Telangana High Court
Dr. Pachipala Namratha @ Athaluri … vs The Union Of India on 21 April, 2026
Author: P.Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA ::
HYDERABAD
***
WRIT PETITION No.6550 of 2026
Between:
Dr. Pachipala Namratha @ Athaluri Namratha,
W/o. Sri Venkata Krishna Prasad.
Petitioner
VERSUS
The Union of India,
Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Secretariat Buildings, New Delhi and another.
Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: 21.04.2026
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
Page 2 of 67
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
+ WRIT PETITION No.6550 of 2026
% 21.04.2026
# Between:
Dr. Pachipala Namratha @ Athaluri Namratha,
W/o. Sri Venkata Krishna Prasad.
Petitioner
VERSUS
The Union of India,
Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Secretariat Buildings, New Delhi and another.
Respondents
! Counsel for petitioners : Mr. Naga Muthu, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Mr. Y.Soma Srinath
Reddy.
^Counsel for respondent : Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Senior
Standing Counsel for ED.
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1) (2025) 2 Supreme Court Cases 248 9) [2025] INSC 272
2) (2024) 7 Supreme Court Cases 576 10) 2023 SCC Online 934
3) (2023) 12 Supreme Court Cases 1 11) CWP.No.13600 of 2025
4) (2024) 8 Supreme Court Cases 254
5) (2023) 15 Supreme Court Cases 91
6) (2014) 8 Supreme Court Cases 273
7) [CRWP Nos.8667 of 2025 (O&M) and 8750 of 2025 (O&M)]
8) CRMP.No.2506 of 2025 - [2025 CGHC 52079]
Page 3 of 67
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
WRIT PETITION No.6550 of 2026
DATE: 21.04.2026
Between:
Dr. Pachipala Namratha @ Athaluri Namratha,
W/o. Sri Venkata Krishna Prasad.
...Petitioner
AND
The Union of India,
Ministry of Finance,
Department of Revenue,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Secretariat Buildings, New Delhi and another.
...Respondents
ORDER:
(per the Hon’ble Sri Justice P.Sam Koshy)
Heard Mr. Naga Muthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of Mr. Y.Soma Srinath Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner;
and Mr. Dominic Fernandes, learned Senior Standing Counsel for ED
appearing on behalf of the respondents.
Page 4 of 67
2. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been filed by the petitioner seeking the following relief/s, viz.,
“………to issue a writ, order or direction, more particularly
1. The writ of certiorari, to call for records and set aside the
arrest of the petitioner dated 12th February, 2026 at the
hands of the respondent No.2 by declaring the arrest of the
petitioner to be arbitrary and wholly non-est, illegal,
unconstitutional, more particularly in violation of Section
19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and in
violation of Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of
India, and thereby quash the entire proceedings relating
thereto including the arrest order dated 12th February, 2026
passed by respondent No.2 and all subsequent against the
petitioner herein.
2. Further, quash and set aside the orders dated 12th February,
2026 and all further orders of remand, passed by the
Special Sessions Judge for Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, Nampally, Hyderabad.
3. Direct forthwith release of the petitioner from custody as
her further incarceration would be anathema to law and
gravely detrimental to the cause of justice;
4. Issue this any other writ(s) order(s), or direction(s), that the
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case in the interest of petitioner.”
Page 5 of 67
3. The facts of the case are that the petitioner is a medical
practitioner (fertility specialist) presently lodged at Chanchalguda
Central Jail. The matter is stated to have originated from a complaint
lodged by one Sonia at Gopalapuram Police Station on 25.07.2025,
leading to registration of FIR No.147 of 2025 under Section 61(2), 316,
318, 335, 336 and 340 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short
‘BNS’) and the petitioner was arrested by the police personnel on
27.07.2025 with remand to judicial custody. Thereafter, the said Police
Station is stated to have registered multiple FIRs on similar cause of
action namely FIR Nos.150 to 157 of 2025, and all such FIRs were later
transferred to CCS Police Station and renumbered as FIR Nos.94 to 102
of 2025 with additional invoked provisions including the provisions of
the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (for short the ‘Act of 2021’) and
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for
short the ‘JJ Act‘).
4. Based on the aforesaid predicate FIRs, respondent No.2 is stated
to have recorded an ECIR bearing No.ECIR/HYZO/46/2025, dated
08.09.2025, on certain scheduled offences. Pursuant thereto, the
Page 6 of 67
Enforcement Directorate is stated to have conducted search and seizure
operations at various premises on 25.09.2025 and 01.10.2025, including
the petitioner’s clinic and residential addresses. It is further stated that an
application vide Crl. Misc. Petition No.3662 of 2025 was filed before the
Special Court seeking permission to record the petitioner’s statement
under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for
short the ‘PMLA’). The said application stood allowed on 15.10.2025.
Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the said order before the High Court
vide Crl.R.C.No.771 of 2025 and the same is pending consideration.
5. The petitioner states that while in custody, summons dated
24.10.2025 were issued and the statement was recorded on the same day
under coercion and without effective access to legal assistance.
Subsequently, the petitioner was summoned again on 06.02.2026 to
appear on 11.02.2026 and was called again on 12.02.2026, on which date
the petitioner was arrested under Section 19 of the PMLA. According to
the petitioner, the arrest and remand are illegal and unconstitutional due
to non-compliance with the statutory safeguards envisaged under Section
19 of the PMLA.
Page 7 of 67
6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the
power of arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA is not an investigative
tool but an exceptional power conditioned upon the authorized Officer
forming an independent and bona fide ‘reasons to believe’ on the basis of
‘material in possession’ that is capable of translating into admissible
evidence, that the arrestee is guilty of the offence of money laundering.
Mere suspicion, unverified allegations or a mechanical reproduction of
the grounds of arrest cannot satisfy this statutory threshold rather, the
‘reasons to believe’ must disclose a rational nexus between specific
material and the alleged proceeds of crime and the petitioner’s conscious
involvement in money laundering activity. In the absence of such
tangible, corroborated material showing a scheduled offence generating
proceeds of crime and a demonstrable laundering process attributable to
the petitioner, any arrest purportedly to unearth facts or aid investigation
is contrary to law and vitiated as an arbitrary and colourable exercise of
power, offending the safeguards built into Section 19 of the PMLA and
the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(1). In support of his
argument, the learned Senior Counsel relied on paragraph Nos.31, 32
Page 8 of 67
and 47 of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Arvind Kejriwal vs.
Directorate of Enforcement 1. For ready reference, paragraph Nos.31,
32 and 47 are reproduced hereunder, viz.,
“31. Providing the written “grounds of arrest”, though a must, does
not in itself satisfy the compliance requirement. The authorised
officer’s genuine belief and reasoning based on the evidence that
establishes the arrestee’s guilt is also the legal necessity. As the
“reasons to believe” are accorded by the authorised officer, the onus
to establish satisfaction of the said condition will be on DoE and not
on the arrestee.
32. On the necessity to satisfy the preconditions mentioned in Section
19(1) of the PML Act, we have quoted from the judgment of this Court
in Padam Narain Aggarwal [Union of India v. Padam Narain
Aggarwal, (2008) 13 SCC 305 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and also
referred to and quoted from the Canadian judgment
in Gifford [Gifford v. Kelson, (1943) 51 Man. R 120] . Existence and
validity of the “reasons to believe” goes to the root of the power to
arrest. The subjective opinion of the arresting officer must be founded
and based upon fair and objective consideration of the material, as
available with them on the date of arrest. On the reading of the
“reasons to believe” the court must form the “secondary opinion” on
the validity of the exercise undertaken for compliance of Section 19(1)
of the PML Act when the arrest was made. The “reasons to believe”
that the person is guilty of an offence under the PML Act should be
founded on the material in the form of documents and oral statements.
1
(2025) 2 Supreme Court Cases 248
Page 9 of 67
47. DoE has drawn our attention to the use of the expression
“material in possession” in Section 19(1) of the PML Act instead of
“evidence in possession”. Though etymologically correct, this
argument overlooks the requirement that the designated officer should
and must, based on the material, reach and form an opinion that the
arrestee is guilty of the offence under the PML Act. Guilt can only be
established on admissible evidence to be led before the court, and
cannot be based on inadmissible evidence. While there is an element
of hypothesis, as oral evidence has not been led and the documents
are to be proven, the decision to arrest should be rational, fair and as
per law. Power to arrest under Section 19(1) is not for the purpose of
investigation. Arrest can and should wait, and the power in terms of
Section 19(1) of the PML Act can be exercised only when the material
with the designated officer enables them to form an opinion, by
recording reasons in writing that the arrestee is guilty.”
7. Reliance is also placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner on Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India 2, wherein in paragraph
No.27 it was held as under, viz.,
“27. In this regard, we may note that, though the appellants did not
allege colourable exercise of power or mala fides or malice on the
part of ED officials, they did assert in categorical terms that their
arrests were a wanton abuse of power, authority and process by ED,
which would tantamount to the same thing. On that subject, we may
refer to the observations of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial
2
(2024) 7 Supreme Court Cases 576
Page 10 of 67
Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471] : (SCC p.
475, para 9)
“9. The question, then, is what is mala fides in the jurisprudence of
power? Legal malice is gibberish unless juristic clarity keeps it
separate from the popular concept of personal vice. Pithily put, bad
faith which invalidates the exercise of power — sometimes called
colourable exercise or fraud on power and oftentimes overlaps
motives, passions and satisfactions — is the attainment of ends beyond
the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of
gaining a legitimate goal. If the use of the power is for the fulfilment
of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not
legicidal. The action is bad where the true object is to reach an end
different from the one for which the power is entrusted, goaded by
extraneous considerations, good or bad, but irrelevant to the
entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise
by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is
vested the court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by
illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the
mark even in law when he stated:’I repeat … that all power is a trust
— that we are accountable for its exercise — that, from the people,
and for the people, all springs, and all must exist’. Fraud on power
voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed.
Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all
cases in which the action impugned is to effect some object which is
beyond the purpose and intent of the power, whether this be malice-
laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad.
If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to
Page 11 of 67
the statute, enter the verdict or impel the action, mala fides or fraud
on power vitiates the acquisition or other official act.”
8. Similarly, reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs. Union of
India 3, wherein in paragraph No.109, it was held as under, viz.,
“109. Tersely put, it is only such property which is derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating
to a scheduled offence that can be regarded as proceeds of crime. The
authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any
person for money laundering on an assumption that the property
recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled
offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the
jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before
the competent forum. For, the expression “derived or obtained” is
indicative of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence already
accomplished. Similarly, in the event the person named in the criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence is finally absolved by a court of
competent jurisdiction owing to an order of discharge, acquittal or
because of quashing of the criminal case (scheduled offence) against
him/her, there can be no action for money laundering against such a
person or person claiming through him in relation to the property
linked to the stated scheduled offence. This interpretation alone can be
countenanced on the basis of the provisions of the 2002 Act, in
particular Section 2(1)(u) read with Section 3. Taking any other view
would be rewriting of these provisions and disregarding the express
3
(2023) 12 Supreme Court Cases 1
Page 12 of 67
language of the definition clause “proceeds of crime”, as it obtains as
of now.”
9. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further contended that
respondent No.2 acted in a wholly mechanical manner and the arrest
stands vitiated at its inception, inasmuch as the so-called ‘grounds of
arrest’ and the ‘reasons to believe’ are not founded on any demonstrable,
cogent, admissible material and instead, are a bare verbatim replication
of the statutory phraseology. It was submitted that the relevant paragraph
supplied to the petitioner is conspicuously non-specific, does not
disclose what material, what transaction, what role, what proceeds of
crime or what nexus is attributed personally to the petitioner and
therefore fails the statutory safeguard which requires an arresting Officer
to form and record a genuine ‘reason to believe’ based on material in
possession and thereafter to inform personalized grounds that
necessitated arrest. The relevant paragraph is produced hereunder:
“24. Therefore, based on the material available on record, including
FIRs, material seized during search operation, statements recorded
under Section 50 of the PMLA, bank statements, property records and
other material collected during investigation, I have reason to believe
that you have been directly & actually involved in the various
processes & activities connected with proceeds of crime viz.,
Page 13 of 67concealment, possession, and use of proceeds of crime, acquisition of
assets out of proceeds of crime and projection of crime as untained.
Thus, you have committed the offence of money laundering as defined
under Section 3 and punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, 2002.”
10. Further, he submitted that Section 19 of the PMLA is not an empty
formality, since the provision uses the expression ‘may arrest’. The
Officer must not only record reasons but must also disclose concrete
grounds showing why arrest was necessary in the facts of the petitioner’s
case which is general omnibus assertions merged with narration of facts,
without any discernible and separate grounds tailored to the petitioner
are impermissible. In support of his argument, the learned Senior
Counsel relied on the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) to submit that the
grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing to the arrestee before
production for remand. The paragraph Nos.17 and 19 of the said
judgment are reproduced hereunder:
“17. At this stage, it would be apposite to consider the case law that
does have relevance to these appeals and the issues under
consideration. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC
929 : (2022) 10 Scale 577] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court
observed that Section 65 PMLA predicates that the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall apply insofar as they are not
Page 14 of 67inconsistent with the provisions of PMLA in respect of arrest, search
and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and
all other proceedings thereunder. It was noted that Section 19 PMLA
prescribes the manner in which the arrest of a person involved in
money laundering can be effected. It was observed that such power
was vested in high-ranking officials and that apart, Section 19 PMLA
provided inbuilt safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised
officers, such as, of recording reasons for the belief regarding
involvement of the person in the offence of money laundering and,
further, such reasons have to be recorded in writing and while
effecting arrest, the grounds of arrest are to be informed to that
person. It was noted that the authorised officer has to forward a copy
of the order, along with the material in his possession, to the
adjudicating authority and this safeguard is to ensure fairness,
objectivity and accountability of the authorised officer in forming an
opinion, as recorded in writing, regarding the necessity to arrest the
person involved in the offence of money laundering. The Bench also
noted that it is the obligation of the authorised officer to produce the
person so arrested before the Special Court or Judicial Magistrate or
a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within 24 hours and
such production is to comply with the requirement of Section 167
CrPC. It was pointed out that there is nothing in Section 19 PMLA
which is contrary to the requirement of production under Section 167
CrPC and being an express statutory requirement under Section 19(3)
PMLA, it has to be complied by the authorised officer. It was
concluded that the safeguards provided in the 2002 Act and the
preconditions to be fulfilled by the authorised officer before effecting
arrest, as contained in Section 19 PMLA, are equally stringent and of
Page 15 of 67higher standard when compared to the Customs Act, 1962, and such
safeguards ensure that the authorised officers do not act arbitrarily,
by making them accountable for their judgment about the necessity to
arrest any person involved in the commission of the offence of money
laundering, even before filing of the complaint before the Special
Court. It was on this basis that the Bench upheld the validity of
Section 19 PMLA.
19. This Court had occasion to again consider the provisions of PMLA
in V. Senthil Balaji v. State [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51
: (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] , and more particularly, Section 19 thereof. It
was noted that the authorised officer is at liberty to arrest the person
concerned once he finds a reason to believe that he is guilty of an
offence punishable under the 2002 Act, but he must also perform the
mandatory duty of recording reasons. It was pointed out that this
exercise has to be followed by the information of the grounds of his
arrest being served on the arrestee. It was affirmed that it is the
bounden duty of the authorised officer to record the reasons for his
belief that a person is guilty and needs to be arrested and it was
observed that this safeguard is meant to facilitate an element of
fairness and accountability.”
11. Similarly, he placed reliance on paragraph No.209 of the judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra)
to emphasize that the statutory design of Section 19 contains inbuilt
safeguards of fairness, objectivity and accountability, recording of
reasons in writing based on material, communication of grounds of arrest
Page 16 of 67
to the person and adherence to the procedure culminating in production
under Section 167 of Cr.P.C. and that the validity of Section 19 of the
PMLA itself has been upheld on the premise that these safeguards will
be scrupulously followed. The paragraph No.208 is reproduced
hereunder, viz.,
“208. Section 19 of the 2002 Act postulates the manner in which
arrest of person involved in money laundering can be effected. Sub-
section (1) of Section 19 envisages that the Director, Deputy Director,
Assistant Director, or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the
Central Government, if has material in his possession giving rise to
reason to believe that any person has been guilty of an offence
punishable under the 2002 Act, he may arrest such person. Besides the
power being invested in high-ranking officials, Section 19 provides for
inbuilt safeguards to be adhered to by the authorised officers, such as
of recording reasons for the belief regarding the involvement of person
in the offence of money laundering. That has to be recorded in writing
and while effecting arrest of the person, the grounds for such arrest
are informed to that person. Further, the authorised officer has to
forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession,
in a sealed cover to the adjudicating authority, who in turn is obliged
to preserve the same for the prescribed period as per the Rules. This
safeguard is to ensure fairness, objectivity and accountability of the
authorised officer in forming opinion as recorded in writing regarding
the necessity to arrest the person being involved in offence of money
laundering. Not only that, it is also the obligation of the authorised
officer to produce the person so arrested before the Special Court or
Page 17 of 67
Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be,
within twenty-four hours. This production is also to comply with the
requirement of Section 167 of the 1973 Code. There is nothing in
Section 19, which is contrary to the requirement of production under
Section 167 of the 1973 Code, but being an express statutory
requirement under the 2002 Act in terms of Section 19(3), it has to be
complied with by the authorised officer.”
12. It was therefore submitted that whereas in the present case the
‘reasons to believe’ and the ‘grounds of arrest’ are identically the same, it
unmistakably reflects non-application of mind and demonstrates either
absence of real ‘reasons to believe’ or absence of lawful, specific
‘grounds of arrest’. Such duplication strikes at the root of Section 19 the
compliance and renders the arrest illegal. The learned Senior Counsel
also relied on Pradir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi)4 to
highlight the clear jurisprudential distinction between general ‘reasons
for arrest’ and the ‘grounds of arrest’ which must contain the basic facts
in possession of the investigating agency that necessitated arrest and
enable the arrestee to oppose custodial remand and seek bail. Applying
the same principle, it was submitted that ‘reasons to believe’ can never
4
(2024) 8 Supreme Court Cases 254
Page 18 of 67
be equated with or reproduced as ‘grounds of arrest’. For ready reference
the paragraph No.48 of the said judgment is produced hereunder, viz.,
“48. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a
significant difference in the phrase “reasons for arrest” and
“grounds of arrest”. The “reasons for arrest” as indicated in the
arrest memo are purely formal parameters viz. to prevent the
accused person from committing any further offence; for proper
investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from
causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering
with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person
for making inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the court or to the investigating officer.
These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on
charge of a crime whereas the “grounds of arrest” would be
required to contain all such details in hand of the investigating
officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused.
Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must
convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was
being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending
himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the
“grounds of arrest” would invariably be personal to the accused
and cannot be equated with the “reasons of arrest” which are
general in nature.”
13. Further, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the petitioner has been gravely prejudiced because of the mechanical
Page 19 of 67
and stereotyped grounds / reasons, without disclosure of the specific
material particulars which make it practically impossible to prepare an
effective defence against remand and bail opposition, and consequently
the continued detention is unconstitutional and violative of the Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India.
14. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended that the
remand was equally unsustainable since the Special Court, as required in
law, ought to have applied judicial mind and formed a ‘secondary
opinion’ on the validity of the reasons to believe and the legality of the
arrest before authorizing custody. However, the remand order did not
reflect any such judicial scrutiny or finding, showing that the remand
was mechanical and consequently the continued detention of the
petitioner is illegal. In support of his argument, the learned senior
counsel relied on the case of Arvind Kejriwal (supra), wherein in
paragraph Nos.14, 74, 78 and 82, it held as under:
“14. Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7
SCC 576 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 450] reiterates V. Senthil Balaji [V.
Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]
to hold that the Magistrate/court has the duty to ensure that the
conditions in Section 19(1) of the PML Act are duly satisfied and
Page 20 of 67that the arrest is valid and lawful. This is in lieu of the mandate
under Section 167 of the Code. If the court fails to discharge its
duty in right earnest and with proper perspective, the remand
order would fail on the ground that the court cannot validate an
unlawful arrest made under Section 19(1). The Court relied
on Madhu Limaye, In re [Madhu Limaye, In re, (1969) 1 SCC
292] , which held that it is necessary for the State to establish
that, at the stage of remand, while directing detention in custody,
the Magistrate has applied their mind to all relevant matters. If
the arrest itself is unconstitutional viz. Article 22(1) of the
Constitution, the remand would not cure the constitutional
infirmities attached to such arrest. The principle stands expanded,
as the violation of Section 19(1) of the PML Act will equally
vitiate the arrest.
74. It has been strenuously urged on behalf of Arvind Kejriwal
that the arrest would falter on the ground that the “reasons to
believe” do not mention and record reasons for “necessity to
arrest”. The term “necessity to arrest” is not mentioned in
Section 19(1) of the PML Act. However, this expression has been
given judicial recognition in Arnesh Kumar v. State of
Bihar [Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 449] , which lays down that “necessity to
arrest” must be considered by an officer before arresting a
person. This Court observed that the officer must ask himself the
questions — Why arrest?; Is it really necessary to arrest?; What
purpose would it serve?; and, What object would it achieve?
78. Thus, time and again, courts have emphasised that the power
to arrest must be exercised cautiously to prevent severe
Page 21 of 67
repercussions on the life and liberty of individuals. Such power
must be restricted to necessary instances and must not be
exercised routinely or in a cavalier fashion.
82. Therefore, the issue which arises for consideration is whether
the court while examining the validity of arrest in terms of Section
19(1) of the PML Act will also go into and examine the necessity
and need to arrest. In other words, is the mere satisfaction of the
formal parameters to arrest sufficient? Or is the satisfaction of
necessity and need to arrest, beyond mere formal parameters,
required? We would concede that such review might be conflated
with stipulations in Section 41 of the Code which lays down
certain conditions for the police to arrest without warrant:
(i) Section 41(1)(b)(ii)(a) — preventing a person from
committing further offence.
(ii) Section 41(1)(b)(ii)(b) — proper investigation of the
offence.
(iii) Section 41(1)(b)(ii)(c) — preventing a person from
disappearing or tampering with evidence in any manner.
(iv) Section 41(1)(b)(ii)(d) — preventing the person from
making any inducement or threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him
from disclosing such facts to the court or police.
(v) Section 41(1)(b)(ii)(e) — to ensure presence of the
person in the court, whenever required, which without
arresting cannot be ensured.
Page 22 of 67
However, Section 19(1) of the PML Act does not permit arrest
only to conduct investigation. Conditions of Section 19(1) have to
be satisfied. Clauses (a), (c), (d) and (e) to Section 41(1)(b)(ii) of
the Code, apart from other considerations, may be relevant.”
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further contended that
the very assumption of jurisdiction by the Enforcement Directorate is
vitiated because the ECIR dated 08.09.2025 is founded on conjecture
and suspicion without any cogent material establishing ‘proceeds of
crime’ as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, which is the sine qua
non for an offence under Sections 3 and 4 of PMLA. It was submitted
that the mere registration of FIRs does not ipso facto justify ED’s action
unless there exists legally admissible, unimpeachable ‘material in
possession’ forming valid ‘reasons to believe’ under Section 19 that the
arrestee is guilty of money-laundering which is devoid of a demonstrated
money trail, time frame or quantification of alleged proceeds and rely
largely on co-accused statement without corroboration thereby failing the
higher threshold of ‘reasons to believe’ which is recognized by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arvind Kejriwal (supra) and warranting
strict judicial scrutiny at the remand stage. Further, it is submitted that no
valid predicate / scheduled offence has been made out against the
Page 23 of 67
petitioner and that the FIRs cited in the initial part of this order (FIR
Nos.147/2025, 150/2025, 151/2025, 152/2025, 153/2025, 154/2025 and
157/2025 of Gopalapuram Police Station under various provisions of the
BNS) do not disclose the essential ingredients to attract the scheduled
offcence to PMLA in the manner required by law with the alleged
“illegal surrogacy / baby selling” narrative even if assumed, falling under
the Act of 2021 whose offences are not scheduled under PMLA.
Reliance was placed on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) wherein in
paragraph No.106, it was held as under, viz.,
“106. The “proceeds of crime” being the core of the ingredients
constituting the offence of money laundering, that expression needs
to be construed strictly. In that, all properties recovered or
attached by the investigating agency in connection with the
criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence under the general
law cannot be regarded as proceeds of crime. There may be cases
where the property involved in the commission of scheduled offence
attached by the investigating agency dealing with that offence,
cannot be wholly or partly regarded as proceeds of crime within
the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the 2002 Act — so long as the
whole or some portion of the property has been derived or obtained
by any person “as a result of” criminal activity relating to the
stated scheduled offence. To be proceeds of crime, therefore, the
property must be derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, “as a
Page 24 of 67
result of” criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. To put it
differently, the vehicle used in commission of scheduled offence
may be attached as property in the case (crime) concerned, it may
still not be proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u)
of the 2002 Act. Similarly, possession of unaccounted property
acquired by legal means may be actionable for tax violation and
yet, will not be regarded as proceeds of crime unless the tax
legislation concerned prescribes such violation as an offence and
such offence is included in the Schedule to the 2002 Act. For being
regarded as proceeds of crime, the property associated with the
scheduled offence must have been derived or obtained by a person
“as a result of” criminal activity relating to the scheduled offence
concerned. This distinction must be borne in mind while reckoning
any property referred to in the scheduled offence as proceeds of
crime for the purpose of the 2002 Act. Dealing with proceeds of
crime by way of any process or activity constitutes offence of
money laundering under Section 3 PMLA.
16. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on
the judgment of the Madras High Court passed in W.P.Nos.4297 & 4300
of 2025 wherein in paragraph Nos.59 to 61 it was held as under:
“59. When this aspect was pointed out to Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, the
Additional Solicitor General pointed out that criminal law can be set
into motion by any person. That is a general principle of criminal law.
No one can dispute it, and we certainly are not going to do it. If any
criminal act takes place, it is certainly open to any individual to bring
it to the notice of police or appropriate authorities who are entitled to
Page 25 of 67register a complaint on these aspects. A perusal of the papers show
that no complaint had been lodged with respect to any of the aforesaid
alleged criminal activities. The ED is not a super cop to investigate
anything and everything which comes to its notice. There should be a
“criminal activity” which attracts the schedule to PMLA, and on
account of such criminal activity, there should have been “proceeds of
crime”. It is only then the jurisdiction of ED commences.
The terminus a quo for the ED to commence its duties and exercise its
powers is the existence of a predicate offence. Once there exists a
predicate offence, and the ED starts investigation under the PMLA,
and file a complaint, then it becomes a stand alone offence. As long as
there is no predicate offence, ED cannot plead that since no one set up
the criminal law into motion, it will rely on that doctrine and
commence proceedings under the PMLA.
60. It is too well settled that where an act has to be done in a
particular way, it must be done in that way and in no other way. The
PMLA demands the existence of a predicate offence. When there is no
predicate offence, initiation of proceedings under PMLA is a non
starter. If the arguments of the Additional Solicitor General is
accepted, then the ED on registration of an ECIR can conduct a
roving enquiry with respect to other aspects also. That is not the
position of law. To put it pithily, no predicate offence, no action by
ED.
61. A careful perusal of Section 66(2) of PMLA points out that if
during the course of investigation, the ED comes across violations of
other provisions of law, then it cannot assume the role of investigating
those offences also. It is to inform the appropriate agency, which is
empowered by law to investigate into that offence. If that Agency, on
Page 26 of 67the intimation from the ED, commences investigation and registers a
complaint, then certainly the ED can investigate into those aspects
also, provided there are “proceeds of crime”. In case, the
investigating agency does not find any case with respect to the aspects
pointed out by the ED, then the ED cannot suo motu proceed with the
investigation and assume powers. The essential ingredient for the ED
to seize jurisdiction is the presence of a predicate offence. It is like a
limpet mine attached to a ship. If there is no ship, the limpet cannot
work. The ship is the predicate offence and “proceeds of crime”. The
ED is not a loitering munition or drone to attack at will on any
criminal activity.”
17. It was submitted that the ECIR and consequential arrest are
without jurisdiction, premature and the ED cannot convert non-
scheduled allegation into a schedule offence through a roving enquiry or
by invoking conspiracy principles which is contrary to the principles
established in Pavana Dibbur vs. Enforcement Directorate 5 wherein
in paragraph No.29 held as under, viz.,
“29. The legislative intent which can be gathered from the definition
of “scheduled offence” under clause (y) of sub-section (1) of Section 2
PMLA is that every crime which may generate proceeds of crime need
not be a scheduled offence. Therefore, only certain specific offences
have been included in the Schedule. Thus, if the submissions of the
learned Additional Solicitor General are accepted, the Schedule will
5
(2023) 15 Supreme Court Cases 91
Page 27 of 67
become meaningless or redundant. The reason is that even if an
offence registered is not a scheduled offence, the provisions of PMLA
and, in particular, Section 3 will be invoked by simply applying
Section 120-B. If we look at Section 120-B, only because there is a
conspiracy to commit an offence, the same does not become an
aggravated offence. The object is to punish those involved in
conspiracy to commit a crime, though they may not have committed
any overt act that constitutes the offence. Conspiracy is an agreement
between the accused to commit an offence. If we look at the
punishments provided under Section 120-B, it becomes evident that it
is not an aggravated offence. It only incorporates the principle of
vicarious liability. If no specific punishment is provided in the statute
for conspiracy to commit a particular offence, Section 120-B treats a
conspirator of the main accused as an abettor for the purposes of
imposing the punishment. The interpretation suggested by ED will
defeat the legislative object of making only a few selected offences as
scheduled offences. If we accept such an interpretation, the statute
may attract the vice of unconstitutionality for being manifestly
arbitrary. It cannot be the legislature’s intention to make every offence
not included in the Schedule a scheduled offence by applying Section
120-B. Therefore, in our view, the offence under Section 120-BIPC
included in Part A of the Schedule will become a scheduled offence
only if the criminal conspiracy is to commit any offence already
included in Parts A, B or C of the Schedule. In other words, an offence
punishable under Section 120-BIPC will become a scheduled offence
only if the conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which is
otherwise a scheduled offence.”
Page 28 of 67
18. Reliance was also placed on Pankaj Bansal (supra) wherein in
paragraph Nos.22 and 23 wherein it was held as under, viz.,
“22. Madhu Limaye, In re [Madhu Limaye, In re, (1969) 1 SCC 292]
was a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court wherein it was
observed that it would be necessary for the State to establish that, at
the stage of remand, the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody
after applying his mind to all relevant matters and if the arrest
suffered on the ground of violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution,
the order of remand would not cure the constitutional infirmities
attaching to such arrest.
23. Viewed in this context, the remand order dated 15-6-2023 passed
by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula,
reflects total failure on his part in discharging his duty as per the
expected standard. The learned Judge did not even record a finding
that he perused the grounds of arrest to ascertain whether ED had
recorded reasons to believe that the appellants were guilty of an
offence under the 2002 Act and that there was proper compliance with
the mandate of Section 19 PMLA. He merely stated that, keeping in
view the seriousness of the offences and the stage of the investigation,
he was convinced that custodial interrogation of the accused persons
was required in the present case and remanded them to the custody of
ED! The sentence — “It is further (sic) that all the necessary
mandates of law have been complied with” follows — “It is the case
of the prosecution….” and appears to be a continuation thereof, as
indicated by the word “further”, and is not a recording by the learned
Judge of his own satisfaction to that effect.”
Page 29 of 67
19. Reliance was also placed on Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar6
wherein in paragraph No.5 it was held as under, viz.,
“5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars
forever. Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is a battle
between the lawmakers and the police and it seems that the police has
not learnt its lesson : the lesson implicit and embodied in CrPC. It has
not come out of its colonial image despite six decades of
Independence, it is largely considered as a tool of harassment,
oppression and surely not considered a friend of public. The need for
caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been emphasised
time and again by the courts but has not yielded desired result. Power
to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the
Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the
lucrative sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and
then proceed with the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to
the police officers who lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.
20. Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner contended
that the ED has wholly failed to discharge the initial and foundational
burden of proof that casts upon it under the PMLA, inasmuch as the very
core requirement which are namely identification, quantification and
linkage of the alleged proceeds of crime to a specified criminal activity
relatable to a scheduled / predicate offence has not been established even
6
(2014) 8 Supreme Court Cases 273
Page 30 of 67
prima facie. The ‘reasons to believe’ and ‘grounds of arrest’ are just a
copy paste and mutually repetitive, resting on vague assertions without
disclosure of any concrete material, without establishing any crime
period, without recording statements or demonstrating even a single
specific transaction that can be said to generate or constitute proceeds of
crime and instead making a desperate attempt to inflate and magnify
unrelated transactions merely by pointing to massive cash deposits
including in the accounts of the petitioner’s sons and alleging acquisition
of properties, which by itself does not satisfy the statutory threshold of
proceeds of crime emanating from the scheduled offence. In this regard,
reliance was placed again on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra)
wherein it was held that even though ‘proceeds of crime’ may include
property derived or obtained directly or indirectly, the explanation cannot
be stretched to widen the main definition beyond the intent of tracking
property derived as a result of criminal activity relating to the scheduled
offence and therefore the investigating agency must demonstrate the
necessary nexus and foundational facts and in the absence of such
linkage and quantification, the presumption regarding interconnected
Page 31 of 67
transactions under Section 23 is wholly inapplicable because no primary/
initial transaction is established and consequently the presumption under
Section 24 cannot arise unless the two statutory preconditions are
satisfied that are (i) the person is charged with the offence of money
laundering and (ii) there exists identifiable proceeds of crime. Further,
since Section 19(1) requires ‘reason to believe’ based on material in
possession indicating guilt of an offence punishable under Section 4, the
ED could not have lawfully formed the requisite opinion to arrest the
petitioner without first establishing, through material, what exactly the
proceeds of crime are and their quantum and hence the arrest and
continued detention are arbitrary, illegal and an abuse of process, having
effected without the ED discharging its initial burden as mandated by
law.
21. On the contrary, the learned Senior Standing Counsel for ED
contended that the investigation has unearthed a sustained and organized
pattern of serious misconduct by the petitioner reflected in multiple
complaints pending since 2014 before the Telangana State Medical
Council alleging fraudulent surrogacy practices and child trafficking. In
Page 32 of 67
one such complaint in the year 2016, it was alleged that a childless
couple was induced to undergo surrogacy on the assurance of receiving
their biological child but a subsequent DNA test as undertaken during a
foreign passport application process revealed that the child handed over
was not biologically related to them, leading to suspension of petitioner’s
medical license for five years in 2016. He further submitted that despite
such suspension she continued surrogacy operations through her
establishments, particularly M/s.Universal Srusthi Fertility Research
Centre (earlier Shrusthi Test Tube Baby Center), Visakhapatnam, as
corroborated by birth records obtained from the Registrar of Births and
Deaths, Visakhapatnam showing numerous deliveries during the period
of suspension and by financial analysis of bank accounts and Income Tax
returns indicating substantial receipts thereby evidencing continued
medical practice without a valid license. He also relied upon FIR No.299
of 2020 and the charge sheet filed before the II Additional CMM,
Visakhapatnam to submit that the criminal conspiracy involved arranging
a surrogate delivery by Jalumuri Sundaramma and deceitfully projecting
the childless couple (Santanu Roy and Amrita Sarkar) as expectant
Page 33 of 67
parents through fabricated medical records, manipulation of the expected
date of delivery through medication, payment flows including receipt of
Rs.2,80,000/- by a key facilitator and suppression of the license
suspension while effecting change of hospital name. It was further
submitted that the subsequent return of a child to Sundaramma did not
match her DNA, while the childless couple allegedly continued to have
the baby, demonstrating grave irregularities suggestive of trafficking and
reinforcing the seriousness of the allegations.
22. The learned Standing Counsel for ED contended that the arrest
dated 12.02.2026 and the consequent remand order of the Special Court
passed on the same day are in substance and the present writ petition is
only an attempt to bypass the statutory regime under the PMLA
particularly the stringent conditions governing release on bail under
Section 45. It was contended that the arrest was effected strictly in
conformity with Section 19 of the PMLA where the authorized Officer
on the basis of material in possession formed ‘reasons to believe’ that the
petitioner is guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA and such
reasons were reduced into writing, and the grounds of arrest were duly
Page 34 of 67
furnished to the petitioner at the time of arrest. It was further contended
that the record demonstrates ‘monumental material’ preceding the arrest,
inter alia, predicate offence FIRs, independent investigation by ED,
searches under Section 17, statements recorded under Section 50
including of co-accused / agents / facilitators / victims, the trail of
proceeds of crime, bank account details / transactions, enquiries with
statutory authorities and local bodies and even the petitioner’s own
statement under Section 50 of PMLA showing that the arrest was not
based on conjecture or on a mere desire to interrogate but on a legally
sustainable satisfaction contemplated under Section 19.
23. Further, the learned Standing Counsel for ED contended that the
petitioner’s plea of ‘non-application of mind’ by the Special Court while
remanding the petitioner is misconceived. It was submitted that the
remand Court’s duty at that stage is not to conduct a mini-trial or to
undertake extensive appreciation of evidence but to satisfy itself that the
statutory safeguards for arrest and remand are complied with. The
language of the remand order when read as a whole and not selectively,
indicates that the Special Court considered the rival submissions,
Page 35 of 67
perused the relevant material / ED file (remand diary) and formed the
necessary ‘secondary opinion’ regarding compliance with Section 19. He
also submitted that the ‘reasons to believe’ and the ‘grounds of arrest’ are
identical by submitting that Section 19 does not mandate that these two
documents must be distinguishable in form or content and similarity
cannot by itself establish illegality. In support of his argument, reliance
was placed on paragraph No.53 of the decision of Arvind Kejriwal
(supra) which for ready reference is reproduced hereunder, viz.,
“53. We now turn to the facts of the present case. At the outset we
must record that DoE has produced the “reasons to believe” to invoke
Section 19(1) of the PML Act. We have examined the contents thereof
and the contents of the “grounds of arrest” furnished to Arvind
Kejriwal upon his arrest. They are identical.”
24. Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered by the Punjab
& Haryana High Court in the case of Arvind Walia v. Enforcement
Directorate7 wherein it was held that similarity in the ‘reasons to
believe’ and ‘grounds of arrest’ primarily reflects similarity of facts
recorded and such similarity does not prove absence of application of
mind or violation of any prescribed procedure, particularly in view of the
7
[CRWP Nos.8667 of 2025 (O&M) and 8750 of 2025 (O&M)]
Page 36 of 67
limited scope of judicial review in arrest challenges. The paragraph No.9
of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder, viz.,
“9.The next contention is that the petitioners’ arrest is vitiated as
there is non-application of mind in recording the ‘reasons to believe’
as well as the ‘grounds of arrest’; the assertion is on the basis that
both are identical in material particulars. The contention lacks merit
as similarity of documents in itself cannot be a ground to conclude
non-application of mind on the part of authorised officer in recording
the same. A perusal of the documents shows the similarity is primarily
in the facts of the case recorded therein. In case the officer has
deemed it appropriate to record the material facts pertaining to the
case in the ‘grounds of arrest’ as well as the ‘reasons to believe, before
arriving at the conclusion and recording his belief regarding the guilt,
no exception can be taken to it. It is not stated to be violative of any
prescribed procedure. The facts are not irrelevant to the documents
besides, it is not the petitioners’ case that the conclusions arrived at
by the authorised officer are not germane to the facts mentioned
therein, or that there is no reasonable nexus between the two; nor can
it be said to be violative of the principles of Wednesbury
reasonableness. Additionally, the argument is to be discounted
keeping in view the scope of judicial review in examining an order of
arrest, as laid down in the Arvind Kejriwal case (supra), which
prohibits merits review of such documents.”
25. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for ED contended that non-
cooperation cannot justify arrest under Section 19 by submitting that the
petitioner is proceeding on a false premise. It was submitted that the
Page 37 of 67
remand application does not treat non-cooperation as the sole basis for
arrest / remand, rather it records multiple grounds including the necessity
to prevent tampering with evidence, influencing witnesses and
dissipation of proceeds of crime apart from the broader material
connecting the petitioner with money laundering and proceeds of crime.
He further contended that even otherwise where the arrest is founded not
merely on an allegation of non-cooperation but on the subjective
satisfaction based on material, the arrest is valid. In support of this
argument, the reliance was placed on the judgment passed by the
Chhattisgarh High Court in the case of Chaitanya Baghel vs.
Directorate of Enforcement 8 wherein it was observed that even if there
is an alleged procedural lapse regarding non-cooperation the arrest does
not become illegal where the grounds of arrest also refer to other legally
relevant necessities such as preventing destruction of evidence,
influencing witnesses and tracing proceeds of crime and that such issues
insofar as they require assessment of adequacy, are more appropriately
addressed by the Trial Court in bail proceedings rather than in writ
8
CRMP.No.2506 of 2025 – [2025 CGHC 52079]
Page 38 of 67
jurisdiction at an incipient stage.The paragraph Nos.80, 90 and 103 of
the said judgment are reproduced hereunder, viz.,
“80. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the custodial
action taken against him is illegal, inasmuch as there was neither
necessity nor exigency warranting such coercive action. It is pertinent
to mention here that the petitioner was neither served with summons
under Section 50 of the PMLA nor required to appear in relation to
the alleged offence before the ED, therefore, the allegations of non-
cooperation are incorrect mentioned in the document of ground of
arrest but the arrest in the present case was not founded solely on the
ground of non-cooperation but in the ground of arrest there are other
grounds which justifies the custodial action, therefore, only on the
basis of wrong mention in the ground of arrest i.e. the non-
cooperation of the accused in investigation would not by itself amount
to illegality because the arrest of the present petitioner was not
founded solely on ground of noncooperation but on the subjective
satisfaction of the Investigating Officer based on material which was
available with the ED. Therefore, this procedural lapse also does not
amount to illegality whereas it amounts to irregularity. The Apex
Court has held that mere non-cooperation to summons under Section
50PMLA is not sufficient to constitute a ground for arrest under
Section 19 of the PMLA. In Pankaj Bansal (supra), the court
emphasized that the ED must show tangible material and the decision
to arrest must confirm to the safeguards and strictures of Section 19 of
the Act.
90. As regards the non-cooperation and mechanical arrest, this Court
finds that the issue involves disputed factual questions that cannot be
Page 39 of 67
conclusively determined in exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Grounds
of Arrest, though brief, refer to the necessity of preventing destruction
of evidence, influencing of witnesses and tracing of proceeds of crime.
Whether such reasons are adequate or not, is a matter of assessment
by the trial court.
103. The ground raised by the petitioner in this petition are proced
lapses/irregularities which does not amount to illegality. Learned
counsel for the respondent in para 70 of his written submission has
stated that the petitioner deserves to be relegated to the remedy of
regular bail which requires the petitioner to satisfy the mandatory
twin conditions of bail under Section 45 of PMLA to seek release
from custody. agree with the contention raised by the learned counsel
for the respondent that the grounds raised in this petition are
procedural lapses irregularities not amounting to illegality and these
are the grounds of bail. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court
finds no ground to interfere with the investigation or the arrest
effected by the Investigating Agency. Accordingly the petition stands
dismissed.
26. Further, learned Senior Standing Counsel for ED contended that the
petitioner’s attempt to assail the arrest on the basis of alleged non-
supply / non-furnishing of all relied-upon documents at the time of
remand is misconceived both on facts and in law. It is submitted that the
petitioner acknowledged that she has received grounds of arrest and that
she has informed her son Dheeraj Krishna. This cannot be refuted as the
Page 40 of 67
petitioner’s signature is appended on arrest order dated 12.02.2025.
Additionally, the intimation of arrest along with the email filed by
respondents clearly show that the petitioner’s son vis-a-vis family had
been adequately intimated as per law. Therefore, it is submitted that the
grounds of arrest and intimation of arrest were both communicated to the
petitioner and her son in accordance with Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India and Section 19 of the PMLA Act. The statutory
safeguard is that the arrestee must be informed of the grounds of arrest
“as soon as may be”, and that the authorized Officer must have recorded
reasons in writing based on material in possession. He further submitted
that the petitioner was furnished with written grounds and was produced
before the competent Court within the statutory timeframe and the
Special Court also had the ED file / remand diary available for perusal. It
is submitted that the petitioner has made misleading and factually
incorrect submissions regarding alleged non-intimation to the
petitioner’s son, despite the “intimation of arrest” specifically recording
that she was informed and that arrest-related documents were being
forwarded through e-mail. He also submitted that ED is also willing to
Page 41 of 67
place in sealed cover the call recording evidencing such intimation and
communication of the grounds and in any event no objection on this
aspect was raised at the time of remand, demonstrating that this plea is
an afterthought. Further, he argued that at this nascent stage, the remand
Court does not adjudicate the evidentiary admissibility or probative
value of each document and the petitioner’s plea is essentially an attempt
to convert a compliance inquiry into a disclosure regime akin to trial.
Further, he submitted that in any event the relevant contents and gist of
the material statements under Section 50, bank trails, searches / seizures
and the alleged role attributed to the petitioner were incorporated in the
reasons / grounds furnished, thereby sufficiently enabling the petitioner
to understand the basis of arrest and any further grievance as to
completeness of record or access to material is a matter to be addressed
before the competent Court in appropriate proceedings and not a ground
to invalidate the arrest or remand in writ jurisdiction. In support of his
argument the learned standing counsel relied on the Arvind Kejriwal
(supra) wherein in paragraph Nos.66 and 67 it has been held as under:
“66. In Amarendra Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, this Court
elaborated on the different facets of judicial review regarding
Page 42 of 67subjective opinion or satisfaction. It was held that the courts should
not inquire into correctness or otherwise of the facts found except
where the facts found existing are not supported by any evidence at
all or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable man would say
that the facts and circumstances exist. Secondly, it is permissible to
inquire whether the facts and circumstances so found to exist have a
reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the power is to be
exercised. In simple words, the conclusion has to logically flow from
the facts. If it does not, then the courts can interfere, treating the lack
of reasonable nexus as an error of law. Thirdly, jurisdictional review
permits review of errors of law when constitutional or statutory terms,
essential for the exercise of power, are misapplied or misconstrued.
Fourthly, judicial review is permissible to check improper exercise of
power. For instance, it is an improper exercise of power when the
power is not exercised genuinely, but rather to avoid embarrassment
or for wreaking personal vengeance. Lastly, judicial review can be
exercised when the authorities have not considered grounds which are
relevant or has accounted for grounds which are not relevant.
67. Error in decision-making process can vitiate a judgment/decision
of a statutory authority. In terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, a
decision-making error can lead to the arrest and deprivation of liberty
of the arrestee. Though not akin to preventive detention cases, but
given the nature of the order entailing arrest — it requires careful
scrutiny and consideration. Yet, at the same time, the courts should
not go into the correctness of the opinion formed or sufficiency of
the material on which it is based, albeit if a vital ground or fact is not
considered or the ground or reason is found to be non-existent, the
order of detention may fail.”
Page 43 of 67
27. Lastly, the learned Standing Counsel contended that the
petitioner’s challenge suffer from suppression, selective quotation and
disputed questions of facts make it unsuitable for determination in
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. It was submitted
that the petition proceeds on a piecemeal reading of the remand order,
‘reasons to believe’ and other papers, while omitting the overall narrative
and the sequence of investigative steps undertaken prior to arrest. It was
also contended that the petitioner has, on the one hand acknowledged
receipt of the grounds of arrest and the fact of intimating a family
member, yet on the other hand advanced a plea of non-intimation to
relatives. Similarly, the petitioner asserts absence of material while
simultaneously relying on extracts of the provisional attachment order
and investigation record, which itself evidences pre-arrest searches,
seizures and Section 50 statements. The respondent submitted that once
the adjudication requires the Court to test the truthfulness of competing
versions, such as what was shown to the remand Court, what exactly was
furnished and whether any alleged lapse caused prejudice, those issues
become disputed factual matters requiring evidentiary appreciation, for
Page 44 of 67
which the appropriate forum is the Special Court / bail Court. Therefore,
the instant writ petition is an exercise in merits masked as a procedural
challenge and ought to be dismissed on the threshold ground of
maintainability. In support of his argument the learned standing counsel
relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhika Agarwal
vs. Union of India 9 wherein in paragraph Nos.9, 10, 12 and 13 it has
been held as under:
“9.However, when the legality of such an arrest made under the
Special Acts like PMLA, UAPA, Foreign Exchange, Customs Act, GST
Acts, etc. is challenged, the Court should be extremely loath in
exercising its power of judicial review. In such cases, the exercise of
the power should be confined only to see whether the statutory and
constitutional safeguards are properly complied with or not, namely
to ascertain whether the officer was an authorized officer under the
Act, whether the reason to belleve that the person was guilty of the
offence under the Act, was based on the “material” in possession of
the authorized officer or not, and whether the arrestee was informed
about the grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest was
made. Sufficiency or adequacy of material on the basis of which the
belief is formed by the officer, or the correctness of the facts on the
basis of which such belief is formed to arrest the person, could not be
a matter of judicial review.
9
[2025] INSC 272
Page 45 of 67
10. It hardly needs to be reiterated that the power of judicial review
over the subjective satisfaction or opinion of the statutory authority
would have different facets depending on the facts and circumstances
of each case. The criteria or parameters of judicial review over the
subjective satisfaction applicable in Service related cases, cannot be
made applicable to the cases of arrest made under the Special Acts.
The scrutiny on the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the authorized
officer to arrest the person could not be a matter of judicial review, in
as much as when the arrest is made by the authorized officer on he
having been satisfied about the alleged commission of the offences
under the special Act, the matter would be at a very nascent stage of
the investigation or inquiry. The very use of the phrase “reasons to
believe” implies that the officer should have formed a prima facie
opinion or belief on the basis of the material in his possession that
the person is guilty or has committed the offence under the relevant
special Act. Sufficiency or adequacy of the material on the basis of
which such belief is formed by the authorized officer, would not be a
matter of scrutiny by the Courts at such a nascent stage of inquiry
or investigation.
12. It is pertinent to note that the Special Acts are enacted to achieve
specific purposes and objectives. The power of judicial review in
cases of arrest under such Special Acts should be exercised very
cautiously and in rare circumstances to balance individual liberty
with the interest of justice and of the society at large. Any liberal
approach in construing the stringent provisions of the Special Acts
may frustrate the very purpose and objective of the Acts. It hardly
needs to be stated that the offences under the PMLA or the Customs
Act or FERA are the offences of very serious nature affecting the
Page 46 of 67financial systems and in turn the sovereignty and integrity of the
nation. The provisions contained in the said Acts therefore must be
construed in the manner which would enhance the objectives of the
Acts, and not frustrate the same. Frequent or casual interference of
the courts in the functioning of the authorized officers who have been
specially conferred with the powers to combat the serious crimes, may
embolden the unscrupulous elements to commit such crimes and may
not do justice to the victims, who in such cases would be the society at
large and the nation itself. With the advancement in Technology, the
very nature of crimes has become more and more intricate and
complicated. Hence, minor procedural lapse on the part of
authorized officers may not be seen with magnifying glass by the
courts in exercise of the powers of judicial review, which may
ultimately end up granting undue advantage or benefit to the person
accused of very serious offences under the special Acts. Such
offences are against the society and against the nation at large, and
cannot be compared with the ordinary offences committed against
an individual, nor the accused in such cases be compared with the
accused of ordinary crimes.
13. Though, the power of judicial review keeps a check and balance
on the functioning of the public authorities and is exercised for better
and more efficient and informed exercise of their powers, such power
has to be exercised very cautiously keeping in mind that such exercise
of power of judicial review may not lead to judicial overreach,
undermining the powers of the statutory authorities. To sum up, the
power of judicial review may not be exercised unless there is
manifest arbitratiness or gross violation or non-compliance of the
statutory safeguards provided under the Special acts, required to be
Page 47 of 67followed by the authorised officers when an arrest is made of a
person prima facie guilty of or having committed offence under the
Special Act.”
28. Reliance was also placed on the judgment of V. Senthil vs Balaji
vs. State10 wherein in paragraph No.30 it was held as under:
“30. In a case where the mandate of Section 167 of the CrPC, 1973
and Section 19 of the PMLA, 2002 are totally ignored by a cryptic
order, a writ of Habeas Corpus may be entertained, provided a
challenge is specifically made. However, an order passed by a
Magistrate giving reasons for a remand”can only be tested in the
manner provided under the statute and not by invoking Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, 1950. There is a difference” between a
detention becoming illegal for not following the statutory mandate
and wrong or inadequate reasons provided in a judicial order. While
in the former case a writ of Habeas Corpus may be entertained, in the
latter the only remedy available is to seek a relief statutorily given. In
other words, a” challenge to an order of remand on merit has to be
made in tune with the statute, while noncompliance of a provision may
entitle a party to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction. In an arrest
under Section 19 of the PMLA, 2002 a writ would lie only when a
person is not produced before the Court as” mandated under sub-
section (3), since it becomes a judicial custody thereafter and the
concerned Court would be in a better position to consider due
compliance.”
10
2023 SCC Online 934
Page 48 of 67
29. Reliance was also placed on the judgment rendered by the High
Court of Himachal Pradesh in the case of Vikas Bansal vs. Directorate
of Enforcement 11 in paragraph Nos.27, 28 , 29, 31, 32 and 35 it has
been held as under:
27. In terms of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the
subjective opinion of the Arresting Officer must be founded and based
upon fair and objective consideration of the material as is available
with him on the date of arrest. The scope of judicial review does not
amount to a mini-trial or a merit review. The exercise is confined to
ascertain whether the ‘reasons to believe’ are based upon material
which establish that the arrestee is ‘guilty’ of an offence under the
PM Act.The exercise is to ensure that DoE has acted in accordance
with the law. The Courts scrutinize the validity of the arrest in
exercise of power of judicial review and if adequate and due care is
taken by DoE to ensure that the “reasons to believe” justify the arrest
in terms of Section 19(1) of the ML Act, the exercise of power of
judicial review would not be a cause of concern. Hon’ble Supreme
Court has further held that under Section 19(1) of the PM Act, it is the
designated/authorized officer who record in writing, their “reasons to
believe that the arrestee is “guilty” of an offence under the PML Act.
Thus, the arrest is based on the opinion of such Officer, which opinion
is open to judicial review, however, not merit review. Section 19(1) of
the ML Act does not permit arrest only to conduct investigation.
Conditions of Section 19(1) have to be satisfied. It is the bounden duty
of the authorized officer to record the reasons for his belief that a
11
CWP.No.13600 of 2025
Page 49 of 67
person is guilty and needs to be arrested and the safeguard is meant
to facilitate an element of fairness and accountability. To effect an
arrest, an officer authorized has to assess and evaluate the materials
in his possess. Through such material, he is expected to form a reason
to believe that a person has been guilty of an offence punishable
under the PMLA, 2002. Thereafter, he is at liberty to arrest, while
performing his mandatory duty of recording the reasons. Said exercise
has to be followed by way of information being served on the arrestee
of the grounds of arrest. Any non-compliance of the mandate of
Section 19(1) of the PMLA, 2002 would vitiate the very arrest itself.
When legality of an arrest made under the Special Acts like PMLA,
UAPA, Foreign Exchange, Customs Act, GST Acts etc. is challenged,
the Court should be extremely loath in exercising its power of judicial
review. In such cases, the exercise of the power should be confined
only to see whether the statutory and constitutional safeguards are
properly complied with or not, namely, to ascertain whether the
officer was an authorized officer under the Act, whether the ‘reason to
believe’ that the person was guilty of the offence under the Act, was
based on the “material” in possession of the authorized officer or not,
and whether the arrestee was informed about the grounds of arrest as
soon as may be after the arrest was made. Sufficiency or adequacy of
material on the basis of which the belief is formed by the officer, or
the correctness of the facts on the basis of which such belief is
formed to arrest the person, could not be a matter of judicial review.
It hardly needs to be reiterated that the power of judicial review over
the subjective satisfaction or opinion of statutory authority
wouldhave different facets depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case. The criteria or parameters of judicial
Page 50 of 67
review over the subjective satisfaction applicable in service related
cases cannot be made applicable to the cases of arrest made under
the Special Acts. The scrutiny on the subjective opinion or
satisfaction of the authorized officer to arrest the person could not
be a matter of judicial review, in as much as when the arrest is made
by the authorized officer on he having been satisfied about the
alleged commission of the offences under the Special Act, the matter
would be at a very nascent stage of the investigation or inquiry. The
very use of the phrase “reasons to believe” implies that the officer
should have formed a prima facie opinion or belief on the basis of
the material in his possession that the person is guilty or has
committed the offence under the relevant special Act. Sufficiency or
adequacy of the material on the basis of which such belief is formed
by the authorized officer, would not be matter of scrutiny by the
Courts at such a nascent stage of inquiry or investigation.
28. It is evident from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that the act of Arresting Officer of arresting a person is amenable to
judicial review, but the scope of judicial review is limited. The High
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction can only scrutinize as to
whether the provisions of Section 19 of the PML Act, 2002 have
been complied with or not. It cannot go into the adequacy or the
sufficiency of the material etc. so as to conduct merit test of the
satisfaction of the Arresting Officer. However, the High Court, of
course, can see as to whether the arrest is legal or not, but, the
legality has to be confined to the compliance of provisions of Section
19(1) of the Act. It is also evident from the judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that though the arrest under Section 19(1) of the
PM Act cannot be only for the purpose of investigation, but where
Page 51 of 67
the arrest is also necessary for that purpose, if the same is after
satisfaction of the statutory provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act,
then such arrest cannot be interfered with by the High Court.
29. Coming back to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the
considered view that the ‘reasons to believe, which have been reduced
into writing by the Arresting Officer not only point out to the
involvement of the petitioner in the predicate offence, but also the
involvement of the petitioner while dealing with the Proceeds of
Crime.The Arresting Officer, in detail, has dealt in the ‘reasons to
believe’ as to why, according to him, the arrest was necessary. Not
only this, a perusal of the ‘reasons to believe’ demonstrates that after
elaborating the reasons, the Arresting Officer also stated in Para-XVI
thereof that the petitioner had committed the offence of money
laundering and is connected with the Proceeds of Crime
derived/obtained from the criminal activity related to scheduled
offence and in acquisition of the said Proceeds of Crime. Though the
word “guilty” has not been specifically used, but, when it stands
mentioned in the reasons to believe that the Arresting Officer has
reasons to believe under Section 19(1) of the PM Act that Vikas
Bansal has committed the offence of money laundering and is
connected with the Proceeds of Crime derived/obtained from the
criminal activity related to scheduled offence and in acquisition of the
said Proceeds of Crime, this was, indeed, recording down his
satisfaction that as per him, the petitioner was guilty of offence
punishable under the PM Act.
30. Besides this, it is further apparent from the ‘reasons to believe’
that said reasons were based on the material with the Arresting
Officer, which stood elaborately dealt with in the ‘reasons to believe,
Page 52 of 67
both relating to the predicate offence as well as the commission of
offence under the PML Act.
31. Now, in terms of the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in exercise of its power of judicial review, this Court is not
going into nor it can go into the correctness of the opinion of the
Arresting Officer, because that is beyond the scope of judicial
review. Suffice to say that when the mandatory requirements of
Section 19(1) of the Act stand complied with by the Arresting Officer
and the compliance is not cosmetic, this Court cannot hold the
arrest of the petitioner to be bad in law. The contention of learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the arrest of the petitioner is for
the sake of investigation only and same is not permissible under
Section 19(1) of the Act, can also not be accepted, for the reason that
though as per the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the arrest
of a person under Section 19(1) of the PM Act cannot only be for the
purpose of investigation, but the same can also be for the purpose of
investigation, if the arrest is in strict compliance of the provisions of
Section 19(1) of the Act. In this case, the reasons to believe, indeed,
prima facie, do justify the arrest of the petitioner in terms of Section
19(1) of the PML Act. The veracity of the ‘reasons to believe cannot be
gone into by the Court in these proceedings, however, it cannot be
said that the ‘reasons to believe, which have been reduced into writing
do not demonstrate that a case was indeed made by the Arresting
Officer for exercising his power of arresting the petitioner. Therefore,
this Court is of the considered view that the arrest of the petitioner is
not in violation of the provisions of Section 19(1) of the PM Act.
Though learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently
submitted that the chronology which preceded the arrest of the
Page 53 of 67
petitioner, shroud the intent of the respondents with suspicion, but this
Court is of the considered view that as the requirements of Section
19 of the MLA were met in course of arrest of the petitioner, then
the backdrop in which the person is arrested, cannot persuade the
Court to declare the arrest in violation of the provisions of Section
19(1) of the Act. In fact, this Court is refraining from making any
observation in this regard, so that it does not prejudice the case of
either of the parties.
32. Now, as this Court has held that the arrest of the petitioner was
not in violation of Section 19(1) of the Act, the remand of the
petitioner by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate can also not
be faulted with, as the satisfaction of learned Judicial Magistrate is
also confined to ensuring that the provisions of Section 19(1) of the
Act are complied with in letter and spirit. The discrepancies pointed
out in the order of learned Judicial Magistrate, which were
specifically referred to by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner,
also do not render either arrest or remand of the petitioner to be bad,
for the reason that when the foundation of the arrest of the petitioner
is being upheld by the Court, the edifice would also survive.
35. From the response of the respondent-Department and the
documents appended with the reply, it is evident that statutory
safeguards were properly complied with in the present case. The
Arresting Officer was an Authorized Officer under Section 19(1) of the
PML Act and the ‘reasons to believe’ that the petitioner was ‘guilty’ of
the offence punishable under the PM Act were based on the material
in possession of the Authorized Officer. It is also not in dispute that
the petitioner was informed about the ‘grounds of arrest’ soon after his
arrest. This Court again reiterates that in this backdrop the sufficiency
Page 54 of 67
or adequacy of material, on the basis of which the belief was formed
by the Arresting Officer or the correctness of the facts on the basis of
which the belief was formed to arrest the petitioner, cannot be gone
into by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review in terms of
the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.”
30. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on
perusal of records, the question of law which arises for consideration
are:-
a) Whether the instant writ petition challenging the arrest dated
12.02.2026 and the consequential remand order is maintainable in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution
of India, when an efficacious statutory remedy of bail under
Section 45 of the PMLA and other remedies under the PMLA /
BNSS are available and the challenge turns substantially on
disputed facts?
b) Whether, on the material placed, the arrest is vitiated for alleged
non-compliance of Section 19(1) of the PMLA, including the
requirement of ‘reasons to believe’ based on material in possession
and communication of grounds of arrest? and
Page 55 of 67
c) Whether the remand order is liable to be set aside as mechanical,
for alleged failure of the Special Court to form a ‘secondary
opinion’ as contemplated by law.
31. We find that the petitioner invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction
of this Court to nullify an arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA and the
consequent remand at a stage when investigation is stated to be in
progress. While we are conscious that personal liberty is a prized
constitutional value, it is equally bound to recognize that the PMLA is
enacted to combat laundering of proceeds generated from serious
criminality and that the statute adopts a distinct architecture of
investigation, attachment, adjudication and prosecution. Therefore, this
Court cannot convert a writ petition challenging arrest into a surrogate
bail hearing or a mini-trial on the correctness of the investigative
narrative as judicial review is directed to legality, jurisdictional facts and
fairness of procedure and not an appellate reassessment of the material
and the petitioner’s submissions, howsoever carefully framed as
procedural infirmities in substance seek a merit evaluation of the
‘reasons to believe’ the money trail and the scheduling of predicate
Page 56 of 67
offences, which is beyond the permissible contours of writ jurisdiction at
this stage.
32. Further, the petitioner seeks to invalidate an arrest and remand in
an ongoing PMLA investigation. The PMLA is a special statute with a
dedicated Special Court and a calibrated scheme for custody and release
including the stringent bail conditions under Section 45 and writ
jurisdiction being discretionary, it is not to be invoked to short-circuit
statutory remedies, particularly where adjudication would require
appreciation of disputed facts regarding the investigative record, the
remand diary and the contemporaneous compliance steps at the time of
arrest. At this stage the Court’s scrutiny is confined to the legality of the
decision-making process and the existence of jurisdictional facts and not
the sufficiency or correctness of the evidence. The petitioner has an
efficacious avenue before the Special Court to seek regular bail and to
urge all permissible defences. Therefore, the writ Court cannot be invited
to do indirectly what the statutory scheme requires to be tested before the
Special Court. Further, the relief sought for setting aside arrest and
remand which inevitably impacts the ongoing investigation and
Page 57 of 67
interdiction at this stage is warranted only when illegality is manifest,
jurisdiction is clearly absent or constitutional safeguards are
demonstrably breached, which threshold is not met here.
33. Section 19 of the PMLA requires authorized Officer must have
‘material in possession’ and must record in writing ‘reasons to believe’
that the person is guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA before
arrest, and the petitioner’s premise that such ‘reasons to believe’ must
read like admissible, trial-proof evidence setting out complete particulars
of each alleged money laundering transaction is not the statutory design,
as Section 19 demands the existence of relevant material and a rational
nexus between that material and the belief recorded, not a pre-trial
adjudication of guilt. According to the respondent’s submission predicate
FIRs, searches and seizures, bank trails, Section 50 statements and
enquiries with statutory bodies constitutes ‘material in possession’
capable of forming the statutory belief while questions of proof,
admissibility and probative weight are for trial. Therefore, we reject the
contention that mere similarity between the ‘reasons to believe’ and the
‘grounds of arrest’ by itself establishes non-application of mind because
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narration of material facts in both documents does not by itself negate
independent satisfaction and the plea that ‘no material collected’ exists is
contradicted by asserted investigative steps and cannot be tested by a
roving writ enquiry into the case file. The plea that ‘no material was
collected’ cannot be accepted. The respondent asserts that, prior to the
arrest, the investigation had already resulted in collection of material,
including predicate FIRs, searches and seizures, statements and the
financial trail. Whether that material is adequate, or what exact weight it
carries, cannot be examined by this Court in writ jurisdiction by
undertaking a roving enquiry into the case file.
34. Further, the expression ‘material in possession’ at the stage of
arrest cannot be confined only to material already tested by cross-
examination or finally adjudicated. At the arrest stage the Court only
examines whether there is some objective material and a rational link
between that material and the belief recorded and not whether each item
is sufficient to prove guilt. An arrest is not rendered illegal merely
because the investigation is still in progress. The arrest is not unlawful
merely because investigation is continuing and once material indicative
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of guilt is shown and reasons are recorded the writ Court will not
substitute its view on timing. In the present case the respondent
submitted that the arrest was necessary to prevent tampering with
evidence, influencing witnesses and dissipation of proceeds of crime,
apart from other material linking the petitioner, which are legitimate
considerations if founded on the investigative context. Though the
‘reasons to believe’ must ultimately be capable of being proved in
accordance with law at trial, we cannot insist upon trial-ready proof at
the stage of arrest. Doing so would wrongly equate the threshold for
arrest with the standard required for conviction.
35. It is a well settled law that the existence of a schedule offence and
the presence of proceeds of crime are foundational jurisdictional
preconditions for action under the PMLA and accordingly the agency
cannot invoke the Act on mere assumption, conjecture or suspicion. The
petitioner’s prayer would require this Bench, at this nascent stage, to
record a conclusive finding that the predicate offences do not fall within
the scheduled offence or that no proceeds of crime exist, issues which
inevitably entail disputed questions of fact and law arising from the
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FIRs, the provisions invoked the nature of the alleged criminal activity
and the alleged financial trail. So long as the respondent shows that the
investigation is founded on predicate FIRs and is supported by the
material suggesting the generation, possession, layering, projection or
use of property as proceeds of crime. Therefore, we will not reassess the
adequacy of such material or substitute its own view. The petitioner’s
objections as to scheduling, nexus and quantification are therefore
matters to be urged before the Special Court in appropriate proceedings
permissible in law. The petitioner’s contention on ‘quantification’ of the
alleged proceeds of crime at this stage is misconceived as quantification
is a matter that unfolds through investigation and subsequent
adjudication. At the stage of arrest, the jurisdictional enquiry is limited to
whether there exists material indicating that property has been derived or
obtained, directly or indirectly, from criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence and that the arrestee is involved in any of the
processes or activities contemplated under Section 3 of the PMLA.
36. On the petitioner’s own averments, as reflected in the respondent’s
contentions and having regard to the contemporaneous record placed
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including the petitioner’s signature on the arrest order and the documents
evidencing intimation / communication, we are not satisfied that any
clear or established infraction of Article 22(1) of the Constitution or
Section 19 of the PMLA is made out. In any event, the questions of what
precisely was served, what material was placed before the remand Court
and whether intimation was in fact and effectively communicated to the
petitioner’s son are matters involving disputed facts. A writ Court is not
the appropriate forum to undertake an evidentiary exercise such as
examining call recordings, emails or oral versions to resolve these
controversies. These issues may, if so advised, be agitated before the
Special Court by way of appropriate applications. The petitioner’s
contention that the arrest stands vitiated merely because all the relied
upon documents were not supplied at the time of remand cannot be
accepted. The constitutional mandate is that the arrestee must be
communicated with the grounds of arrest and the remand stage is not
intended to operate as a full-fledged discovery or disclosure process. If
any grievance persists regarding access to records thereafter, the same is
to be pursued before the competent Court by adopting the appropriate
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procedure available in law. In offence having a transnational and
economic character the investigative record may legitimately comprise
sensitive leads, third-party inputs and evolving financial analysis. The
legal requirement is that the arrestee be informed of the grounds of arrest
so as not to be kept in the dark; it does not oblige the authorities to
furnish the entire investigation file at the threshold.
37. We also finds that, at that stage of remand the Court is only
required to prima facie satisfy itself that the arrest has been effected in
compliance with the statutory safeguards and is not manifestly illegal on
its face. It is neither expected nor obliged at that stage to deliver an
elaborate, reasoned order or to undertake a detailed scrutiny of the
sufficiency of each item of investigative material. In the absence of a
clear jurisdictional error apparent on the face of the remand record itself,
we would not interfere with the order of remand in writ jurisdiction,
particularly when the relief sought would, in substance, amount to a re-
examination of issues of custody and bail under the guise of writ.
38. The petitioner’s plea of ‘mechanical remand’ cannot be accepted
merely because the remand order is brief. Remand orders are often
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concise unless the record demonstrates that the remand Court wholly
abdicated its duty. The remand Court’s obligation to form a secondary
opinion on Section 19 of PMLA in compliance with the stage of Section
187 BNSS remand, as reiterated in Pankaj Bansal (supra) and Arvind
Kejriwal (supra) does not translate into a requirement of a detailed
judgment akin to final adjudication; brevity is not illegality unless
abdication is demonstrable on the face of the record.
39. It was also observed by the Bench that the learned Senior Counsel
for the petitioner did not advance any substantive challenge to the PMLA
proceedings on merits or on the factual matrix of the case, nor was there
any challenge to the very applicability of the PMLA and that no serious
contest was raised to the core allegations underpinning the ED’s action.
The Bench noted that this manner of argument indicated, at least prima
facie, an acceptance of the prosecution narrative which in turn lent
support to the inference regarding the alleged modus operandi and the
need for the statutory process to take its course.
40. Moreover, we find that the allegation relate to an organized
exploitation of vulnerable persons, further manipulation and cheating
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parenthood and identity through illegal practices. Such allegations, if
true, have a long shadow on both the parents and the child. A child who
grows up to discover that the biological origin was misrepresented can
face deep psychological distress, identity confusion, and social stigma.
The parents too may suffer trauma, grief, and loss of trust, apart from the
fear of social judgment and legal uncertainty.
41. Society bears the cost when medical systems are alleged to be
used to commodify children and to erode the integrity of birth records
and family identity. The justice system must therefore ensure that
investigations into such alleged conduct are not obstructed without clear
illegality. The petitioner’s license was previously suspended on serious
allegations, yet the alleged conduct is stated to have continued. This
strengthens the need for lawful investigation to proceed unhindered,
subject to safeguards. A child’s identity is not merely a biological fact
but it is also a social truth lived each day within a family, in school, in
the community and in official records. If the allegation is that a child was
handed over under false assurances and false documentation, the injury
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is not limited to a single transaction but it can fracture trust within the
family and expose the child to lifelong questions about belonging.
42. The emotional harm in such cases is often silent and cumulative.
Parents who believed they were taking their biological child home may
live with recurring grief and helplessness upon learning otherwise. The
child may face distress on learning that the foundational narrative of
birth was altered. In a society where lineage and identity are frequently
treated as markers of social standing, such revelations can expose a child
to stigma and a family to social judgement. These are precisely the kinds
of allegations which require careful, unobstructed investigation within
the bounds of law.
43. This Bench is also conscious of the wider societal and emotional
dimensions that accompany allegations of illegal surrogacy/child
trafficking and manipulation of parenthood. In many cases couples who
are medically unable to conceive approach fertility centres with deep
vulnerability and legitimate hope, investing substantial emotional,
physical and financial resources in a process that they believe is lawful,
ethical and medically regulated. Medical institutions, particularly fertility
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clinics and hospitals occupy a position of heightened trust as they are
expected to function with professional integrity, transparent counselling,
informed consent, strict record-keeping and rigorous compliance with
statutory safeguards because the procedure does not involve merely
“treatment” but implicates identity, lineage and the legal status of a child.
If the allegation is that such institutional trust is exploited through
deception, substitution of babies, fabrication of records, manipulation of
birth registrations or routing of procedures through informal agents, the
harm is not confined to a private dispute between individuals but also
undermines public confidence in the medical system, weakens the
credibility of regulatory oversight and creates a climate where even
lawful, medically necessary surrogacy is viewed with suspicion. The
resultant distress often extends beyond the immediate parties and these
acts, if established, carry stigma and trauma that can persist for years and
can irreparably affect the child’s sense of identity and belonging.
Therefore, while the Bench remains vigilant to protect liberty through
procedural safeguards, yet must be equally vigilant that the extraordinary
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writ jurisdiction is not used to pre-emptively arrest the investigative
process in cases having serious social ramifications.
44. For all the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed, leaving it
open for the petitioner to pursue remedies available to her before the
Special Court. The question of law framed in paragraph No.30 of this
order stands answered against the petitioner and in favour of the
respondents.
45. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand
closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
_______________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA, J
Date: 21.04.2026
Note: L.R. copy to be marked.
(B/o)GSD