the following effect:–
effect:
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:693515 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018“19. Now, let us see whether on the strength of the
decree passed in Suit No. 215 of 1973, the petitioner
could sustain his case as put up in his written
statement in the present suit, despite the decree not
having been registered. According to us, it cannot
for two reasons:
(1) The decree having purported to create right or
title in the plaintiff for the first time that is not being
a declaration of pre pre-existing
existing right, did require
registration. It may also be pointed out that the first
suit cannot really be said to have been decreed on
the basis of compromise, as the suit was decreed “in
view of the written statement filed by the defendant
admitting the claim of the plaintiff to be correct”.
Decreeing of suit in such a situation is covered by
Order 12 Rule 6, and not by Order 23 Rule 3, which
deals with compromise of suit, whereas the former is
on the subject of judgment on admissions.
(2) A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that
the first appellate court held the decree in question
as ‘collusive’ as it was with a view to defeat the
right of others who had bona fide claim over the
property of Ganpat. Learned Judge of the High
Court also took the same view.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
11. A reading of the judgment by the Apex Court in the case of Mukesh
(supra) indicates that a co
conjoint reading of Section 17 (1) (b) and Section
17 (2) (vi) of the Registration Act, 1908 makes it clear that a compromise
decree comprising immovable property other than which is the subject
matter
ter of the suit or proceedings requires registration, although any decree
or order of a Court is exempted from registration by virtue of Section 17
(2) (vi) of the Registration Act, 1908.
1908. When the facts of the instant case are
examined in the light of the proposition of the law as laid down by the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
16 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
Apex Court, it is seen that the Civil Suit No.32A/2016
No.32A/2016 was filed by the
petitioners in the Court of the Second Civil Judge, Class II, Karera, District
Shivpuri, wherein a decree of declaration and permanent injunction
injunc in
respect of land bearing Survey No.435 admeasuring 2.08
2.0800 hectare and
Survey No.436 admeasuring 0.09
0.090 hectare situated at Village Chit
Chitahri,
Tehsil Narwar, District Shvipuri hereinafter referred to a suit land was
prayed for. The plea of inheritance/p
inheritance/partition
artition etc. only qua the suit land was
prayed for.
12. A perusal of the compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017
passed by the leaned trial Court indicates that the alleged co-owners
co
namely Gurmeet Singh and Nirmal Singh
Singh, were not impleaded as
defendants in the said proceedings and the compromise which was
recorded between the parties, (i.e,
i.e, the petitioners and the private
respondents herein) not only pertained
pertain to land bearing Survey Nos. 435
and 436 but also pertained to land bearing Survey Nos.4
No .438 and 439,
445/Min-2,
2, 434, 451, 447/Min-2
4 and 448/Min-2.
2. It is thus evidently clear
that the compromise decree pertain
pertained to as many as seven other lands
which were not the suit lands and were not formi
forming
ng part of the Civil Suit
No.32A/2016
A/2016 filed by the petitioners herein
erein and it is for this reason that the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
17 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
learned trial Court, in the last para
paragraph of the compromise judgment and
decree dated 08.08.2017
.08.2017, observed as under:
“12. चूं क उ त राजीनामा के मा यम
य से वाद त भूिम के अलावा अ य भूिमय के
संबध
ं म भी व व का अ त तरण कया जा रहा है] अत: यह समझौता िड ी] टा प
अिधिनयम एवं रिज टे शन अिधिनयम के सुसंगत ावधानों के अ तगत गत टा त व
पंजीकृ त कराए जाने के प चा
चातत ही भावी होगी एवं उभय प राजीनामा अनुसार
अपने अंश के संबंध म नामांतरण कराने के अिधकारी होंगे।’
13. It is thus apparent that the compro
compromise
mise judgment and decree dated08.08.2017 was also in respect of immovable property other than the
subject matter of suit or proceedings and therefore, the learned trial Court
rightly imposed the condition for its registration in accordance with law for
giving effect to the compromise judgment and decree dated 008.08.2017 as
the ownership was sought to be transferred in respect of other lands
land aswell.
14. In the light of the above consideration,
consideration, this Court is of the view thatthe condition of registration of the compromise judgment and decree dated
08.08.2017 as imposed by the learned trial Court is just and proper and is
in terms of the provisions contained under Section 17 (2) (vi) of the
Registration Act, 1908. This aspect has also been taken into consideration
by the first appellate Court while rejecting the first appeal preferred by the
petitioners vide order dated 23.09.2017. The issue no. (i) is answered
accordingly.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 18 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018 Answer to Issue no. (ii) (ii):-
15. Though it has been strenuously argued by the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners that the compromise judgment and decree
dated 08.08.2017 only recognizes pre
pre-existing
existing rights of the petitioners quathe lands in question which are flowing from the succession devolved on
the petitioners and therefore, the bar contained in Section 20 of the Act,
1972 would not come in their way. The said arguments are taken for
consideration. Section 20 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 is as
under :
“20. Bar of accrual of rights.–After
rights After the issue of a notification under
section 18, no right shall be acquired in, on or over the land
comprised within the limits of the area specified in such notification,
intestate.”
except by succession, testamentary or in
[Emphasis Supplied]
16. It is not in dispute between the parties that all the survey numbers of
lands mentioned in the compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017
are affected by the notification date 15.2.2000 and 18.02.2000 issued under
Section 18 of the Act of 1972 pertaining to village Chitahri coming under
the notified area of Son Chiraiya National Park. The consideration made
by this Court hereinabove while answering issue no. (i) reflects that the
civil suit was filed by the petitioners
ers only seeking declaration and
permanent injunction qua the land bearing Survey No.435 admeasuring
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
19 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
2.080 hectare and Survey No.436 admeasuring 0.090 hectare. However,
the compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017, as is evident from
the consideration
ion made hereinabove indicates that the ownership in respect
of lands other than suit lands, i.e., Survey Nos. 438, 439, 445/Min-2,
445/Min 434,
451, 448/Min-22 and 447/Min-2
447/Min is also sought to be transferred by the
compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017 re
regarding
garding which, there
was no plea of any accrual of rights through inheritance or succession in
the pleadings of the civil suit filed by the petitioners (Annexure P/3).
17. Ass the petitioners claim the exemption under Section 20 of the Act
of 1972, it is crucial
rucial to highlight the distinction between partition and
succession proceedings. In Shub Karan Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna
Bubna,
(2009) 9 SCC 689, the Supreme Court held that partition is a redistribution
or adjustment of pre
pre-existing rights, among co-owners/cop
owners/coparceners,
resulting in a division of lands or other properties jointly held by them into
different lots or portions and delivery thereof to the respective allottees.
allottees
The relevant paras of Shub Karan Bubna (supra) are reproduced herein as
follows:
“The issue
5. “Partition” is a redistribution or adjustment of pre
pre-existing
existing rights,
among co-owners/coparceners,
owners/coparceners, resulting in a division of lands or
other properties jointly held by them into different lots or portions
and delivery thereof to the respective allottees.
all . The effect of such Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 20 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018
division is that the joint ownership is terminated and the respective
shares vest in them in severalty.
6. A partition of a property can be only among those having a share or
interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property
cannot obviously be a party to a partition. “Separation of share” is a
species of “partition”. When all co-owners
owners get separated, it is a
partition. Separation of share(s) refers to a division where only one
or only a few among several co-owners/coparceners
co rs/coparceners get separated,
and others continue to be joint or continue to hold the remaining
property jointly without division by metes and bounds. For example,
where four brothers owning a property divide it among themselves
by metes and bounds, it is a partition. But if only one brother wants
to get his share separated and other three brothers continue to
remain joint, there is only a separation of the share of one brother.
brother
7. In a suit for partition or separation of a share, the prayer is not
only for declaration of the plaintiff’s share in the suit properties, but
also division of his share by metes and bounds. This involves three
issues:
(i) whether the person seeking division has a share or interest in the
suit property/properties;
(ii) whether he iiss entitled to the relief of division and separate
possession; and
(iii) how and in what manner, the property/properties should be
divided by metes and bounds?
In a suit for partition or separation of a share, the court at the first
stage decides whether thethe plaintiff has a share in the suit property and
whether he is entitled to division and separate possession. The
decision on these two issues is exercise of a judicial function and
results in first stage decision termed as “decree” under Order 20 Rule
18(1)) and termed as “preliminary decree” under Order 20 Rule 18(2)
of the Code. The consequential division by metes and bounds,
considered to be a ministerial or administrative act requiring the
physical inspection, measurements,calculations and considering
various
rious permutations/combinations/alternatives of division is referred
to the Collector under Rule 18(1) and is the subject
subject-matter
matter of the final
decree under Rule 18(2).
[Emphasis Supplied]
18. On the other hand, succession involves devolution of title of a
deceased person to his heir or heirs. The Apex Court in Sambudamurthi
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC
2026:MPHC-GWL:6935
21 W.P.No.21095
W.P.No. of 2018
Mudaliar v. State of Madras
Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 4 discussed the meaning of
succession and held that …
“4. …. In Black’s Law Dictionary the word “succession”
succession” is defined as
follows:
“The devolution of title to property under the law of descent and
distribution.
The right by which one set of men may, by succeeding another set,
acquire a property in all the goods, movables, and other chattels of a
corporation.
The fact of the transmission of the rights, estate, obligations and
charges of a deceased person to his heir or heirs.”
heirs
[Emphasis Supplied]
19. In the present case, the
t relief claimed in civil suit filed by the
petitioners was that of declaration and permanent injunction based on an
alleged oral partition effected by the grandfather of the petitioners, Late
Darshan Singh, during his lifetime that too only in respect of a part of land
bearing Survey Nos.435 and 436
436. In view of the law discussed
hereinabove, such
uch a claim based on partition
partit is distinct from succession
succession, as
partition involves separation of shares inter se co-parceners
parceners during their
lifetime,, whereas succession involves devolution of the estate of a
deceased person upon his legal heirs in accordance with the applicable
laws off intestate successionin the absence of a will or in terms of a valid
will made by the deceased. In the present case, there is neither any
instrument placed on record nor any other material to prove devolution of
title in disputed lands forming subject matter
ter of compromise deed dated
08.08.2017 upon the petitioners in accordance with the laws of succession.
Signature Not Verified Signed by: ANAND KUMAR Signing time: 27-02-2026 12:51:38 NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC 2026:MPHC-GWL:6935 22 W.P.No.21095 W.P.No. of 2018
Therefore, the plea of oral partition as raised in the compromise suit cannot
be equated with acquisition of rights by succession, whether testamentary
or intestate, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Act of 1972.
1972
20. Therefore,
herefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the bar of
accrual of rights as regards the aforesaid lands as provided under Section
20 of the Act of 1972 would come into play and therefore, the alternative
relief as prayed for by the petitioners in the instant writ petition, i.e,
issuance of mandamus the respondents authorities for registration of the
compromise judgment and decree dated 08.08.2017
8.08.2017 being contravention to
the mandate
andate as provided under Section 20 of the Act 1972 cannot be
issued. The Issue no. (ii) is answered accordingly.
21. In view of the above considerations and answers to the issues
framed, no case for interference is made out and the petition,
petition being bereft
of merits, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.
22. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated and all
a pending
applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
(AMIT SETH)
JUDGE
AK/-
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ANAND KUMAR
Signing time: 27-02-2026
12:51:38