Orissa High Court
Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena vs State Of Odisha (Vigilance) ….. … on 13 March, 2026
Author: A.K. Mohapatra
Bench: Aditya Kumar Mohapatra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.3829 of 2025
(An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)
Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena ..... Petitioner
Represented by Adv. -
Mr. Prateik Parija
-versus-
State Of Odisha (Vigilance) ..... Opposite Party
Represented by Adv. -
Mr. N. Moharana,
Standing Counsel (Vigilance)
CRLMC NO.3682 OF 2024
(An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973)
Prof. (Dr.) Trupti Rekha Swain ..... Petitioner
Represented by Adv. -
Mr. Prateik Parija
-versus-
State Of Odisha (Vigilance) ..... Opposite Party
Represented by Adv. -
Mr. N. Moharana,
Standing Counsel (Vigilance)
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR MOHAPATRA
Page 1 of 33
Date of Hearing: 27.02.2026 : Date of Judgement: 13.03.2026
A.K. Mohapatra, J. :
1. The Petitioners in the present batch of CRLMC petitions have both
approached this Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings against
them in VGR No.62 of 2017 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance Cell P.S. Case
No.18 of 2017, registered for the alleged commission of offences under Sections
13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act“) read
with Section 34 of the IPC, which is presently pending before the learned
Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack.
2. Since both the CRLMC applications arise out of the self-same FIR
and involve a common set of facts and issues, they are heard analogously and
are being disposed of by this common order. For the sake of convenience, the
CRLMC No.3829 of 2025 has been taken as the lead matter.
FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE
3. A brief narration of the essential facts of the present case, shorn of
unnecessary details, is as follows. Upon receiving information regarding alleged
criminal misconduct and possession of assets disproportionate to the known
sources of income of the Petitioners, the Vigilance Department initiated an
inquiry and conducted searches at various locations. These included the
Government residential quarters of the Petitioners, certain flats owned by them,
Page 2 of 33
their office at the Department of Haematology in SCB Medical College and
Hospital (“SCB MCH”), as well as other places connected with them.
4. The FIR records at Annexure-1 series reveal that, upon discovery of
assets allegedly disproportionate to the known sources of income of the present
Petitioners, a further preliminary inquiry was undertaken. It is relevant to note
that the Petitioner in CRLMC No. 3829 of 2025, Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena, is
the husband of the Petitioner in CRLMC No. 3682 of 2024, Dr. Trupti Rekha
Swain. Both the Petitioners are Government servants, with Dr. Rabindra Kumar
Jena serving as the Head of the Department of Haematology at SCB MCH and
Dr. Trupti Rekha Swain serving as Professor and Head of the Department of
Pharmacology at the same institution.
5. The FIR further indicates that the Petitioners had neither submitted
their property statements since joining Government service, nor had they
obtained the requisite permission from the competent authority prior to
acquiring certain assets. On the basis of the tentative preliminary calculation of
the movable and immovable assets of the Petitioners and their expenditure, the
Vigilance Department has alleged that the Petitioners are in possession of assets
disproportionate to their known sources of income to the tune of Rs.4,00,32,026,
which is stated to constitute approximately 219% of their known sources of
Page 3 of 33
income. Accordingly, the present case was registered against the Petitioners
under the aforementioned provisions of the PC Act and the IPC.
6. Aggrieved by their implication in the aforesaid offences and by the
fact that the FIR, registered nearly eight years ago, has not yet culminated in
completion of the investigation, the Petitioners have approached this Court
seeking quashing of the present criminal proceedings.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
7. Heard Mr. Prateik Parija, learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioners. It is the firm stance of the Petitioners that the allegations in the FIR
do not disclose any prima facie offence, that the inordinate delay in completion
of the investigation violates their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India and that continuation of the present criminal proceeding amounts to an
abuse of the process of the Court. In support of the aforesaid position, the
learned counsel for the Petitioners has advanced the following contentions;
i) At the very outset, learned counsel for the Petitioners submitted
that in an earlier matter involving similar factual circumstances, this Court
had quashed the criminal proceedings by judgment dated 16.04.2025 in
CRLMC No.1628 of 2023 along with CRLMC No.1629 of 2022. Referring
to paragraphs 10, 11, 34 to 45, 52 and 53 of the said judgment, annexed as
Annexure-2 series to CRLMC No.3829 of 2025, it was contended that the
Page 4 of 33
present Petitioners stand on an even better footing than the petitioners in
the aforesaid case. Accordingly, it was urged that the present Petitioners are
entitled to similar relief.
ii) Learned counsel further contended that both Petitioners have
regularly submitted their property statements in accordance with the
applicable service rules. Referring to the income computation reflected in
the FIR (Annexure-1 series), it was submitted that the total income of the
Petitioners from known sources has been shown as Rs.4,04,80,744/-,
which, according to the learned counsel, exceeds the value of the assets and
expenditure attributed to them. It was therefore contended that no case of
disproportionate assets is made out. Learned counsel further submitted that,
on the basis of the figures mentioned in the FIR itself, the Petitioners have
surplus income of Rs.11,44,885/- and Rs.20,14,307/- respectively after
accounting for their assets and expenditures. It was also contended that
certain amounts received by Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain, the Petitioner in
CRLMC No.3682 of 2024, from her relatives through her SBI account,
though duly reflected in the income-tax returns filed before the authorities,
have not been considered by the investigating agency. Likewise, an amount
of Rs.5,00,000/- received as advance towards sale of an immovable
Page 5 of 33
property at Bhubaneswar has also allegedly been ignored despite being
reflected in the income-tax returns.
iii) With specific reference to the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3682 of
2024, the learned counsel submitted that she has been implicated in the
present case under Section 34 of the IPC solely on the ground that she is
the wife of the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3829 of 2025. It was contended
that the said Petitioner, Dr. Trupti Rekha Swain, was serving as Professor
and Head of the Department of Pharmacology at SCB MCH during the
relevant check period and possesses independent and lawful sources of
income. In such circumstances, according to learned counsel, no element of
common intention or abetment can be attributed to her so as to justify her
implication under Section 34 of the IPC.
iv) Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that a
departmental proceeding had also been initiated against the Petitioner-
Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain on the self-same allegations. It was contended that
in the said proceeding the Petitioner was ultimately exonerated of all the
charges. The competent authority, while passing the order of exoneration,
observed that the Petitioner had not committed any illegality as alleged
against him. It was further observed that non-submission of property
statements is not uncommon in the case of doctors, and that the Petitioner
Page 6 of 33
had subsequently submitted the property statements in accordance with the
applicable service rules.
v) Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that the
computation of income reflected in the FIR suffers from serious
inaccuracies. By way of illustration, it was pointed out that the income of
the Petitioners from salary has been reflected as Rs.1,45,00,000/- instead of
the actual amount of Rs.2,19,77,372/-. It was also contended that the
income derived from the private medical practice of the Petitioners
amounting to Rs.89,48,501/- has been completely ignored by the
investigating agency. Additionally, the professional income of the
Petitioners for the financial year 2017-18 (Rs.76,54,575/- and
Rs.12,93,926/- respectively) has also not been taken into account, despite
the fact that the FIR was registered in November 2017 and the said
financial year falls within the ambit of the check period in the present case.
vi) Continuing with the inconsistencies in the calculation of
incomes and expenditures of the Petitioners by the Vigilance authorities,
the learned counsel for the Petitioners pointed out that several other heads
of income, including bank loans, house rent, advances received,
agricultural income, interest on deposits, bonus received on bank deposits
and LIC policies, BMT training income, VTP scholarship, honorarium, and
Page 7 of 33
insurance pay-outs from SBI Life policies, have not been considered by the
investigating agency while computing the income of the Petitioners. It was
also contended that certain assets have been incorrectly valued. For
instance, the registration fee of Rs.2,56,917/- paid by the vendor in respect
of the properties reflected at serial nos. 1 and 6 of the balance sheet in
Annexure-1 series has been wrongly attributed to the Petitioners. Similarly,
the value of the house situated at Mahanadi Vihar (Plot No.114), which
according to the applicable Vigilance circular should be Rs.7,20,000/-, has
allegedly been arbitrarily shown as Rs.10,04,671/-. Learned counsel further
submitted that the ancestral house mentioned at serial no.10 of the asset
statement had been constructed by the father of the Petitioner prior to his
entry into government service and therefore could not legally be included
in the assets of the Petitioners. It was also contended that the educational
expenditure of the Petitioners’ daughter amounting to Rs.1,20,00,000/- has
been wrongly shown as personal expenditure even though the same was
borne by the university through scholarship. In this regard, reliance was
placed upon the detailed computation sheet and representations submitted
by the Petitioners under Annexure-2 series in CRLMC No.3682 of 2024
and Annexure-3 series in CRLMC No.3829 of 2025.
Page 8 of 33
vii) Addressing the computation of household expenditure, learned
counsel submitted that both the Petitioners reside together as husband and
wife and therefore the household expenditure cannot be calculated
separately for each of them. It was contended that the deduction of 33% of
income towards household expenditure from both Petitioners individually
is arbitrary and devoid of logic. According to learned counsel, such
deduction ought to have been made only once from the income of either of
the Petitioners.
viii) Learned counsel further submitted that had the Vigilance
authorities correctly computed the household expenditure by deducting
33% of the income of Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena instead of that of his wife,
the disproportionate assets would come to Rs.40,38,244/-, which is
approximately 10% of the total income of the Petitioners. It was further
contended that even this figure is not final since several legitimate sources
of income have been ignored by the investigating agency, and upon proper
inclusion of those amounts the alleged disproportionate assets would fall
well below the permissible margin, which would clearly abolish the present
case wrongly instituted against the Petitioners.
ix) Lastly, placing reliance on several case laws, submitted that the
claims of the Petitioners are supported by documentary evidence, including
Page 9 of 33
the income-tax returns filed before the competent authorities. It was
therefore contended that no offence as alleged in the FIR is made out
against the Petitioners. Learned counsel further emphasised that despite the
lapse of more than eight years since registration of the FIR, the Vigilance
Department has failed to submit the final form. Such inordinate delay,
according to learned counsel, seriously impairs the Petitioners’ right to a
speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was
submitted that the Petitioners have at all stages cooperated with the
investigation and have furnished all relevant documents sought by the
investigating agency, yet the investigation has remained inconclusive.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE-VIGILANCE DEPARTMENT
8. Heard Mr. N. Maharana, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the
State-Vigilance Department. Learned Standing Counsel has opposed the
CRLMC applications and submitted that the allegations in the FIR disclose the
commission of cognizable offences warranting a thorough investigation. It is
contended that the investigation is still in progress and that the materials
collected thus far prima facie justify continuation of the criminal proceeding.
Learned Standing Counsel therefore urged that the present CRLMC applications
are devoid of merit and are liable to be dismissed. In support of the aforesaid
Page 10 of 33
submissions, the learned standing counsel has advanced the following
contentions;
i) At the outset, learned counsel for the State-Vigilance
Department submitted that upon receipt of allegations that the Petitioners
had abused their official positions and extended undue favour to certain
pharmaceutical companies by intentionally prescribing costly
chemotherapy drugs to blood cancer patients treated under the OSTF
scheme, Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.19 of 2017 was registered. In the
course of investigation, a search was conducted on 22.11.2017 at the
residential quarters of the Petitioners as well as other connected premises.
Consequent upon the said search, the present case bearing Vigilance Cell
P.S. Case No.18 of 2017 was registered under Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e)
of the PC Act read with Section 34 of the IPC on the allegation that the
Petitioners were found in possession of assets disproportionate to their
known sources of income to the extent of Rs.4,00,32,026/-.
ii) Addressing the stage of investigation, learned counsel
submitted that the investigation is presently at an advanced stage and is
nearing completion. It was contended that the investigation has taken
considerable time due to the necessity of collecting and scrutinising
voluminous documents from multiple sources. Learned counsel submitted
Page 11 of 33
that upon detailed examination of the materials collected thus far, the
initially alleged disproportionate amount of Rs.4,00,32,026/- as reflected in
the FIR has been revised to Rs.54,32,621.08. It was further submitted that
such computation has been made after examining the net salaried income of
both the Petitioners and after deducting 33% of the gross salary of the
Petitioner in the second CRLMC application towards household
expenditure, against the lawful income assessed by the Vigilance
Department at Rs.3,76,45,650/-, which differs from the Petitioners’ claim
that their lawful income amounts to Rs.4,04,80,744/-. Learned counsel
submitted that the exact quantum of disproportionate assets can only be
conclusively determined upon receipt and verification of certain remaining
documents from the concerned authorities, and the final form would be
submitted thereafter.
iii) Learned standing counsel further submitted that since both the
Petitioners are husband and wife and are public servants residing together
in a common household, the Petitioner in the second CRLMC application,
being the wife of the Petitioner in the first CRLMC application, has rightly
been implicated as a co-accused with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. It
was also contended that the FIR cannot be treated as an encyclopaedia of
the entire case. According to learned standing counsel, one of the principal
Page 12 of 33
reasons for the delay in completion of the investigation has been the
delayed supply or non-supply of certain crucial documents from various
sources. It was submitted that some documents are still awaited, which are
essential not only for ensuring a fair investigation but also for establishing
the prosecution case through documentary evidence attached as exhibits.
iv) Learned standing counsel for the Vigilance Department further
submitted that although the investigation has taken considerable time, such
delay has occurred in the course of conducting a fair and comprehensive
investigation and ultimately operates to the benefit of the accused. It was
also contended that the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic
contributed to delays in the investigative process. In such circumstances, it
was argued that the Petitioners cannot be said to have suffered any real
prejudice.
v) Addressing the Petitioners’ contention that a similar proceeding
with similar factual matrix was earlier quashed by this Court, the learned
counsel for the State-Vigilance Department has stated that although the said
judgment relates to Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.19 of 2017, and there is
some overlap in the background facts and circumstances of both the cases,
each criminal proceeding must be examined on its own facts and
Page 13 of 33
circumstances. It was therefore contended that the present case cannot be
quashed solely on the basis of the aforesaid judgment.
vi) With regard to the Petitioners’ claim of violation of their
inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the learned
counsel for the State-Vigilance Department submitted that a qualitative
distinction must be drawn between the accused’s right to fair trial and the
right to speedy trial. According to learned counsel, the right to a speedy
trial is relative in nature and the mere passage of time in the course of
investigation does not automatically result in prejudice to the accused. It
was contended that mere delay in completion of investigation cannot by
itself justify the quashing of criminal proceedings. Learned standing
counsel stated that while considering such a plea, the Court must balance
the rights of the accused with the larger societal interest in prosecuting
serious offences. It was argued that the right of an accused to a speedy trial
cannot override the demands of public justice.
vii) In support of his contention, the learned standing counsel for
the State-Vigilance Department has relied on several case laws vis-à-vis;
Niranjan Hermchandra Sashitttal and another Vs. State of Maharashtra,
reported in (2013) 4SCC 642; M/s Niharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs.
State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported in (2021) SCCONLINE (SC)
Page 14 of 33
315; Hussainara Khatoon & Others vs Home Secretary, Bihar & Others,
reported in (1980 to 1995) 5 SCC 326; R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, reported
in (1992) 1 SCC 225; P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State Of Karnataka,
reported in (2002) 4 SCC 578; Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali vs the State
(Govt, Of Net) Delhi, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 408.
viii) Finally, In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned standing
counsel for the State-Vigilance Department contended that a prima facie
case of possession of disproportionate assets is clearly made out against the
Petitioners and that the investigation is still in progress. It was therefore
submitted that interference by this Court at this stage would be premature
and contrary to the interests of justice. Accordingly, it was prayed that the
present CRLMC applications be dismissed forthwith.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
9. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties, perused the CRLMC
petitions along with the FIR and other documents attached thereto. Perused the
written submission filed by the Petitioners along with the objection filed by the
Vigilance Department.
10. The Petitioners in the present batch of CRLMC applications, who are
husband and wife, are both medical professionals of considerable repute,
engaged at SCB Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack, in the fields of
Page 15 of 33
haematology and pharmacology respectively. In the year 2017, allegations were
levelled against Petitioner-Dr. Rabindra Kumar Jena that he had abused his
official position by intentionally prescribing expensive chemotherapy drugs to
14 patients under the State-sponsored OSTF scheme, thereby showing undue
favour. Pursuant to such allegations, searches were conducted by the Vigilance
authorities at various premises connected with the Petitioners, following which
Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.18 of 2017 came to be instituted against them.
11. It is the principal contention of the Petitioners that if a proper and
accurate assessment of their income and expenditure is undertaken, no case
under the alleged offences would be made out against them. The Petitioners
have further assailed the continuation of the present criminal proceeding on the
grounds of inordinate delay in completion of the investigation and the fact that,
on an earlier occasion, a case arising out of a similar factual background had
been quashed by this Court, with the Petitioners herein claiming to stand on a
better footing than the petitioners in the said decision. The Vigilance
Department, however, has stoutly opposed the Petitioners’ plea, primarily
contending that a prima facie case of accumulation of assets disproportionate to
known sources of income is clearly made out against the Petitioners. It is further
submitted that mere delay in completion of investigation, by itself, does not
constitute a valid ground for quashing the proceeding, particularly when the
Page 16 of 33
nature of the offence has wider societal ramifications. The prosecution has also
argued that cases of the present nature, being heavily dependent on documentary
evidence, inevitably require considerable time for collection, scrutiny, and
verification of the relevant materials. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that this
Court is called upon to examine the sustainability of the relief sought by the
Petitioners in the present batch of CRLMC applications.
12. Before advancing further, it would be apposite to once again delineate
the scope of the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS
(erstwhile section 482 Cr.P.C). In this context, reference may be had to R.P
Kapur‘s case, reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21, where the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, while dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court under
Section 561-A of the erstwhile Cr.P.C (which is in pari materia with Section
482 of the Code and section 528 of the BNSS), observed that the inherent
powers of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case
either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice. Similarly in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, reported
in (1977) 4 SCC 551, the Hon’ble Apex Court further clarified that the inherent
powers of the High Courts are to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do the real
and the substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist.
Finally, in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC
Page 17 of 33
335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while cautioning against reckless exercise of
such inherent powers and highlighting the impracticality of prescribing rigid
guidelines circumscribing the exercise thereof, laid down the following non-
exhaustive and illustrative scenarios in para 102 where a High Court may quash
the impugned F.I.R or criminal proceeding;
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint
and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/orPage 18 of 33
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite
him due to private and personal grudge.”
13. Additionally, it is also fairly well-settled that the power to quash a
criminal proceeding is to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and while
exercising such power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in
the complaint to be true and correct on its face. It has been repeatedly held that
except in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage
of justice, the Courts should ordinarily refrain from interfering at the stage of
investigation of offences (see Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401, and Punit Beriwala v. State
(NCT of Delhi), reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983). This Court is also
aware that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, a mini-
trial is to be avoided. Instead, the adjudication is to be restricted to the question
as to whether the allegations made in the complaint or FIR, if accepted as true
on their face, constitute a prima facie offence (reference, in this regard, may be
had to CBI vs Aryan Singh, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 379). Having said
that, it must also be borne in mind that that primary object of the F.I.R is to set
the criminal investigation into motion.
Page 19 of 33
14. The F.I.R may not set out the every minute details of the case with
unmistakable precision and it is definitely not to be considered an encyclopedia
of all the facts and circumstances of the case on which prosecution relies, and, as
such, the FIR is not considered a substantive evidence and its evidentiary value
is limited to corroboration and contradiction of the evidences (see Nisar
Ali v. State of U.P., reported in 1957 SCC OnLine SC 42, Kirender Sarkar v.
State of Assam, reported in (2009) 12 SCC 342, and Bable Alias Gurdeep
Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 181). Therefore,
while considering an application for quashing of an F.I.R or a criminal
Proceeding, the primary consideration to be borne in mind must always be to
prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to otherwise secure the ends of
justice.
15. In the case at hand, one of the primary points of contention between
the parties pertains to the delay in the completion of the investigation. The
Petitioners have relied upon the right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution to challenge the prolonged investigation, whereas the
Vigilance Department submits that the time taken is not abnormal in cases of
this nature, which entail scrutiny of voluminous records. In this context, it would
be apt to refer to Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India & Anr reported in (1978)
1 SCC 248 and Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of
Page 20 of 33
Bihar, reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81, wherein it was observed by the Hon’ble
Apex Court that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be
deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law
and that such procedure is not some semblance of a procedure but the procedure
should be ‘reasonable, fair and just’ and therefrom flows, without doubt, the right
to speedy trial. It was also observed that no procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would
fall foul of Article 21.
16. The abovenoted settled position of law was again come up for
discussion by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
once again recognised and reiterated that fair, just and reasonable procedure
implicit in Article 21 creates a right in an accused to be tried speedily, and, if
such right is found to have been infringed, quashing of charges or conviction
may be an appropriate relief. However, this is not the only course open, and
having regard to the nature of the offence and other attending circumstances, the
Court may pass such other appropriate orders as the interests of justice demands.
Subsequently, in P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, reported in
(2002) 4 SCC 578, the Constitution Bench reaffirmed the law laid down in A.R.
Antulay (supra).
Page 21 of 33
17. Consequently, in Pankaj Kumar vs. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.,
reported in (2008) 16 SCC 117, the Hon’ble Apex Court, again taking note of a
catena of judicial decisions governing the field, including the ones cited above,
observed that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an
inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution and such a right is
applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its
sweep the preceding by the police during investigations as well. The Hon’ble
Apex Court has further observed that in every case, where the right to speedy
trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing test
having regard to all attendant circumstances, and determine in each case as to
whether the right to speedy trial has been denied. In the event the Court arrives
at the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed,
the charges or the conviction may be quashed unless the court feels that, having
regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of
proceedings may not be in the interest of justice [see paragraphs 17, 18, 19, 20,
and 21 of Pankaj Kumar‘s case (supra)].
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Pankaj Kumar‘s case (supra) quashed
the criminal proceedings on account of “unwarranted prolonged investigations”
that caused inordinate delay. It was held that;
Page 22 of 33
“24. Tested on the touchstone of the broad principles, enumerated
above, we are of the opinion that in the instant case, the appellant’s
constitutional right recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution stands
violated. It is common ground that the first information report was
recorded on 12-5- 1987 for the offences allegedly committed in the year
1981, and after unwarranted prolonged investigations, involving
aforestated three financial irregularities; the charge-sheet was submitted
in court on 22-2-1991. Nothing happened till April 1999, when the
appellant and his deceased mother filed criminal writ petition seeking
quashing of proceedings before the trial court.
25. Though, it is true that the plea with regard to inordinate delay in
investigations and trial has been raised before us for the first time but
we feel that at this distant point of time, it would be unfair to the
appellant to remit the matter back to the High Court for examining the
said plea of the appellant. Apart from the fact that it would further
protract the already delayed trial, no fruitful purpose would be served as
learned counsel for the State very fairly stated before us that he had no
explanation to offer for the delay in investigations and the reason why
the trial did not commence for eight long years. Nothing, whatsoever,
could be pointed out, far from being established, to show that the delay
was in any way attributable to the appellant.
***
27. Be that as it may, the prosecution has failed to show any
exceptional circumstance, which could possibly be taken into
consideration for condoning the prolongation of investigation and the
trial. The lackadaisical manner of investigation spread over a period of
four years in a case of this type and inordinate delay of over eight years
(excluding the period when the record of the trial court was in the High
Court), is manifestly clear.
28. Thus, on facts in hand, we are convinced that the appellant has
been denied his valuable constitutional right to a speedy investigation
and trial and, therefore, criminal proceedings initiated against him inPage 23 of 33
the year 1987 and pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Latur,
deserve to be quashed on this short ground alone.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vakil Prasad v. State of
Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355, emphasized that the right to a speedy trial is a
fundamental right and that excessive delay in investigation or trial would
compromise the fairness of the trial itself. It was further clarified that speedy
trial means reasonably expeditious trial which is an integral and essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. Similarly, in
Mahendra Lal Das vrs. State of Bihar and Ors, reported in 2002 (1) SCC 149 it
was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that delay beyond a reasonable period is
not only detrimental to the accused but also undermines public confidence in the
criminal justice system. Inordinate delay not only causes personal hardship to
the accused but also societal harm by rendering the process of justice ineffective.
It was further observed that;
“7. In cases of corruption the amount involved is not material but
speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution being in the interests of
the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating to corruption
are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. As and when
delay is found to have been caused during the investigation, inquiry or
trial, the concerned appropriate authorities are under an obligation to
find out and deal with the persons responsible for such delay. The delay
can be attributed either to the connivance of the authorities with thePage 24 of 33
accused or used as a lever to pressurie and harass the accused as is
alleged to have been done to the appellant in this case…
9. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
we are inclined to quash the proceedings against the appellant as
permitting further prosecution would be the travesty of justice and a mere
ritual or formality so for as the prosecution agency is concerned, and
unnecessary burden as regards the courts.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Likewise, in another instance of inordinate delay in conclusion of the
trial, the Hon’ble Supreme court, in Santosh De Vs. Archana Guha & Ors.,
reported in (1994) 1 SCC 421, while entertaining an appeal against the decision
of the High Court to quash a criminal proceeding, declined to interfere with the
impugned order of the High Court and observed that unexplained delay, of eight
years in the said case, in commencing the trial by itself infringes the right of the
accused to speedy trial. In the absence of any material to the contrary, the Court
accepted the findings of the High Court that the delay of eight years was entirely
and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution, and, as such,
dismissed the appeal. In Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia,
reported in (2008) 2 SCC 370, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that one of
the mandates of Article 21 is that a person should not be disturbed except on
sufficient grounds (para 18). The Hon’ble Court emphasised the need to balance
the law enforcement powers of the State with the protection of citizens from
Page 25 of 33
injustice and harassment, observing that while the State has a duty to ensure that
no crime goes unpunished, it also owes a duty to ensure that none of its subjects
are unnecessarily harassed (see paras 19, 20 thereof).
21. In addition to the above, reference may also be had to one recent
pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Anr.
Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 2023 SC 102, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and
quashed the impugned criminal proceeding, and held that:
“24. In the present case, the Respondent has provided no
explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years between
the initial site inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. In
fact, the absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer
some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings.
25. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for
quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate
delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial
factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint.
26. While this court does not expect a full-blown investigation at
the stage of a criminal complaint, however, in such cases where the
accused has been subjected to the anxiety of a potential initiation of
criminal proceedings for such a length of time, it is only reasonable for
the court to expect bare-minimum evidence from the Investigating
Authorities.
27. At the cost of repetition, we again state that the purpose of
filing a complaint and initiating criminal proceedings must exist solely to
meet the ends of justice, and the law must not be used as a tool to harassPage 26 of 33
the accused. The law, is meant to exist as a shield to protect the innocent,
rather than it being used as a sword to threaten them.
CONCLUSION
28. It must be noted that the High Court while passing the
impugned judgment, has failed to take into consideration to the facts and
circumstances of the case. While it is true that the quashing of a
criminal complaint must be done only in the rarest of rare cases, it is
still the duty of the High Court to look into each and every case with
great detail to prevent miscarriage of justice. The law is a sacrosanct
entity that exists to serve the ends of justice, and the courts, as protectors
of the law and servants of the law, must always ensure that frivolous cases
do not pervert the sacrosanct nature of the law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Finally, very recently in Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State
of Bihar, reported 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was
concerned with a criminal prosecution that had remained pending for an
inordinately long period without meaningful progress in trial, largely attributable
to prosecutorial and systemic delays. The appellant’s primary contention was
that the prolonged pendency of the proceedings violated his fundamental right to
a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Court, taking
into consideration the pronouncement in Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of
U.P., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 351, wherein it was held that the
process of investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude, and CBI
v. Mir Usman, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2066, along with its other
Page 27 of 33
earlier decisions, surveyed the constitutional jurisprudence on speedy trial and
held that inordinate and unexplained delay in conclusion of criminal
proceedings, particularly where attributable to the State, renders the prosecution
oppressive and violative of Article 21, and may warrant quashing of the
proceedings notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations. The Court
further emphasised that constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene where
the criminal process itself becomes punitive by the passage of time. Relevant
portion thereof is quoted hereinbelow:
“19. …When only the actions of the appellant were subject matter of
investigation by the time permission was taken as above – 11 years is
quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay. No reason is forthcoming
for this extended period either in the chargesheet or at the instance of
the Court having taken cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words,
the appellant has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over
him for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold
unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to speedy trial
and it is also held therein, that violation of this right can strike at the
root of the investigation itself, leading it to be quashed. At the same time,
it must be said that timelines cannot be set in stone for an investigation to
be completed nor can outer limit be prescribed within which necessarily,
an investigation must be drawn to a close. …Where though, Article 21
would be impacted would be a situation where, like in the present
matter, no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record
for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The accused
cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of continuing
investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing over their everyday
existence.
Page 28 of 33
***
21…(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the
machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness,
transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds
or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate
the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information
report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an
explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the
propriety of the explanation so furnished.
The direction above does not come based on this case alone. This
Court has noticed on many unfortunate occasions that there is massive
delay in filing chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. This Court has time and
again, in its pronouncements underscored the necessity of speedy
investigation and trial as being important for the accused, victim and the
society. However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the
translation of this recognition into a reality.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the FIR was
lodged on 05.12.2017. Despite the lapse of more than eight years, the
investigation has yet to reach its logical conclusion. The Vigilance Department
has sought to justify the prolonged duration of the investigation by contending
that such time was necessary to ensure a fair and proper inquiry. This Court
finds it difficult to accept such explanation, particularly when the final amount
of disproportionate assets has not even been crystallised till date. It is an
admitted position on behalf of the Vigilance Department, as reflected in their
Page 29 of 33
objections filed in the present matter, that the earlier alleged quantum of
disproportionate assets, to the tune of Rs.4,00,32,026, attributable to the
Petitioners and quantified in the FIR, has later been reduced to Rs.54,32,621.08.
Even this figure is not final, as the Vigilance Department has once again
acknowledged that the definitive determination of the disproportionate assets
would only be possible after obtaining and verifying certain documents from the
concerned authorities.
24. The materials on record further indicate that throughout the prolonged
course of investigation, the Petitioners have extended full cooperation to the
investigating agency, and no circumstance has been brought to the notice of this
Court to attribute the delay in conclusion of the investigation to the conduct of
the Petitioners. Moreover, upon a prima facie consideration of the record, the
inconsistencies and arbitrariness pointed out by the Petitioners in the
computation of their income and expenditure, including the alleged omission of
certain heads of income, do not appear to have been satisfactorily addressed by
the Vigilance Department. The explanation offered by the Vigilance authorities
in response to these contentions is limited to stating that the final
disproportionate assets figure has not yet been determined, that 33% of the gross
salary of only the wife-Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain has been considered towards the
per capita expenditure of both Petitioners, and that the interest earned by the
Page 30 of 33
Petitioners through MOD facilities would be taken into account only upon
receipt of clarificatory documents from the concerned authorities. Apart from
these statements, and the plea that the investigation in the matter is still
underway, no other explanation to the satisfaction of this Court has been
furnished to address the alleged discrepancies in the computation of income and
expenditure as highlighted by the Petitioners.
25. So far as the implication of Dr.Trupti Rekha Swain (the Petitioner in
CRLMC No.3682 of 2024 and the wife of the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3829 of
2025) is concerned, it prima facie appears that her involvement in the present
case is founded solely on the fact that she is the spouse of Dr.Rabindra Kumar
Jena, i.e. the Petitioner in CRLMC No.3829 of 2025. Furthermore, this Court
notes that a matter involving a broadly similar factual background and
allegations under the same provisions of law as involved in the present case had
earlier come up for consideration before this Court in CRLMC No.1628 of 2022
along with CRLMC No.1629 of 2022, which were allowed and the proceedings
therein were quashed by the judgment of this Court dated 16.04.2025 primarily
on the ground that no prima facie case was made out against the Petitioners
therein. On a prima facie appreciation of the materials placed on record, it
appears that the Petitioners in the present case stand on a similar footing to those
who were granted relief by the aforesaid judgment dated 16.04.2025.
Page 31 of 33
CONCLUSION
26. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties
and upon due consideration of the factual matrix of the case, the materials
available on record, as well as the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the
considered view that no prima facie case of the alleged offences is made out
from the uncontroverted allegations contained in the FIR insofar as the present
Petitioners are concerned. Furthermore, having regard to the unexplained and
inordinate delay in completion of the investigation despite the lapse of more
than eight years since the registration of the FIR, and taking into account the fact
that the case of the present Petitioners appears to be substantially covered by the
earlier judgment of this Court dated 16.04.2025 rendered in CRLMC No.1628 of
2022 along with CRLMC No.1629 of 2022, this Court finds no hesitation in
holding that the present case falls squarely within the parameters laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal‘s case (supra), particularly the third
illustration to para 102 thereof. In such circumstances, this Court is of the
considered view that permitting the criminal proceeding to continue any further
would amount to a clear abuse of the process of law. As such, the present case
appears to be a fit case for the exercise of the inherent powers of this Court
under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. which corresponds to 528 of BNSS.
Page 32 of 33
27. Accordingly, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and to secure the ends of justice, this Court is
inclined to and hereby quash the present criminal proceeding bearing VGR
No.62 of 2017 arising out of Cuttack Vigilance Cell P.S. Case No.18 of 2017,
registered for the alleged commission of offences under Sections 13(2) and
13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with Section 34 of the IPC, presently pending before
the Court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack, insofar as the
present Petitioners are concerned.
28. The CRLMC applications are accordingly allowed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
A. K. Mohapatra
(Judge)
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 13th March, 2026/S.K.Sethi/P.A.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: SISIR KUMAR SETHI
Designation: Personal Assistant
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT
Date: 14-Mar-2026 13:06:51
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