Orissa High Court
Hamiya Kumar Patel vs The Management Of Gomardih ….. … on 17 April, 2026
Author: Mruganka Sekhar Sahoo
Bench: M. S. Sahoo
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
RVWPET No.153 of 2025
Hamiya Kumar Patel ..... Petitioner
-versus-
The Management of Gomardih ..... Opposite Parties
Dolomite Quarry, M/s. Tata Steel
Limited and another
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Petitioner : Mr. Agasti Kanungo, Advocate
For Opp. Parties : Mr. Prabhu Prasad Mohanty, Advocate
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. S. SAHOO
JUDGMENT
——————————————————————————
Date of hearing :13.03.2026: Date of Judgment: 17.04.2026
——————————————————————————
PER MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO, J.
1. The application has been filed seeking review of the
judgment dated 10.01.2025 passed by Division Bench in
W.P.(C) No.16091 of 2024.
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 1 of 30
Since M.S. Sahoo, J. was Member of the said Division
Bench for consideration of the review application it is listed
before a Bench consisting M.S. Sahoo, J other Hon’ble
Judge who was part of the Bench that decided the writ
petition, being not available.
2. The review application has been filed under Order
XLVII Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 114 of C.P.C. The
opposite party in the writ petition is the petitioner in the
review petition.
3. In the review application notices were issued by order
dated 07.08.2025 for condonation of delay in filing the
review application. The opposite parties appeared. The
delay in filing the review application was condoned by order
dated 18.12.2025. By the said order copy of the review
petition was directed to be served on the learned counsel
for the opposite parties.
4. Learned counsel for the review petitioner is heard at
length. The learned counsel has opted to file written
submissions dated 13.03.2026 in the review application
which were not part of the writ petition when it was
considered and allowed.
5. Now the issue for consideration and determination in
the review is whether the review petitioner has made out a
case for review of the judgment dated 10.01.2025 in W.P.(C)
No.16091 of 2024, as per the parameters of Order XLVII
Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 114 of the C.P.C.
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 2 of 30
6. The applicable provisions of C.P.C. which have bearing
in deciding the review application are reproduced herein :
“ORDER XLVII
REVIEW
1. Application for review of judgment.–(1)
Any person considering himself aggrieved–
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal
is allowed, but from which no appeal has been
preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal
is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of
Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of
new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced
by him at the time when the decree was
passed or order made, or on account of some
mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record or for any other sufficient reason,
desires to obtain a review of the decree passed
or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed
the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or
order may apply for a review of judgment
notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by
some other party except where the ground of such
appeal is common to the applicant and the
appellant, or when, being respondent, he can
present to the Appellate Court the case on which
he applied for the review.
[Explanation.–The fact that the decision on a
question of law on which the judgment of the
Court is based has been reversed or modified by
the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any
other case, shall not be a ground for the review of
such judgment.]
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 3 of 30
2. To whom applications for review may be
made.–[Rep. by the Code of Civil Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 1956 (66 of 1956) s. 14.]
“114. Review.–Subject as aforesaid, any person
considering himself aggrieved– (a) by a decree or
order from which an appeal is allowed by this
Code, but from which no appeal has been
preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no
appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) by a decision
on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may
apply for a review of judgment to the Court which
passed the decree or made the order, and the
Court may make such order thereon as it thinks
fit.”
Judgment in the writ application:
7. In the writ application petitioner-employer challenged
the award dated 30.06.2023 passed by the learned Central
Government Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in
Industrial Dispute Case No.36 of 2013.
In the writ application upon appearance of the opposite
party through his learned counsel copy was directed to be
served on the opposite party. The opposite party in the writ
application filed counter affidavit. Learned counsel for the
parties were heard at length and the writ application was
allowed by the judgment dated 10.01.2025.
8. In the writ application, the order passed by the learned
Industrial Tribunal exercising power under Section 11-A in
the Industrial Disputes Act was challenged by the
petitioner-management.
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 4 of 30
9. Interpretation, application and purport of the
Section 11-A was considered by the Division Bench in
deciding the writ petition. The said Section as quoted in
the judgment in the writ application is reproduced herein:
“Mr. Mohanty, learned advocate appears on behalf
of petitioner-management and submits, impugned is
award dated 30th June, 2023 made by the Central
Government Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court.
In answering the reference the Tribunal purported to
exercise power under section 11-A in Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947. The section is reproduced
below.
“11-A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals
and National Tribunals to give appropriate
relief in case of discharge or dismissal of
workmen. – Where an industrial dispute
relating to the discharge or dismissal of a
workman has been referred to a Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for
adjudication and, in the course of the
adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case
may be, is satisfied that the order of
discharge or dismissal was not justified, it
may, by its award, set aside the order of
discharge or dismissal and direct
reinstatement of the workman on such terms
and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give
such other relief to the workman including
the award of any lesser punishment in lieu
of discharge or dismissal as the
circumstances of the case may require:”
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the writ
application had relied upon certified standing orders
defining ‘misconduct’ as there is entry. The relevant
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 5 of 30
paragraphs of the judgment in the writ application is
reproduced herein:
“There was made termination order dated 4th
February, 2012 on charge of absence from work
without prior intimation amounting to misconduct
within meaning of the Certified Standing Orders
(CSO). He demonstrates from the order, there is
entry therein of ‘absence without permission and
without satisfactory cause’ under misconduct
and punishment for misconduct, to include
‘discharge’. As such, the termination was duly
issued. He seeks interference.”
11. As noted in the judgment in the writ application,
learned counsel for the opposite party-workman in the
writ application relied upon decisions rendered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mavji C. Lakum v. Central
Bank of India, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 726,
paragraphs-3, 4 and 22; Davalsab Husainsab Mulla v.
North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation)
reported in (2003) 10 SCC 185. As it has been further
noted, the learned counsel had further relied on
paragraphs-8 to 11 of the judgment rendered in Delhi
Transport Corporation v. Sardar Singh, reported in
(2004) 7 SCC 574, paragraph 7 to 14.
12. The Division Bench, in the writ application has
referred to the paragraph-39 of the impugned award
wherein finding of the learned Tribunal is recorded. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment by the Division
Bench is reproduced herein from paragraph-7:
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 6 of 30
“Paragraph-39 from impugned award is
reproduced below:
“In the instant case it is an admitted fact
that the 2nd party workman had applied
for leave for six months from 27.5.2010 to
28.11.2010 and the same was regretted
by the Management, but he remained
absent unauthorizedly during that period.
Moreover, he also absented from duty after
the month of November, 2010 so he was
only unauthorizedly absent from duty.
Moreover, there is nothing in the service
record of the 2nd Party-workman of the
above regarding any of his past
misconduct.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is clear the Tribunal found unauthorized
absence for six months as also after month
of November, 2010. This under the certified
standing orders amount to misconduct
attracting, inter alia, punishment of
discharge, awarded to opposite party-
workman.”
13. The judgment rendered in Mavji C. Lakum (supra)
was discussed by the Division Bench and was
distinguished on facts. Further the decisions rendered in
Davalsab Husainsab Mulla (supra) and Delhi Transport
Corporation (supra) were dealt with by the Division
Bench and were distinguished in the context of applicable
‘certified Standing Order’. The relevant paragraph from
the judgment is reproduced herein:
“9. For purpose of adjudication of the writ
petition we need not comment on declaration of
law made regarding exercise of discretion by the
Tribunal under section 11-A as interpreted in
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 7 of 30
Davalsab Husainsab Mulla (supra). So also
Delhi Transport Corporation (supra) because
the SO in that case is distinguishable from the
CSO in this case.”
14. Upon adjudication of the issues, the writ application
was allowed, order of the learned Industrial Tribunal was
set aside and quashed, the relevant paragraphs are
reproduced herein:
“10. Finding of the Tribunal was that the charge of
misconduct stood admitted is a finding of proof of
it. The charge attracts the punishment of
discharge, imposed on opposite party (workman).
Where the finding was found to be proved by the
Tribunal, there was no scope for exercise of
discretion under section 11-A. This is because the
provision requires satisfaction obtained by the
Tribunal that the order of discharge and dismissal
was not justifiable.
11. Impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside
and quashed. The writ petition is allowed and
disposed of.”
15. In the writ application, the counter affidavit filed by
the review petitioner being the opposite party is on record,
the learned counsel for the review petitioner has chosen to
file written note of submission dated 13.03.2026 apart from
the grounds as stated in the petition itself. Learned counsel
has annexed and relied upon the decisions annexed to the
written note of submission dated 13.03.2026, i.e.,
Commissioner of Sales Tax, J & K and others v. Pine
Chemicals Ltd. and others, reported in (19955)1 SCC
58. Also annexed to written note is copy of paragraphs-7
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 8 of 30
and 8 and extract from the book of learned author O.P.
Malhotra, Industrial Disputes Act.
16. After hearing the learned counsel for the review
petitioner, the learned counsel for the opposite parties was
not called upon to answer.
Discussions, Reasoning and Conclusions of the Court in
the review application :
17. In The State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs.
Confederation of State Government Employees, West
Bengal & Ors.: R.V.W. 159 of 2022 In WPST 102 of 2020
With C.A.N. 1 of 2022 dated 22nd September, 2022, the
Division Bench of Calcutta High Court considered the
review application, speaking for the Bench regarding
interpretation of Order XLVII Rules- 1 and 2 of the C.P.C.,
one of us Harish Tandon, J. (as His Lordship then was)
observed thus:
“Upon the meaningful reading of the above quoted
provisions the review is permissible provided the
condition enshrined therein are fulfilled. Although
the High Court enjoins the plenary powers of
review while dealing under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India yet the condition put forth
therein needs to be looked into and the power is to
be exercised within the circumference thereof. The
review is permissible provided the order/decree
contained an error apparent on the face of the
record or on a discovery of new and important
matters or evidence which despite the exercise of
due diligence was not within the knowledge of the
aggrieved person, at the time of passing of the said
order or decree or for any other substantial
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 9 of 30
reasons. The explanation appended thereto
creates a further fetter on the part of the Court
exercising review jurisdiction in not entertaining if
aimed at the subsequent decision of the superior
Court in any other case.”
[Underlined to supply emphasis]
18. It would be apt and appropriate to quote the
judgments relied upon and discussions made thereon by
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in State of
West Bengal (supra).
“The Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in
case of M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. Vs.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh reported in
AIR 1964 SC 1372 discussed the incidents which
can be engulfed within the expression “error
apparent on the face of the record”. It is held that
there is a distinction between an erroneous decision
and a decision vitiated by a patent error. It is
highlighted that the review jurisdiction should not be
invoked and/or exercised converting itself as a court
of appeal but founded upon the well sanctified
parameters and at the time of exercising such
jurisdiction the Court must be cautious and careful
in bearing in mind the aforesaid distinction. The
error can be said to be apparent on the face of the
record provided the law expounded therein does not
invite two possible conclusions/opinions. It is an
ardent duty of the Court not to find out the error
after an elaborate argument… … …”
In Parsion Devi & Ors. vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors.
reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Apex Court in
fact, propelled the exposition of law laid down in the
case of Thungabhadra (Supra) and held that the
error apparent on the face of the record must be self-
evident and does not require to be ascertained by a
process of reasoning. It is further held that the said
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 10 of 30
jurisdiction can never be invoked for the purpose of
mere correction of the order and upon rehearing of the
entire matter, in the following:
“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment
may be open to review inter alia if there is a
mistake or an error apparent on the face of
the record. An error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of
reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error
apparent on the face of the record justifying
the court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the
jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is
not permissible for an erroneous decision to
be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition,
it must be remembered has a limited purpose
and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in
disguise”.
[Emphasis in original]
In Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik & Ors.
reported in (2006) 4 SCC 78, the Apex Court held
that the error or mistake appearing in Order 47 Rule
1 of the Code must not be such which is to be
established by a long drawn process of reasoning
upon lengthy arguments but should be self-evident in
the following:
“A Constitution Bench of this Court in the
case of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v.
Maruti Hari Jadhav MANU/SC/0033/1965:
[1966]1SCR102 has held that the issue
concerning res judicata is an issue of law
and, therefore, there is no impediment in
treating and deciding such an issue as a
preliminary issue. Relying on the
aforementioned judgment of the
Constitution Bench, this Court has taken the
view in the case of Meharban v. Punjab
Wakf Board (supra) and Harinder Kumar
(supra) that such like issues can be treated
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 11 of 30
and decided as issues of law under Order
XIV, Rule 2(2) of the Code. Similarly, the
other issues concerning limitation,
maintainability and Court fee could always
be treated as preliminary issues as no
detail evidence is required to be led.
Evidence of a formal nature even with
regard to preliminary issue has to be led
because these issues would either create a
bar in accordance with law in force or they
are jurisdictional issues.”
[Emphasis in original]
In a recent judgment rendered by the Three Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court in S. Madhusudhan
Reddy (Supra), it is held that the power of review
should not be equated with the power of an appeal. It
is further held that the Court can exercise such
powers for correction of a mistake but not to
substitute its view taken earlier solely on the ground
that there is a possibility of two views. It would be
profitable to quote the observations contained in
Paragraph 26 thereof which runs thus:
“26. As can be seen from the above
exposition of law, it has been consistently
held by this Court in several judicial
pronouncements that the Court’s jurisdiction
of review, is not the same as that of an
appeal. A judgment can be open to review if
there is a mistake or an error apparent on
the face of the record, but an error that has
to be detected by a process of reasoning,
cannot be described as an error apparent
on the face of the record for the Court to
exercise its powers of review under Order
XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising
powers of review, the Court can correct a
mistake but not substitute the view taken
earlier merely because there is a possibility
of taking two views in a matter. A judgment
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 12 of 30
may also be open to review when any new
or important matter of evidence has
emerged after passing of the judgment,
subject to the condition that such evidence
was not within the knowledge of the party
seeking review or could not be produced by
it when the order was made despite
undertaking an exercise of due diligence.
There is a clear distinction between an
erroneous decision as against an error
apparent on the face of the record. An
erroneous decision can be corrected by the
Superior Court, however an error apparent
on the face of the record can only be
corrected by exercising review jurisdiction.
Yet another circumstance referred to in
Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment
has been described as “for any other
sufficient reason”. The said phrase has
been explained to mean “a reason sufficient
on grounds, at least analogous to those
specified in the rule” (Refer: Chajju Ram V.
Neki Ram 17 and Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos and Anr. V. Most Rev. Mar
Poulose Athanasius and Others 18).”
[Emphasis in original]
19. The further observations of the Division Bench of
Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal (supra) are
quoted and applied in considering the present review
application:
“The law that emanates from the aforesaid decision
leaves no ambiguity that the power of the review is
to be exercised within the limited compass. Though
the substantive provision in the Code of Civil
Procedure in the form of Section 114 confers power
upon the Court to review its judgment, order or
decree yet it does not prescribe any conditions
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 13 of 30
and/or the grounds of such review. In other words
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure neither
prescribes any condition for exercising the power of
review nor creates any brindle or prohibition on the
Court from exercising such powers. Logically what
follows therefrom is that though the substantive
provision of review is provided in the Code yet the
power is to be exercised by the Court on the grounds
enumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code.
Although the High Court enjoins a plenary power of
correcting its mistakes or the errors in a writ
jurisdiction yet by virtue of the introduction of Order
47 Rule 1 of the Code it is required to be exercised
bearing in mind the condition enshrined therein. The
expression ‘mistake’ or ‘error’ apparent on the face
of the record leaves no ambiguity on the legislative
intent that such error which are self-evident and
does not require a detailed examination, the detailed
scrutiny, roving enquiry and/or the elucidation of
the facts or the legal position, are kept outside the
purview of the aforesaid expression. The said
expression connotes that the mistake or error
apparent on the face of record must be such which
does not require a long debate or the elaborate
reasoning but on a bare look of the record and the
consequence to follow therefrom. Every error cannot
be construed as error apparent if it does not result
into an accepted decision already taken. The fringe
mistake or error which is ministerial having no
impact on the ultimate decision taken on a well
defined reasonings, cannot be perceived an error
apparent on the face of the record. There is a real
and apparent distinction between an erroneous
decision and the decision containing an error
apparent on the face of the record. In former case
the remedy available to an aggrieved person is to
move higher up and the review jurisdiction cannot
be invoked; on the other hand, in later case if the
Court finds that the judgment under review
contained patent error striking at the root of the
decision the review can be the proper remedy.
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 14 of 30
Though the Justice is a virtue and transcends all
barriers unbrindled with the rules of procedure or
technicalities but there is a difference in the nature
of a mistake and scope of the review as it largely
depends upon the facts of the each case. The
plenary powers of the Writ Court is based on equity
and the fairness and the mistake of a Court should
not cause prejudice to the litigants. The moment the
mistake or the error is qualified with the word
“apparent on the face of the record”, the power is to
be exercised in keeping the legislative intent and the
conferment of the jurisdictions by the statutory
provisions. The review jurisdiction is never equated
with the appellate jurisdiction nor can be considered
as an appeal in disguise. In case of an error, there is
a possibility of two views and the one has been
adopted it cannot come within the purview of the
review jurisdiction even the Court feels the other
possible views should have been taken. In such
cases, it should be regarded as an erroneous
decision capable of being corrected by a higherer
forum and does not come within the ambit of the
review jurisdiction. The normal principle perceived in
this regard is that the Court should avoid the
departure from the judgment taken as it becomes
final except when it is justified by the circumstances
of substantial and compelling character.
[Underlined to supply emphasis]
20. In judgment dated 25.04.2022 in RVWPET No.20
of 2022 rendered by coordinate Bench of this Court, of
which one of us M.S. Sahoo, J. was Member, decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kamlesh Verma v.
Mayawati1 was relied upon. Kamlesh Verma (supra)
has also been relied upon by the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court in State of West Bengal (supra).
1 (2013) 8 SCC 320
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 15 of 30
21. In Kamlesh Verma (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has laid down scope of review by the High Court of
its earlier judgment and the instances which do not come
within the purview thereof. The paragraphs which are
relied upon and applied for adjudication of the present
review are reproduced herein, at paragraphs-12 to 20 of
SCC the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as follows:-
“12. This Court has repeatedly held in various
judgments that the jurisdiction and scope of review
is not that of an appeal and it can be entertained
only if there is an error apparent on the face of the
record. A mere repetition through different counsel,
of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over
ineffectually covered grounds or minor mistakes of
inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.
This Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib
[(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC
(L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200] held as under :
(SCC p. 675, para 1)
(underlined to supply emphasis)
“1. Mr Daphtary, learned counsel for the
petitioners, has argued at length all the points
which were urged at the earlier stage when we
refused special leave thus making out that a review
proceeding virtually amounts to a rehearing. May
be, we were not right in refusing special leave in
the first round; but, once an order has been passed
by this Court, a review thereof must be subject to
the rules of the game and cannot be lightly
entertained. A review of a judgment is a serious
step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where
a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave
error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A
mere repetition, through different counsel, of old
and overruled arguments, a second trip over
ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 16 of 30
inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.
The very strict need for compliance with these
factors is the rationale behind the insistence of
counsel’s certificate which should not be a routine
affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the
court which decided nor awareness of the precious
public time lost what with a huge backlog of
dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for
counsel to issue easy certificates for entertainment
of review and fight over again the same battle
which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the
Bar, we are sure, are jointly concerned in the
conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We
regret to say that this case is typical of the
unfortunate but frequent phenomenon of repeat
performance with the review label as passport.
Nothing which we did not hear then has been
heard now, except a couple of rulings on points
earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges
and then pressed, our order refusing special leave
was capable of a different course. The present
stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier
order which has the normal feature of finality.”
(emphasis in original)
13. In a criminal proceeding, review is permissible
on the ground of an error apparent on the face of
the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated
with the original hearing of the case. In Northern
India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi
[(1980) 2 SCC 167 : 1980 SCC (Tax) 222] , this
Court, in paras 8 and 9 held as under : (SCC pp.
171-72)
“8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to
seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court
merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh
decision of the case. The normal principle is that a
judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and
departure from that principle is justified only when
circumstances of a substantial and compelling
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 17 of 30
character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh
v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1965 SC 845]. For
instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn
to a material statutory provision during the original
hearing, the Court will review its judgment:
Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC
189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279]. The Court may also
reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been
done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full
and effective justice : O.N. Mohindroo v. District
Judge, Delhi [(1971) 3 SCC 5]. Power to review its
judgments has been conferred on the Supreme
Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that
power is subject to the provisions of any law made
by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145.
In a civil proceeding, an application for review is
entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order
47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a
criminal proceeding on the ground of an error
apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1
of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever
the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute
that a review proceeding cannot be equated with
the original hearing of the case, and the finality of
the judgment delivered by the Court will not be
reconsidered except ‘where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has crept in
earlier by judicial fallibility’ : Sow Chandra Kante
v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Cri)
305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200].
(underlined to supply emphasis)
9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal
material so assiduously collected and placed before
us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who
has now been entrusted to appear for the
respondent, was never brought to our attention
when the appeals were heard, we may also
examine whether the judgment suffers from an
error apparent on the face of the record. Such an
error exists if of two or more views canvassed on
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 18 of 30
the point it is possible to hold that the controversy
can be said to admit of only one of them. If the view
adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a
possible view having regard to what the record
states, it is difficult to hold that there is an error
apparent on the face of the record.”
(underlined to supply emphasis)
14. Review of the earlier order cannot be done
unless the court is satisfied that material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its
soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. This
Court in Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India
[1980 Supp SCC 562 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 381] held
as under : (SCC p. 566, para 12)
“12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we
resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any
feeling that the party has been hurt without being
heard. But we cannot review our earlier order
unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the
face of the order, undermines its soundness or
results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra
Kante v. Sk. Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC
(Cri) 305 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 : 1975 SCC (Tax)
200] this Court observed : (SCC p. 675, para 1)
‘1. … A review of a judgment is a serious step and
reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring
omission or patent mistake or like grave error has
crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. … The present
stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier
order which has the normal feature of finality.’ “
15. An error which is not self-evident and has to
be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly
be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the Court to exercise its power of
review. A review is by no means an appeal in
disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard
and corrected, but lies only for patent error. ThisRVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 19 of 30
Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC
715] held as under : (SCC pp. 718-19, paras 7-9)
(underlined to supply emphasis)
“7. It is well settled that review proceedings
have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope
of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra
Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372]
this Court opined : (AIR p. 1377, para 11)
’11. What, however, we are now concerned with
is whether the statement in the order of September
1959 that the case did not involve any substantial
question of law is an “error apparent on the face of
the record”. The fact that on the earlier occasion the
court held on an identical state of facts that a
substantial question of law arose would not per se
be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be
erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was
wrong, it would not follow that it was an “error
apparent on the face of the record”, for there is a
distinction which is real, though it might not
always be capable of exposition, between a mere
erroneous decision and a decision which could be
characterised as vitiated by “error apparent”. A
review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected, but lies only for patent error.’
(underlined to supply emphasis)
8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari
Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC 170] while quoting with
approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC
389] this Court once again held that review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have
to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may
be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or
an error apparent on the face of the record. An error
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 20 of 30
which is not self-evident and has to be detected by
a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an
error apparent on the face of the record justifying
the court to exercise its power of review under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for
an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and
corrected’. A review petition, it must be
remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be
allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.”
(emphasis in original)
16. Error contemplated under the Rule must be
such which is apparent on the face of the record
and not an error which has to be fished out and
searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. The
power of review can be exercised for correction of a
mistake but not to substitute a view. The mere
possibility of two views on the subject is not a
ground for review. This Court, in Lily Thomas v.
Union of India [(2000) 6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
1056] held as under : (SCC pp. 250-53, paras 54,
56 & 58)
(underlined to supply emphasis)
xxx xxx xxx
56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review
can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not
to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised
within the limits of the statute dealing with the
exercise of power. The review cannot be treated
like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of
two views on the subject is not a ground for review.
Once a review petition is dismissed no further
petition of review can be entertained. The rule of
law of following the practice of the binding nature
of the larger Benches and not taking different
views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of
equal strength has to be followed and practised.
However, this Court in exercise of its powers under
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 21 of 30
Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and
upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have
resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a
citizen or rights created under any other statute,
can take a different view notwithstanding the
earlier judgment.
***
17. In a review petition, it is not open to the
Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a
different conclusion, even if that is possible.
Conclusion arrived at on appreciation of evidence
cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is
shown that there is an error apparent on the face of
the record or for some reason akin thereto. This
Court in Kerala SEB v. Hitech Electrothermics &
Hydropower Ltd. [(2005) 6 SCC 651] held as under
: (SCC p. 656, para 10)
“10. … In a review petition it is not open to this
Court to reappreciate the evidence and reach a
different conclusion, even if that is possible. The
learned counsel for the Board at best sought to
impress us that the correspondence exchanged
between the parties did not support the conclusion
reached by this Court. We are afraid such a
submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in
a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on
record is fully within the domain of the appellate
court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced,
the court records a finding of fact and reaches a
conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a
review petition unless it is shown that there is an
error apparent on the face of the record or for some
reason akin thereto. It has not been contended
before us that there is any error apparent on the
face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to
argue on a question of appreciation of evidence
would amount to converting a review petition into
an appeal in disguise.”
(underlined to supply emphasis)
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 22 of 30
18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter.
The power of review cannot be confused with
appellate power which enables a superior court to
correct all errors committed by a subordinate court.
A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This
Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public
Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501] , held as under : (SCC
pp. 504-505, paras 11-12)
(underlined to supply emphasis)
19. Review proceedings are not by way of an
appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope
and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review
jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the
judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the
same. As long as the point is already dealt with
and answered, the parties are not entitled to
challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that
an alternative view is possible under the review
jurisdiction.
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following
grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated
by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence,
was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could
not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been
interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA
144 : (1922) 16 LW 37 : AIR 1922 PC 112] and
approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius
[AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 23 of 30
reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to
those specified in the rule”. The same principles
have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur
Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337 : JT
(2013) 8 SC 275]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material
error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines
its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record
should not be an error which has to be fished out
and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully
within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot
be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same
relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter
had been negatived.”
(underlined to supply emphasis)
22. The principles laid down in Kamlesh Verma (supra),
have been subsequently reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in several judgments, some of the latest being Sunil
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 24 of 30
Vasudeva & others vrs. Sundar Gupta & others2,
Yashwant Sinha & others vrs. Central Bureau of
Investigation through its Director and another3.
23. Grounds seeking review as stated by the review
petitioner in the review petition are as follows:
(i) there is misreading and misconstruction of the
Legislative intent of the I.D. Act and introduction of
Section-11A of the I.D. Act Vis-à-vis certified Standing
Order (CSO) and violation of Supreme Court Ruling,
which is the law of the land under Article-141 of the
Constitution of India. It is the settled position of law
and ruled by the Apex Court that failure to consider
the “Rule” and Supreme Court Rulings is an “error
apparent on the face of record”;
(ii) the assimilation and analysis made to the Mavji C.
Lakum‘s case in paragraph-8 of judgment with respect
to the application of Section 11 A of the I.D. Act, while
holding the enquiry just and proper on proved
misconduct, the application of Section 11 of the Act
and the doctrine of proportionality has completely
escaped the notice of the Court, which needs to be
given a fresh look;
(iii) the paragraphs-19 and 22 is completely misread of the
Mavji C. Lakum v. Central Bank of India, (2008) 12
SCC 726. Mavji is not properly appreciated;
2 (2019) 17 SCC 385
3 (2020) 2 SCC 338
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 25 of 30
(iv) the Hon’ble Court has not taken notice that in the
case, the charges partly proved and partly not proved
in as much as charge Nos.2 and 5 are proved, for
which order of discharge is imposed;
It indicates that the recorded statement in the
paragraph that “Mr. Mohanty is correct in pointing out
that the Tribunal found the charges were not proved
and hence had the power to exercise discretion under
Section-11A as in that case” is totally incorrect,
whereby the judgment is influenced;
(v) paragraph-9 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Court while
commenting on the declaration law regarding exercise
of discretion by the Tribunal under Section 11A of the
Act, distinguished the Certified Standing Order (CSO),
thereby the aims and objective of the legislation and
introduction of Section 11A of the I.D. Act giving
power to the Labour Court to exercise the jurisdiction
on the principle of the doctrine of proportionality has
been defeated, the Act being the Principal Act and one
beneficial legislation;
(vi) paragraph-10 of the judgment has completely not
taken cognizance of the judgment of Raghubir Singh
(reflected in the counter affidavit) and application of
the doctrine of proportionally;
(vii) the Hon’ble Court, while taken note of the Award and
quoting paragraph-39 of the Award that the appellant
has taken privilege leave for a six month from
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 26 of 30
27.05.2010 to 28.11.2010 and thereafter, amounts to
misconduct and attracting discharge has not taken
cognizance of the fact that after being transferred
from the post of cashier to a downgrading post as Sr.
Asst. in Weighbridge Section, on the apprehension of
threat of being framed with criminal misconduct and
misappropriation of money, since no written order is
issued to handover the cash section with liquid cash
to any person/employee, nor any reliever was given to
hand over the charge and cash;
(viii) from the cross-examination of sole management
witness no.1, it can been crystal clear that the
workmen was handling cash and no employee is
entrusted to relieve and take over the cash. The copy
of the evidence in affidavit of sole management
witness, M.W.1 and Cross Examination may be
enclosed for appreciation; and
(ix) the Hon’ble Court has missed the appreciation that
the charge-sheet is only for the unauthorized absence
for the period from 27.05.2010 to 28.11.2010, but,
there is no 2nd charge-sheet ever been issued by the
management on 28.11.2010 and thereafter.
24. Keeping in view the principles which have been laid
down in Kamlesh (supra) at paragraphs 20.1 and 20.2, the
contentions raised in the review petition are to be considered
to arrive at a conclusion whether a case has been made out
for reviewing judgment dated 10.01.2025. Accordingly, each
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 27 of 30
of the grounds raised by the petitioner noted above at 23(i)
to 23(ix) are discussed and answered herein :
24.1 Submissions as noted at para 23(i) inter alia suggest
that the judgment passed by the Division Bench is
erroneous. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
submission is correct, review will not be maintainable as
held in Kamlesh (supra). Para-20.2(ii)(v): that a review is by
no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous
decision is reheard and corrected. The arguments were
considered and overruled by the Division Bench and such
plea raised again is not enough to reopen the concluded
adjudication.
24.2 The contentions raised at 23(ii) regarding interpretation
of Mavji C. Lakum (supra) was considered at paragraph-8
of the judgment rendered by the
Division Bench and the Division Bench has interpreted
Mavji which has not favoured the review petitioner-opposite
party. Reiteration of the argument in review cannot be
countenanced as the argument has been overrulled. In
considering the review petition, it cannot be equated with
rehearing of the matter.
Further assuming that the interpretation of Mavji
suggested by the review petitioner as indicated above would
be a possible view, applying the principles laid down in
Kamlesh 20.2(vi): mere possibility of two views on the
subject cannot be a ground for review.
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 28 of 30
24.3 The grounds as contended in the review application
culled out and noted above at paragraph 23 at: (iv), (v), (vi),
(vii) & (viii) deal with legal and factual aspects. The said
factual aspects have been considered by the Division Bench
in challenge to the award of the learned Tribunal and have
been discussed/decided. Therefore, the grounds (iv) to (viii)
would not come to the aid of the review petitioner as it would
amount to reappreciation of evidence on record which would
not be available to be done even in appeal much less in
exercising review jurisdiction.
The legal issues raised in grounds (iv) to (viii) are
reiteration of contentions those were raised in writ petition,
rejected and cannot be reheard and reconsidered in review.
Further, the relief as sought at the time of arguing the
writ application which have been negatived cannot be
reconsidered.
25. Further it has to be and is held that the suggested
grounds seeking review are not errors manifest on the
judgment and they do not undermine soundness of the
judgment rendered by the Division Bench in the writ
application.
26. We do not find any material error manifest on the face
of the order in the writ application nor can we ‘revisit’ the
judgment, the matter being ‘reargued’ in review.
RVWPET NO. 153 of 2025 Page 29 of 30
27. In view of the discussions made above, the review
application being devoid of any merit has to be and is
dismissed.
No costs.
I agree.
(HARISH TANDON) (MRUGANKA SEKHAR SAHOO)
CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 17th day of April, 2026/dutta/Gs.
asant Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: AJIT KUMAR DUTTA Reason: Authentication Location: ohc RVWPET Date: 17-Apr-2026 NO. 153 of 2025 18:51:32 Page 30 of 30