Supreme Court of India
Harbinder Singh Sekhon vs The State Of Punjab on 13 February, 2026
Author: Vikram Nath
Bench: Vikram Nath
2026 INSC 159
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO………………….. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.8316 OF 2024)
HARBINDER SINGH SEKHON
& ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF PUNJAB
& ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO………………….. OF 2026
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) No. 8495 OF 2024)
AND
WRIT PETITION (C) No. 481 OF 2025
AND
WRIT PETITION (C) No. 551 OF 2025
JUDGMENT
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. At the outset, it may be noted that the present
judgment is structured in two parts. The first part
Signature Not Verified addresses the civil appeals arising out of the Special
Digitally signed by
Leave Petitions and examines the legality of the
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2026.02.16
17:20:33 IST
Reason:
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 1 of 63
change of Land Use and the impugned judgment of
the High Court. The second part separately considers
the writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India, which raise an independent challenge to
subsequent regulatory actions taken during the
pendency of the appeals.
Part I: For SLP (Civil) No. 8316 of 2024 and SLP
(Civil) No. 8495 of 2024
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeals arise from the common
judgment and order dated 29.02.2024 passed by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in
CWP No. 20134 of 2022 and CWP No. 18676 of 2022.
By the impugned judgment, the High Court
dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the change
of Land Use dated 13.12.2021 granted in favour of
“Shree Cement North Private Limited”. Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8316 of 2024 has been
filed by the writ petitioners in CWP No. 20134 of
2022. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8495
of 2024 has been filed by Vasant Valley Public
School, which was the writ petitioner in CWP No.
18676 of 2022. For ease of reference, the parties shall
be referred to as per their status in SLP (Civil) No.
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 2 of 63
8316 of 2024. Accordingly, Respondent No. 9 is Shree
Cement North Private Limited, the main contesting
respondent, before this Court.
4. The facts giving rise to the present appeals are as
follows:
4.1. The Appellant in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil)
No. 8316 of 2024 is a group of agriculturists residing
in and around Sangrur, Punjab. The Appellants state
that Respondent No. 9 purchased land admeasuring
about 47.82 acres for establishing a cement related
industrial unit in close proximity to their agricultural
lands and residential houses. The Appellant in Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8495 of 2024 is
Vasant Valley Public School. The School claims that
its premises are located in the immediate vicinity of
the proposed site and that the proposed activity
would adversely affect the health and safety of
students and staff.
4.2. On 13.12.2021, the Punjab Bureau of Investment
Promotion issued a Change of Land Use1 in favour of
Respondent No. 9 for the proposed unit. On
14.12.2021, consent to establish/No Objection
Certificate from the pollution angle was granted1
In short “CLU”C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 3 of 63
under the Single Window mechanism on the basis of
Punjab Pollution Control Board’s2 consideration. The
Appellants contend that the CLU was granted in a
manner not contemplated by the Punjab Regional
and Town Planning and Development Act, 19953. The
Appellants also contend that the proposed site falls
within a rural agricultural zone under the Master
Plan for Sangrur and that a red category polluting
industry could not have been permitted at the said
location.
4.3. The agriculturist Appellants, therefore, instituted
CWP No. 20134 of 2022 before the High Court
challenging the CLU dated 13.12.2021 and the
consequent approvals. Vasant Valley Public School
instituted CWP No. 18676 of 2022 raising similar
objections and specifically relied upon the proximity
of the school and other habitations to the proposed
site. During the pendency of the writ proceedings, the
High Court passed an interim order dated
20.09.2022, and the interim arrangement continued
till the writ petitions were finally decided.
2
In short “PPCB”
3
In short “PRTPD Act”
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4.4. By the common judgment and order dated
29.02.2024, the High Court dismissed both writ
petitions. The High Court noted that as on
13.12.2021, the CLU did not have statutory backing
in the form contemplated by the PRTPD Act. The High
Court, however, upheld the CLU on the reasoning
that the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and
Development Board granted approval in its 43rd
meeting dated 05.01.2022. The High Court treated
the said approval as curing the defect and accepted
the stand that the land use permissibility stood
validated thereafter.
4.5. The High Court also proceeded on the basis that the
decision taken by the Planning Board on 05.01.2022
was relatable to the power of amendment of the
Master Plan. The High Court relied upon Section 76
of the PRTPD Act and held that the approval recorded
in the 43rd meeting dated 05.01.2022 could operate
to support the CLU and to sustain the proposed
industrial activity. The High Court further proceeded
on the premise that the competent authorities had
considered the relevant siting aspects and that the
CLU itself contained conditions and restrictions. The
High Court observed that if the conditions stipulated
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in the CLU were violated, the affected persons would
be at liberty to pursue appropriate remedies.
5. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their writ petitions and
by the upholding of the CLU dated 13.12.2021, the
Appellants have preferred the present civil appeals.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties,
and we have gone through the comprehensive
material on record. In our considered opinion, the
following questions arise for determination in the
present appeals:
I. Whether the CLU dated 13.12.2021 could have
been granted for the proposed unit when the land
use under the Master Plan for Sangrur treated the
site as falling in a rural agricultural zone.
II. Whether the “approval” recorded in the 43rd
meeting of the Punjab Regional and Town
Planning and Development Board dated
05.01.2022 could lawfully cure the admitted
defect in the CLU and whether such approval is
capable in law of operating as an alteration or
amendment of the Master Plan under the PRTPD
Act.
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 6 of 63
III. Whether the siting norms and environmental
safeguards, including the PPCB notification dated
02.09.1998 and the relevant regulatory
framework, were complied with in relation to the
proximity of habitations and the school, and
whether the process adopted by the authorities
satisfies the requirements of the prevailing legal
norms.
7. It is apparent that the controversy before us turns
principally on the statutory scheme governing the
Master Plan and control of development under the
PRTPD Act; and the environmental and siting
safeguards applicable to a cement grinding unit as in
the present case.
A. PRTPD Act, the Master Plan, its binding force, and
the procedure for alteration/revision
7.1. Chapter X of the PRTPD Act deals with ‘Preparation
and Approval of Master Plans.’ Under the same,
Section 70 of the PRTPD Act lays down the
foundational statutory scheme for the preparation,
approval, and legal operation of a Master Plan. The
same has been reproduced hereunder:
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“70. Outline Master Plan. – (1) As soon as
may be after the declaration of a planning
area and after the designation of a Planning
Agency for that area, the Designated
Planning Agency shall, not later than one
year after such declaration or within such
time as [the State Government may, from
time to time, extend, prepare and submit to
the State Government for its approval a plan
(hereinafter called the “Master Plan”)] for the
planning area or any of its part and the
Master Plan so prepared shall –
(a) indicate broadly the manner in which the
land in the area should be used;
(b) allocate areas or zones of land for use for
different purposes;
(c) indicate, define and provide the existing
and proposed highways, roads, major
streets and other lines of communication;
[(cc) indicate areas covered under heritage
site and the manner in which protection,
preservation and conservation of such site
including its regulation and control of
development, which is either affecting the
heritage site or its vicinity, shall be carried
out.]
(d) include regulations (hereinafter called
“Zoning Regulations”) to regulate within each
zone the location, height, number of storeys
and size of buildings and other structures,
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 8 of 63
open spaces and the use of buildings,
structures and land.
(2) Subject to the provisions of the rules made
under this Act for regulating the form and
contents of the Master Plan, any such plan
shall include such maps and such
descriptive matters as may be necessary to
explain and illustrate the proposals in the
Master Plan.
(3) [As soon as after the Master Plan has
been prepared under sub – section (1) ,by the
Designated Planning Agency, the State
Government, not later than such time, as
may be prescribed, shall direct the
Designated Planning Agency to publish the
existing land use plan and master plan and
the place or places, where the copies of the
same may be inspected, for inviting
objections in writing from any person with
respect to the existing land use plan and
master plan within a period of thirty days
from the date of publication.]
(4) [The State Government, after considering
the objections and in consultation with the
Board, may, direct the Designated Planning
Agency to modify the Master Plan or approve
it as such.]
(5) [The Designated Planning Agency, after
approval of the State Government, shall
publish the final Master Plan in the Official
Gazette, after carrying out the modifications
if any, under intimation to the State
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 9 of 63
Government within a period of thirty days
from the date of according approval by the
State Government.]”
7.2. The provision makes it clear that the Master Plan is
not a mere policy document or an internal
administrative guideline. It is a statutory instrument
which governs how land in the planning area is to be
used and regulated. The Act places the primary
responsibility for preparing the Master Plan upon the
Designated Planning Agency, which is required to
prepare the plan and submit it to the State
Government for approval. The contents of the Master
Plan, as reflected in the statutory scheme, include the
identification and allocation of land into different
zones for specified purposes and the regulatory
norms that will govern development and land use
within those zones. Equally significant is the
procedure that Section 70 mandates before a Master
Plan can acquire enforceable effect. The Act requires
that the proposed Master Plan be brought into the
public domain, that the public be afforded an
opportunity to submit objections and suggestions
within the prescribed period, and that such
objections and suggestions be considered by the
Designated Planning Agency before the plan is placed
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for approval. This is not a procedural formality. It is
a statutory safeguard intended to ensure
transparency, participatory planning, and reasoned
decision making, particularly because zoning and
land use decisions have a direct bearing on property
rights, local habitations, public amenities, and
environmental and health concerns.
7.3. The Act then ties enforceability to publication in the
Official Gazette. In other words, the Master Plan
becomes operational, and thereby binding for land
use regulation, only upon its publication in the
Official Gazette in the manner contemplated by the
statute. Section 75 of the PRTPD Act reinforces this
principle by reiterating that the Master Plan comes
into operation from the date of such publication, and
the same reads as follows:
“75. [Coming into operation of Master Plan,-
The Master Plan come into operation from the
date of publication, referred in sub-section(5)
of section 70.]”The combined statutory scheme indicates that once
the Master Plan is published and comes into
operation, it binds both the authorities and the
public, and land use permissibility is to beC.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 11 of 63
determined with reference to its zoning prescriptions
unless the statute is duly followed to alter or revise
the plan.
7.4. The same statutory discipline governs review and
revision. Section 76 of the PRTPD Act contemplates
periodic review of the Master Plan, and it permits
revision where the statutory authority considers it
necessary. Section 76 reads as follows:
“76(1) At any after time after the date on
which the Master Plan for an area comes into
operation, and atleast once after every ten
years, after that date, the Designated
Planning Agency shall after carrying out
such fresh surveys as may be considered
necessary or as directed by the [State
Government], prepare and submit to the
Board, a Master Plan after making
alterations or additions as it considers
necessary.
(2) The provisions of *[Sections 70 and 75]
shall mutatis mutandis as for as may be
possible, apply to the Master Plan submitted
under sub-section (1).”However, the Act does not treat review as a
mechanism by which land use norms can be altered
informally or on a case by case basis. The provision
expressly applies the publication, objection,C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 12 of 63
consideration, and gazette publication requirements
to a revised Master Plan as well. This legislative
design ensures that revision of the Master Plan, even
when undertaken as part of a periodic review cycle,
remains subject to the same safeguards of notice,
participation, and formal publication which give the
Master Plan its legal force in the first place.
7.5. The Act also provides for the making of minor
changes, but even that power is not arbitrary. Where
changes are proposed to the Master Plan, including
changes described as minor, the statutory scheme
requires that the State Government’s direction and
the fact of change be brought to the notice of the
public in the manner contemplated by the Act. The
underlying principle is that a change in zoning or
land use permissibility cannot rest only upon
internal file notings, minutes, or administrative
approvals. Where the change alters the operative land
use framework that binds the public and the
authorities, the statute insists upon transparency
and public notice so that the Master Plan continues
to remain a legally certain and publicly knowable
instrument of planning regulation.
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B. Control of development and “change of land use”
permissions
7.6. Once a Master Plan has come into operation in the
manner contemplated by the PRTPD Act, the
statutory command is that land use and development
within the planning area must conform to the zoning
and regulatory prescriptions of the Plan. Section 79
to 81 in Chapter XI of the PRTPD Act provides for the
same and has been reproduced hereunder:
79. After the coming into operation of any
Master Plan in any area, no person shall use
or permit to be used any land or carry out
any development in that area otherwise than
in conformity with such Master Plan:
Provided that the Competent Authority may
allow the continuance of any use of any land,
for a period not exceeding ten year, upon
such terms and conditions as may be
provided by regulations made in this behalf
for the purpose and to the extent, for and to
which it was being used on the date on
which such a Master Plan came into
operation.
80. After coming into operation of any Master
Plan in any area and subject to the other
provisions of this Act, no development in
respect of, or change of use of, any land shall
be undertaken or carried out, in that area –C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 14 of 63
(a) without obtaining the permission in
writing as provided for hereafter; and
(b) without obtaining a certificate from the
Competent Authority certifying that the
development charge or betterment charge as
leviable under this Act has been paid or that
no such charges are leviable:
[Provided that except in the case of
development, affecting heritage site or its
vicinity, no such permission shall be
necessary-]
(i) for operational constructions and
constructions in the area comprised in the
abadi-deh of any village falling inside its Lal
Lakir or Phirni ;
(ii) for carrying out such works for the
maintenance, improvement or other
alteration of any building which affect only
its interior or which do not materially affect
the external appearance of the building ;
(iii) [….] for the carrying out by the Central
Government or the State Government or any
local authority of,-
(a) any work required for the maintenance or
improvement of a high way, road or public
street, being work carried out on land within
the boundaries of such highway, road or
public street;
(b) any work for the purpose of inspecting,
repairing or renewing any drains, sewers,
mains, pipes, cables or other apparatus
including the breaking open of any street or
other land for that purpose ;
(iv) for the excavations (including wells and
tubewells) made in the ordinary course of
agricultural operation or for suchC.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 15 of 63
constructions which are made for
agricultural purposes subservient to
agriculture :
Provided that such excavation or
constructions are situated in the areas in
which agriculture is permitted land use as
per the Master Plan ;
(v) for the construction of unmetalled roads
intended to give access to land solely meant
for agricultural purpose.
81.(1) Any person intending to carry out any
development in respect of, or a change of use
of any land or intending to sub-divide his plot
or to layout a private street shall make an
application in writing to the Competent
Authority for permission in such form and
containing such particulars and
accompanied by such documents and plans
as may be prescribed.
(2)(a) In the case of a Department of the State
Government or the Central Government or a
local authority intending to carry out any
development in respect of, or, change of use
of, any land, the concerned Department or
the local authority, as the case may be, shall
notify in writing to the Competent Authority
of its intention to do so giving full particulars
thereof and accompanied by such
documents and plans as may be prescribed,
at least, two months prior to the undertaking
of such development or change, as the case
may be.
(b) Where the Competent Authority has
raised any objection in respect of the
conformity or the proposed development
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either to any Master Plan under preparation
or to any rules in force at that time, or due to
any other material consideration, the
Department of the State Government or the
Central Government or the local authority, as
the case may be, shall either make
necessary modifications in the proposals for
such development or change of use to meet
the objections raised by the Competent
Authority or submit *[to the State
Government the proposal for such
development or change of use together with
the objections raised by the Competent
Authority for decision.]
(c) The **[State Government] on receipt of
such proposal together with the objections of
the Competent Authority shall either approve
the proposals with or without modifications
or direct the Department of the State
Government or the Central Government or
the local authority, as the case may be, to
make such modifications in the proposals as
it considers necessary in the circumstances.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1)
shall be accompanied by such fee as may be
prescribed:
Provided that no fee shall be payable in the
case of an application made by a Department
of the State Government or the Central
Government.
(4) On an application having being duly
made under sub-section (1) and on payment
of the development charge or betterment
charges if any, as may be assessed under
Chapter XIII, the Competent Authority may,-
(a) pass an order –
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(i) granting permission unconditionally ; or
(ii) granting permission subject to such
conditions as it may think
necessary to impose ; or
(iii) refusing permission ;
(b) without prejudice to the generality of
clause (a) impose conditions –
(i) to the effect that the permission granted
is only for a specified period and after the
expiry of that period, the land shall be
restored to its previous condition or the
use of the land so permitted shall be
discontinued ; or
(ii) for regulating the development or use
of any land under control of the applicant
or for the carrying out of works on any
such land as may appear to the
Competent Authority expedient.
(5) The Competent Authority in considering
the application for permission shall ensure
that it is in conformity with the provisions of
the Master Plan prepared or under
preparation under this Act and where the
development or change or use of any land is
likely in the opinion of the Competent
Authority to interfere with the operation of
the Master Plan or to be prejudicial to
planned development, or any plan for
development of the Authority, the Competent
Authority may refuse such permission.
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(6) Where permission is granted subject to
conditions or is refused, the grounds of
imposing such conditions or such refusal
shall be recorded in the order and such order
shall be communicated to the applicant in the
prescribed manner.
(7) *[If the Competent Authority does not
communicate its decision to grant or refuse
permission to the applicant within a period of
sixty days from the date of receipt of his
application in case other than the heritage
site, and within a period of one hundred
twenty days in the case of heritage site and
development affecting such site, or within a
period of sixty days from the date of receipt
of reply from the applicant in respect of any
requisition made by the Competent
Authority, whichever is later, then such
permission shall be deemed to have been
granted to the applicant on the date
immediately following the date of expiry of
the later date without prejudice to the
provisions of this Act, rules and regulations
made thereunder:
Provided that any development carried out in
pursuance of such deemed permission,
which is in contravention of the provisions of
the Act, rules and regulations made
thereunder, shall be deemed to be an
unauthorised development for the purposes
of sections 86, 87, 88, 89 and 90.]”7.7. Section 79 is a prohibition in mandatory terms. It
does not leave the matter to administrative discretionC.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 19 of 63
on a case to case basis. It interdicts the use of land
and the carrying out of development in a manner
inconsistent with the operative Master Plan. The
legislative intent is to ensure certainty, uniformity,
and enforceability in planning control, so that the
zoning framework is not diluted by ad hoc departures
that would defeat the Plan’s public purpose.
7.8. Section 80 then provides the complementary
statutory control. Even where a proposed activity is
otherwise permissible under the Plan, the statute
mandates that development or change of use can be
undertaken only upon written permission of the
competent authority. This written permission is not
conceived as a substitute for, or an override of, the
Master Plan. It is a regulatory permission which must
operate within the discipline of the Plan and the
statute. In other words, Section 80 does not create a
untrammelled executive power to authorise land use
contrary to the Master Plan. It creates a permission
regime which presupposes conformity with the
planning framework, and which is intended to
regulate the manner, conditions, and safeguards
subject to which permissible development may
proceed.
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7.9. Section 81 sets out the structured decision-making
process for grant or refusal of permission. The
provision contemplates an application by the person
intending to carry out development, a time bound
decision by the competent authority, the power to
impose conditions while granting permission, and an
obligation to record reasons where permission is
refused. The scheme is designed to ensure that
permissions are granted on relevant considerations,
that the decision is not arbitrary, and that the
affected party is informed of the basis of refusal. The
deemed permission clause is also part of this
discipline. It operates as a statutory consequence
where the authority fails to act within the prescribed
period. It does not dispense with the substantive
requirements of conformity with the Master Plan or
compliance with other applicable laws.
7.10. The appellate remedy is similarly part of the
statutory architecture. It provides a supervisory
forum within the executive framework, but it does not
dilute the binding force of the Master Plan or the
mandatory nature of the statutory controls in
Sections 79 and 80.
C. Environmental clearance and siting safeguards
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7.11. Environmental clearance and siting safeguards
stand on a distinct but overlapping legal plane. Under
the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the
Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, the EIA
Notification dated 14.09.2006 (hereinafter referred to
as the EIA Notification, 2006) is a delegated
legislation which creates a regime of prior
environmental clearance for specified projects and
activities. The requirement of prior environmental
clearance is triggered before commencement of
construction activity or preparation of land at the
site. The statutory design is preventive. It ensures
that environmental impacts, mitigation measures,
and site-specific concerns are assessed at a stage
when the project can still be meaningfully evaluated,
conditioned, modified, or declined.
7.12. The EIA Notification, 2006 also prescribes a stage
wise process which includes screening, scoping,
public consultation, and appraisal. These stages are
not interchangeable. Each stage serves a distinct
function within the regulatory design, and public
consultation has a specific role in ensuring that
persons likely to be affected can place their concerns
on record and that the appraisal is informed by local
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 22 of 63
conditions and stakeholder inputs. Where the project
is treated as falling within Category “B” under the
relevant schedule entry, the appraisal is at the State
level through the institutional mechanism of the
State Level Environment Impact Assessment
Authority4 and the State Expert Appraisal
Committee5. This classification determines the forum
and the process for appraisal. It does not dilute the
core requirement that the environmental clearance
must be prior and must be obtained before
construction or preparation of land.
7.13. Siting and proximity norms operate as an additional
layer of safeguards, particularly where habitations
and sensitive receptors such as educational
institutions are involved. The PPCB notification dated
02.09.1998 prescribes minimum siting distances for
cement plants and grinding units, including
minimum buffers from residential clusters and
educational institutions, and it also requires
development of a green belt along the boundary.
These norms reflect a regulatory framework
prescribing that certain minimum separations and
4
In short “SEIAA”
5
In short “SEAC”
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 23 of 63
buffers are required to reduce risk of exposure and
nuisance from dust, emissions, noise, and traffic.
They function as minimum protective standards for
the purpose of grant of consent and related pollution
control permissions. Compliance with these
standards is relevant to evaluate whether the
regulatory authorities have applied the correct
yardsticks and whether the safeguards imposed are
adequate having regard to the site conditions and the
proximity of habitations and the school.
8. Having set out the statutory scheme governing
planning control and the environmental and siting
safeguards, we now turn to the three issues that arise
for determination in these appeals as framed in the
earlier part of this judgment.
Issue I: Whether the CLU dated 13.12.2021 could
have been granted when the site fell in a rural
agricultural zone under the Master Plan for
Sangrur.
9. At the outset, it is necessary to notice the legal
character of the Master Plan for Sangrur and the
zoning prescription governing the site in question.
The material on record, including the reports and
communications relied upon by the parties, proceeds
on the consistent premise that the land purchased by
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 24 of 63
Respondent No. 9 fell in a rural agricultural zone
under the notified Master Plan for Sangrur. It is also
not in dispute that, as per the zoning permissibility
then prevailing, a red category industry was not
permissible at the said site.
10. In this backdrop, the CLU dated 13.12.2021 has to
be tested on its own legal footing. This Court has
consistently held that a statutory development plan
is not a mere policy statement. It has binding force
and regulates land use in the larger public interest.
Any development contrary to the operative plan is
impermissible unless the plan itself is altered in the
manner known to law. The principle has been
reiterated in decisions of this Court in K. Ramadas
Shenoy v. Town Municipal Council, Udipi6 and
Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa7,
where this Court emphasised that zoning and
planned development norms cannot be diluted by ad
hoc departures at the cost of public interest. The
relevant portion from Bangalore Medical Trust
(Supra) is reproduced hereunder:
“48. Much was attempted to be made out of
exercise of discretion in converting a site6
(1974) 2 SCC 506, para nos.26-30
7
(1991) 4 SCC 54C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 25 of 63
reserved for amenity as a civic amenity.
Discretion is an effective tool in
administration. But wrong notions about it
results in ill-conceived consequences. In law
it provides an option to the authority
concerned to adopt one or the other
alternative. But a better, proper and legal
exercise of discretion is one where the
authority examines the fact, is aware of law
and then decides objectively and rationally
what serves the interest better. When a
statute either provides guidance or rules or
regulations are framed for exercise of
discretion then the action should be in
accordance with it. Even where statutes are
silent and only power is conferred to act in
one or the other manner, the Authority
cannot act whimsically or arbitrarily. It
should be guided by reasonableness and
fairness. The legislature never intends its
authorities to abuse the law or use it
unfairly. When legislature enacted sub-
section (4) it unequivocally declared its
intention of making any alteration in the
scheme by the Authority, that is, BDA and
not the State Government. It further
permitted interference with the scheme
sanctioned by it only if it appeared to be
improvement. The facts, therefore, that were
to be found by the Authority were that the
conversion of public park into private nursing
home would be an improvement in the
scheme. Neither the Authority nor the State
Government undertook any such exercise.
Power of conversion or alteration in scheme
was taken for granted. Amenity was defined
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in Section 2(b) of the Act to include road,
street, lighting, drainage, public works and
such other conveniences as the government
may, by notification, specify to be an
amenity for the purposes of this Act. The
Division Bench found that before any other
facility could be considered amenity it was
necessary for State Government to issue a
notification. And since no notification was
issued including private nursing home as
amenity it could not be deemed to be
included in it. That apart the definition
indicates that the convenience or facility
should have had public characteristic. Even
if it is assumed that the definition of amenity
being inclusive it should be given a wider
meaning so as to include hospital added in
clause 2(bb) as a civic amenity with effect
from 1984 a private nursing home unlike a
hospital run by government or local authority
did not satisfy that characteristic which was
necessary in the absence of which it could
not be held to be amenity or civic amenity. In
any case a private nursing home could not be
considered to be an improvement in the
scheme and, therefore, the power under
Section 19(4) could not have been exercised.
49. Manner in which power was exercised
fell below even the minimum requirement of
taking action on relevant considerations. A
scheme could be altered by the Authority as
defined under Section 3 of the Act. It is a
body corporate under Section 3 consisting of
the Chairman and experts on various
aspects, namely, a finance member, an
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 27 of 63
engineer, a town planner, an architect, the
ex-officio members such as Commissioner of
Corporation of the City of Bangalore, officer
of the Secretariat and elected members for
instance, two persons of the State
legislature, one a woman and other a
scheduled caste and scheduled tribe
member, representative of labour,
representative of water supply, sewerage
board, electricity board, State Road
Transport Corporation, two elected
councillors etc. and the Commissioner. This
authority functions through committees and
meetings as provided under Sections 8 and
9. There is no section either in the Act nor any
rule was placed to demonstrate that the
Chairman alone, as such, could exercise the
power of the Authority. There is no whisper
nor there is any record to establish that any
meeting of the Authority was held regarding
alteration of the scheme. In any case the
power does not vest in the State Government
or the Chief Minister of the State. The
exercise of power is further hedged by use of
the expression, if ‘it appears to the
Authority’. In legal terminology it visualises
prior consideration and objective decision.
And all this must have resulted in conclusion
that the alteration would have been
improvement. Not even one was followed.
The Chairman could not have acted on his
own. Yet without calling any meeting of the
Authority or any committee he sent the letter
for converting the site. How did it appear to
him that it was necessary, is mentioned in
the letter dated April 21, because the Chief
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Minister desired so. The purpose of the
Authority taking such a decision is their
knowledge of local conditions and what was
better for them. That is why participatory
exercise is contemplated. If any alteration in
scheme could be done by the Chairman and
the Chief Minister then sub-section (4) of
Section 19 is rendered otiose. There is no
provision in the Act for alteration in a scheme
by converting one site to another, except, of
course if it appeared to be improvement. But
even that power vested in the Authority not
the government. What should have
happened was that the Authority should
have applied its mind and must have come
to the conclusion that conversion of the site
reserved for public park into a private
nursing home amounted to an improvement;
then only it could have exercised the power.
But what happened in fact was that the
application for allotment of the site was
accepted first and the procedural
requirements were attempted to be gone
through later and that too by the State
Government which was not authorised to do
so. Not only that the Authority did not apply
its mind and take any decision if there was
any necessity to alter the scheme but even if
it is assumed that the State Government
could have any role to play, the entire
exercise instead of proceeding from below,
that is, from the BDA to State Government
proceeded in reverse direction, that is, from
the State Government to the BDA. Every
order, namely, converting the site from public
park to private nursing home and even
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 29 of 63
allotment to BMT was passed by State
Government and the BDA acting like a true
subservient body obeyed faithfully by
adopting and confirming the directions. It
was complete abdication of power by the
BDA. The legislature entrusted the
responsibility to alter and approve the
scheme to the BDA but the BDA in complete
breach of faith reposed in it, preferred to take
directions issued on command of the Chief
Executive of the State. This resulted not only
in error of law but much beyond it. In fact the
only role which the State Government could
play in a scheme altered by the BDA is
specified in sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section
19 of the Act. The former requires previous
sanction of the government if the estimated
cost of executing the altered scheme exceeds
by a greater sum than five per cent of the cost
of executing the scheme as sanctioned. And
later if the ‘scheme as altered involved the
acquisition otherwise than by agreement’. In
other words the State Government could be
concerned or involved with an altered
scheme either because of financial
considerations or when additional land was
to be acquired, an exercise which could not
be undertaken by the BDA. A development
scheme, therefore, sanctioned and published
in the gazette could not be altered by the
government.”
11. Once a Master Plan has come into operation under
Section 70(5) of the PRTPD Act read with Section 75
of the PRTPD Act, the statutory scheme does not
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 30 of 63
contemplate a permission regime where land use
contrary to the operative zoning can be authorised
merely by issuance of a CLU. The prohibition
contained in Section 79 of the PRTPD Act, read with
the written permission requirement in Section 80 of
the PRTPD Act and the structured decision-making
framework in Section 81 of the PRTPD Act, makes it
clear that a CLU is not a source of power to override
the Master Plan. A CLU operates as a regulatory
permission within the statutory discipline of the
Master Plan. It presupposes that the proposed use is
permissible under the operative planning framework,
or that the framework has already been altered or
revised in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by the PRTPD Act. The binding character of the
Master Plan under Sections 70 and 75 of the PRTPD
Act, read with the control on development and land
use under Sections 79 to 81 of the PRTPD Act,
requires that land use permissibility be determined
with reference to the operative zoning prescription. It
cannot be displaced by ad hoc permissions.
12. It must be emphasized that when a statute prescribes
a particular manner for doing an act, it must be done
in that manner and in no other manner. In the
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present case, where the Master Plan is the governing
statutory instrument for land use, a departure which
effectively changes land use permissibility must
satisfy the statutory procedure for alteration,
amendment, or revision contemplated by the PRTPD
Act. It cannot rest on internal approvals or
administrative convenience. This is also why the High
Court’s recording that, as on 13.12.2021, the CLU
did not have statutory backing, assumes decisive
significance. If on the date of its issuance the CLU
lacked statutory support to permit the proposed use
in the relevant zone, the defect is not a mere
irregularity. It goes to the root of jurisdiction. A
permission must be lawful when it is granted. It
cannot be rendered lawful by a later event unless the
PRTPD Act itself so provides.
13. The CLU dated 13.12.2021 also proceeds on the
footing that the site falls within the notified Master
Plan and is treated as a non-conforming land use
zone. In such a situation, a conditional permission
issued in the course of the Section 80 of the PRTPD
Act and Section 81 of the PRTPD Act framework
cannot be used to invert the statutory order by first
granting a CLU in a zone where the use is not
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 32 of 63
permissible under Section 79 of the PRTPD Act and
then seeking to sustain it on the basis of subsequent
approvals.
14. We may also note, in this context, that the reliance
placed upon conditions contained in the CLU, and
the observation that affected persons may pursue
remedies if such conditions are violated, cannot
answer the foundational objection. Conditions may
regulate the manner in which a permission that is
otherwise lawful may be implemented; they cannot
supply jurisdiction where the proposed land use is
impermissible under the operative Master Plan. To
accept conditions as a substitute for conformity with
the Plan would invert the statutory order by
permitting what is prohibited under Section 79 of the
PRTPD Act first, and leaving compliance with the
Master Plan to future contingencies.
15. It was also urged that the proposed unit would
advance industrial development and employment
and that the CLU was processed under a single-
window mechanism. Such considerations cannot
dilute the binding force of the operative Master Plan
or the statutory prohibitions governing land use.
Administrative facilitation, however efficient, must
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 33 of 63
operate within the four corners of the PRTPD Act, and
cannot legitimise a land use that is impermissible
under the Plan.
16. The objection founded on alternate remedy or
disputed questions of fact does not carry the matter
further. The challenge in the present appeals goes to
the root of statutory competence and legality, namely,
whether a change of land use contrary to the
operative Master Plan could be granted at all. Where
jurisdictional legality is in issue, the matter cannot
be non-suited on the plea that factual aspects may
be disputed.
17. For these reasons, we are of the view that the CLU
dated 13.12.2021 could not have been granted for the
proposed unit when, under the operative Master Plan
for Sangrur, the site fell in a rural agricultural zone
where the proposed activity was not permissible.
Issue II: Whether the “approval” recorded in the
43rd meeting dated 05.01.2022 could lawfully
cure the admitted defect in the CLU and whether
such approval is capable in law of operating as an
alteration or amendment of the Master Plan under
the PRTPD Act
18. We now turn to the reliance placed on the “approval”
recorded in the 43rd meeting of the Punjab Regional
and Town Planning and Development Board dated
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05.01.2022. The record indicates that the item placed
before the Planning Board itself described the
proposal as requiring ex post facto approval, and the
minutes record that such ex post facto approval was
granted. The crucial question, however, is not the
label applied by the administration, nor the form in
which the approval is described. The determinative
question is whether the decision recorded on
05.01.2022 is capable, in law, of operating as an
alteration or amendment of the Master Plan so as to
retrospectively validate and cure the admitted defect
in the CLU dated 13.12.2021.
19. In our considered view, it is not. Once a Master Plan
has come into operation under Section 70(5) of the
PRTPD Act read with Section 75 of the PRTPD Act, it
acquires statutory force and becomes the governing
instrument for land use and development within the
planning area. Any change which has the effect of
altering land use permissibility, whether described as
an amendment, modification, or revision, can be
brought about only by following the procedure
expressly prescribed by the statute. The review and
revision mechanism under Section 76 of the PRTPD
Act does not operate in isolation. It expressly attracts,
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 35 of 63
by legislative design, the procedural discipline
embodied in Sections 70 and 75, including
publication, invitation and consideration of
objections and suggestions, and formal bringing into
operation of the revised position through publication
in the Official Gazette.
20. A decision recorded in the minutes of a meeting, or
an internal approval accorded by an executive or
statutory body, does not by itself amount to an
alteration or amendment that has been brought into
legal operation as part of the Master Plan framework.
Section 76 empowers the initiation of a revisionary
process. It does not dispense with the mandatory
steps that alone give legal efficacy to a change in the
Master Plan. To treat minutes of a meeting as the
functional equivalent of a statutory amendment
would be to collapse the distinction between a
proposal to revise and a revision that has acquired
legal force, and would render the procedural
safeguards built into the PRTPD Act otiose.
21. This conclusion becomes inescapable where, as in
the present case, the asserted “approval” has the
effect of permitting an otherwise impermissible
industrial activity in a rural agricultural zone, with
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direct consequences for residents, habitations, and a
functioning educational institution. Zoning
prescriptions under a Master Plan are not mere
internal guidelines. They represent a considered
legislative balance between competing land uses and
are intended to protect public interest. Any departure
which dilutes that balance must satisfy the full
statutory process prescribed for altering the Plan
itself. Executive convenience or post facto
endorsement cannot be a substitute for statutory
compliance.
22. Equally, the statutory scheme does not contemplate
the curing of a jurisdictional defect by retrospective
administrative approval. A CLU which is unlawful on
the date of its grant for want of statutory authority
does not become lawful merely because a later
decision purports to validate it, unless the statute
expressly confers such a power of retrospective
validation. The PRTPD Act contains no such
provision. The legality of the CLU must therefore be
tested with reference to the law and the operative
planning framework as they stood on the date the
CLU was granted.
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23. Therefore, we hold that where the PRTPD Act
occupies the field and prescribes the manner in
which an operative planning instrument is to be
revised or altered, that manner cannot be substituted
by executive decision-making or by treating minutes
of a meeting as the equivalent of an amendment
brought into operation under the Act. The approach
adopted by the High Court, which treats the
subsequent approval as curing the illegality of the
CLU, cannot be accepted when the statutory
structure does not permit legality to be supplied to an
act which was unlawful when done, by a later
administrative approval which does not itself satisfy
the mandatory requirements governing alteration or
revision of the Master Plan. The High Court’s
approach, which proceeds on the premise that an act
lacking statutory backing on the date of its issuance
may nonetheless be sustained by a subsequent ex
post facto approval, is inconsistent with this
statutory structure.
24. It was lastly urged that substantial financial
investment has been made pursuant to the CLU and
that interference at this stage would cause prejudice.
We are unable to accept this submission.
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Expenditure incurred or steps taken in furtherance
of a permission that is unlawful or without statutory
authority cannot confer legitimacy upon the
underlying action. No amount of financial investment
can justify the continuation of an illegal project that
operates in derogation of the statutory planning
framework and directly impacts the rights of civilians
living in the region.
25. For these reasons, we hold that the “approval”
recorded on 05.01.2022 could not lawfully cure the
defect in the CLU dated 13.12.2021, and it is not
capable, in law, of operating as an alteration or
amendment of the Master Plan under the PRTPD Act.
Issue III: Whether the siting norms and
environmental safeguards applicable to the
proposed unit were complied with in the manner
required by law.
26. The present issue arises at the intersection of two
distinct, but complementary, safeguards. The first is
the requirement of prior environmental clearance
under the EIA Notification, 2006 before
commencement of construction activity or
preparation of land at the site. The second is the
siting and proximity discipline applied at the level of
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pollution control permissions, including the siting
distances prescribed by the PPCB notification dated
02.09.1998 for cement plants and grinding units.
These safeguards are intended to operate in advance.
They are designed to prevent avoidable risk to
habitations and sensitive receptors, including
educational institutions, and to ensure that
regulatory satisfaction is reached on objective
material and not on assumption.
27. The record indicates that Respondent No. 9 applied
for Terms of Reference with the SEIAA, Punjab, and
that Terms of Reference were granted on 28.09.2021
and amended on 25.11.2021. The record also
indicates that a public hearing was conducted on
19.04.2022 in connection with the process for
environmental clearance, and that environmental
clearance has not been granted, with the parties
attributing the pendency to interim orders operating
in the writ proceedings and thereafter in these
appeals. These steps, however, do not dilute the basic
position that the requirement of prior environmental
clearance under the EIA Notification, 2006 is not a
post facto formality. The statutory scheme proceeds
on the basis that assessment, public consultation,
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and appraisal must precede the commencement of
construction activity or preparation of land at the
site.
28. Equally, so far as siting is concerned, the PPCB
notification dated 02.09.1998 prescribes minimum
distances for cement plants and grinding units,
including 300 metres from an educational institution
and 300 metres from a residential area described as
a cluster of 15 pucca houses, apart from other siting
parameters. On the material placed before us,
Respondent No. 6 has sought to justify the grant of
the No Objection Certificate dated 14.12.2021 by
stating that it was based on the SDM certification and
a site visit dated 17.11.2021. Respondent No. 9 relies
upon material which states that the school is beyond
the prescribed distance when measured from the
periphery of the proposed site and that there is no
residential cluster of 15 pucca houses within the
prescribed radius. The Appellants, on the other hand,
dispute this position and rely upon material to
contend that the school and residential habitations
are in closer proximity to the proposed site and that
the prescribed siting safeguards are attracted. The
record also refers to nearby habitations and other
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 41 of 63
establishments in the vicinity. This material, taken
as a whole, indicates that the site is not isolated and
that the proposed unit is in the vicinity of habitations
and an educational institution, which are precisely
the kinds of receptors for which siting safeguards
exist.
29. A further difficulty arises from the manner in which
compliance with distance is sought to be established
on the material relied upon by the authorities.
Respondent No. 6 acknowledges that the
measurement was carried out from the boundary
shown by the project proponent and then asserts that
the distance would increase if measured from the
source of pollution. This approach does not satisfy
the minimum regulatory discipline. Siting norms are
not satisfied by an assumption that the distance may
be more when measured differently. They require
demonstrable compliance on the basis of identified
emission sources and verified measurements. This is
more so when, at the relevant stage, the material
placed for consideration did not demonstrably
crystallise the emission sources and their
configuration in a manner that would permit verified
assessment of siting compliance on objective
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parameters. When the emission sources and their
configuration are not crystallised and verified, a
conclusion on siting compliance based on boundary
measurements cannot be treated as a conclusive
regulatory satisfaction, particularly where the school
and habitations are close to the margin.
30. Respondent No. 9 has also sought to contend that the
proposed unit is a clinker grinding unit, that it is
assessed at the State level as a Category “B” project,
and that it proposes the use of fly ash and control
systems such as bag filters. These submissions do
not answer the core concern we have. Classification
for the purposes of appraisal under the EIA
Notification, 2006 does not displace the obligation to
comply with siting safeguards. Proposed mitigation
measures and conditions in a consent to establish do
not substitute the minimum siting standards, nor do
they permit the regulator to postpone demonstrable
compliance to a later stage. In environmental
matters, where a school is in close proximity and
where there is material indicating nearby
habitations, the decision-maker must proceed on the
precautionary approach and must demonstrate, on
objective material, that the applicable safeguards
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have been complied with. This approach is consistent
with the principles reiterated by various landmark
decisions of this Court in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare
Forum v. Union of India8, M. C. Mehta v. Union of
India9 and Hospitality Assn. of Mudumalai v. In
Defence of Environment & Animals10, among
others.
31. The submissions advanced on behalf of Respondent
No. 6 (PPCB), that the consent to establish/No
Objection Certificate was granted on the basis of the
SDM’s report and a site visit, and that compliance
with the siting guidelines can be verified at a later
stage while considering consent to operate, do not
meet the legal requirement of demonstrable
compliance at the threshold. Preventive safeguards,
by their very design, cannot be treated as matters to
be tested only after permissions have been granted or
after the project has advanced. Where the regulatory
framework prescribes minimum buffers from
habitations and educational institutions, the
satisfaction recorded by the authority must be
founded on objective and verifiable measurements,
8
(1996) 5 SCC 647
9
(1997) 3 SCC 715
10
(2020) 10 SCC 589
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and not on an assumption that compliance can be
ensured later.
32. Likewise, Respondent No. 9’s reliance on the
grant/amendment of Terms of Reference, the
conduct of public hearing, and proposed mitigation
measures, does not dilute the requirement that
statutory safeguards must operate in advance.
Proposed control systems and future-stage
compliances cannot substitute the obligation to
satisfy siting norms and the discipline underlying
prior environmental clearance at the relevant time.
Nor can subsequent material or later regulatory
developments be invoked to retrospectively validate
the legality of permissions already found to be
without statutory foundation.
33. For these reasons, we are not satisfied that the siting
norms and safeguards, including the PPCB
notification dated 02.09.1998 and the regulatory
discipline underlying prior environmental clearance
under the EIA Notification, 2006, were complied with
in the manner required by law on the material
presently relied upon. Issue III is accordingly
answered in favour of the Appellants.
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34. In view of the discussion above, the appeals are
allowed.
35. The common judgment and order dated 29.02.2024
passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh in CWP No. 20134 of 2022 and CWP No.
18676 of 2022 is set aside.
36. The Change of Land Use dated 13.12.2021 granted in
favour of Respondent No. 9 is quashed.
Consequently, the No Objection Certificate/Consent
to Establish dated 14.12.2021 issued from the
pollution angle in favour of Respondent No. 9, insofar
as it proceeds on the basis of the said CLU, is also set
aside.
37. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
No order as to costs.
Part II: For Writ Petition (C) 481 of 2025 and Writ
Petition (C) 551 of 2025
38. The appellants in the above civil appeals have also
filed the present writ petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. The appellants in Civil Appeal
arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8316 of 2024 has
instituted WP(C) No. 481 of 2025 and the appellant
in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 8495 of
2024 have instituted WP(C) No. 551 of 2025, inter
C.A.NO……OF 2026 @ SLP(C) No.8316 OF 2024 ETC. Page 46 of 63
alia, assailing the revised list of industrial sector
categorization issued by the CPCB in January, 2025
and the consequential notifications issued by the
Ministry of Environment, Forest11 and Climate
Change12.
39. During the pendency of the above appeals, the CPCB,
in January, 2025, issued a revised list of industrial
sector categorisation. Under the revised list, the
activity described as “stand-alone grinding unit
without CPP (Captive Power Plant)” was reclassified
from the “Red” category to the “Orange” category.
Shortly thereafter, the MoEF & CC issued
Notifications GSR 84E dated 29.01.2025 and GSR
85E dated 30.01.2025, namely the Control of Air
Pollution (Grant, Refusal Or Cancellation Of Consent)
Guidelines, 2025 and the Control of Water Pollution
(Grant, Refusal or Cancellation of Consent)
Guidelines, 2025. The Appellants have accordingly
instituted WP(C) No. 481 of 2025 and WP(C) No. 551
of 2025 seeking, inter alia, quashing of the revised
categorisation and the aforesaid notifications to the
11
MoEF
12
Climate Change
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extent they relax the applicable regulatory safeguards
for such units.
40. We have gone through the material placed on record
in the writ petitions, including the revised industrial
sector categorisation issued by the Central Pollution
Control Board in January, 2025, the Notifications
GSR 84E dated 29.01.2025 and GSR 85E dated
30.01.2025 issued by the MoEF & CC, and the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the
parties.
41. In our considered opinion, the question that arises
for determination in these two Writ Petitions is
whether the revised industrial sector categorisation
issued by the CPCB in January, 2025, insofar as it
reclassifies the activity described as “stand-alone
grinding unit without CPP” from the “Red” category
to the “Orange” category, together with the
consequential relaxation of siting and regulatory
safeguards brought about by Notifications GSR 84E
dated 29.01.2025 and GSR 85E dated 30.01.2025,
can be sustained in law having regard to the
constitutional mandate under Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution of India and the governing principles
of environmental jurisprudence.
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Rationale advanced by the CPCB for the revised
categorisation
42. The determination of the above issue necessarily
requires an examination of the rationale offered by
the Central Pollution Control Board for the revised
categorisation, the implications of such
reclassification on preventive environmental
safeguards including siting norms, and the balance
that constitutional and environmental law requires to
be maintained between developmental
considerations and the protection of life, health, and
the environment.
43. The CPCB has relied upon a revised classification
methodology based on a modified Pollution Index
framework, under which industrial activities are
assessed on the basis of their potential to cause air
pollution, water pollution, and waste generation, and
are thereafter assigned a cumulative pollution index.
The stated justification for revisiting the 2016
classification is the experience gained over time,
increased use of cleaner fuels, adoption of cleaner
technologies, and the need to differentiate between
integrated industrial operations and standalone
units.
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44. A central premise of the CPCB’s reasoning is that a
stand-alone cement grinding unit without a captive
power plant has a lower pollution potential than an
integrated cement plant involving clinker
manufacturing and kiln operations. On this basis,
the CPCB has treated such units as a distinct sub-
category within the cement sector and has placed
them in the “Orange” category upon application of the
revised scoring methodology. The CPCB has also
stated that the revised methodology was placed in the
public domain, representations were invited, and the
final framework was adopted after examination by a
duly constituted committee.
45. The CPCB has further asserted that the revised
categorisation continues to be guided by the
precautionary principle and is intended to function
as a regulatory tool for consent management,
inspection frequency, siting decisions, and
environmental oversight, while also incentivising
adoption of cleaner fuels and technologies. The PPCB
has substantially adopted this position and has
stated that it has implemented the revised
categorisation in terms of the directions issued by the
CPCB.
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46. This, in essence, is the rationale advanced by the
regulatory authorities in support of the revised
categorisation. The validity of this rationale, when
tested against constitutional requirements and the
governing principles of environmental jurisprudence,
now falls for consideration.
Assessment of the CPCB’s rationale and its legal
sustainability
47. Having considered the rationale advanced by the
CPCB, we are unable to accept that the
reclassification of a “stand-alone grinding unit
without CPP” from the “Red” category to the “Orange”
category, together with the consequential relaxation
of regulatory and siting safeguards, can be sustained
in law.
48. The revised categorisation proceeds on a sector-level
assessment based on a Pollution Index methodology.
While such a framework may serve as a regulatory
tool for consent management and inspection
frequency, it cannot be treated as determinative
where the consequence of reclassification is dilution
of preventive safeguards, particularly siting norms
intended to protect habitations and sensitive
receptors such as educational institutions.
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49. The CPCB’s principal justification rests on a
comparative distinction between integrated cement
plants and stand-alone grinding units, on the
premise that absence of clinker manufacturing and
captive power generation necessarily results in lower
pollution potential. This approach, however, does not
address the core concern. The relevant question is
not whether a stand-alone grinding unit is less
polluting than an integrated plant in relative terms,
but whether its pollution potential is sufficiently low
to justify a regulatory downgrade that materially
relaxes safeguards governing proximity to civilian
habitations.
50. It must be noted that cement grinding units, even
without CPP, involve extensive handling and
processing of powdered material, which inherently
gives rise to particulate emissions and fugitive dust.
These emissions have direct public health
implications, particularly where units are located
near residential areas and schools. The revised
categorisation does not demonstrate, on objective
and publicly disclosed material, that such exposure
risks have diminished to an extent that warrants
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dilution of the precautionary standards earlier
applied.
51. The reliance on adoption of cleaner fuels and
technologies is equally unpersuasive. The revised
framework proceeds on generic, sector-level
assumptions rather than on demonstrated, site-
specific performance. Preventive environmental
regulation does not permit safeguards to be relaxed
on the assumption that mitigation will suffice at a
later stage. Where the risk to life and health is
foreseeable, safeguards must operate at the
threshold.
52. Notably, the CPCB itself recognises that the
precautionary principle governs categorisation and
that deviation from a mechanical application of
methodology is warranted where activities pose a
high risk of environmental or ecological harm. This
recognition undermines the argument that a uniform
application of the revised methodology can justify
dilution of siting norms in sensitive contexts. The
relaxation of minimum siting distances under
Notifications GSR 84E dated 29.01.2025 and GSR
85E dated 30.01.2025 further aggravates the
concern. Permitting activities with known particulate
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emission profiles to be located closer to habitations
and educational institutions, without a sector-
specific justification demonstrating redundancy of
earlier safeguards, cannot be regarded as reasonable
or proportionate.
53. We are therefore of the view that the revised
categorisation and the consequential regulatory
relaxations elevate a generic classification
methodology to a position where it overrides
preventive environmental safeguards, without
adequate regard to exposure risks, local conditions,
or the constitutional obligation to protect life and
health. Such an approach is inconsistent with the
precautionary principle, the doctrine of sustainable
development, and the content of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
Constitutional threshold for interference with
regulatory classification
54. As a general rule, this Court exercises
circumspection in interfering with technical
classifications and regulatory frameworks formulated
by expert bodies. Matters such as industrial
categorisation and pollution indices ordinarily fall
within the domain of specialised authorities, and
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judicial review is not invoked merely because a
different regulatory choice is possible. Intervention is
confined to cases where the decision-making process
or its consequences transgress constitutional limits.
55. However, this principle of restraint cannot apply
where a regulatory classification has the direct and
foreseeable effect of diluting safeguards that protect
fundamental rights. When a classification decision
results in a blatant erosion of preventive protections
governing exposure to environmental hazards, the
issue ceases to be a matter of technical regulation
alone and assumes constitutional significance.
56. This Court has repeatedly recognised that while
judicial restraint is the norm in matters involving
policy choices and expert regulation, environmental
adjudication occupies a distinct constitutional space.
Where executive or regulatory action has the effect of
exposing communities to foreseeable environmental
harm or diluting preventive safeguards that protect
life and health, judicial intervention is not an act of
activism but a discharge of constitutional duty. This
position has been consistently affirmed in landmark
decisions such as Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum
v. Union of India (Supra), M.C. Mehta v. Union of
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India (Shriram – Oleum Gas)13, Indian Council for
Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India14, and A.P.
Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu15,
where this Court held that when scientific
uncertainty coexists with a credible risk to human
health or the environment, courts must err on the
side of protection. These decisions underscore that
environmental governance is not immune from
constitutional scrutiny, and that judicial intervention
becomes imperative where regulatory choices
undermine the fundamental right to a clean and
healthy environment guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India.
57. In the present case, the revised categorisation and
the consequential relaxation of siting safeguards
materially affect the level of protection available to
civilians, including residents and school-going
children, against exposure to industrial pollution. By
lowering the regulatory threshold applicable to an
activity with known particulate emission
characteristics, the revised framework permits such
units to be located closer to habitations and
13
(1987) 1 SCC 395
14
(1996) 3 SCC 212
15
(1999) 2 SCC 718
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educational institutions. The impact is not
speculative. It directly implicates public health and
safety.
58. The right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India encompasses the right to a clean and healthy
environment. Preventive environmental safeguards,
including siting norms, are the means by which this
right is protected. Where such safeguards are relaxed
without a demonstrable and reasoned basis showing
that the underlying risk has been materially reduced,
the resulting action infringes the substantive content
of Article 21. Further, Article 14 of the Constitution
of India also comes into the picture. A regulatory
downgrade that weakens environmental protection
must bear a rational nexus to the object of
safeguarding life and health. In the absence of a
proportionate and scientifically substantiated
justification, such dilution is arbitrary. Arbitrariness
that impacts life and health cannot be sustained
under constitutional scrutiny.
59. The precautionary principle which was recognized as
the law of the land by this Court under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India in Vellore Citizens’
Welfare Forum v. Union of India (Supra), and
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which underlines environmental governance in this
country, mandates that where there is a plausible
risk of harm, regulatory frameworks must err on the
side of protection. In the present case, the revised
categorisation prioritises sectoral differentiation over
preventive protection, without adequately addressing
exposure risks in sensitive contexts. This Court does
not interfere with classification merely because it
concerns industrial activity. The present intervention
is warranted because the impugned actions have the
effect of lowering the constitutional minimum of
protection guaranteed to affected communities.
Where regulatory action compromises fundamental
rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India, judicial review becomes a constitutional
necessity rather than an intrusion into policy.
Concluding Remarks and Operative Directions
60. Before we proceed to the operative directions, it is
necessary to underscore, in clear terms, the
constitutional balance that must govern questions of
development and environmental protection.
Economic development and industrial growth are
legitimate and important objectives of the State.
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However, in a constitutional framework founded on
the rule of law, development is not an abstract or
absolute goal. It is conditioned by the non-derogable
obligation to protect life, health, and environmental
integrity. Development that undermines these
foundational values ceases to be constitutionally
permissible development.
61. We believe that the doctrine of sustainable
development is not a slogan of compromise but a
principle of prioritisation. It requires that when
developmental activity poses a credible risk to human
health or environmental safety, regulatory
frameworks must err on the side of protection. The
Constitution does not permit a trade-off where
civilian life and health are exposed to foreseeable
harm on the assumption that economic benefit or
industrial facilitation justifies such exposure. Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution of India do not tolerate
a regulatory calculus that treats environmental
safety as negotiable.
62. If regulatory dilution of the kind impugned in the
present case were to be accepted, it would mark a
fundamental shift in environmental governance.
Sector-level reclassification, divorced from exposure
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realities and local sensitivities, would become a ready
instrument to justify siting of polluting activities in
close proximity to habitations, schools, and other
sensitive receptors. Such an approach would not
remain confined to the present case. It would operate
as a precedent, enabling progressive erosion of
preventive safeguards across regions, with
cumulative and irreversible consequences. The law
does not permit environmental protection to be
weakened incrementally until harm becomes
inevitable.
63. Equally important is the recognition that
environmental harm, once caused, is often
irreversible or incapable of full remediation. Public
health consequences, degradation of air quality, and
long-term ecological damage cannot be undone by
subsequent regulatory correction. It is for this reason
that environmental regulation is designed to be
preventive rather than reactive. A regulatory
framework that allows risk to materialise first and
seeks to address consequences later is
fundamentally incompatible with constitutional
environmental jurisprudence.
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64. At the same time, we reiterate that this Court does
not ordinarily interfere with technical classifications
or policy determinations made by expert bodies.
Judicial restraint in matters of regulatory policy
remains a settled principle. However, restraint
cannot extend to abdication. Where regulatory action
results in a lowering of the constitutional minimum
of protection guaranteed to citizens, particularly in
matters affecting life and health, judicial intervention
becomes a constitutional obligation. The present case
falls squarely within that exceptional category.
65. For the reasons recorded above, we are of the
considered view that the revised industrial sector
categorisation issued by the CPCB in January, 2025,
insofar as it reclassifies the activity described as a
“stand-alone grinding unit without CPP” from the
“Red” category to the “Orange” category, cannot be
sustained in law. The said reclassification, read
together with the consequential relaxation of siting
and regulatory safeguards brought about by
Notifications GSR 84E dated 29.01.2025 and GSR
85E dated 30.01.2025, has the effect of diluting
preventive environmental protections in a manner
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that infringes the constitutional guarantees under
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
66. Accordingly, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 481 of 2025 and
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 551 of 2025 are allowed to the
following extent:
I. The revised industrial sector categorisation
issued by the CPCB in January, 2025 is
quashed insofar as it reclassifies the activity
described as a “stand-alone grinding unit
without CPP” from the “Red” category to the
“Orange” category.
II. Notifications GSR 84E dated 29.01.2025 and
GSR 85E dated 30.01.2025 issued by the
MoEF&CC are quashed insofar as they relax the
applicable siting and regulatory safeguards for
such units on the basis of the aforesaid
reclassification.
67. Consequently, any consent, approval or permission
that has been granted solely on the basis of the
aforesaid reclassification of “stand-alone grinding
unit without CPP” as an “Orange” category activity or
on the basis of the relaxed siting and regulatory
safeguards introduced by Notifications GSR 84E
dated 29.01.2025 and GSR 85E dated 30.01.2025
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shall not survive and shall stand withdrawn, and the
concerned authorities shall take all consequential
steps in accordance with law.
68. We clarify that this judgment shall not preclude the
CPCB or the MoEF & CC from undertaking a fresh
exercise of classification or regulatory review in
accordance with law, provided that any such exercise
is supported by a reasoned, transparent, and
scientifically substantiated assessment, and is
consistent with the precautionary principle and the
constitutional mandate to protect life, health, and the
environment.
69. With the above directions, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 481
of 2025 and Writ Petition (Civil) No. 551 of 2025 stand
disposed of.
70. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
………………………………..J.
[VIKRAM NATH]
………………………………..J.
[SANDEEP MEHTA]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 13, 2026
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