Chattisgarh High Court
Dikeshwar Yadav @ Dk vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:18918-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 848 of 2025
Dikeshwar Yadav @ DK S/o Satyanarayan Yadav Aged About 24 Years R/o
Village - Ghontey, P.S. Gobra Nawapara, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station - Gobra
Nawapara (Wrongly Mentioned Urla In The Cause Title Of The Impugned
Judgment), District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr. Akash Deep Sharma, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Government Advocate.
Hon’ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
24/04/2026
1. Heard Mr. Akash Deep Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant as well
as Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government Advocate for the
State/respondents.
2. Today, the matter is listed for hearing on IA No. 1, which is an application
for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellant.
3. It is informed by Mr. Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government Advocate that
the notice issued to the complainant/mother (PW-2) of the victim could
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not be served on account of the fact that she was not found on the
address mentioned in the memo of appeal and it has been informed that
the mother of the victim has gone somewhere for earning her livelihood.
Hence, with the consent of learned counsel appearing for the parties, we
proceed to her the matter finally on merits.
4. The appellant has filed this appeal under Section 415(2) of the Bharatiya
Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, the BNSS) questioning the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
06.03.2025 passed in Special Sessions Trial No. 93/2020, by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge and Second (POCSO) Fast Track Special
Court, Raipur, District Raipur, whereby the appellant has been convicted
and sentenced as under:
Conviction under Jail Sentence Fine Default
Section (Rigorous) Sentence
313 of the Indian Penal 5 years Rs. 3000/- 5 months R.I.
Code (for short, the IPC)
4(2) of the Protection of 20 years Rs. 3000/- 5 months R.I.
Children From Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (for
short, the POCSO Act)
6 of POCSO Act 20 years Rs. 3000/- 5 months R.I.
All the sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
5. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the victim lodged a written
complaint at Police Station Gobra Navapara stating that about four years
prior to filing the report, in the year 2016, she had come to village-Ghot
with her mother to work at making bricks at Pratap Welding Center. At
that time, she was studying in Class 6 and used to go from village Ghot to
Tari for schooling. During that period, the appellant DK @ Dikeshwar
Yadav of village Ghot started following her from 02.07.2016, and on
02.07.2017, by saying that he would marry her, took her to his home,
3enticed her and came to her house and established physical relations
with her. Thereafter, the appellant made physical relations with her
multiple times continuously. During this period, in January 2019, she
became pregnant. Then, in March 2019, the appellant brought pills and
told her that if she did not take them, he would die, and said that they
would not have a child now but would have one after attaining majority
and marrying. Upon his insistence, she consumed the pills, due to which
she had a miscarriage. In this way, the appellant continued to have
physical relations with her until 18.11.2019. Thereafter, the appellant left
her and thereafter denied to marry her.
6. On the basis of this written complaint (Exhibit P-1) of the informant, FIR
(Exhibit P-02) was registered at Police Station Gobra Navapara against
the accused under Sections 366, 376 of the IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of
the POCSO Act. During investigation, the spot map (Exhibit P-3) and
Patwari map (Exhibit P-4) were prepared. Regarding the date of birth of
the victim, the certified copy of the school admission register (Exhibit P-
08C), which mentions her date of birth, was seized as per seizure memo
(Exhibit P-09). After obtaining consent from the victim and her mother
vide Exhibit P-05 and Exhibit P-07 respectively, the victim was medically
examined as per Exhibit P-12. Similarly, the appellant was also medically
examined and the seized clothes were sent for examination as per Exhibit
P-13 and Exhibit P-14. The underwear of the appellant was seized as per
seizure memo (Exhibit P-16). The statement of the victim under Section
164 CrPC was recorded as per Exhibit P-06. The appellant was arrested
and arrest memo (Exhibit P-20) was prepared. The seized exhibits were
sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur as per Exhibit P-
22; the acknowledgment receipt is Exhibit P-23 and the FSL report is
Exhibit P-24.
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7. Further, during investigation, statements of witnesses under Section 161
Cr.P.C were recorded, and after completing other necessary procedures,
charge-sheet was filed before the learned trial Court against the
appellant under Sections 366, 376, 313 IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the
POCSO Act.
8. Charges were framed against the appellant under Sections 363, 366,
376(3), 376(2)(n) / 376(2), 313 IPC and Sections 4(2), 5(l)/6, 5(j)(ii) / 6 of
the POCSO Act, 2012. The charges were read over and explained to
him, upon which he denied the alleged offence and claimed trial.
9. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as
8 witnesses namely, the victim (PW-01), her mother (PW-02), the in-
charge headmaster of her school (PW-03), Dr. S.D. Kanwar (PW-04), Dr.
A.K. Sharma (PW-05), Patwari Mugal Singh Nagesh (PW-06), Head
Constable Sunita Mahilang (PW-07), and Sub-Inspector B.L. Kosariya
(PW-08) and exhibited as many as 24 exhibits namely, written complaint
(Exhibit P-01), FIR (Exhibit P-02), spot map (Exhibit P-03), Patwari map
(Exhibit P-04), consent form of victim for medical examination (Exhibit P-
05), statement under Section 164 CrPC (Exhibit P-06), consent form of
mother (Exhibit P-07), original admission register (Exhibit P-08) and its
certified copy (Exhibit P-08C), seizure memo of register (Exhibit P-09),
notice to headmaster (Exhibit P-10), supurdnama (Exhibit P-11), medical
examination request and report of victim (Exhibit P-12), medical
examination request and report of accused (Exhibit P-13), testing of
seized underwear (Exhibit P-14), application for Patwari map (Exhibit P-
15), seizure memo of underwear (Exhibit P-16), seizure memo of slide
packet (Exhibit P-17), seizure memo of appellant’s underwear packet
(Exhibit P-18), application to magistrate for recording statement (Exhibit
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P-19), arrest memo (Exhibit P-20), arrest intimation (Exhibit P-21),
application for FSL (Exhibit P-22), receipt (Exhibit P-23), and FSL report
(Exhibit P-24).
10.The statement of the convict/appellant was recorded under section 313
C.rP.C wherein he has expressed his ignorance about most of the
questions, however, some of them were denied as well. The documents
exhibited by the defense include the police statement of the victim’s
mother (Exhibit D-01).
11.The learned trial Court, after considering the statement of witnesses and
evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant/
accused as detailed in the opening paragraph of this judgment. Hence,
the present appeal by the appellant/convict.
12.Mr. Akash Deep Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case. There are
omissions and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution
witnesses and the conviction is based on conjecture and surmises. There
is no eye witness to the incident. Even the parents of the victim could not
properly state with regard to the age of the victim. The prosecution has
utterly failed to prove that the victim was a minor as on the date of
incident. In fact it was a consensual relationship out of love affair between
them and only when the victim became pregnant, the FIR was lodged.
The victim, in her deposition before the learned trial Court herself has
admitted that she was having love affair with the appellant and they used
to meet often. Hence, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of the
charges.
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13. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State/ respondent
submits that the learned trial Court was fully justified in convicting and
sentencing the convict/appellant as mentioned in the opening paragraph.
There is ample evidence on record to hold the appellant guilty of the
offence. The order passed by the learned trial Court needs no
interference and the appeal filed by the convict/appellant be dismissed.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival
submissions made herein-above and went through the records with
utmost circumspection.
15. The appellant/convict is alleged to have made physical relationship with
the victim multiple times on the pretext of marriage. According to the
prosecution, the victim was aged about 15 years 3 months on the date of
incident. The first question of determination would be, whether the victim
was a minor on the date of incident.
16. In this regard, the victim herself deposed that she was born in
Maharashtra but she does not know the name of the village. She was
further unaware as to who had admitted her in the school and on basis of
which documents. However, she stated that in her marksheet, her date of
birth is mentioned as 18.03.2002 and on the said basis, she was stated
her age. She has clearly stated that she was unaware whether the said
date of birth is correct or incorrect.
17. The mother of the victim (PW-2) has stated that the victim was born in
village Jhanjhiya of District Gondiya, Maharashtra on 18.03.2002. The
victim was born in house itself. The same was neither recorded in the
register of the Anganbadi Centre or the Kotwar and while admitting the
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victim in the school by her father, the date of birth was got recorded
merely on assumption.
18. Rajesh Kumar Verma (PW-3) is the Incharge Head Master of the
Government Primary School, Sankra. According to him, the name of the
victim was recorded in the Admission/Discharge register at serial No.
2450 wherein the date of birth of the victim was recorded as 18.03.2002
and was admitted in Class I on 21.07.2008 and she left the school on
30.08.2010. This witness has admitted that the relevant entries were not
made by him nor could he say that on what basis, the said date of birth
was recorded.
19. Dr. Smt. S.D.Kanwar (PW-4) is the Medical Officer who had examined
the victim. She has stated the age of the victim to be 18 years. On
examination, she found that the secondary sexual characteristics of the
victim were fully developed and there were no signs of injuries either on
the thighs or breast. Hymen was old torn at 6 O’Clock and 3 O’Clock.
Though he has opined that the victim was subjected to sexual
intercourse but in the cross examination, she has stated that there were
no signs of recent sexual intercourse. She admitted that with respect to
age of the victim, she had not seen any document but she mentioned the
age according to the appearance of the victim. She further stated that the
secondary sexual characteristics are well developed after the age of 18
years which was found in the victim.
20. In view of the above discussion, it cannot be conclusively held that the
date of birth as stated by the victim and her mother is correct and that the
victim was minor on the date of incident. Even in the written complaint
(Exhibit P/1) and FIR (Exhibit P/2), the victim has stated her age to be 18
years.
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21. The victim (PW-1) has admitted that she was in love with the appellant.
She further admitted that she never attempted to inform anyone with
regard to her relationship with the appellant and whenever her mother
used to go out of the house for work, the appellant used to come to her
house where they made physical relationship. It has further been stated
by her that when she came to know that the appellant was going to marry
some other girl, she informed her family members regarding the incident
and when the family members did not support her, she made complaint
at Police Station.
22. From the deposition of the victim (PW-1) herself, it is amply clear that it is
not a case rape or forceful sexual intercourse but she was in love with
the appellant. The complaint was lodged only when the victim came to
know that the appellant was going to marry some other girl and not
before that.
23. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case and
evidence available on record, it emerges that the prosecution could not
produce the clinching and legally admissible evidence with respect to
the date of birth or age of the victim so as to hold that on the date of
incident she was minor and below 18 years of age. Only on the basis of
school Dakhil-kharij register, it would not be safe to hold that the victim
was minor on the date of incident.
24. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana {(2013) 7 SCC 263}, the Supreme
Court, at paragraph 23 has observed as under:
“23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to
determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the
view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis
for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime.
For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the
issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with
9law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our
considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply
Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the
prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age
conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12
extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a
child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out of
a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme
of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a
preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option
expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option
available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In
the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent)
certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option. In
case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can
be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule
12(3), envisages consideration of the date of birth entered, in
the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of
date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is
liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other
material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such
entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate
issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no
other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for
determining the age of the child concerned, as the said
certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It
is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3)
postulates the determination of age of the concerned child, on
the basis of medical opinion.”
25. In the matter of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of UP, {(2006) 5 SCC
584}, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :
“26. In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit, this Court held:
(SCC p. 619, para 15)]
“To render a document admissible under Section 35, three
conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on
must be one in a public or other official book, register or
record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue
or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public
servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person
in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry
relating to date of birth made in the school register is
relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the
entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of
not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in
10the absence of the material on which the age was
recorded.”
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its
judgment in Alamelu and Another v. State, represented by
Inspector of Police, {(2011) 2 SCC 385, has observed as under:
“40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates
that the girl’s date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore,
even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be
above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on
the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The
transfer certificate has been issued by a Government
School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster.
Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section
35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of
such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to
prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on
the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth
mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no
evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or
who gave the date of birth is examined.
xxxx
42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a
document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad
Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:-
“14…..The date of birth mentioned in the scholars’
register has no evidentiary value unless the person
who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is
examined….Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9,
10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the
contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof
of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not
tantamount to proof of all the contents or the
correctness of date of birth stated in the documents.
Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of
Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue,
mere proof of the documents as produced by the
aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of
the truth of the facts or contents of the documents.
The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely,
the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in
the documents could be proved by admissible
evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who
could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No
11evidence of any such kind was produced by the
respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the
date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash
Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as
mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp)
SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of
birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted.”
43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court
in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar
Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:-
“16….The legal position is not in dispute that mere
production and marking of a document as exhibit by
the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its
contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible
evidence, that is, by the “evidence of those persons
who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”
44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not
been discharged by the prosecution. The father says
nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The
Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the
entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to
definitely fix the age of the girl.
xxxx
48. We may further notice that even with reference to
Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document
has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as
well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be
appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in
the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as
follows:-
“38….The age of a person as recorded in the school
register or otherwise may be used for various
purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for
obtaining an appointment; for contesting election;
registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit
under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of
litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being
represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a
suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a
minor he was not appropriately represented therein or
any transaction made on his behalf was void as he
was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of
determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to
the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of
the Evidence Act will have to apply the same
12standard. No different standard can be applied in case
of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or
similar offence where the victim or the victim although
might have consented with the accused, if on the
basis of the entries made in the register maintained by
the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the
accused would be deprived of his constitutional right
under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the
accused may unjustly be convicted.”
27. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Others, {2022 8 SCC 602}, while considering various judgments, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the
aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:
33.2. If an application is filed before the Court
claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of
section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be
applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9
so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a
finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may
be.
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the
burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the
Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the
documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii)
of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or
sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be
sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On
the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of
juvenility may be raised.
33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive
proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be
rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.
33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not
the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a
juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is
pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In
13
case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie
conclusion but when there is a determination of age as
per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a
declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the
age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be
the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the
standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that
required in a proceeding where the determination and
declaration of the age of a person has to be made on
the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if
worthy of such acceptance.
33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay
down an abstract formula to determine the age of a
person. It has to be on the basis of the material on
record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by
the parties in each case.
33.7. This Court has observed that a hypertechnical
approach should not be adopted when evidence is
adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the
plea that he was a juvenile.
33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence,
the court should lean in favour of holding the accused
to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to
ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made
applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the
same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act,
2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment
after having committed serious offences.
33.9. That when the determination of age is on the
basis of evidence such as school records, it is
necessary that the same would have to be considered
as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act,
inasmuch as any public or official document
maintained in the discharge of official duty would have
greater credibility than private documents.
33.10. Any document which is in consonance with
public documents, such as matriculation certificate,
could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board
provided such public document is credible and
authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence
Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.
33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for
age determination and a mechanical view regarding
the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the
basis of medical opinion by radiological examination.
14
Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a
very useful guiding factor to be considered in the
absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of
the JJ Act, 2015.”
28. In P. Yuvaprakash v. State represented by Inspector of Police,
{2023 SCC Online SC 846}, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14
to 17 as under :
“14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that
the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation
or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination
board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the
birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal
Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the
absence of these such documents the age is to be
determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest
medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of
the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court.
In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate
and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or
equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the
school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the
victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate
was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the
court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always
upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore,
the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a
document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-
3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had
stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect
to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not
answer to thedescription of any class of documents
mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer
certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold
that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the
offence.
15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to
be followed in cases where age determination is required.
The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile
Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of
the JJ Act, and held as follows:
“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the
procedure to be followed in determination of age. The
15juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be
decided prima facie on the basis of physical
appearance, or documents, if available. But an
inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or
the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining:
(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of
birth certificate from the school (other than a play
school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the
absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical
opinion could be sought from a duly constituted
Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or
child. It was also provided that while determination
was being made, benefit could be given to the child
or juvenile by considering the age on lower side
within the margin of one year.”
16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act,
especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ
Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:
“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth
certificate from the school and the matriculation or
equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502
[2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the
same category (namely (i) above). In the absence
thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth
certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or
panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that
age determination by means of medical analysis is
provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant
change over the provisions which were contained in
Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act
of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or
equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was
only in the event of the certificate not being available
that the date of birth certificate fromthe school first
attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both
the date of birth certificate from the school as well as
the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in
the same category.
17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West
Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that
the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below
the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further,
16
in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of
documents that would be accepted in order of preference.”
29. In Alamelu & Another (supra), where the facts and circumstances were
similar to that of this case, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“51. This Court in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan {AIR
1952 SC 54} declared that corroboration is not the sine qua
non for a conviction in a rape case. In the aforesaid case,
Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-
“The rule, which according to the cases has hardened
into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential
before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of
corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the
circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be
present to the mind of the judge, … The only rule of law
is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind
of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be
understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no
rule of practice that there must, in every case, be
corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to
stand.”
52. The aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated by
this Court in numerous judgments subsequently. These
observations leave no manner of doubt that a conviction can
be recorded on the sole, uncorroborated testimony of a
victim provided it does not suffer from any basic infirmities or
improbabilities which render it unworthy of credence.
xxx xxx xxx
54. Even PW5, Thiru Thirunavukarasu stated that Sekar (A1)
had brought the girl with him to his house and told him that
he had married her. They had come to see Trichy and
requested a house to stay. This witness categorically stated
that he thought that they were newly married couple. He had
made them stay in Door No. 86 of the Police Colony, which
was under his responsibility. On 10th August, 1993, the
police inspector, who arrived there at 10.00 p.m. told this
witness that Sekar (A1) had married the girl by threatening
her and “spoiled her”. The girl, according to the prosecution,
was recovered from the aforesaid premises. Therefore, for
six days, this girl was staying with Sekar (A1). She did not
raise any protest. She did not even complain to this witness
or any other residents in the locality. Her behavior of not
complaining to anybody at any of the stages after being
allegedly abducted would be wholly unnatural.
17
55. Earlier also, she had many opportunities to complain or
to run away, but she made no such effort. It is noteworthy
that she made no protest on seeing some known persons
near the car, after her alleged abduction. She did not make
any complaint at the residence of Selvi, sister of Sekar (A1)
at Pudupatti. Again, there was no complaint on seeing her
relatives allegedly assembled at the temple. Her relatives
apparently took no steps at the time when mangalsutra was
forcibly tied around her neck by Sekar (A1). No one sent for
police help even though a car was available. She made no
complaint when she was taken to the house of PW5, Thiru
Thirunavukarasu and stayed at his place. Again, there was
no protest when Sekar (A1) took her to the police station on
5th day of the alleged abduction and told at the Tiruchi
Police Station that they had already been married. The
above behaviour would not be natural for a girl who had
been compelled to marry and subjected to illicit sexual
intercourse.
56. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion
that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt any of the offences with which the appellants had
been charged. It appears that the entire prosecution story
has been concocted for reasons best known to the
prosecution.”
30. In the present case, the victim was not under detention or captivity and
she was all the time free and had it been a case of forceful sexual
intercourse, she had the opportunity to take help of anyone, either the
police or her family members. But in the instant case, even as per the
deposition of the victim, she was in love with the appellant and only when
she came to know that the appellant was going to marry other girl, she
lodged the complaint which clearly establishes that the relationship
between the appellant and the victim was consensual. She never
attempted to inform anyone or make a complaint to her family members
that the appellant was bothering him for long time. The relationship
continued between the appellant and the victim for a quite long time i.e.
between 02.07.2017 to 18.11.2019 and the written complaint and the
FIR was lodged only on 06.05.2020 i.e. after about five months for which
there is no explanation offered by the victim.
18
31. In view of the above discussion, and in light of the ratio laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases (supra), this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond
reasonable doubt and the judgment passed by the learned trial Court
needs interference and as such, the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 06.03.2025 is hereby set aside and the appellant/convict
is acquitted of the charges.
32. Resultantly, this appeal stands allowed.
33. The appellant/convict is reported to be in jail. He is directed to be
released forthwith unless wanted in any other case. However, keeping in
view the provision of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C. {Section 481 of the
BNSS}, the accused-appellant is directed to furnish a personal bond for a
sum of Rs. 25,000/- with two sureties in the like amount before the court
concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with
an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against
the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant, on
receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.
34. Registry is directed to transmit the trial court record along with a copy of
this order to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information
and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Amit
AMIT
KUMAR
DUBEY
Digitally signed by
AMIT KUMAR
DUBEY
Date: 2026.04.27
18:14:37 +0530