Punjab-Haryana High Court
Dharampal Alias Kala vs State Of Punjab on 17 February, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
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Dharampal alias Kala
....Petitioner
Petitioner
versus
State of Punjab
....Respondent
Date of decision: February 17,
17, 2026
Date of Uploading: February 17,
17, 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:-
Present: Mr. Jagjit Pal Singh Sarao, Advocate for the petitioner
(presence
presence marked through video-
video-conferencing
conferencing).
Mr. Adhiraj Singh Thind, AAG Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL,
GOEL, J. (ORAL)
Present second petition has been filed under Section 483 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNSS’
‘BNSS’) for grant of
regular bail to the petitioner,
petitioner in case bearing FIR No
No.161 dated 20.09.2023,,
registered for the offences
off punishable under Section
Sections 22/ 29 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘NDPS Act‘), at Police
Station Passiana, District Patiala.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question is that the petitioner is an
accused of being involved in an FIR pertaining to NDPS Act involving alleged
recovery of 820 loose intoxicant tablets (Tramadol Hydrochloride) from a
polythene envelope thrown by the co-accused,
accused, namely, Happy Singh and the
petitioner,, when they were apprehended by the police
police.
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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the petitioner
was initially arrested on 20.09.2023, thereafter, he was released on interim bail,
vide order dated 30.10.2023. Learned counsel has further iterated that the
petitioner surrendered on 08.08.2024 and is in continuous custody since then.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that mandatory
provisions of the NDPS Act have not scrupulously been complied with, and
thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent defects. Learned counsel for
the petitioner has iterated that the trial is delayed and the liability thereof
cannot be fastened upon the petitioner. Learned counsel has further iterated that
the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more than 01½ years. Thus, regular
bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has filed status report by way of an
affidavit dated 16.02.2026 and custody certificate dated 16.02.2026, in the
Court today, which are taken on record. Raising submissions in tandem with
the said status report, learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by
arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in nature
and, thus, the petitioner does not deserve the concession of the regular bail.
Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is barred
by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same ought to be
dismissed.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. Concededly, the petitioner was initially arrested on 20.09.2023,
thereafter, he was released on interim bail, vide order dated 30.10.2023. The
petitioner surrendered on 08.08.2024 and is in continuous custody since then.
After culmination of investigation, challan was presented on 27.04.2024. Total
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11 prosecution witnesses have been cited, out of which, 03 have been examined
till date. Indubitably, conclusion of the trial will take long time. The rival
contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues, which shall be
ratiocinated upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it
appropriate to delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may
prejudice the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the
likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or interfering
with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. The trial is indeed procrastinating and folly thereof cannot be
saddled upon the petitioner. As per custody certificate dated 16.02.2026 filed
by the learned State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration
for a period of 01 year, 07 months and 20 days, & is not shown to be involved
in any other FIR(s).
6.2. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM
CRM–M-64074
64074–2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after relying
upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81; Abdul
Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR (Criminal) 494; Mohd
Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported as 2023 INSC 311;
Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated 07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias
Subhas vs. The State of West Bengal“; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The
State of West Bengal”, Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated
22.08.2022 titled as “Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of
Gujarat“; Criminal Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal
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Krishna Patra @ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a
vital safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail any
impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there is an
overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This right has
been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio decidendi of the
above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. The concept of
speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21 as an essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty, guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed at the time of the arrest of the accused and consequent
incarceration which continues at all stages, namely, the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible
prejudice that may result due to impermissible and avoidable delay since
the time of the commission of the offence till the criminal proceedings
consummate into a finality, could be averted. The speedy trial, early
hearing and quick disposal are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The
overcrowded Court-dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant
pressure on the prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire
criminal jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to the
criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs. The
guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and prevent
delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an obligation to
proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The guarantee serves a
threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused against oppressive pre-
trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the accused of the anxiety and
public suspicion due to unresolved criminal charges and lastly, it protects
against the risk that evidence will be lost or memories dimmed by the
passage of time, thus, impairing the ability of the accused to defend
himself. It goes without saying that the consequences of pre-trial detention
are grave. Accused, presumed innocent, till proven otherwise, are
subjected to psychological and physical deprivations of jail-life, usually
under onerous conditions. Equally important, the burden of detention of
such an accused frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his
family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail petition
in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep in mind the
rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985 which mandates
that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after hearing the public
prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin conditions which are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985
must be meticulously scrutinized against the backdrop of accused’s
fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to life and personal liberty
cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted delays in the judicial process,
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particularly where such delay(s) is neither attributable to the accused nor
justified at the end of the prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual
cannot be kept behind bars for an inordinate period of time by taking
refuge in rigours laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The
legislature in its wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of
the cases under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts
under Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s
eye to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does
not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with bail
petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act,
1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the legislative
intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right of the accused
to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration, without justifiable
cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into punitive imprisonment,
an outcome antithetical to the principle of justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of life
and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In other
words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity, on the
ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985.”
In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
6.3. Indubitably, the present petition is the second attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea was dismissed as withdrawn
on 21.04.2025. However, keeping in view the entirety of the factual matrix of
the case in hand; especially, factum of the petitioner having suffered extended
incarceration for more than 09 months & pace of trial; this Court is inclined to
affirmatively consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this
CRA–S-2332
regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA 2332–2023
titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another; relevant whereof
reads as under:
“10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the following
principles emerge:
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I Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be rejected
solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-prosecution
or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently
required to show substantial change in circumstances and showing
of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not suffice. The
metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive bail plea(s)
ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of petition(s) without
substantial, effective and consequential change in circumstances.
IV No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as every
case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such an
attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this issue is
best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the Court dealing
with such second/successive regular bail petition(s).
V In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular
bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently required to
be recorded for granting such plea despite such a plea being
second/successive petition(s). In other words, the cause for a Court
having successfully countenanced/entertained such
second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and clearly
decipherable from the said order passed.”
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial is
not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is allowed. Petitioner is
ordered to be released on regular bail, if not required in any other case, on his
furnishing bail/surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial
Court/Duty Magistrate. However, in addition to conditions that may be
imposed by the concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall
remain bound by the following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral or
documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date before
the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on bail.
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(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with the
trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station and
shall not change his cell-phone number without prior
permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial Court,
to the effect that he has not been involved in commission of
any offence after being released on bail. In case the
petitioner is found to be involved in any offence after his
being enlarged on bail in the present FIR, on the basis of
his affidavit or otherwise, the State is mandated to move,
forthwith, for cancellation of his bail which plea, but of
course, shall be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as directed
hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the State/complainant
shall be at liberty to move cancellation of bail of the petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stands disposed off.
(SUMEET GOEL)
GOEL)
JUDGE
February 17,
17, 2026
2026
mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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