Delhi High Court – Orders
Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd vs Union Of India, Through Ministry Of … on 25 March, 2026
$~49
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CS(OS) 253/2026, I.A. 8028/2026, I.A. 8029/2026, I.A. 8030/2026 &
I.A. 8031/2026
DELHI RACE CLUB (1940) LTD. .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Sankalp Goswami and Mr. Azhar
Alam, Advs.
M: 9711794546
versus
UNION OF INDIA, THROUGH MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA .....Defendant
Through: Mr. Ashish K. Dixit, CGSC and Mr.
Varun Pratap Singh, GP with Mr.
Umar Hashmi, Adv. Mr. Rohit
Lather, ASO, Mr. Gautam Yadav,
Adv., Mr. Gaurav, Adv., Mr. Kunal
Bhashkar, Dy L&DO, Ms. Iqra
Shekh, Mr. Adhiraj Singh, Ms.
Deepika Kalra, Ms. Urmila Sharma,
Adv. and Ms. Venni Kakkar, Adv.
for UOI
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
ORDER
% 25.03.2026
I.A. 8030/2026 (For Exemption)
1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. Application stands disposed of.
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I.A. 8031/2026
3. The present application has been filed on behalf of the plaintiff under
Order II Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(“CPC“).
4. Issue notice. Notice is accepted by learned counsel appearing for the
defendant.
5. Let reply be filed, within a period of four weeks, from today.
6. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed, within two weeks, thereafter.
I.A. 8028/2026
7. The defendant-Union of India (“UOI”) has put in appearance.
8. Noting the aforesaid, the present application is disposed of.
CS(OS) 253/2026
9. Let the plaint be registered as suit.
10. Issue summons. Summons is accepted by learned counsel appearing
for the defendant.
11. Let written statement be filed by the defendant, within thirty (30) days
from today. Along with the written statement, the defendant shall also file an
affidavit of admission/denial of the documents of the plaintiff, without
which, the written statement shall not be taken on record.
12. Liberty is given to the plaintiff to file replication, if any, within thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the written statement. Along with the
replication, filed by the plaintiff, the affidavit of admission/denial of the
documents of defendant, be filed by the plaintiff, without which,
replication(s) shall not be taken on record.
13. It is made clear that any unjustified denial of documents may lead to
an order of costs against the concerned party.
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14. If any of the parties wish to seek inspection of the documents, the
same shall be sought and given within the timelines.
15. List before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on 18th May, 2026.
16. List before the Court on 09th April, 2026.
I.A. 8029/2026
17. The present suit has been filed seeking permanent injunction
restraining the defendant from illegally and forcibly dispossessing the
plaintiff from the premises, i.e., Delhi Race Club, Kamal Ataturk Marg,
New Delhi, pursuant to the Eviction Notice dated 12th March, 2026.
18. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits that the
plaintiff was granted property situated as Race Course Road on perpetual
lease by the defendant in the year 1926. The lease initially was for a period
of twenty-five years, which was further extendable for further terms of
twenty-five years.
19. It is submitted that since the year 1987 the defendant started
unilaterally demanding increased ground rent which was opposed by the
plaintiff through various communications. Subsequently, the plaintiff
received Show Cause Notice dated 25th October, 1999 under Section 7(3) of
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP
Act“).
20. Pursuant thereto, the plaintiff herein filed a writ petition, being
W.P.(C) 7822/1999, wherein, the plaintiff herein raised various grounds of
challenge, with regard to the provisions of PP Act not being applicable to
the plaintiff.
21. Vide order dated 29th December, 1999, further proceedings in relation
to the said Show Cause Notice, was stayed. The order dated 29th December,
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1999 reads as under:
22. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits that the
said writ petition was ultimately disposed of vide order dated 09th July,
2012, wherein, the plaintiff herein was directed to make a representation to
the UOI. Order dated 09th July, 2012 reads as under:
“The challenge in this petition is to a Notice of 25th October, 1999
(Annexure-A), under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction ofPage 4 of 15
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Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, as it is not preceded by
determination of the Lease of March, 1926 (Annexure-C). It is contended
by learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the issuance of the
impugned Show Cause Notice (Annexure-A) is per se bad in law.
Respondents’ counsel has been called upon to show as to whether the
Lease (Annexure-C) was determined at any point of time or whether the
subject premises was ever re-entered.
Learned counsel for respondents fairly concedes that neither the lease was
determined nor there was re-entry, as per Clause-5 of the Lease Deed
(Annexure-C), which is required to be preceded by impugned Notice
(Annexure-A).
In this view of the aforesaid stand taken, issuance of Notice (Annexure-A)
is patently bad in law and, therefore, the same is required to be quashed.
Accordingly, Show Cause Notice (Annexure A) is quashed with liberty to
the respondent to decide petitioners representation of 19th December,
2011 preferably within a period of four weeks and to apprise the petitioner
of the fate of the representation. In the event of rejection of the
representation of 19th December 2011 of the petitioner, the respondent is
free to determine the lease and re-enter the subject premises as the
petitioner is said to be in arrears of ground rent etc. Needless to say that
the petitioner would also be at liberty to challenge the rejection of his
representation of 19th December 2011 in accordance with the law.
This petition is disposed of in aforesaid terms.”
23. It is submitted that earlier, the plaintiff had also requested for
extension of lease of the Delhi Race Club Limited vide Letter dated 19th
December, 2011.
24. It is submitted that subsequently, the plaintiff also received a Demand
Letter dated 22nd July, 2013 issued by the Land and Development Office
(“L&DO”), Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India. Further,
by way of the said Letter dated 22nd July, 2013, the Government has
categorically stated that in case the various compliances with regard to
breach of the lease is complied with by the petitioner, the Government will
regularize the breaches in the premises. The said Letter dated 22nd July,
2013, reads as under:
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”
”
25. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner draws the attention of this
Court to the details of the payment already having been made by the plaintiff
to the Government with regard to the lease, which are reproduced as under:
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26. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to the Letter dated 23rd
August, 2013 written by the Delhi Race Club Limited, where there was a
request for extension of Lease Deed by the plaintiff. Along with the said
letter, a cheque for an amount of Rs. 3,48,82,723/- was also attached.
27. It is submitted that the said payment was duly received by the
Government. Thus, it is submitted that once, upon the request of the
petitioner for extension of the Lease Deed, amounts have been received by
the defendant, this would deem that the lease of the plaintiff has been
extended.
28. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff also draws the
attention of this Court to a breach notice issued by the Government attached
as Document no.17, which pertains to Report dated 09th March, 2022. By
referring to the said document, it is submitted that even in the year 2022, the
letter written by the Government to the plaintiff categorically referred to the
arrangement between the parties, as lease. The relevant paragraphs of the
said letter, read as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx”
29. By referring to the aforesaid, it is submitted by learned Senior
Counsel for the plaintiff that rather in the year 2022, the Government had
categorically written to the plaintiff with regard to the various breaches,
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which were termed as being in contravention of the Lease Deed. Thus, it is
submitted that the plaintiff has always been treated as a Lessee by the
defendant.
30. Further, attention of this Court has also been drawn to a Letter dated
24th November, 2023 issued by the Government of India to the plaintiff
wherein, again reference is made to matter related to lease administration of
land allotted to Delhi Race Club Limited. Thus, the said letter is reproduced
as under:
31. By referring to the aforesaid document, it is submitted that even in the
year 2023, the defendant has referred to the plaintiff being in occupation of
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the land in question in terms of the lease and as a lessee.
32. Learned Senior Counsel, thus, submits that there is a subsisting lease
in favour of the plaintiff, qua which, annual payments are being made by the
plaintiff for the time being.
33. He draws the attention of this Court to the letter dated 11th April,
2025, which contains the fact regarding the lease rent being paid by the
plaintiff for the land in question for the period from 01st April, 2025 to 31st
March, 2026. The said document is reproduced as under:
34. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff has also relied
upon Section 116 of the Transfer of Properties Act, 1882 (“TP Act“), which
reads as under:
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“xxx xxx xxx
116. Effect of holding over.–If a lessee or under-lessee of property
remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted
to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from
the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in
possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the
purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in section 106.
xxx xxx xxx”
35. By referring to the aforesaid Section, learned Senior Counsel for the
plaintiff submits that it is clear that the lease of the plaintiff is being renewed
from year to year. He further relies upon the judgment in the case of
Badrilal Versus Municipal Corporation of Indore, (1973) 2 SCC 388, and
in particular, relies upon the following paragraphs:
“xxx xxx xxx
8. It was then urged by Mr Gupte that the appellant having deposited
the rent up to March 31, 1954 and the Municipal Commissioner
having accepted it he should be deemed to be a tenant holding over.
Leaving aside for the moment the contention put forward on behalf of
the Corporation that this payment was made behind its back, it has to
be noted that the payment was at the rate prevailing before September
30, 1949 and on that date the Corporation having passed a resolution
specifying a new rate of rent of Rs 9 per Chasma the payment at the
old rate by the appellant and its acceptance by the Municipal
Commissioner was not an acceptance of rent as such and in clear
recognition of the tenancy right of the appellant. It cannot amount to
the Corporation consenting to the appellant continuing as a tenant by
paying the old rates of rent. There is thus no question of the appellant
being a tenant holding over. But a person who was lawfully in
occupation does not become a trespasser, even if he does not become
a tenant holding over but is a tenant by sufferance. The position at law
was explained in Kai Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia v. Bai Jerbai
Hirjibhoy Warden [AIR 1949 FC 124 : 1949-50 FCR 262 at 270 :
1949 FLJ 168] as follows:
“On the determination of a lease, it is the duty of the lessee to
deliver up possession of the demised premises to the lessor. If
the lessee or a sub-lessee under him continues in possession
even after the determination of the lease, the landlord
undoubtedly has the right to eject him forthwith; but if he doesPage 10 of 15
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not, and there is neither assent nor dissent on his part to the
continuance of occupation of such person, the latter becomes in
the language of English law a tenant on sufferance who has no
lawful title to the land but holds it merely through the laches of
the landlord. If now the landlord accepts rent from such person
or otherwise expresses assent to the continuance of his
possession, a new tenancy comes into existence as is
contemplated by Section 116, Transfer of Property Act, and
unless there is an agreement to the contrary, such tenancy
would be regarded as one from year to year or from month to
month in accordance with the provisions of Section 116 of the
Act.”
At p. 272 it was pointed out:
“It can scarcely be disputed that the assent of the landlord
which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of
rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy right
asserted by the person who pays it.”
9. The same position was explained in a recent decision of this Court
to which one of us was a party in Bhawanji Lakhamashi v. Himatlal
Jamnadas Dani. [(1972) 1 SCC 388] At p. 391 it was observed:
“The act of holding over after the expiration of the term does
not create a tenancy of any kind. If a tenant remains in
possession after the determination of the lease, the common law
rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. A distinction should be
drawn between a tenant continuing in possession after the
determination of the term with the consent of the landlord and a
tenant doing so without his consent. The former is a tenant at
sufferance is English Law and the latter a tenant holding over or
a tenant at will. In view of the concluding words of Section 116
of the Transfer of Property Act, a lessee holding over is in a
better position than a tenant at will. The assent of the landlord
to the continuance of possession after the determination of the
tenancy will create a new tenancy. What the section
contemplates is that on one side there should be an offer of
taking a new lease evidenced by the lessee or sub-lessee
remaining in possession of the property after his term was over
and on the other side there must be a definite consent to the
continuance of possession by the landlord expressed by
acceptance of rent or otherwise. In Kai Khushroo Bezonjee
Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden case the Federal Court
had occasion to consider the question of the nature of the
tenancy created under Section 116 of the Transfer of Property
Act and Mukherjea, J., speaking for the majority said that thePage 11 of 15
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tenancy which is created by the “holding over” of a lessee or
under-lessee is a new tenancy in law even though many of the
terms of the old lease might be continued in it, by implication;
and that to bring a new tenancy into existence, there must be a
bilateral act. It was further held that the assent of the landlord
which is founded on acceptance of rent must be acceptance of
rent as such and in clear recognition of the tenancy right
asserted by the person who pays it.”
xxx xxx xxx”
36. By referring to the aforesaid judgment, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the plaintiff submits that a person, who is in lawful
occupation, does not become a trespasser, and if the landlord accepts rent
from such person, then unless there is an agreement to the contrary, such
tenancy would be regarded as one, from year to year or from month to
month, in accordance with the provisions of Section 116 of the TP Act.
Thus, he submits that the occupation of the plaintiff cannot be considered to
be unlawful in any manner whatsoever.
37. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits that
submission with regard to the lease being for year to year basis, is without
prejudice to the rights and contention of the plaintiff, and has only been
made in view of the stand of the defendant in this regard.
38. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the defendant disputes the
submissions made by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff. He
draws the attention of this Court to Clause 3 (xiv) and (xv) of the Lease
Deed dated 08th March, 1926, which is reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
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xxx xxx xxx”
39. He, thus, submits that once the lease is determined, the land along
with the buildings, vested with the lessor, i.e., the UOI in the present case.
He further relies upon Clause 6 of the Lease Deed executed between the
parties, which is reproduced as under:
“xxx xxx xxx
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xxx xxx xxx”
40. By referring to the aforesaid, learned Counsel appearing for the
defendant submits that the lessee was enjoined upon to approach the
defendant with a written request for the purposes of extension of the lease.
However, no such written request was ever received from the defendant.
41. He submits that after the year 1994, the lease of the plaintiff has not
been extended, and the acceptance of any money by the defendant does not
take away the fact, that lease of the plaintiff has not been extended. He
further relies upon Section 63 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, to submit
that the plaintiff only has a right of easement.
42. Learned counsel for the defendant submits that the Eviction Notice
dated 12th March, 2026, issued by the defendant-UOI, shall be deemed as a
Revocation Notice.
43. He further submits that even if a lease is for a long period, the same
cannot be said to be a perpetual lease. For this purpose, he relies upon
judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India and
Others Versus National Cold Storage & Refrigeration, 2026 SCC OnLine
Del 141.
44. He further relies upon the judgment in the case of M/s Saptagiri
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Restaurant Versus Airports Authority of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del
9555.
45. The matter requires consideration.
46. Accordingly, issue notice. Notice is accepted by learned counsel
appearing for the defendant.
47. Let reply be filed, within a period of four weeks, from today.
48. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within two weeks, thereafter.
49. Based on the aforesaid narration of facts and submissions made before
this Court, a prima facie case has been made out in favour of the plaintiff.
Further balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiff and
irreparable injury shall be caused to the plaintiff, if interim relief is not
granted to the plaintiff.
50. In view thereof, the defendant is restrained from dispossessing the
plaintiff from the premises known as the Delhi Race Club comprising of
53.242 Acres, including, office, stables, race tracks and other super
structure, etc., till the next date of hearing.
51. At this stage, this Court has made a pointed query to the defendant,
whether the defendant would make a statement before this Court similar to
the other connected matter, that the defendant shall not dispossess the
plaintiff without resorting to due process of law.
52. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant submits that he shall take
instructions, in that regard.
53. Accordingly, for instructions on behalf of the defendant, list on 09th
April, 2026.
MINI PUSHKARNA, J
MARCH 25, 2026/KR
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