Bombay High Court
Dharamdas S/O Melumal Ramani vs State Of Mah. Thr. Its P.S.O., P.S. Ajni … on 29 April, 2026
2026:BHC-NAG:6684-DB
(1) appw.192.2015.Ord.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APPW) NO.192 OF 2015
IN
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.297 OF 2011
Dharamdas s/o Melumal Ramani
Vs.
State of Maharashtra through Police Station, Ajni, Nagpur and another
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Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders
appearances, Court's orders of directions
and Registrar's orders
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Mr. P. S. Tiwari, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. A. M. Joshi, APP for respondent No.1/State.
Mr. Satish Uke - in person - applicant/respondent No.2.
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.
CLOSED ON : 26/03/2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 29/04/2026
1. By this application, the applicant/respondent
No.2 is seeking an action as per under Section 195
read with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) against the petitioner
contending that the petitioner has made false,
scandalous, unfounded, scrupulous, allegations
against him in the memo of petition.
The applicant is further seeking an
appropriate action against the petitioner for
misleading the Court and their act of fraud on Court.
(2) appw.192.2015.Ord.
2. The respondent No.2 has filed the above
said application contending that the petitioner has
filed a criminal writ petition for quashing of the FIR
registered against him in connection with Crime
No.197/2008 and the consequent proceeding arising
out of the same bearing charge sheet No.234/2009
as well as challenged the order passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur in Criminal
Revision Application No.606/2010, by which the
application for discharge was rejected.
3. While preferring the criminal writ petition on
a solemn affirmation, the petitioner has made a false
statement in para No.4 as follows:
“That Satish Mahadeorao Uke by taking
benefit of his position as a lawyer makes
repeated complaints to the police and by his
influence causes due harassment to innocent
citizens.”
4. The further pleading of the petition in the
same para as “That the father of the respondent No.2
was also a retired policeman. It is by exploiting
these police relations which he has developed
(3) appw.192.2015.Ord.
because of he being belonging to a family a
policeman, that the respondent No.3 has been
successful in lodging these false FIR’s.”
5. The above said statement is false against
the present applicant who is respondent No.2 to
lower down his image and to cause the prejudice in
the mind of the Court. In other connected matters
also he made similar false statement against him and
his family members. It is further contended that in
writ petition in para No.5, further false statement is
made by the petitioner as “That, the petitioner has
been a victim of the similar complaints made by
Satish Uke at about 15 – 20 complaints have been
lodged against the present petitioner by the said
advocate who has been using the complaints a tool to
extract easy money by pressurizing innocent person
of dire consequences.” This statement is also false
only to cause the prejudice against the applicant
(respondent No.2). Similarly, he has made the false
statement in Para Nos.6 and 7 which is mentioned in
his application. Similarly in Para Nos.8 to 10. Thus,
he submitted that the petitioner has filed the petition
(4) appw.192.2015.Ord.
with above false submissions and thereby mislead the
Court and therefore, the action under Section 195
read with Section 340 of Cr.P.C. is required against
the present petitioner.
6. Heard learned counsel for the applicant who
is respondent No.2. He has also placed on record the
written submission in support of his contention. The
first contention raised by him is that the petitioner
has made fraud upon the Court by making false
frivolous and misleading affidavit making false
statement by twisting the material facts and thereby
he has committed an offence of perjury therefore, it
is expedient in the interest of justice that dishonest
litigants must be prosecuted as per the provision of
Section 195 read with Section 340 of Cr.P.C. He
further submitted being the present application is
filed by the applicant for taking action the petitioner –
accused do not have right of hearing at the stage of
enquiry under Section 340(1) of the Cr.P.C. He
submitted that the catena of decisions dealt with this
aspect and it is held that the application under
Section 340 of Cr.P.C. required to be considered
(5) appw.192.2015.Ord.
wherein the petitioner accused has no role to play.
In support of his contention, he placed reliance on
the decision of this Court in Harish V. Milani Vs.
Union of India [Civil Application No.2939 of
2017 in Writ Petition No.14039 of 2017] dated
26.04.2018, wherein this Court has held that it
would be just and proper to hear CA filed by the
respondent under Section 340 of Cr.P.C. before
deciding the writ petition. He also relied upon on the
same judgment wherein it is held that before
registering the complaint by the Magistrate under
Section 340 of CrP.C. hearing the person against
whom prosecution is likely to be instituted is not
contemplated. A respondent who will face inquiry
has every right to know and is to be heard in the
proceeding once a complaint is registered and the
proceedings are conducted under Section 340 of the
Code to refer the matter for registering the complaint
to the Magistrate under Section 340 of Cr.P.C.
7. As far as this submission of the present
applicant (respondent No.2) is concerned, it is well
settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in
(6) appw.192.2015.Ord.
the case of The State of Punjab vs. Jasbir Singh,
reported in (2020)12 SCC 96 by relying upon the
ratio in the case of Pritish vs. State of
Maharashtra, (2002) 1 SCC 253 and in the case of
Sharad Pawar v. Jagmohan Dalmiya, (2010)15
SCC 290. In the case of The State of Punjab vs.
Jasbir Singh it is noted that three Judge-Bench in
Sharad Pawar supra did not take note of dictum in
Pritish and proceeded to hold that the proposed
accused should be given an opportunity of hearing
before the court directs a preliminary enquiry under
Section 340(1) of the CrPC. The view taken by the
Larger Bench in reference in The State of Punjab
vs. Jasbir Singh supra by relying upon the
constitution bench decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah
vs. Meenakshi Marwah, reported in (2005)4 SCC
370 to hold that there is no question of opportunity
of hearing being given to the proposed accused under
Section 340(1) of the CrPC. The Hon’ble Apex Court
further opined that law laid down by the Constitution
Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah was in line with
dictum in Pritish and while answering the reference
as to the whether an opportunity of hearing should
(7) appw.192.2015.Ord.
be given to the proposed accused before the
complaint is made under section 195 of the CrPC in
negative.
8. Thus, the settled law laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that the accused do not have
right of hearing at the stage of enquiry i.e. under
Section 340(1) of the CrPC. Similarly, in Gurpreet
Singh Kang vs. Gurpartap Singh, reported in
2013 SCC OnLine P&H 6599 wherein also it is held
that summoning the accused for the purpose of
holding preliminary enquiry will be the violation of the
concept of criminal jurisprudence.
9. In the case of Partha Sarathy Saha vs.
Nagpur District Court, reported in 2005 SCC
OnLine Bom 634 wherein the co-ordinate bench of
this court held that the accused has no right to be
heard at the stage of enquiry under Section 340 of
the CrPC or even when the complaint is filed before
the Magistrate. Thus, it is consistent view that the
accused has no right to appear and contest the
present application.
(8) appw.192.2015.Ord. 10. The further submission of the learned
counsel for the applicant who is respondent No.2 that
the statement of the petitioner in his writ petition
“That the respondent No.2 has been indulging into
causing serious harassment to the present petitioner
and many other innocent persons in the city by
lodging false criminal complaints and then dragging
them in the court to face the long drawn trial and
thus harassment for extracting easy money.” The
further statement “That said Satish Mahadeorao Uke
has been indulging into making frivolous complaints
in the Criminal Courts so also the revenue authorities
against the innocent persons and in all his complaints
he is the complainant in person.” “That Satish
Mahadeorao Uke by taking benefit of his position as a
lawyer makes repeated complaints to the police and
by his influence causes, undue harassment to
innocent persons.” “That the petitioner has been a
victim of the similar complaints made by Satish Uke
and about 15 – 20 complaints have been lodged
against the present petitioner by the said advocate
who has been using this complaints as tool to extract
easy money by pressurizing innocent persons of dire
(9) appw.192.2015.Ord.
criminal consequences.” “That the dispute between
the petitioner and the respondent No.2 started in the
year 2002 when the property bearing field survey
no.142 situated at mauza Pipala, District Nagpur was
purchased by the petitioner from a Handicapped
person Shri Pandurang Banait who was the then
owner of the property.” “That as the respondent was
trying to interfere with the ownership and possession
of the said property a suit came to be filed bearing
Special Suit No.88/2002 before the Civil Judge Senior
Division Nagpur. The respondent thereafter also filed
a suit against the present petitioner and the same
was registered as RCS No.1854/2002.” and “That
subsequently the said dispute between the parties
came to be settled and a consent decree came to be
passed dated 26.06.2002.” The further statement
that the allegation in the said complaint were in
respect of the same property wherein the respondent
has surrendered all his claim in view of the
compromise and the consent decree.” The false
statements made by the petitioner only to cause the
prejudice in the mind of the Court. These statements
are made by him on oath and thereby action is
(10) appw.192.2015.Ord.
required against him under Section 195 read with
Section 340 of Cr.P.C. He submitted that in fact, he
has purchased Survey No.142 situated at Mouza
Pipala, District Nagpur by registered sale deed.
Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that
applicant (respondent No.2) has purchased Survey
No.142 by taking advantage of his position as a
lawyer is false statement on oath. The applicant is in
possession of the said land. As his possession was
disturbed by original owner Pandurang Banait. He
filed a Civil Suit No.1854/2001 i.e. prior to the suit
filed by the said Pandurang Banait against him
bearing Civil Suit No.88/2002. The Court after
considering the pleading has granted the relief of
interim injunction against the original owner. Thus,
he submitted that in the light of the above fact, the
statement made by the petitioner in the writ petition
is apparently false. He further submitted that the
contention of the petitioner that the applicant has
filed various complaints against him and various
citizens is also false and misleading statement. On
the contrary, he submitted that the crime
No.197/2008 was registered against the present
(11) appw.192.2015.Ord.
petitioner under Sections 448, 389, 506(2) read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, wherein after
due investigation, the investigating agency has filed
charge sheet against the present petitioner. He
further submitted that Crime No.136/2006 was
registered against the petitioner on the basis of a
report by Smt. Khairunnissa Samad. Report of
Superintendent of Police dated 05.06.2002 shows
that despite Survey No.142 admeasuring 4.81 R was
sold out to the applicant – respondent No.2 Satish
Uke, original owner Pandurang Banait has preferred
the Civil Suit, but prior to that the present applicant
has preferred the suit wherein the said original owner
Pandurang Banait was restrained from causing any
disturbance to the peaceful possession of the present
applicant by the competent Civil Court.
11. Thus, despite of the above fact,
Sub-Registrar registered the sale deed in favour of
the petitioner Dharamdas Ramani, which is executed
by the original owner Pandurang Banait with the help
of Shyam Moudkar who is not a registered petition
writer. Thus, he submitted that the report of
(12) appw.192.2015.Ord.
Superintendent of Police also shows the involvement
of the present petitioner in various illegal activities.
The information obtained from Sub-Registrar Office
dated 23.06.2008 also shows that one of the
co-accused Shyam Anandrao Moudkar is not a
registered petition writer. Despite he is not the
registered petition writer, the present petitioner with
the help of him got executed the sale deed of the
same property in his favour from the original owner.
He further invited my attention towards the another
Crime No.3008/2005 registered against the petitioner
on 25.01.2005 under Sections 294, 506(B) wherein
also after completion of investigation the charge
sheet is filed. Thus, he submitted that all these
aspects sufficiently shows that the statement made
by the petitioner are not only false, misleading,
scandalous before the Court and therefore, the action
under Section 195 read with Section 340 of Cr.P.C. is
required against the present petitioner. In support of
his contention, he placed reliance on the decision of
ABCD vs. Union of India, reported in AIR OnLine
2019 SC 1946, Criminal Application
No.728/2017 [Fareed Ahmed Qureshi vs. The
(13) appw.192.2015.Ord.
State of Maharashtra and another] decided on
07.03.2018. The order passed by this Court in Civil
Application No.1282/2011 in Appeal From
Order No.102/2011 [CTR Manufacturing
Industries Limited vs. Sergi Transformer
Explosion Prevention Technologies Private
Limited and others] decided on 30.10.2012.
12. Before entering into the merits of the case,
it would be appropriate to reproduce Section 340 of
the Cr.PC, as under:
“340. Procedure in cases mentioned in
Section 195. (1) When upon an application
made to it in this behalf or otherwise any
Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the
interest of justice that an inquiry should be
made into any offence referred to in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, which
appears to have been committed in or in
relation to a proceeding in that Court or, as
the case may be, in respect of a document
produced or given evidence in a proceeding in
that Court, such Court may, after such
preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks
necessary,
(a) record a finding to that effect;
(b) make a complaint thereof in writing;
(14) appw.192.2015.Ord.
(c) send it to a Magistrate of the first class
having jurisdiction;
(d) take sufficient security for the appearance
of the accused before such Magistrate, or if
the alleged offence is non-bailable and the
Court thinks it necessary so to do, send the
accused in custody to such magistrate; and
(e) bind over any person to appear and give
evidence before such Magistrate.
(2) The power conferred on a Court by
subsection (1) in respect of an offence may,
in any case where that Court has neither
made a complaint under sub-section (1) in
respect of that offence nor rejected an
application for the making of such complaint,
be exercised by the Court to which such
former Court is subordinate within the
meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 195.
(3) A complaint made under this section shall
be signed, –
(a) where the Court making the complaint is
a High Court, by such officer of the Court as
the Court may appoint;
(b) in any other case, by the presiding officer
of the Court[or by such officer of the Court as the Court
may authorise in writing in this behalf.]
[Substituted by Act 2 of 2006, Section 6, for
Cl. (b) (w.e.f. 16-4-2006). Prior to its
substitution, Cl (b) read as under : – [(b) in
by other case, by the presiding officer of the
Court].]
(15) appw.192.2015.Ord.
(4) In this section, “Court” has the same
meaning as in Section 195.
13. Section 195 (1)(b) of the CrPC is also
relevant, which is also reproduced as under :
“195(1)(b)
(i) of any offence punishable under any of the
following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860), namely, sections 193 to 196 (both
inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both
inclusive) and 228, when such offence is
alleged to have been committed in, or in
relation to, any proceeding in any Court, or
(ii)of any offence described in section 463, or
punishable under section 471, section 475 or
section 476 of the said Code, when such
offence is alleged to have been committed in
respect of a document produced or given in
evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or
attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any
offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-
clause (ii),
[except on the complaint in writing of that
Court or by such officer of the Court as that
Court may authorise in writing in this behalf,
or of some other Court to which that Court is
subordinate.] [Substituted by Act 2 of 2006,
Section 3 for “except on the complaint in
writing of that Court, of some other Court to
which that Court is subordinate” (w.e.f. 16-4-
2006).]
(16) appw.192.2015.Ord.
14. Here in the present application, the
contention of the applicant who is respondent No.2 is
that the scandalous, false allegations are levelled
against him and therefore, the action is required. He
vehemently submitted that the various statements
made by the petitioner in the writ petition appears to
be false in the light of the investigation papers as well
as the various circumstances which are on record.
The core of the submission of the applicant is that the
entire pleading in the writ petition is false, scandalous
and misleading, the Court which is sufficient to take
action against him.
15. As far as the law regarding action under
Section 195 read with Section 340 is concerned, the
law is settled in the case of Dalip Singh vs. State of
UP and anr, reported in (2010)2 SCC 114;
Ramrameshwari Devi and ors vs. Nirmala Devi
and ors, reported in (2011)8 SCC 249; Kishore
Samrite vs. State of UP and ors, (2013)2 SCC
398 wherein it is held that, “it is very well settled
that a persons whose case is based on falsehood has
no right to approach the court and he is not entitled
(17) appw.192.2015.Ord.
to be heard on merits and he can be thrown out at
the stage of litigation”.
16. In Tiscon Realty Private Limited vs. C.G.
Edifice, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1154 it is held that
the defendant should not be allowed leave to defend
on the pretext of making false oath on the affidavit.
It is further held that if a party comes to court with
unclean hands or basis its case and/or defence on
falsehood, as has been done in the present case, the
party should be dealt with very strongly and
substantial costs and also should be imposed on the
party.
17. In the case of Union of India and ors vs.
Haresh Virumal Milani, reported in 2017 SCC
OnLine Bom 1705, it is observed that if the court is
of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of
justice that an inquiry should be made into any
offence, it means that the Court has to undergo a
process of formation of opinion in respect of would be
or proposed inquiry. Thus it is a process of not
confirming of the offence or guilt, but just formation
(18) appw.192.2015.Ord.
of opinion that the matter is worth, having some
material which apparently constitutes an offence as
specified under Section 195 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, to send it to a magistrate of the First
Class having jurisdiction. Thus it is a stage of a
preliminary inquiry, wherein the Judge need not go in
depth of the assessment. It is further held that
hearing of the person against whom prosecution is
likely to be instituted is not contemplated.
18. In The State of Punjab vs. Jasbir Singh
supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court was considering the
issue whether Section 340 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 mandates a preliminary inquiry and
an opportunity of hearing to the would-be accused
before a complaint is made under Section 195 of the
Code by a Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that
there is no question of opportunity of hearing in a
scenario of this nature and we say nothing else but
that a law as enunciated by the Constitution Bench in
Iqbal Singh Marwah‘s case supra is in line with
what was observed in Pritish‘s case supra. The
(19) appw.192.2015.Ord.
answer thus raised to the question raised can be
granted.
19. In the case of Devinder Mohan Zakhmi
vs. The Amritsar Improvement Trust, Amritsar
reported in 2002 SCC OnLine 439 also the aspect
was considered and it is held that the accused has no
right to participate at this stage.
20. Thus, it is settled law that at this stage the
accused against whom the action is sought is not
entitled to participate in the said proceeding.
21. Sub-section (1) of Section 195 of the CrPC
creates a bar in taking cognizance on the complaint
filed by the respondent. The controversy revolves
around the interpretation that “when such offence is
alleged to have been committed in respect of
document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in any court. After going through the
provisions especially Section 195(1)(b)(ii), it is clear
that for taking cognizance of an offence, the
document or the allegation of a false evidence or a
(20) appw.192.2015.Ord.
forgery if produced before the court, the bar of taking
cognizance under section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets attracted
and the criminal court is prohibited from taking
cognizance of offence unless complaint in writing is
filed as per the procedure prescribed under Section
340 of the Code or by on behalf of the court. The
object is to preserve purity of the administration of
justice and to allow the parties to adduce evidence.
22. Thus, the scope of the preliminary enquiry
envisaged in Section 340(1) of the Code is to
ascertain whether any offence affecting
administration of justice has been committed in
respect of a document produced in court or given in
evidence in a proceeding in that Court. In other
words, the offence should have been committed
during the time when the document was in custodia
legis.
23. While dealing with the provisions under
Sections 340 and 341 of the CrPC, the Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh
Marwah supra observed that in view of the language
(21) appw.192.2015.Ord.
used in Section 340 Cr.PC the court is not bound to
make a complaint regarding commission of an
offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the
section is conditioned by the words “court is of
opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice”.
This shows that such a course will be adopted only if
the interest of justice requires and not in every case.
Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a
preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect
that it is expedient in the interests of justice that
enquiry should be made into any of the offences
referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will
normally be judged by the court by weighing not the
magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected
by such forgery or forged document, but having
regard to the effect or impact, such commission of
offence has upon administration of justice. It is
possible that such forged document or forgery may
cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person
in the sense that it may deprive him of a very
valuable property or status or the like, but such
document may be just a piece of evidence produced
or given in evidence in court, where voluminous
(22) appw.192.2015.Ord.
evidence may have been adduced and the effect of
such piece of evidence on the broad concept of
administration of justice may be minimal. In such
circumstances, the court may not consider it
expedient in the interest of justice to make a
complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as
canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants,
would render the victim of such forgery or forged
document remediless. Any interpretation which leads
to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered
remediless, has to be discarded.
It is further held by the Hon’ble Apex Court
that there is another consideration which has to be
kept in mind. Sub-section (1) of Section 340 Cr.PC
contemplates holding of a preliminary enquiry.
Normally, a direction for filing of a complaint is not
made during the pendency of the proceeding before
the court and this is done at the stage when the
proceeding is concluded and the final judgment is
rendered. Section 341 provides for an appeal against
an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearing
and ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take
time. Section 343(2) confers a discretion upon a
(23) appw.192.2015.Ord.
court trying the complaint to adjourn the hearing of
the case if it is brought to its notice that an appeal is
pending against the decision arrived at in the judicial
proceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In
view of these provisions, the complaint case may not
proceed at all for decades specially in matters arising
out of civil suits where decisions are challenged in
successive appellate foram which are
time-consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is
no provision of appeal against an order passed under
Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is
adjourned until the decision of the appeal. In view of
these provisions, the complaint case may not proceed
at all for decades specially in matters arising out of
civil suits where decisions are challenged in
successive appellate foram which are
time-consuming. It is also to be noticed that there is
no provision of appeal against an order passed under
Section 343(2), whereby hearing of the case is
adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These
provisions show that, in reality, the procedure
prescribed for filing a complaint by the court is such
that it may not fructify in the actual trial of the
(24) appw.192.2015.Ord.
offender for an unusually long period. Delay in
prosecution of a guilty person comes to his
advantage as witnesses become reluctant to give
evidence and the evidence gets lost. This important
consideration dissuades us from accepting the broad
interpretation sought to be placed upon clause (b)
(ii).
The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed
that judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the
courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a
criminal complaint and such a course is rarely
adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an
interpretation which leads to a situation where a
person alleged to have committed an offence of the
type enumerated in clause (b)(ii) is either not placed
for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a
complaint is filed, the same does not come to its
logical end.
24. In KTMS Mohd. and anr vs. Union of
India, reported in (1992)3 SCC 178, it has been
held that, “in this context, reference may be made to
Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under
(25) appw.192.2015.Ord.
Chapter XXVI under the heading “Provisions as to
certain offences affecting the administration of
justice”. This section confers an inherent power on a
Court to make a complaint in respect of an offence
committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that
Court, or as the case may be, in respect of a
document produced or given in evidence in a
proceeding in that Court, if that Court is of opinion
that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an
enquiry should be made into an offence referred to in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 and
authorizes such Court to hold preliminary enquiry as
it thinks necessary and then make a complaint
thereof in writing after recording a finding to that
effect as contemplated under sub-section (1) of
Section 340. The words “in or in relation to a
proceeding in that Court” show that the Court which
can take action under this section is only the Court
operating within the definition of Section 195(3)
before which or in relation to whose proceeding the
offence has been committed. There is a word of
caution inbuilt in that provision itself that the action
to be taken should be expedient in the interest of
(26) appw.192.2015.Ord.
justice. Therefore, it is incumbent that the power
given by this Section 340 of the Code should be used
with utmost care and after due consideration”
25. In the case of K.Karunakaran vs.
T.V.Eachara Warrier, reported in 1978 AIR 290
also it is held that, “at an enquiry held by the court
under Section 340(1) Cr.P.C., irrespective of the
result of the main case, the only question is whether
a prima facie case is made out which, if unrebutted,
may have a reasonable likelihood to establish the
specified offence and whether it is also expedient in
the interest of justice to take such action”.
26. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) vs.
Pankaj Chaudhary and others, reported in
(2019) 11 SCC 575, the Hon’ble Apex Court held
that there are two preconditions for initiating the
proceeding under Section 340 of the CrPC; (1).
materials presented before the court must establish a
prima facie case for a complaint related to an offense
under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Cr.PC, and (2). It
must be deemed expedient in the interests of justice
(27) appw.192.2015.Ord.
to conduct an inquiry into the alleged offense. It has
been observed that the Court has to be satisfied as to
the prima facie case for a complaint for the purpose
of inquiry into an offence under Section 195(1)(b)
Cr.P.C. The mere fact that a person has made a
contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not
by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution
under Sections 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal
Code, but it must be shown that the defendant has
intentionally given a false statement at any stage of
the judicial proceedings or fabricated false evidence
for the purpose of using the same at any stage of the
judicial proceedings. Even after the above position
has emerged also, still the Court has to form an
opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice
to initiate an inquiry into the offences of false
evidence and offences against public justice and more
specifically referred to in Section 340(1) Cr.P.C.,
having regard to the overall factual matrix as well as
the probable consequences of such a prosecution.
Thus, the Court must be satisfied that such an inquiry
is required in the interests of justice and appropriate
in the facts of the case. In the process of formation of
(28) appw.192.2015.Ord.
opinion by the Court that it is expedient in the
interests of justice that an inquiry should be made
into, the requirement should only be to have a prima
facie satisfaction of the offence which appears to
have been committed. It is open to the Court to hold
a preliminary inquiry though it is not mandatory.
27. Thus, it is consistently held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that the prosecution for perjury
be sanctioned by the courts only in those cases
where perjury appears to be deliberate and
prosecution ought to be ordered where it would be
expedient in the interest of justice to punish
delinquent and not merely because there is some
inaccuracy in the statement. The prosecution for
perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those
cases where the perjury appears to be deliberate and
conscious and the conviction is reasonably probable
or likely. No doubt giving of false evidence and filing
false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively
curbed with a strong hand but to start prosecution for
perjury too readily and too frequently without due
care and caution and on inconclusive and doubtful
(29) appw.192.2015.Ord.
material defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should
be ordered when it is considered expedient in the
interests of justice to punish the delinquent and not
merely because there is some inaccuracy in the
statement which may be innocent or immaterial.
There must be prima facie case of deliberate
falsehood on a matter of substance and the court
should be satisfied that there is reasonable
foundation for the charge. The approach should not
be mechanical and superficial. It is sufficient to justify
conclusion that it is expedient in the interests of
justice to file a complaint.
28. It is expedient in the interest of justice that
“the enquiry shall be made”. These words are key
note to Section 340. Under Section 340 of the Code,
if it is expedient in the interest of justice and not on
mere allegations, the course of initiating an enquiry
under Section 340 is adopted only if the interests of
justice so requires.
29. In law, “expedient” generally deals suitable
or appropriate for achieving a particular purpose,
(30) appw.192.2015.Ord.
even if not always morally or ethically ideal. It can
also refer to something i.e. advantageous or helpful
in a specific situation, particularly when dealing with
an exigency. Essentially, it is about what is practical
and beneficial in the moment rather than necessarily
what is right or fair.
30. Advanced Law Lexicon defines “expedient”
as “act” and “suitable” to the end or “practical” and
“efficient,” “Polite”, “profitable,” “advisable” “fit,”
“proper” and “suitable” to the circumstances of the
case. In another case, it means a device
“characterized” by merely rather than principle,
conducting to special advantage rather than to what
universally right.
31. The law lexicon defines the term “expedient”
as “necessary” means what is indispensable, needful,
essential. The term has a precise meaning and
connotation and there is nothing vague or nebulous
about it. The term “expedient” has no doubt a wide
ambit and gives large scope to the exercise of power.
But this expression has also a recognized connotation
(31) appw.192.2015.Ord.
in the eye of law. There is no magic in recording the
words that “Court find it expedient in the interest of
justice that inquiry should be made” but from order
of Court, it should appear that Court has formed such
opinion.
32. In the case of in Shri Narendra Kumar
Srivastava vs. State of Bihar and ors, reported
in 2019 AIR (SC) 2675, while dealing with this
aspect, it is held that requirement of formation of
opinion of Court that it is expedient in the interest of
justice that an inquiry should be made, is with an
objective that prosecution should be ordered if it is in
the larger interest of administration of justice and not
to gratify feelings of personal revenge or
vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party.
The Hon’ble Apex Court referred its earlier judgment
in Santokh Singh vs. Izhar Hussain and anr,
reported in (1973) 2 SCC 406, and observed that
too frequent prosecutions for such offences tend to
defeat its very object. It is only in glaring cases of
deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely
that Court should direct prosecution.
(32) appw.192.2015.Ord.
33. Thus, the settled law on this aspect shows
that mere fact that a person has made a
contradictory statement in a judicial proceeding is not
by itself always sufficient to justify a prosecution for
an offence under section 195 of the IPC or 340 of the
Cr.PC but it must be shown that the defendant has
intentionally given a false statement at any stage of
judicial proceeding or fabricated false evidence for
the purpose of losing the same at any stage of
judicial proceedings. Even after the above position
has emerged, still the court has to form an opinion
that it is expedient in the interests of justice to
initiate an inquiry under Section 340(1) of the Cr.PC
into the offences of false evidence and offences
against public justice, having regard to the overall
factual matrix as well as the probable consequences
of such a prosecution. The court must be satisfied
that such an inquiry is required in the interests of
justice and appropriate in the facts of the case. In the
process of formation of opinion by the court that it is
expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry
should be made into, the requirement should only be
to have a prima facie satisfaction of the offence which
(33) appw.192.2015.Ord.
appears to have been committed. It is open to the
court to hold a preliminary inquiry though it is not
mandatory. In case, the court is otherwise in a
position to form such an opinion, that it appears to
the court that an offence as referred to under Section
340 CrPC has been committed, the court may
dispense with the preliminary inquiry. Even after
forming an opinion as to the offence which appears to
have been committed, it is not mandatory that a
complaint should be filed as a matter of course.
34. The question is whether it was expedient in
the interest justice that an enquiry should be directed
to be made as provided under Section 340 of the
CrPC. In this connection, it is pertinent to mention
that Section provides procedure in respect of offences
enumerated under Section 195 (1) (d)(i) of the Code
occur under Chapter XVI and XXVI. Sections 340 and
195 are closely connected and have to be read
together. Section 195 starts with the words ‘no court
shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under
Sections 172 to 188 of the IPC except with the
document in writing of the public servant concerned”.
(34) appw.192.2015.Ord.
Whereas, Section 195(1)(d) forbids cognizance by
any court and the offence against public servant
except on complaint in writing of that court. Section
340 enacted and gives procedure for the same and
provides as to the how the complaint is to be filed.
This Section deals with cases mentioning Section
195(1)(d) and it has no concern with the offences
under Section 195(1)(a). Thus, Section 340 and 195
(1)(d) are supplemented to each other. Section
195(1)(a) as observed earlier is not concerned with
the courts. It deals with contempt of lawful authority
of public servants and hence is not within the purview
of Section 340 of the Code. In view of the procedure
under Section 340, the court may take action
suo-motu or otherwise on an application made by
person if it is of the opinion that it is expedient in the
interest of justice to do so. In that case, the court
may complaint in writing or otherwise but the powers
of the court under Section 340 is confined with the
provisions whether the court is of the opinion that it
was expedient in the interest of justice to do so.
(35) appw.192.2015.Ord.
35. It is worth mentioning that the power under
Section 340 of the Code is not absolute one. The
enquiry can be made or the complaint can be
directed to be filed only when the court comes to
conclusion that it was expedient in the interest of
justice to do so. There may be case where false
complaint might have been filed for offence under
Section 195 (1)(d) might appear to have been
committed, but unless it is expedient in the interest
of justice, the opinion of the court that enquiry
should be made or complaint should be directed to be
filed, the same cannot be done.
36. Applying these rules of interpretation to
provisions of Section 340 of the CrPC, it is evident
that the intention of the legislature behind such a
language that the court’s discretion is circumscribed
by words used. The Court has to consider and weigh
the balance of situation to ascertain as to whether in
a given case is it ‘expedient’ in the interest of justice
that an enquiry should be made. As an inescapable
corollary, in case it is not ‘expedient’, under the
circumstances, enquiry must not be made. Deliberate
(36) appw.192.2015.Ord.
use of word “expedient” by the legislature obviously
connotes its meaning as to suitable or advisable. The
power of the Court in directing an enquiry to be made
or a complaint to be filed in view of the provisions of
Section 340 as limited with a condition that it should
appear to the Court to be expedient in the interest of
justice to do so. To put it differently, it is only in
glaring cases of deliberate falsehood when the Court
can direct an enquiry to be made or complaint to be
filed but this discretion has to be exercised judicially
in the light of all the relevant circumstances. Section
340 of the code is not with a view to satisfy personal
feelings of vindictiveness. The Court has to be
satisfied about the deliberate falsehood as a matter
of substance and there must be a reasonable
foundation for the charge and it must be expedient in
the interest of justice. The court has to exercise
judicial discretion in the light of all relevant
circumstances when it determines question of
expediency.
37. In Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi
Marwah case, the constitution bench of the Hon’ble
(37) appw.192.2015.Ord.
Apex Court has gone into scope of Section 340 and in
paragraph No.23 relevant considerations are noted
and observed as follows:
“In view of the language used in Section 340
Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a
complaint regarding commission of an offence
referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is
conditioned by the words “Court is of opinion that
it is expedient in the interest of justice.” This
shows that such a course will be adopted only if
the interest of justice requires and not in every
case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may
hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to
the effect that it is expedient in the interests of
justice that enquiry should be made into any of
the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This
expediency will normally be judged by the Court
by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered
by the person affected by such forgery or forged
document, but having regard to the effect or
impact, such commission of offence has upon
administration of justice. It is possible that such
forged document or forgery may cause a very
serious or substantial injury to a person in the
sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable
property or status or the like, but such document
may be just a piece of evidence produced or given
in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence
may have been adduced and the effect of such
piece of evidence on the broad concept of
administration of justice may be minimal. In such
circumstances, the Court may not consider it
expedient in the interest of justice to make a
complaint.”
38. Thus, it has been consistently held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that the prosecution for perjury
(38) appw.192.2015.Ord.
be sanctioned by the court only in those cases where
perjury appears to be dealt with and that prosecution
ought to be ordered where it would be expedient in
the interest of justice to punish delinquent and there
is no inaccuracy in the statement. Thus, before taking
action under Section 340 of the Cr.PC, the court is
required to see as to whether material produced
before the court makes out prima facie case for
complaint for the purpose of enquiry into the offence
referred in clause (b) of sub section (1) of Section
195 of the CrPC and it is expedient in the interest of
justice that enquiry should be made into the alleged
offence.
39. Thus, before directing the prosecution for
perjury for giving false evidence before the court, the
court has to come to conclusion the perjury appears
to be deliberate.
40. In Criminal Appeal No.1931/2011
(Ashok Gulabrao Bondre vs. Vilas Madhukarrao
Deshmukh) decided on 12.4.2023, the Hon’ble
Apex Court, while dealing with the provisions under
(39) appw.192.2015.Ord.
Section 195 of the CrPC and under section 340(1) of
the CrPC by referring its earlier judgment in the case
of Sachida Nand Singh and anr vs. State of Bihar
and anr, reported in (1998)2 SCC 493, observed
scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section
340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any
offence affecting administration of justice has been
committed in respect of a document produced in
court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that
Court. In other words, the offence should have been
committed during the time when the document was
in custodia legis. It would be a strained thinking that
any offence involving forgery of a document if
committed far outside the precincts of the Court and
long before its production in the Court, could also be
treated as one affecting administration of justice
merely because that document later reached the
court records.
41. Now, the only question requires for
consideration is that whether preliminary enquiry
before directing the prosecution for the alleged
statements of the accused is required.
(40) appw.192.2015.Ord.
42. At this stage, in view the settled law, it is
not expedient in the interest of justice to direct the
prosecution of the accused for making such
statements in the petition.
43. As observed earlier, basic requirement to
apply Section 340 is formation of an opinion by court
that it is expedient in the interest of justice that the
enquiry should be made for the offence which
appears to have been committed. It is also well
settled that merely because some statements are
made or a person has made a contradictory
statement in judicial proceeding is not by itself
always sufficient to justify prosecution of the
accused. It is to be ascertained whether the accused
intentionally made such statement in judicial
proceeding. Even after the above position, the court
has to form an opinion that it is expedient in the
interest of justice to initiate the enquiry into offence
of false statements and more specifically referred to
in Section 340(1) of the Cr.PC having regard to the
overall factual matrix as well as the probable
(41) appw.192.2015.Ord.
consequences of such prosecution. The court must be
satisfied that such an enquiry is required in the
interest of justice.
44. As observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that
the prosecution for perjury be sanctioned by the
courts only in those cases where perjury appears to
be dealt and that prosecution ought to be ordered
where it would be expedient in the interest of justice
to punish delinquent and there no inaccuracy in the
statement. Thus, before taking action under Section
340 of the Cr.P.C. the court is required to see as to
whether material produced before the court makes
out prima facie case for complaint for the purpose of
enquiry into the offence referred in clause (b) of sub
section (1) of Section 195 of the CrPC and it is
expedient in the interest of justice that enquiry
should be made into the alleged offence. It is worth
mentioning that the power under Section 340 of the
Code is not absolute one. The enquiry can be made
or the complaint can be directed to be filed only when
the court comes to conclusion that it was expedient
in the interest of justice to do so. There may be case
(42) appw.192.2015.Ord.
where false complaint might have been filed for
offence under Section 195 (1)(d) might appear to
have been committed, but unless it is expedient in
the interest of justice, the opinion of the court that
enquiry should be made or complaint should be
directed to be filed, the same cannot be done. The
power of the Court in directing an enquiry to be made
or a complaint to be filed in view of the provisions of
Section 340 as limited with a condition that it should
appear to the Court to be expedient in the interest of
justice to do so. To put it differently, it is only in
glaring cases of deliberate falsehood when the Court
can direct an enquiry to be made or complaint to be
filed but this discretion has to be exercised judicially
in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
Admittedly, the Section 340 of the code is not with a
view to satisfy personal feelings of vindictiveness.
The Court has to be satisfied about the deliberate
falsehood as a matter of substance and there must
be a reasonable foundation for the charge and it
must be expedient in the interest of justice.
(43) appw.192.2015.Ord.
45. Thus, at this stage, the material placed on
record is not sufficient to come to conclusion and to
form an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of
justice that enquiry should be made into offence
which appears to have been committed.
46. The controversy revolves around the
interpretation that “when such offence is alleged to
have been committed in respect of document
produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any
court. After going through the provisions especially
Section 195(1)(b)(ii), it is clear that for taking
cognizance of an offence, the document or the
allegation of a false evidence or a forgery if produced
before the court, the bar of taking cognizance under
section 195(1)(b)(ii) gets attracted and the criminal
court is prohibited from taking cognizance of offence
unless complaint in writing is filed as per the
procedure prescribed under Section 340 of the Code
or by on behalf of the court. The object is to preserve
purity of the administration of justice and to allow the
parties to adduce evidence. This shows that such a
course will be adopted only if the interest of justice
(44) appw.192.2015.Ord.
requires and not in every case. This expediency will
normally be judged by the court by weighing not the
magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected
by such forgery or forged document, but having
regard to the effect or impact, such commission of
offence has upon administration of justice. It is
possible that such forged document or forgery may
cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person
in the sense that it may deprive him of a very
valuable property or status or the like, but such
document may be just a piece of evidence produced
or given in evidence in court, where voluminous
evidence may have been adduced and the effect of
such piece of evidence on the broad concept of
administration of justice may be minimal. In such
circumstances, the court may not consider it
expedient in the interest of justice. Thus, the
broader view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed in
various judgments shows that the discretion is to be
used when it is a need for the purpose of securing
the justice or in other words where it is expedient in
the interest of justice. The term “expedient” as
mentioned above with the help of dictionary meaning
(45) appw.192.2015.Ord.
if applied to the present case, in my view, at this
stage, it is not expedient in the interest of justice to
hold an enquiry or to entertain the question.
47. Keeping in view the entire facts and
circumstances of the present case, I am of the view
that no case is made out by the applicant who is
respondent No.2, at this stage showing it is expedient
in the interest of justice to hold an enquiry and
therefore, the application deserves to be rejected and
hence it is rejected.
(URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.)
Sarkate
Signed by: Mr. A.R. Sarkate
Designation: PA To Honourable Judge
Date: 29/04/2026 20:15:27
