Delhi District Court
Gopal Ansal vs State on 3 February, 2026
DLND010053532023 Page 1 of 38
Cr Rev 430/2023
Gopal Ansal
Vs.
State
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 430/2023
In the matter of :-
Gopal Ansal
S/o Late Sh. C.L. Ansal
R/o Villa A-6, Aurangjeb Road,
New Delhi.
.....Revisionist
(represented by Ld. Counsels
Sh. Vikas Aggarwal, Ms. Somya Kashyap & Sh. Surender)
Versus
The State of NCT of Delhi
....Respondent
(represented by Ld. Addl. PP for State Sh. Mukul Kumar)
(Sh. Anil Kumar and Sh. Abhishek Mahajan,
Ld. Counsels for the complainant)
CRIMINAL REVISION UNDER SECTION 397 CrPC
Date of institution : 06.06.2023
Date when judgment reserved : 03.02.2026
Date of Judgment : 03.02.2026
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
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JUDGMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
(a) The present Criminal Revision Petition has been filed under Section
397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’) by the
Revisionist challenging the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 passed
by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-01, Patiala House Courts,
New Delhi (‘ld. Trial Court’) in FIR No. 512/2006, Police Station
Connaught Place, registered under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201,
120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC‘).
(b) Vide the impugned order, the ld. Trial Court discharged co-accused
Sushil Ansal while framing charges against the Revisionist Gopal
Ansal for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471,
201, 120-B IPC.
(c) Aggrieved by the said order, the Revisionist has approached this
Court seeking to set aside the order on charge dated 06.04.2023,
contending that the ld. Trial Court committed grave errors both on
facts and in law while framing charges against him.
2. BRIEF FACTS FOR DISPOSAL OF THE REVISION PETITION
(a) On 19.09.2006, FIR No. 512/2006 was registered at Police Station
Connaught Place on the complaint of Shri Deepu Marwah,
Attorney of M/s. Sachdeva & Sons Industries Pvt. Ltd. (the
complainant) against Shri Krishan Bakshi (since deceased) and the
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
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Gopal Ansal
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State
Directors of M/s. Ansal Properties & Industries Limited for offences
under Sections 420, 468, 471, and 120-B IPC.
(b) The brief facts of the case, as per the prosecution, are as follows:
i) Brigadier Krishan Bakshi developed friendly relations with Shri
Ashok Sachdeva in 1991 and induced him to purchase a flat in the
‘Navrang House’ project being developed by M/s. Ansal
Properties at Connaught Place, New Delhi, representing that Shri
Gopal Ansal was known to him and would help in the matter.
ii) The complainants, Shri Ashok Sachdeva and Shri Vinod
Sachdeva, signed a blank application form for booking of a flat
and made payments totaling Rs. 2,50,000/- towards the flat cost
in the joint names of Krishan Bakshi, Ashok Sachdeva, and Vinod
Sachdeva through various demand drafts during the period 1991-
1992.
iii) Subsequently, in 1994, further payments of Rs. 2,50,000/-, Rs.
41,715/-, and Rs. 1,00,000/- (cash) were made on the demand of
Brigadier Bakshi for the same purpose.
iv) It is alleged that Brigadier Bakshi had separately booked Flat No.
15-C in the ‘Statesman House’ project (formerly Navrang House)
in his individual name on 23.01.1992.
v) The complainants later discovered that the amounts paid by them
towards the joint booking were diverted and transferred by
Brigadier Bakshi towards his individual flat (Flat No. 15-C,
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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State
Statesman House) on the basis of a purportedly forged and
fabricated affidavit and indemnity bond dated 15.07.1993,
allegedly bearing the signatures of Ashok Sachdeva and Vinod
Sachdeva, authorizing M/s. Ansal Properties to transfer the said
amounts.
vi) The complainants denied executing any such affidavit or
indemnity bond. During investigation, specimen signatures of the
complainants were sent for forensic examination to the Central
Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL). As per the CFSL report, the
signatures on the questioned documents did not belong to the
complainants.
vii) After the demise of Brigadier Krishan Bakshi on 09.06.1998,
his widow Smt. Usha Bakshi applied for substitution of her name
in place of her deceased husband as the owner of Flat No. 15-C,
which was granted by M/s. Ansal Properties on 21.01.2000.
viii) Subsequently, on 10.11.2001, Smt. Usha Bakshi transferred
the ownership rights to Ms. Chitra Jain, and later on 05.10.2005,
the property was transferred to M/s. Anish Mahajan & Sons
(HUF). These transfers were effected despite the pendency of a
civil suit filed by the complainant and despite M/s. Ansal
Properties having knowledge of the complainant’s claims through
letters dated 24.04.1995 and 11.05.1995.
ix) It is further alleged that the original booking forms submitted
jointly by the complainants and accused Krishan Bakshi were
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
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destroyed/weeded out by the accused company despite having
reason to believe or knowledge of the commission of the
offence.
(c) After completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed on
25.03.2011 against Gopal Ansal, Deepak Ansal (since expired), and
Sushil Ansal for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201,
and 120-B IPC.
(d) The ld. Trial Court took cognizance of the offences and summoned
the accused. The Revisionist appeared before the Court and was
granted bail. After compliance with Section 207 Cr.P.C. and hearing
arguments on charge, the ld. Trial Court passed the impugned order
dated 06.04.2023.
3. THE IMPUGNED ORDER AND CHARGE FRAMED
(a) The relevant portions of the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 are
reproduced hereinbelow:
” The stage of framing charges against the accused persons is indeed a
crucial stage in the journey of a criminal proceeding as it allows the court
to carefully look into the case of the prosecution, as discernible from the
charge sheet, and come to a logical conclusion regarding the charges on
which the accused persons are liable to be tried. Notably, the satisfaction of
the Court at this stage pertains to the material/evidence available against the
accused in the charge sheet and a detailed evaluation or consideration of the
possible defences that the accused may take during the trial is
impermissible at this stage.
I may usefully refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
Vs. R. Soundirarasu, Crl. Appeal No. 1452-53/2022, wherein the Court
observed that at the stage of discharge, the Court must afford an opportunitySAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
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Stateof hearing to both the parties and if it comes to a conclusion that the charges
against the accused are ‘groundless’, discharge must follow.
Importantly, the Court goes to explain the meaning of the word
groundless and holds it to mean something without any foundation or basis
and finally, the Court lays down the test to be applied at this stage as:
‘The test which may, therefore, be applied for determining whether the
charge should be considered groundless, is that where the materials are such
that even if unrebutted, would make out no case whatsoever.’
Thus, at this stage the consideration before me is whether the material in
the charge sheet, if un-rebutted, would establish the guilt of the accused or
not. At the same time, the threshold for passing an order on charge is the
threshold of grave suspicion. On a bird’s eye view, the allegations appear to
be pertaining to the complainants and the deceased accused Krishan Bakshi.
However, in matters concerning cheating on the basis of a conspiracy, a
broad view may not be able to present the true picture and dissection of
truth in such cases requires the Court to meticulously look into the entire
chain of conspiracy. It is so because conspiracy is never hatched in open
and is always constituted upon the foundation of multifarious elements
often rooted in secrecy. In the present case, accused Gopal Ansal was
known to the other accused. The said fact has not only appeared in the
statement of the complainants but has also featured in the statement of Mrs.
Usha Bakshi, wife of the other accused. Even otherwise, the material on
record overwhelmingly indicates certain crucial aspects:
(i) That the accused Krishan Bakshi was offered a special treatment by
M/s. Ansal Properties, specifically in view of the booking application
form for the subject property, whereby booking was made without
mentioning any payment plan or time of payment, which was
mandatory for other buyers;
(ii) That the accused company relied upon forged and fabricated
affidavit and indemnity bond purportedly signed by the complainants
and without seeking any response from the complainants. Moreover, the
complainants were in-fact never even informed that the amounts
received from them were diverted for the booking of a different
property in the name of a different person and they were never called in
person, thereby raising grave suspicion.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
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(iii) That the accused company was in possession of certain
documents signed by the complainants and could have compared the
signatures of the complainants on the forged documents.
(iv) That the accused company perpetuated this default and went on to
permit the transfer of the subject property in the names of the
subsequent purchasers despite knowing that the very ownership of the
subject property was obtained on the basis of forged and fabricated
documents. The timeline in this regard is very crucial and it is a matter
of record that the complainants had informed the accused company
about the alleged fraud vide letters dated 24.04.1995 and 11.05.1995.
(v) During investigation, it also appeared that the original booking
forms submitted jointly by the complainants and accused Krishan
Bakshi could not be recovered as they were destroyed/weeded out by
the accused company. The said documents would have been material
evidence in this case and since the fraudulent acts were duly
communicated to the accused company by letters of the complainants,
the company had reason to believe or even knowledge of the
commission of offence, however, despite that the documents were
caused to disappear.
(vi) That even after receiving the complaint of diversion of the
complainants money from a joint property to an individual property, the
accused firm made no efforts to inquire into the status of the joint
property and could not provide any document regarding the cancellation
of the booking made with respect to the joint property.
(vii) The charge sheet has a document dated 13.01.1994 which was
written by the co-accused Krishan Bakshi wherein it is stated that the
matter has been discussed with Gopal Ansal and name of complainant’s
firm can be inducted if certain payments are sent immediately. Notably,
it was after this communication that the complainants obtained loan
from Punjab National Bank and transferred the same to the accused
company.
The above stated circumstances including the statement of Mrs. Usha
Bakshi, the statements of the complainants and the documentary evidence
dated 13.01.1994 indicate that the accused Gopal Ansal was not only
known to the accused Krishan Bakshi but was also a part of the chain
constituting the allegations in this case. For conspiracy, it is not essential
that all the accused persons perform the same set of acts. What is essential
is that the accused must be sharing a common intent or a shared mental
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
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State
element with each other. The judgments relied upon by the accused to
contend that directors cannot be incriminated on the basis of vicarious
liability, may not advance the case of the accused in this case. It is so
because the accused Gopal Ansal is not being incriminated on vicarious
liability and the material on record appears to indicate that the accused
had a specific criminal intent and was a part of the conspiracy.
As regards accused Sushil Ansal, I find the material on record to be grossly
insufficient. Apart from a bare statement that the fraud was not possible
without the involvement of all the directors, there is nothing on record to
implicate him. In such circumstances, decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. CBI, 2015 (4) SCC 609, would come to the
rescue of accused Sushil Ansal as it explicitly provides that directors can be
charged for criminal liability only if there is incriminating evidence against
them coupled with criminal intent or if the concerned statutory regime
attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability. In this case, the material on record
fulfills neither of these conditions. Otherwise put, the charge against
accused Sushil Ansal appears to be ‘groundless’. Accordingly, accused
Sushil Ansal stands discharged from this case.
In view of the foregoing discussion, I find it a fit case to frame charges
against accused Gopal Ansal for the commission of offences punishable
under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 201, 120-B IPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(b) Pursuant to the aforesaid order, charges were framed against the
Revisionist Gopal Ansal on 01.06.2023. The charge framed is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“… do hereby serve you Gopal Ansal, S/o Shri C.L. Ansal, R/o Villa-A, 6-
Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi, (Director of M/s. Ansal Properties Pvt.
Ltd.) the following charge:
That in the year 1991 or thereafter, you with an intent to cheat the
complainant, namely, M/s. Sachdeva & Sons Industries Pvt. Ltd. (being
represented through Deepu Marwah) in association with your employee
Krishan Bakshi and associate Deepak Ansal (Since expired) hatched a
criminal conspiracy and induced Shri Vinod Sachdeva and Ashok Sachdeva
(Partners of M/s. Sachdeva & Sons Industries Pvt. Ltd.) to invest a sum of
Rs. 50,000/- in an upcoming project known as ‘Navrang House’ now knownSAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
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Stateas ‘Statesman House’ being developed by M/s. Ansal Properties at
Connaught Place, within the jurisdiction of Police Station Connaught Place,
New Delhi. And, in pursuance thereto, complainant made the aforesaid
payments in two installments of Rs. 25,000/- each vide demand draft No.
731541 and 731542, both dated 30.08.1991.
Subsequently, in the year 1992 you demanded Rs. 50,000/- from the
complainant to be deposited in favour of M/s. Ansal Properties for the
aforesaid upcoming project and the said amount was paid vide demand draft
No. 73200 dated 14.01.1992. Thereafter, in August, 1992 you further
demanded Rs. 1,50,000/- from the complainant for the aforesaid purpose,
and in order to fulfill the same, the complainant obtained loan from PNB
and gave payment to your employee Krishan Bakshi vide demand draft No.
71314 dated 03.08.1992.
Further, in the year 1994 you requisitioned Rs. 2,50,000/-, Rs. 41,715/- and
cash of Rs. 1,00,000/- separately for the same purpose and in pursuance
thereto the complainant took up the matter with PNB and obtained loan
from the said bank and thereafter, made a payment of Rs. 2,50,000/- and
Rs. 41,715/- vide demand draft Nos. 195818 and 195817, both dated
15.01.1994 and a cheque of Rs. 1,50,000/- was handed over to you to
meet the requirement of cash as demanded by you, which was encashed in
the account of M/s. Ansal Properties Pvt. Ltd. However, upon checking the
receipts of payments it was revealed that the said receipts were issued
only in the name of your acquaintance Krishan Bakshi only (towards
payment of Flat No. 15-C, Statesman House, New Delhi) and thereby you
deceived the complainant in order to extract money from him and diverted
the aforesaid amount for booking the said flat in the name of your employee
Krishan Bakshi. Thereby, you committed an offence punishable under
Section 420 read with Section 120-B & Section 34 of IPC.
Further, you diverted the entire amount, transferred to you by the
complainant, after obtaining duly notarized affidavit and indemnity bond
dated 15.07.1993 on behalf of Krishan Bakshi and two complainants,
however, the said affidavit and indemnity bond were forged and never
executed by the complainant, thus you committed an offence punishable
under Section 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B & Section 34 of
IPC.
Further, the original booking forms submitted jointly by the complainants
and your acquaintance Krishan Bakshi could not be recovered as the same
were destroyed/weeded out by you despite having reason to believe or even
knowledge of the commission of offence through the
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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complaints/communications sent by the complainant to your company,
however, you still caused the said documents to disappear and thereby
you committed an offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section
120-B & Section 34 of IPC.”
4. GROUNDS OF REVISION
(a) The Revisionist has challenged the impugned order on the following
principal grounds:
i) The ld. Trial Court committed grave error by not considering the
settled proposition of law that a Director/Managing Director of a
Company cannot be held liable for the acts of the Company
without there being any specific role alleged to have been
performed by the Director/Managing Director.
ii) The ld. Trial Court failed to consider that in the present case, the
Company (M/s. Ansal Properties & Industries Limited) has not
been made an accused and all the alleged acts as enumerated in
the charge pertain to the Company without there being any
specific individual role attributed to the Revisionist.
iii) The ld. Trial Court erred in not appreciating the cardinal principle
of criminal jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless
the statute has specifically provided so, and the Indian Penal Code
does not contain any provision for vicarious liability of
Directors.
iv) The ld. Trial Court committed grave error by not considering the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil BhartiSAURABH Digitally signed
by SAURABH
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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Vs.
StateMittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609, Maksud Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668, and Ravindranatha Bajpe v.
Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. (2021) SCC Online SC
806, which clearly establish that without any specific role
attributed and active participation coupled with criminal intent,
directors cannot be arrayed as accused merely on the basis of their
position in the company.
v) The ld. Trial Court committed grave error in observing parity
amongst the Revisionist and co-accused Sushil Ansal, even
though both had no specific individual role in the alleged
offences. The discharge of Sushil Ansal and framing of charges
against Gopal Ansal on the same set of facts is discriminatory and
contrary to established principles.
vi) The ld. Trial Court erred in relying upon the letter dated
13.01.1994 written by co-accused Krishan Bakshi to the
complainant, which merely mentions that the matter has been
discussed with Gopal Ansal. Such a letter, written by a co-accused
to the complainant (who is the ultimate beneficiary), cannot form
the sole basis for framing charges against the Revisionist.
vii) The ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the said letter dated
13.01.1994 may have been written by Krishan Bakshi to induce
the complainant to make further payments, and in the absence of
any direct inducement or demand by the Revisionist, he cannot
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH
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be held liable for what the co-accused stated in his
communication.
viii) With regard to the forged affidavit and indemnity bond dated
15.07.1993, the ld. Trial Court failed to consider that these
documents were submitted to the Company by co-accused
Krishan Bakshi, who as per the complaint itself was holding a key
position in the complainant’s Delhi office from August 1993 to
April 1994. The Company, upon receiving such documents
purportedly executed by all parties, had no reason to doubt their
veracity at that stage.
ix) The ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that if the Company relied
upon and acted upon the said documents, the liability lies
primarily upon the person who submitted the forged documents,
i.e., co-accused Krishan Bakshi (now deceased), and not upon a
specific director of the Company in his individual capacity, while
discharging another co-director.
x) The ld. Trial Court committed grave error by not appreciating that
in the seven points enumerated on pages 6 and 7 of the impugned
order, the first six points specifically deal with the role of the
“accused company” and do not specifically apply to either Gopal
Ansal or Sushil Ansal individually. It is only the seventh point
(the letter dated 13.01.1994) that specifically mentions Gopal
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
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Ansal, and that too is a letter written by co-accused Krishan
Bakshi, not by the Revisionist himself.
xi) The ld. Trial Court failed to note the significant fact that while
repeatedly using the words “accused company” in the seven
enumerated points, the Company itself was not charged, and only
Gopal Ansal was singled out for framing of charges while Sushil
Ansal was discharged.
xii) The ld. Trial Court committed grave error by not considering
the findings given in Civil Suit No. 95819/2016, instituted by the
complainant against the same parties, which was dismissed with
costs by the ld. Civil Judge. As per Section 42 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, such judgment and decree would be relevant,
though not conclusive. The ld. Trial Court failed to apply the law
laid down in K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police (2002) 8
SCC 87 and V.M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra 1996 AIR 339.
5. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE REVISIONIST
Learned counsel for the Revisionist has vehemently argued that the
impugned order is bad in law and liable to be set aside on the following
grounds:
(a) It was submitted that the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence
is that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically
provides for it. The Indian Penal Code does not contain any provision
for attaching vicarious liability on the part of the Managing DirectorSAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signedPARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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Stateor Directors of a Company when the accused is the Company.
Reference was made to the decision in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI
(2015) 4 SCC 609, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
categorically held in paragraphs 42, 43, and 44 that:
“42. No doubt, a corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through
its officers, Directors, Managing Director, Chairman, etc. If such a
company commits an offence involving mens rea, it would normally be the
intent and action of that individual who would act on behalf of the company.
It would be more so, when the criminal act is that of conspiracy.
However, at the same time, it is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is no vicarious liability unless the statute
specifically provides so.
(b) Learned counsel further relied upon Maksud Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668, wherein it was held:
“13. …The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching
vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of
the Company when the accused is the Company… Vicarious liability of the
Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists
in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision
fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on
the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract
the provisions constituting vicarious liability.”
(c) Learned counsel also relied upon Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore
Special Economic Zone Ltd. (2021) SCC Online SC 806, wherein
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that without any specific role
attributed and the role played by directors in their capacity, they
cannot be arrayed as an accused, more particularly they cannot be
held vicariously liable for the offences committed.
(d) It was further submitted that the ld. Trial Court, while culling out
seven points on pages 6 and 7 of the impugned order indicating the
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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material on record available against the accused persons, has
repeatedly used the expression “accused company” in the first six
points. None of these first six points specifically applies to any
individual accused, i.e., either Gopal Ansal or Sushil Ansal. All six
points are common to both directors and pertain to the acts of the
Company.
(e) It was submitted that it is only the seventh point that specifically
mentions Gopal Ansal, and that evidence is a letter dated 13.01.1994
written by co-accused Krishan Bakshi to the complainant stating that
“the matter has been discussed with Gopal Ansal and name of
complainant’s firm can be inducted if certain payments are made.”
(f) Learned counsel strenuously argued that this letter, being a
communication from co-accused Krishan Bakshi to the complainant
(who is the ultimate beneficiary of the entire chain of events having
received the property in his name as per the allegations), cannot be
the sole basis for framing charges against the Revisionist. The co-
accused may have written such a letter to induce the complainant to
make more payments. In such circumstances, the complainant should
have directly approached the accused Company or Gopal Ansal and
obtained something in writing from them.
(g) It was submitted that merely because co-accused Krishan Bakshi
mentioned the name of the Revisionist in a letter to the complainant
does not mean that the Revisionist is liable for what the co-accused
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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stated. There is no evidence that the Revisionist personally induced
the complainant, directly asked for more payments, or gave any
assurance before the name of the complainant could be inducted.
(h) It was further argued that the said piece of evidence (the letter dated
13.01.1994) cannot segregate the case of Gopal Ansal from Sushil
Ansal, thereby rendering one liable to be discharged and the other to
be charged. If the first six points apply equally to both directors and
relate to the Company’s actions, and only the seventh point mentions
Gopal Ansal in a letter written by a third party (co-accused), then
there is no justifiable basis for this differential treatment.
(i) With regard to the forged affidavit and indemnity bond dated
15.07.1993, learned counsel submitted that the availability of these
documents with the Company indicates that the Company sought the
relevant documents and, having received them from co-accused
Krishan Bakshi (who as per the complaint itself was holding a key
position in the complainant’s Delhi office from August 1993 to April
1994), there was no reason for the Company to doubt the veracity of
the said documents at that stage.
(j) It was submitted that if the Company relied upon these documents
and acted upon them, then the liability lies upon the person who
submitted the forged documents, i.e., co-accused Krishan Bakshi,
who has since expired. A specific director of the Company, Gopal
Ansal, cannot be charged for forgery of these documents in his
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH
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individual capacity while the other co-director Sushil Ansal is
discharged.
(k) Learned counsel further pointed out the inherent contradiction in the
ld. Trial Court’s reasoning. While the ld. Trial Court in the seven
enumerated points specifically dealt with the role of the “accused
company” and repeatedly used the words “accused company,” the
said Company was not charged, and only Gopal Ansal was charged
vide the impugned order. This demonstrates that the ld. Trial Court
failed to appreciate that without charging the Company, individual
directors cannot be held vicariously liable for the Company’s acts.
(l) It was also submitted that the ld. Trial Court failed to consider the
findings in Civil Suit No. 95819/2016, which was filed by the
complainant against the same parties and was dismissed with costs.
As per Section 42 of the Indian Evidence Act, the judgment and
decree passed by a civil court are relevant, though not conclusive, to
the facts and findings of the court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police (2002) 8 SCC 87 has held
that such civil court findings are relevant and cannot be ignored.
(m) In light of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
Revisionist prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the
Revisionist be discharged from the case.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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6. ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE AND
COMPLAINANT
(a) Learned Addl. PP for the State as well as Ld. Counsel for the
complainant opposed the revision petition and submitted that the ld.
Trial Court has rightly framed charges against the Revisionist based
on the material available on record.
(b) It was submitted that the Revisionist was part of the criminal
conspiracy hatched along with co-accused Krishan Bakshi to cheat
the complainant. The letter dated 13.01.1994 written by Krishan
Bakshi specifically mentions that the matter was discussed with
Gopal Ansal, which establishes his involvement in the conspiracy.
(c) It was further submitted that the statement of Mrs. Usha Bakshi, wife
of the deceased co-accused, indicates that Gopal Ansal was known
to Krishan Bakshi, which further strengthens the case of
conspiracy.
(d) Learned Addl. PP submitted that at the stage of framing of charge,
the threshold is of “grave suspicion” and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The ld. Trial Court has rightly held that the material on record,
if unrebutted, would make out a case against the Revisionist.
(e) It was submitted that the case of the Revisionist is distinguishable
from that of Sushil Ansal, as there is specific evidence against Gopal
Ansal in the form of the letter dated 13.01.1994, whereas no such
evidence exists against Sushil Ansal.
SAURABH Digitally signed
by SAURABH
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State
(f) Learned Addl. PP and Ld. Counsel for the complainant lastly prayed
that the revision petition be dismissed and the impugned order be
upheld.
7. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
(a) Threshold for Framing of Charge
i) Before analyzing the specific grounds raised in the present
revision petition, it is apposite to briefly set out the well-settled
legal principles governing the stage of framing of charge.
ii) At the stage of framing of charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C. (for
Magistrate) or Section 239 Cr.P.C. (for Sessions Court), the court
is required to evaluate whether there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused. The threshold at this stage is of
“prima facie case” or “grave suspicion,” and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which is the standard at the stage of final
judgment after trial.
iii) However, it is equally well-settled that even at the stage of
framing of charge, the court must apply its judicial mind and
cannot mechanically frame charges without proper application of
mind to the material on record. The court must ensure that there
is some material on record to connect the accused with the alleged
offence.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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(b) Vicarious Liability of Directors and the Requirement of Specific
Role
i) The most fundamental and critical issue that arises for
consideration in the present case is: whether a Director of a
Company can be held criminally liable for the acts of the
Company under the Indian Penal Code in the absence of any
specific statutory provision creating such vicarious liability, and
in the absence of specific material showing his active role coupled
with criminal intent?
ii) The law on this aspect is now well-settled by a catena of decisions
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI
(2015) 4 SCC 609, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the
following principles:
ï‚· A corporate entity is an artificial person which acts through its
officers, directors, managing director, chairman, etc.ï‚· It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is
no vicarious liability unless the statute specifically provides
so.
ï‚· An individual who has perpetrated the commission of an
offence on behalf of a company can be made an accused, along
with the company, only if there is sufficient evidence of his
active role coupled with criminal intent.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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Stateï‚· When the company is the offender, vicarious liability of the
directors cannot be imputed automatically in the absence of
any statutory provision to this effect.
ï‚· There has to be a specific act attributed to the director or any
other person allegedly in control and management of the
company, to the effect that such a person was responsible for
the acts committed by or on behalf of the company.
iii) The ratio of Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra) has been consistently
followed and reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
subsequent decisions.
iv) In Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
“13. …The Penal Code does not contain any provision for attaching
vicarious liability on the part of the Managing Director or the Directors of
the Company when the accused is the Company… Vicarious liability of the
Managing Director and Director would arise provided any provision exists
in that behalf in the statute. Statutes indisputably must contain provision
fixing such vicarious liabilities. Even for the said purpose, it is obligatory on
the part of the complainant to make requisite allegations which would attract
the provisions constituting vicarious liability.”
v) In Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore Special Economic Zone
Ltd. (2021) SCC Online SC 806, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
after dealing with various judgments on this aspect, held that
without any specific role attributed to the directors and the role
played by them in their capacity, they cannot be arrayed as an
SAURABH Digitally
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accused, more particularly they cannot be held vicariously liable
for the offences committed.
vi) The Indian Penal Code does not contain any provision similar to
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which
specifically creates vicarious liability for persons in charge of the
business of a company. In the absence of such a statutory
provision, directors cannot be held vicariously liable merely by
virtue of their position in the company.
(c) Applying these well-settled principles to the facts of the present case,
this Court must examine whether there is specific material on record
showing the active role of the Revisionist coupled with criminal
intent, or whether the charges are based merely on vicarious liability
arising from his position as a Director of M/s. Ansal Properties &
Industries Limited.
(d) Analysis of the Seven Points Enumerated by the ld. Trial Court
i) The ld. Trial Court, in the impugned order, has enumerated seven
points on pages 6 and 7 (highlighted earlier), indicating the
material on record available against the accused persons. These
seven points formed the basis for the ld. Trial Court’s conclusion
that charges should be framed against Gopal Ansal, while Sushil
Ansal should be discharged.
ii) A careful perusal of these seven points reveals the following:
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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StatePoint (i): “That the accused Krishan Bakshi was offered a special
treatment by M/s. Ansal Properties…”
This point refers to the actions of M/s. Ansal Properties, i.e., the
Company. It does not attribute any specific act to Gopal Ansal or
Sushil Ansal individually.
Point (ii): “That the accused company relied upon forged and
fabricated affidavit and indemnity bond…”
This point specifically uses the expression “accused company”
and refers to the Company’s reliance on the forged documents. It
does not attribute any specific individual act to either Gopal Ansal
or Sushil Ansal.
Point (iii): “That the accused company was in possession of
certain documents signed by the complainants…”
Again, this point refers to the “accused company” being in
possession of documents. It does not attribute any specific act to
any individual director.
Point (iv): “That the accused company perpetuated this default
and went on to permit the transfer of the subject property…”
This point again refers to the acts of the “accused company” in
permitting subsequent transfers. No specific individual act is
attributed to either Gopal Ansal or Sushil Ansal.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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Point (v): “…that the original booking forms submitted jointly
by the complainants and accused Krishan Bakshi could not be
recovered as they were destroyed/weeded out by the accused
company…”
This point refers to destruction of documents by the “accused
company.” No specific individual involvement of either director
is mentioned.
Point (vi): “That even after receiving the complaint of diversion
of the complainants money… the accused firm made no efforts to
inquire…”
This point refers to the failure of the “accused firm” to make
inquiries. Again, no specific individual act is attributed to either
director.
Point (vii): “The charge sheet has a document dated 13.01.1994
which was written by the co-accused Krishan Bakshi wherein it
is stated that the matter has been discussed with Gopal Ansal and
name of complainant’s firm can be inducted if certain payments
are sent immediately.”
This is the only point that specifically mentions Gopal Ansal by
name.
iii) From the above analysis, it is evident that the first six points
enumerated by the ld. Trial Court do not specifically apply to
either Gopal Ansal or Sushil Ansal individually. All six points are
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common to both directors and pertain to the acts of the “accused
company” or “accused firm.”
iv) It is only the seventh point that specifically deals with evidence
against the Revisionist, and that evidence is a letter dated
13.01.1994 written by co-accused Krishan Bakshi to the
complainant, mentioning that the matter has been discussed with
Gopal Ansal.
(e) Evidentiary Value of the Letter Dated 13.01.1994
i) The critical question that arises is: whether the letter dated
13.01.1994, written by co-accused Krishan Bakshi to the
complainant, is sufficient to frame charges against Gopal Ansal,
who in the absence of this letter would have been discharged like
Sushil Ansal?
ii) The said letter is a communication from co-accused Krishan
Bakshi to the complainant, wherein he states that the matter has
been discussed with Gopal Ansal and that the complainant’s name
can be inducted if certain payments are made.
iii) Several critical observations must be made regarding this piece of
evidence:
ï‚· The letter is written by a co-accused, not by the Revisionist:
The letter is not written by Gopal Ansal himself. It is written
by Krishan Bakshi. There is no direct evidence of anySAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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Stateinducement, demand, or assurance made by Gopal Ansal to
the complainant.
ï‚· The complainant is the ultimate beneficiary: The complainant,
who alleges to have been defrauded, is the person who
ultimately claims beneficial interest in the property. The co-
accused Krishan Bakshi may have written the said letter to
induce the complainant to make further payments, using the
name of Gopal Ansal to lend credibility to his
representations. It is not the case of prosecution that Gopal
Ansal in some manner personally benefitted from the alleged
cheating.
ï‚· No corroborative evidence: There is no other corroborative
evidence to show that Gopal Ansal was actually involved in
the discussions mentioned in the letter, or that he made any
demands or gave any assurances to the complainant, either
directly or through Krishan Bakshi.
ï‚· Complainant should have verified: If the complainant was
indeed making payments based on such representations, he
should have directly approached the accused Company or
Gopal Ansal and obtained something in writing from the
Company or the director himself. Making payments merely on
the basis of a letter from co-accused Krishan Bakshi, withoutSAURABH Digitally
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Stateverification from the Company or its directors, raises serious
questions.
iv) In the opinion of this Court, the said letter dated 13.01.1994,
written by co-accused Krishan Bakshi, is not sufficient to frame
charges against Gopal Ansal. A letter by a co-accused
(beneficiary having obtained the property in his name) to the
complainant (who would have been ultimate beneficiary of the
entire chain of events) cannot, by itself, establish that the accused
Revisionist induced the complainant or was part of a criminal
conspiracy, particularly when there is no other corroborative
evidence.
v) If the co-accused Krishan Bakshi, in order to induce the
complainant to make more payments, mentioned that he had
discussed the matter with Gopal Ansal, and if the complainant
made payments based on such representation without verifying
the same with the Company or Gopal Ansal directly, then merely
because co-accused Krishan Bakshi named Gopal Ansal in the
said letter does not mean that the Revisionist is liable for what the
co-accused stated.
vi) The Revisionist never directly induced the complainant, nor is
there any evidence that he personally asked for more payments or
gave any assurance before the name of the complainant could be
inducted. It is the co-accused Krishan Bakshi who wrote the saidSAURABH Digitally
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Stateletter, and this solitary piece of evidence cannot segregate the case
of Gopal Ansal from Sushil Ansal, thereby rendering one liable
to discharge and the other to be charged.
(f) The Forged Affidavit and Indemnity Bond
i) With regard to the forged affidavit and indemnity bond dated
15.07.1993, the ld. Trial Court has held in Point (ii) that ” the
accused company relied upon forged and fabricated affidavit
and indemnity bond purportedly signed by the complainants.”
ii) The availability of these documents with the Company indicates
that the Company sought the relevant documents from the parties
concerned. The said documents were submitted to the Company
by co-accused Krishan Bakshi.
iii) It is pertinent to note that as per the complaint itself, Krishan
Bakshi was holding a key position in the complainant’s Delhi
office from August 1993 to April 1994. In such circumstances,
when documents purportedly executed by all parties (including
Krishan Bakshi and the complainants) were submitted to the
Company by Krishan Bakshi, there was no reason for the
Company to doubt the veracity of the said documents at that
stage.
iv) If the Company relied upon these documents and acted upon
them, then the liability lies primarily upon the person who
SAURABH Digitally
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submitted the forged documents and benefited from them, i.e., co-
accused Krishan Bakshi, who has since expired.
v) A specific director of the Company, Gopal Ansal, cannot be
charged for forgery of these documents in his individual capacity,
while another co-director Sushil Ansal is discharged, particularly
when both directors had the same relationship with the Company
and there is no specific evidence showing that Gopal Ansal
personally created, executed, or submitted the forged documents.
Further, the prosecution has failed to point out as to what benefit
or wrongful gain was made by Gopal Ansal by forging these
documents.
(g) The Company Was Not Charged
i) One of the most glaring infirmities in the impugned order is that
while the ld. Trial Court in the seven enumerated points
specifically dealt with the role of the “accused company” and
repeatedly used the words “accused company” or “accused firm,”
the said Company was not charged, and only Gopal Ansal was
charged vide the impugned order.
ii) This demonstrates a fundamental flaw in the reasoning of the ld.
Trial Court. If the acts complained of were acts of the Company,
then the Company should have been charged as an accused.
Without charging the Company, individual directors cannot be
held vicariously liable for the Company’s acts, particularly in the
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
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absence of any specific statutory provision creating such
vicarious liability in the Indian Penal Code.
iii) The ld. Trial Court has fallen into error by attributing acts to the
“accused company” in the first six points, and then proceeding to
charge only an individual director (Gopal Ansal) while
discharging another director (Sushil Ansal) on the ground that
there is insufficient evidence against him.
iv) If the first six points pertain to the acts of the Company and not
to the individual acts of the directors, then either both directors
should be discharged (as in the case of Sushil Ansal), or the
Company should have been charged along with any director
against whom specific evidence of active participation exists.
(h) Discriminatory Treatment: Gopal Ansal vs. Sushil Ansal
i) Another critical aspect that requires consideration is the
differential treatment meted out to Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal
by the ld. Trial Court.
ii) The ld. Trial Court, after analyzing the material on record, held
that as regards Sushil Ansal, “the material on record is grossly
insufficient” and that “apart from a bare statement that the fraud
was not possible without the involvement of all the directors,
there is nothing on record to implicate him.” Accordingly, the ld.
Trial Court discharged Sushil Ansal by applying the ratio of Sunil
Bharti Mittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609.
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
signed
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
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iii) The ld. Trial Court correctly applied the law laid down in Sunil
Bharti Mittal (supra) to Sushil Ansal and held that directors can
be charged for criminal liability only if there is incriminating
evidence against them coupled with criminal intent, or if the
concerned statutory regime attracts the doctrine of vicarious
liability.
iv) However, when it comes to Gopal Ansal, the ld. Trial Court has
held that he is “not being incriminated on vicarious liability” and
that “the material on record appears to indicate that the accused
had a specific criminal intent and was a part of the conspiracy.”
v) The question is: what is the specific material that distinguishes
the case of Gopal Ansal from Sushil Ansal?
vi) As analyzed above, the first six points enumerated by the ld. Trial
Court pertain to the acts of the “accused company” and apply
equally to both directors. There is no specific act attributed to
Gopal Ansal in these six points that is not equally applicable to
Sushil Ansal.
vii) It is only the seventh point–the letter dated 13.01.1994
written by co-accused Krishan Bakshi–that mentions Gopal
Ansal specifically.
viii) However, as held earlier in this judgment, a letter written by a
co-accused to the complainant, mentioning that the matter was
discussed with Gopal Ansal, is not sufficient evidence of active
SAURABH Digitally
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participation or criminal intent on the part of Gopal Ansal,
particularly when there is no corroborative evidence and the
Revisionist himself never directly induced the complainant or
made any demands.
ix) If the law laid down in Sunil Bharti Mittal (supra) was correctly
applied to discharge Sushil Ansal on the ground that there is no
specific evidence of his active role coupled with criminal intent,
then the same law and the same principle should have been
applied to Gopal Ansal as well, since the only additional evidence
against him is the letter dated 13.01.1994, which, for the reasons
stated above, is insufficient.
x) The differential treatment of two directors of the same Company,
both of whom have no specific individual acts attributed to them
except for a letter written by a third party (co-accused)
mentioning one of them, is discriminatory and violative of the
principles of equality and fairness.
(i) Findings in the Civil Suit
i) The Revisionist has also raised the ground that the ld. Trial Court
failed to consider the findings in Civil Suit No. 95819/2016,
which was filed by the complainant against the same parties and
was dismissed with costs by the ld. Civil Judge.
ii) Section 42 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that
judgments of civil courts are relevant when they relate to matters
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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of public or general interest, or when the existence of any
judgment is a fact in issue or is relevant.
iii) In K.G. Premshankar v. Inspector of Police (2002) 8 SCC 87, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judgment and decree passed by
a civil court would be relevant, though not conclusive, to the facts
and findings of the court. The principle was reiterated in V.M.
Shah v. State of Maharashtra 1996 AIR 339.
iv) While it is true that findings in a civil case are not conclusive in a
criminal case, and vice versa, they are nevertheless relevant and
ought to be considered by the court, particularly when the civil
court has examined the same set of facts and documentary
evidence.
v) The ld. Trial Court has not discussed or considered the findings
of the civil court in the impugned order. While this by itself may
not be a ground for setting aside the order on charge, it is a
relevant factor to be considered along with the other infirmities
pointed out above.
8. CONCLUSION ON THE GROUNDS OF REVISION
(a) In view of the detailed analysis set out above, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 suffers
from serious legal infirmities and cannot be sustained.
(b) The fundamental flaw in the impugned order is that the ld. Trial
Court has failed to apply the well-settled principles laid down by the
SAURABH Digitally signed by
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Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC
609, Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668, and
Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd.
(2021) SCC Online SC 806 uniformly to all the directors of the
Company.
(c) The ld. Trial Court correctly applied these principles to discharge
Sushil Ansal, holding that there is no specific evidence of his active
role coupled with criminal intent. However, the same principles were
not applied to Gopal Ansal, despite the fact that the only additional
piece of evidence against him is a letter written by co-accused
Krishan Bakshi, which is insufficient to establish his active
participation or criminal intent.
(d) The seven points enumerated by the ld. Trial Court on pages 6 and 7
of the impugned order reveal that the first six points pertain to the
acts of the “accused company” and do not attribute any specific
individual act to either Gopal Ansal or Sushil Ansal. It is only the
seventh point that mentions Gopal Ansal, and that too in a letter
written by a co-accused.
(e) In the absence of any direct evidence of inducement, demand, or
assurance by the Revisionist to the complainant, and in the absence
of corroborative evidence supporting the contents of the letter dated
13.01.1994, the said letter alone cannot form the basis for framing
SAURABH Digitally
by SAURABH
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charges against the Revisionist, who would otherwise have been
discharged like Sushil Ansal.
(f) With regard to the forged affidavit and indemnity bond, the
Company received these documents from co-accused Krishan
Bakshi, who was holding a key position in the complainant’s office
at the relevant time. There was no reason for the Company to doubt
the veracity of these documents at that stage. If the Company relied
upon and acted upon these documents, the primary liability lies upon
the person who submitted the forged documents, i.e., Krishan Bakshi
(now deceased), and not upon a specific director in his individual
capacity while discharging another co-director.
(g) Furthermore, the ld. Trial Court repeatedly referred to the acts of the
“accused company” in the seven enumerated points, but the
Company itself was not charged. Without charging the Company,
individual directors cannot be held vicariously liable for the
Company’s acts, particularly in the absence of any specific statutory
provision creating such vicarious liability in the Indian Penal Code.
(h) The differential treatment of Gopal Ansal and Sushil Ansal, both
directors of the same Company with no specific individual acts
attributed to them (except for a letter by a co-accused mentioning
one of them), is discriminatory and violative of the principles of
equality and fairness.
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH PARTAP
PARTAP SINGH LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
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9. CONCLUSION
(a) For the reasons set out in detail above, this Court is of the considered
view that the impugned order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the ld.
Metropolitan Magistrate-01, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi,
framing charges against the Revisionist Gopal Ansal, is not
sustainable in law.
(b) The principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil
Bharti Mittal v. CBI (2015) 4 SCC 609, Maksud Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 668, and Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore
Special Economic Zone Ltd. (2021) SCC Online SC 806 clearly
establish that directors of a company cannot be held vicariously
liable for the acts of the company under the Indian Penal Code in the
absence of specific statutory provision, and without specific
evidence of their active role coupled with criminal intent.
(c) In the present case, apart from a letter dated 13.01.1994 written by
co-accused Krishan Bakshi to the complainant mentioning that the
matter was discussed with Gopal Ansal, there is no other specific
evidence showing the active participation of the Revisionist or his
criminal intent. This solitary piece of evidence, in the form of a letter
written by a co-accused who may have been inducing the
complainant to make further payments, is insufficient to frame
charges against the Revisionist.
SAURABH Digitally signed
by SAURABH
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
LALER 17:42:56 +0530
DLND010053532023 Page 37 of 38
Cr Rev 430/2023
Gopal Ansal
Vs.
State
(d) The first six points enumerated by the ld. Trial Court pertain to the
acts of the “accused company” and do not attribute any specific
individual act to the Revisionist. The Company itself was not
charged. The Revisionist cannot be held vicariously liable for the
acts of the Company, particularly when another co-director (Sushil
Ansal) has been discharged applying the correct legal principles.
(e) The Revisionist, in the absence of the letter dated 13.01.1994 (which
is of dubious evidentiary value for the reasons discussed above),
would have been discharged like Sushil Ansal. The said letter alone
cannot justify the framing of charges against him.
10.ORDER
(a) In view of the foregoing discussion and for the detailed reasons set
out above, the present Criminal Revision Petition is ALLOWED.
(b) The impugned order dated 06.04.2023 passed by the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate-01, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, in
FIR No. 512/2006, Police Station Connaught Place, framing charges
against the Revisionist Gopal Ansal under Sections 420, 467, 468,
471, 201, 120-B IPC, is hereby SET ASIDE.
(c) The charge dated 01.06.2023 framed against the Revisionist Gopal
Ansal is also hereby SET ASIDE.
(d) The Revisionist Gopal Ansal is hereby DISCHARGED from the
aforesaid FIR No. 512/2006.
SAURABH Digitally signed
by SAURABH
PARTAP PARTAP SINGH
LALER
SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
LALER 17:43:05 +0530
DLND010053532023 Page 38 of 38
Cr Rev 430/2023
Gopal Ansal
Vs.
State
11. Copy of this order be sent to the Ld. Trial Court for information and
compliance.
12.The Trial Court record be sent back forthwith.
13.Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
14.File be consigned to Record Room.
Pronounced in open court on this SAURABH
PARTAP
Digitally signed by
SAURABH PARTAP
SINGH LALER
03rd day of February, 2026 SINGH Date: 2026.02.03
LALER 17:43:16 +0530
(Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts Delhi
03.02.2026
