Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 20 March, 2026
Author: Hiranmay Bhattacharyya
Bench: Hiranmay Bhattacharyya
2026:CHC-AS:458
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Before:
The Hon'ble Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya
WPA 25183 of 2025
Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 25184 of 2025
Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 25185 of 2025
Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
With
WPA 25187 of 2025
Gour Chandra Ghosh & Ors.
Vs.
he State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the petitioners : Mr. Partha Pratim Roy
Mr. Samrat Chakraborty
Mr. Saikat Gayen
..... advocates
For the State
In WPA 25183 of 2025 : Mr. Jaharlal Dey
Ms. Sukla Das Chandra
...... advocates
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For the State
In WPA 25184 of 2025 : Mr. Suman Ghosh
Mr. Arka Mondal ....... advocates
For the State
In WPA 25185 of 2025 : Mr. Chandi Charan De, AGP
Ms. Saswati Chatterjee ....... advocates
For the State
in WPA 25187 of 2025 : Mr. Supriyo Chattopadhyay
Mr. Suman Dey ........... advocates
For the respondent no. 7 : Mr. Rajdeep Bhattacharya ....... advocate
For the Private Respondent
nos. 7 to 10 : Mr. Sanjib Kumar Mukhopadhyay
Md. Nasim Ali
Ms. Nargish Parveen ……. advocates
Reserved on : 20.01.2026
Judgment on : 20.03.2026
Hiranmay Bhattacharyya, J.:-
1. The petitioners have prayed for setting aside the orders of the District Land
and Land Reforms Officer, Murshidabad dated 02.05.2024 and 28.02.2025.
By the order dated 02.05.2024 the application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act for condonation of delay in preferring an appeal under
Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 1955 (for short “the 1955
Act”) challenging an order dated 17.01.2020 passed by the Prescribed
Authority under Section 50 of the 1955 Act was allowed thereby condoning
the delay in preferring the said appeal. By the order dated 28.02.2025, the
appeal under Section 54 of the 1955 Act was allowed thereby setting aside
the orders of the Prescribed Authority in the mutation cases under Section
50 of the 1955 Act with a direction upon the Block Land and Land Reforms
Officer, Murshidabad- Jiyaganj to rehear the mutation cases afresh.
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2. Petitioners claim to have acquired title in respect of the plots in question by
dint of purchase from the erstwhile recorded owners. Petitioners claim to
have mutated their names in respect of the said plots. Petitioners also claim
to be in possession of the said plots. Upon enquiry from the office of the
Block Land and Land Reforms Officer, petitioners came to know that the
Sub-Divisional Land and Land Reforms Officer was taking steps for
inclusion of the names of the private respondents in terms of the order
passed by the District Land and Land Reforms Officer. After obtaining the
certified copies of the proceedings started at the instance of the private
respondents for recording their name in the Record of Rights, the petitioners
came to know that the private respondents filed four appeals against the
vendors of the petitioners challenging the orders passed in the Mutation
cases by the Prescribed Authority. The petitioners state that from the
certified copies of the proceedings initiated for recording the names of the
private respondents in the Record of Rights, the petitioners came to know
that the appeals were filed accompanied by applications under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act and such applications were allowed without serving any
notice upon the petitioners or their vendors. The petitioners further state
that the appellate authority passed the order dated 28.02.2025 without
issuing any notice either upon the petitioners or their vendors.
3. Mr. Roy, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners submitted that the
appellate authority ought not to have condoned the delay in preferring the
appeal under Section 54 of the 1955 Act without giving any opportunity of
hearing to the petitioners. He submitted that the appellate authority
exceeded its jurisdiction in condoning the delay ex parte thereby taking
away the valuable right of the petitioners without giving them any
opportunity to contest the application for condonation of delay. In support of
such contention he placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Samir Kumar Sarkar vs. State of West
Bengal and Ors1.
1 (2015) 1 CHN 6 (DB).
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4. Objection against maintainability of these writ petitions was raised by the
State and the private respondents.
5. Mr. Dey, learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the West
Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal was established for the
adjudication and trial by such tribunal of disputes relating to and/or arising
out of land reforms or tenancy in land and other matters under the specified
Act and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. He further
contended that the jurisdiction of all courts, excepting the Division Bench of
the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India and the Supreme Court of India, regarding any
adjudication and trial of such disputes, claims, objections and applications
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto have been
excluded. He also contended that the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has not been taken away by
the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997 but the
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India is restricted only before the Division Bench of the High Court as the
Tribunal was established to provide relief to litigants expeditiously and to
reduce the pressure of the High Court. He further contended that the West
Bengal Land Reforms Act is a “specified Act” under Section 2(r) of the West
Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997 (for short “the 1997
Act”) and in view of the provisions laid down under Section 6, 7 and 8 of the
1997 Act, this Court should not entertain these writ petitions. In support of
such contention, the learned Additional Government Pleader placed reliance
upon the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India2.
6. Mr. Dey also placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Division
Bench in the case of Ananda Koley vs. State of West Bengal and Ors3.;
2 (1997) 3 SCC 261
3 (2016) 3 WBLR 577
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and Indian Oil Corporation Limited vs. Anchit Agarwal4 in support of
the aforesaid contention. He also placed reliance upon a judgment and order
dated 11.10.2018 passed by the co-ordinate bench in the case of Rita Basu
and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.5 in support of his contention
that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not
maintainable before the Single Bench, if the issue is in relation to or arising
out of an Act which is a “specified Act” under the 1997 Act.
7. Mr. Mukhopadhyay, learned advocate appearing for the private respondents
contended that it is upon the aggrieved party to move the Tribunal for
obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute and the High Court
should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set
up under the Statute. He contended that an alternative and efficacious
remedy is available under the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy
Tribunal Act 1997 before the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy
Tribunal (for short “WBLRTT”) and this Court should not permit the
machinery created under the 1997 Act to be bypassed. He, thus, contended
that this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not
be entertained. In support of such contention he placed reliance upon a
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered on November 12, 2025 in
the case of Rikhab Chand Jain vs. Union of India6.
8. In reply, Mr. Roy, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner contended
that existence of an alternative remedy does not by itself bar the High Court
from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or the
order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. In support of such
contention he placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
4 2023 (1) CHN(CAL) 493
5 WP 1205 of 2010
6 Civil Appeal no. 6719 of 2012.
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in Magadh Sugar and Energy Limited vs. State of Bihar and others7.
He contended that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has
been allowed without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to contest the
same and, therefore, there has been a violation of the principles of natural
justice. He, therefore, contended that the existence of an alternative remedy
provided under the 1997 Act cannot be a bar in exercising the jurisdiction
by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Roy
placed reliance upon an order dated January 13, 2026 passed by a co-
ordinate bench in the case of Md. Masidul Islam vs. State of West Bengal
and Ors.8 in support of his contention that a writ petition is maintainable
before the Single Bench when no order has been passed by the Tribunal.
9. Heard the learned advocates for the parties and perused the materials on
record.
10. Petitioners are aggrieved by the orders passed by the appellate authority
allowing the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as well as the
subsequent orders allowing the appeals thereby setting aside the orders
passed by the Prescribed Authority.
11. The question that arises for consideration is whether in view of the remedy
provided under the 1997 Act this Court should entertain the instant
application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
12. The West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997 received the
assent of His Excellency the Governor of the State on 12.12.1997. The said
Act was promulgated to provide for the setting up of a Land Reforms and
Tenancy Tribunal in pursuance of Article 323(B) of the Constitution of India
and for adjudication and for trial by such Tribunal of disputes, claims,
objections and applications relating to, or arising out of land reforms or
tenancy and other matters under a specified Act and for matters connected
7 (2022) 16 SCC 428
8 WPA No. 27327 of 2025
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therewith or incidental thereto. “Specified Act” is defined under Section 2(r)
of the 1997 Act which includes the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.
13. On the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Court,
The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra
Kumar (supra)9 held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts
under Article 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution and
the power of judicial review cannot wholly be excluded. It was further held
that the Tribunals created under Article 323A and 323B of the Constitution
have the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory
provisions and rules except the vires of the legislation which creates the
particular Tribunal. The Constitution Bench held that such Tribunals will
function as the courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for
which they have been constituted and all decisions of those tribunals will,
however, be subject to Judicial Review of the Division Bench of High Courts
under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and from the decision of
the Division Bench of the High Court, the aggrieved party could move the
Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 78, 92 and 99 of the said Report
held as follows-
“78…………………..We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review
over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and
in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and
essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic
structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the
Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can
never be ousted or excluded.”
“92. ……………………. In the view that we have taken, no appeal from
the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the aggrieved party
will be entitled to move the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the High9 (1997) 3 SCC 261
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Court the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution.”
“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of
Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude
the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles
226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of
the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other
legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would,
to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon
the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic
structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted,
other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in
discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the
Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-
B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the
constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of
these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division
Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal
concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like
courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they
have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to
directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question
the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which
creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid
and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have
indicated.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. It, therefore, follows from the decision of the Constitution Bench that it is
not open for the litigants to approach the High Courts directly in respect of
the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal.
16. In State of W.B. v. Ashish Kumar Roy10 the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated the observations of the Constitution Bench decision in the case of
L. Chandra Kumar (supra)11 and it was held that as long as the tribunal
constituted performs a supplementary role, without exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 and under Article
10 (2005) 10 SCC 110
11 (1997) 3 SCC 261
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32 of the Constitution of India, the validity of the legislation constituting
such tribunals could not be doubted. It was further held that the Tribunals
would act as authorities of first instance whose decision could be challenged
before the Division Bench of the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Leelavathi N. vs. State of Karnataka12
reiterated the principles of law laid down in Radha Krishan Industries vs.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.13 which is extracted hereinafter.
“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power Under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can
be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for
any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition.One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is
where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved
person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where : (a) the
writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of
the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its
powers Under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an
efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the
remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be
had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the
discretionary remedy Under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of
exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High
Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if
the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the
controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.”
12 2025 INSC 1242=2025 SCC Online SC 2253
13
(2021) 6 SCC 771
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18. Leelavathi N.(supra)14 also noticed the decisions rendered by three Hon’ble
Judges of the Supreme Court in PHR Invent Educational Society vs. UCO
Bank & Ors15, wherein after reiterating the well-known exceptions when a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could be entertained
in spite of availability of an alternative remedy, it was clarified that the High
Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India if an effective alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved person or
statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains
a mechanism for redressal of grievance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
paragraph 35 of the said reports held thus-
“35. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in PHR Invent
Educational Society v. UCO Bank and Others, reported in (2024) 6 SCC
579, has held as under:
“37. It could thus clearly be seen that the Court has carved out certain
exceptions when a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution could
be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy. Some of
them are thus:
(i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with
the provisions of the enactment in question;
(ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure;
(iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and
(iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the
principles of natural justice.
38. It has however been clarified that the High Court will not entertain a
petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative
remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which
the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for
redressal of grievance.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
14 2025 INSC 1242=2025 SCC Online SC 2253
15
(2024) 6 SCC 579
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19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Leelavathi N. (supra)16 after perusal of the
judgments, in paragraph 36 of the Reports, concluded that where an
efficacious alternate remedy is available, the High Court should not
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters
falling squarely within the domain of the Tribunals.
20. There is no quarrel to the proposition of law laid down in Magadh Sugar
and Energy Limited17 (supra) that the existence of an alternative remedy
does not itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution in certain contingencies. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further observed that the High Court has the discretion not
to entertain a writ petition when an effective alternative remedy is provided
by law.
21. From the aforesaid discussion, it logically follows that exercise of discretion
by the High Court to entertain an application under Article 226 of the
Constitution would largely depend upon whether the alternative remedy
available to the aggrieved person is an effective one or not.
22. The Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Ananda Koley (supra)18 after
noting the provisions of Article 323 B of the Constitution of India and the
interpretation of the same as made in the case of L. Chandra Kumar
(supra)19 held that a tribunal created under Article 323B of the Constitution
is a Court of first instance and in a case coming within the jurisdiction of
the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, the Court setting
under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India cannot act as a court of
first instance. The Hon’ble Division Bench held that there are two
distinguishable features so far as the tribunals created by virtue of any
16 2025 INSC 1242=2025 SCC Online SC 2253
17
(2022) 16 SCC 428
18 (2016) 3 WBLR 577
19 (1997) 3 SCC 261
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statute whether the power conferred from the provisions of Article 323A or
323B of the Constitution of India, which are as follows-
(i) The Tribunal is a court of first instance and under the
provisions of Section 8 of the 1997 Act the jurisdiction of a
Court sitting under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India has been ousted to act as the Court of first instance and
that judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution of
India.
(ii) The Tribunal created under the provisions of Article 323A of the
Constitution of India or by virtue of the provisions of the Act
which is legislated by the State Legislature in exercise of power
conferred on it by the provision of Article 323B of the
Constitution of India is competent to examine the vires of any
provision of an Act save and except any provision of an Act
which creates that tribunal.
23. The Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of Indian Oil Corporation Limited
(supra)20 after considering the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra)21 and Ashish Kumar Roy (supra)22
held that it indubitably follows that for adjudication of any dispute which
touches upon any provision of a specified Act under the West Bengal Land
Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Act 1997, one must approach the Tribunal
at the first instance and all other civil courts including the High Court
except the Division Bench exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article
226/227 of the Constitution of India do not have any power and jurisdiction
to entertain such dispute.
24. From the aforesaid discussion it logically follows that the jurisdiction of the
single bench of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the
20 2023 (1) CHN (CAL) 493
21 (1997) 3 SCC 261
22 (2005) 10 SCC 110
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Constitution of India has been expressly excluded by virtue of Section 8 of
the 1997 Act in respect of matters falling within the jurisdiction, power and
authority of the WBLRTT.
25. The decision of the co-ordinate bench in the case of Rita Basu (supra)23
supports the aforesaid view taken by this Court wherein it was held that the
writ petition before the Division Bench without exhausting the remedy
before the Tribunal is not maintainable. It was further held that the writ
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable
before the Single Bench of the High Court.
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rikhab Chand Jain (supra)24 reiterated the
proposition of law laid down in the Constitution Bench decision in the case
Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes25 that when it is open to the
aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal for obtaining redress in the
manner provided by the statute, the High Court normally will not permit by
entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
machinery created under the statute to be bypassed and will leave the party
applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.
27. This Court shall now consider whether the remedy provided under the 1997
Act is an effective one or not.
28. Section 6 of the 1997 Act deals with the jurisdiction, power and authority of
the Tribunal. Section 6 states that the Tribunal shall, with effect from such
date as may be appointed by the State Government by notification in that
behalf, exercise jurisdiction, power and authority in relation to any order
made by an authority under a specified Act; an application complaining
inaction or culpable negligence of an Authority under a specified Act; an
appeal against an order of the Mines Tribunal appointed under Section 36 of
the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953; applications relating to
23 WP 1205 of 2010
24 Civil Appeal no. 6719 of 2012
25 AIR 1964 SC 1419
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matters under any provision of a specified Act or matters relating to any
constitutional validity of any Act under the provisions of a specified Act; and
adjudication of matters, proceedings, cases and appeals which stand
transferred from the High Court and other Authorities to the Tribunal in
accordance with the provisions of that Act.
29. Section 7 of the 1997 Act states that the Tribunal shall with effect from the
date appointed by the State Government under Section 6 exercise the
jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately before that date
by any Court including the High Court except the writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India exercised by a Division
Bench of the High Court but excluding the Supreme Court, for adjudication
or trial of disputes and applications relating to land reforms and matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto and other matters arising out any
provisions of a specified Act.
30. Section 8 of the 1997 Act deals with the exclusion of jurisdiction of courts. It
states that on and from the date from which jurisdiction, power and
authority becomes exercisable under that Act by the Tribunal, the High
Court except where the Court exercises its jurisdiction under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India by a Division Bench , or any Civil Court
except the Supreme Court shall not entertain any proceeding or application
or exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to adjudication or
trial of disputes or applications relating to land reforms or any matter
connected therewith or incidental thereto or any other matter under any
provision of a specified Act.
31. Section 10(1) of the 1997 Act states that a person aggrieved by any order
passed by any authority or any action taken either by an authority or by the
State Government may prefer an appeal to the Tribunal for the redressal of
his grievance.
32. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 states when an application under sub-section
(1) has been admitted by the Tribunal it shall decide and dispose of such
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application as expeditiously as possible and ordinarily within six months
from the date of such admission or from the date of receipt of records from
the concerned authority or the State Government as the case may be. Thus,
the statute mandates expeditious disposal of matters before the WBLRTT.
33. Sub-section (7) of Section 10 enables the Tribunal to pass interim orders
subject to fulfilment of certain conditions. Sub-section (7) of Section 10 lays
down the conditions for making interim orders. Section 10(7) reads as
follows-
“(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this
Act or in any other law for the time being in force, no interim order
(whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) shall be
made on, or in any proceeding relating to, an application made under
sub-section (1) unless–
(a) copies of such application and of all documents in support of the plea
for such interim order are duly furnished seven days in advance to each
of the parties against whom such application is made or is proposed to
be made;
(b) an opportunity of being heard is given to each of the parties against
whom such application is made:
Provided that the Tribunal may pass an interim order as an exceptional
measure if it is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is
necessary so to do for preventing any loss being immediately caused to
the applicant:
Provided further that if the application referred to in sub-section (1) is
not decided and disposed of within a period of six months from the date
of the interim order, the interim order shall, if it is not vacated earlier,
stand vacated on the expiry of the period as aforesaid unless, for
special reasons or in the interest of justice, the interim order is varied,
modified or extended by the Tribunal.”
34. Section 13 of the 1997 Act provides for execution of order passed by the
Tribunal. It states that an interim order in and an order finally disposing of
any matter or proceeding by the Tribunal, including an order as to costs
may be executed in such manner as may be prescribed. Rule 8 of the West
Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal Rules, 1997 lays down the
manner in which the orders of the Tribunal may be executed.
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35. Section 15 of the 1997 Act vests power upon the Tribunal to punish for
contempt of the Tribunal.
36. Section 16 of the 1997 Act deals with the powers of the Tribunal. Section 16
reads as follows-
“16. Power of Tribunal to take evidence on oath etc.–The Tribunal
shall for the purposes of this Act, have the same powers as are vested
in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a
suit, in respect of the following matters:–
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and
examining him on oath or affirmation;
(b) requiring the discovery, inspection and production of documents;
(c) examining witness or issuing commissions for the examination of
witness;
(d) reviewing its decisions;
(e) dismissing an application or proceeding for default or deciding it ex
parte;
(f) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application or proceeding
for default or any order passed by the Tribunal ex parte;
(g) such other matters as may be prescribed.”
37. Thus, the Tribunal constituted under the 1997 Act has the power to review
its decisions. It also has the power to dismiss an application for default or
proceed ex parte. Tribunal has the power to restore any application which
was dismissed for default and also set aside any order passed ex parte.
38. After going through the aforesaid provisions of the 1997 Act and the Rules
framed thereunder, this Court is of the considered view that the WBLRTT is
equipped with all the powers to effectively and holistically deal with a matter
presented before it. To the mind of this Court, the machinery provided under
the 1997 Act is an effective one.
39. Prior to the amendment effected by the West Bengal Act 7 of 2001 which
was given retrospective effect from 03.08.1998, Clause (a) of Section 6 of the
1997 Act read as follows- “an order in original made by an Authority under
the specified Act”. By virtue of the said amendment the words “an order in
original” have been substituted by the words “any order”. The object behind
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such amendment was that any order, whether it is original or appellate,
interim or final that has been made by an Officer or Authority or functionary
exercising powers or discharging functions as such under a “specified Act”
has to be challenged by any person aggrieved against such order before the
Tribunal.
40. In view of the statutory mandate under 1997 Act, this Court holds that any
order passed by an “Authority” as defined under Section 2(b) of the 1997 Act
can be challenged only before the WBLRTT at the first instance and the
jurisdiction of this High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution
exercised by a judge sitting singly would stand excluded in view of the
specific bar created under Section 7 read with 8 of the 1997 Act and all
decisions of the WBLRTT shall be subject to Judicial Review by the High
Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution exercised by the Division
Bench of the High Court.
41. In the case on hand, the orders passed by the Appellate authority in appeals
filed under Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 have been
challenged in these writ petitions. The orders under challenge in these writ
petitions squarely falls under clause (a) of Section 6 of the 1997 Act.
42. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds that the orders
impugned herein can be assailed only before the WBLRTT at the first
instance and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India exercised by a judge sitting singly would stand
excluded.
43. The 1997 Act created a machinery for the purpose of adjudication of the
disputes and matters falling under the specified Act. This Court has already
held that the machinery created under the 1997 Act is an effective
alternative remedy. By applying the well settled proposition of law laid down
in Thansingh Nathmal26 (supra) as reiterated in Rikhab Chand Jain27
26
AIR 1964 SC 1419
27
Civil Appeal no. 6719 of 2012
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2026:CHC-AS:458
(supra), this Court is not inclined to permit the petitioner to bypass the
WBLRTT i.e., the machinery created under the 1997 Act by entertaining
these applications under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
44. In the case of Samir Kumar Sarkar (supra)28 an application under Article
226 of the Constitution of India was filed before the Hon’ble Division Bench
challenging inaction on the part of the WBLRTT in not extending some
interim protection during the pendency of the Original Application before the
WBLRTT. In the said reported case also, the Tribunal was approached at the
first instance and thereafter an application under Article 226 was filed
before the Hon’ble Division Bench.
45. However, in the case on hand the petitioner has directly approached this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging an order
passed by an authority under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The
decision in Samir Kumar Sarkar (supra) being distinguishable on facts
cannot come to the aid of the petitioner.
46. The issue that fell for consideration before the co-ordinate bench in the case
of Md. Masidul (supra)29 was when the West Bengal Administrative
Tribunal is non-functional due to non-availability of Chairman and
members, litigants on issues concerning State Government service are
required to approach the single bench of the High Court or Division Bench
without approaching the single bench. In that case the Tribunal was non-
functional due to non-availability of the Chairman and members. The said
decision is distinguishable on facts as it is not the case of the petitioner
herein that the WBLRTT is non-functional. Thus, the said decision also
cannot come to the aid of the petitioner.
47. The Hon’ble Division Bench in Mobile Store Limited vs. Joint
Commissioner, Commercial Taxes and others30 after noticing that the
28 (2015) 1 CHN 6 (DB).
29 WPA No. 27327 of 2025
30
2022 SCC Online Cal 4116
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2026:CHC-AS:458
Tribunal was non-functional on account of lack of quorum held that the
assesses are entitled to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The said decision being distinguishable on facts
cannot be applied to the case on hand.
48. For all the reasons as aforesaid the writ petitions stand dismissed as not
entertained and the petitioners are left free to approach the appropriate
forum in accordance with law. It is, however, made clear that this Court has
not gone into the merits of the claims and counter claims of the respective
parties and all the observations made hereinbefore are only for the purpose
of supporting the ultimate conclusion and the same shall not prejudice the
parties in future proceedings. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.
49. Urgent photostat certified copies, if applied for, be supplied to the parties
upon compliance of all formalities.
(HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, J.)
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