Delhi High Court – Orders
Delhi Devlopment Authourity vs Sanjeev Aggarwal And Ors on 12 February, 2026
Author: Neena Bansal Krishna
Bench: Neena Bansal Krishna
$~25
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA 368/2024 & CM APPL. 32705/2024
DELHI DEVLOPMENT AUTHOURITY .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Manika Tripathy, SC for DDA
with Mr. Ashutosh Kaushik and
Mr. Saksham Singh, Advocates
versus
SANJEEV AGGARWAL AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Gurmeet Bindra, Advocate for
R-1
Mr. Vivek Kumar Tandon, Ms. Lovie
Bagga, Ms. Yukti Bhardwaj and
Ms. Pooja Giri, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
ORDER
% 12.02.2026
CM APPL. 32702/2024
1. Application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC‘) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act
has been filed on behalf of the Appellant/ Delhi Development Authority
seeking condonation of delay of 2241 days in filing the accompanying
Appeal.
2. It is submitted that Civil Suit bearing No. CS(OS) 1518/2007 had
been filed by the Respondent No.1 for the recovery of possession of property
and mesne profit. The Appellant was initially not a party to the Suit, but was
impleaded by the Respondent No.1 at a later stage.
3. Vide Notification No. 2187/DHC/Orgl dated 24.11.2015, this Court
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had transferred the Suit to the Ld. Tis Hazari Court vide Order dated
08.01.2016, which was re-numbered as CS No. 9612/2016. The matter was
disposed of by the Ld. Tis Hazari Court vide Order dated 21.12.2017. It is
submitted that before deciding the issue of “possession of the subject
property”, the Ld. Trial Court ought to have decided the issue of ownership
of the property. Without deciding the ownership and the right and the title of
the property, the issue of possession cannot be decided.
4. The Written Statement of the Appellant/DDA could not be filed/
placed on record before the Ld. Trial Court and the Suit was decreed vide
Judgment dated 21.12.2017 in favour of Respondent no.1. The main file of
the property was not traceable and therefore an FIR was registered by DDA
on 05.09.2016. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Appeal
Committee on 18.04.2018 in the Chamber of CLD wherein it was decided
that since the Decree was not against DDA and it is only against the Multan
DAV Higher Secondary School, therefore Appeal is not to be filed.
5. The Appellant/ DDA is a Government Organization and the matter
has to be examined at various departmental levels. The present matter was
also examined at various departmental levels i.e. by the Law Department,
Land Development Department and also at different verticals i.e. by the
Dealing Assistant, Senior Law officer, Junior Law Officer etc. It was further
submitted that the DDA is an artificial person and an impersonal body and
has to act through different officials at different levels. The file is examined
at different levels by different officials, which is time consuming.
6. After the deliberation by the Appellant Authority, it was observed that
the Lease had been determined on 22.12.2006 for violation of the terms of
lease, as a school was found running on the Suit Property however the same
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was allotted for residential purpose only. Therefore, the matter was referred
to the Ld. Estate Officer for initiating the Eviction Proceeding under the
Public Premises Act, 1971. The Ld. Estate Officer vide Order dated
10.01.2019 rejected the Eviction proceeding and directed to restore the
Lease in terms of Public Premises Act, 1971.
7. The matter was referred to Law department on 14.05.2019 for opinion
on the following two issues:
i. Whether Estate Officer (EO) is competent to pass the
direction to DDA to restore the lease in terms of Public
Premises Act, 1971.
ii. Whether conclusion of the Estate Officer that the
Respondent was the absolute owner of the property by
virtue of the sale deed. Whereas stand of the DDA (Nazul
Section) is very clear that the property is a leasehold
property executed by DIT.
8. A detailed opinion was given by the Legal Department on 24.05.2019,
wherein it was mentioned that in accordance with the provision of Section 5
of the Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971 the Estate Officer, after the
issuance of Show Cause Notice and hearing the parties may either hold the
possession as unauthorized possession and pass the Order of Eviction, or
may reject to hold so. However, there is no provision under the Public
Premises Act, 1971 where the Estate Officer may pass direction to DDA to
restore the lease. Passing of such an order is beyond his jurisdiction and is
not in accordance with law. Therefore, it was opined that the Order of the
Estate Officer is required to be challenged.
9. Therefore, the Appellant/ DDA has challenged the Order dated
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10.01.2019 passed by the Ld. Estate Officer under Section 9 of Public
Premises Act, 1971 by filing the PPA No. 01/2022, which is still pending
before the Appropriate Authority.
10. The Suit No. 9612/2016 (old number CS(OS)No.1518/2007) was
decreed in favour of Respondent No.1. by the Ld. Tis Hazari Court, and it
has been held that Sh. Sanjeev Aggarwal/ Respondent No.1, is the owner of
the premises in question, and is entitled to be in possession of the property.
11. An Appeal bearing RFA 367/2018 against the impugned Judgment,
has been filed by the Multan DAV Higher Secondary School, before this
Court. Vide Order dated 02.05.2018, this Hon’ble Court has stayed the
operation of the impugned Judgment dated 21.12.2017 and further vide
Order dated 30.08.2018, the interim Order was made absolute.
12. It is stated that the said Judgement is binding upon DDA/ Appellant as
it was a party to the Suit. The impugned Judgment, which has been passed
subsequent to the lease being determined on 22.12.2006, for violation of the
terms of lease, as a school was found running on the Suit Property even
though the land was allotted for residential purpose only. Hence, the subject
land vests in DDA, which is the rightful owner of the subject land. Any
occupier or person claiming interest over the subject land, becomes an
unauthorized occupant in the eyes of law. Therefore, the impugned Order
ought to be set aside, and DDA be put in possession of the subject land.
13. Instead of preferring an Appeal against the impugned Order, the
Appellant/ DDA initiated proceedings under the Public Premises Eviction
Act, 1971. The Order passed by the Ld. Estate Officer has further been
challenged by DDA in an Appeal bearing No. PPA No. 01/2022, under the
Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971 which is still pending.
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14. The matter was again placed before the Appeal Committee on
27.03.2023 and it was decided that:
(i) Since, the lease of the premises was determined on
22.12.2006 and the possession is with Multan DAV Higher
Secondary School and a school is being run in premises in
question, but no eviction proceeding have been initiated by
DDA against the Multan DAV School, therefore an Eviction
Proceeding be filed against the Multan DAV Higher
Secondary School for recovery of the possession.
(ii) Shri Sanjeev Aggarwal filed a suit for possession
against Multan DAV Higher Secondary School on the basis
of Registered Sale Deed dated 28.03.2003. The said suit was
disposed of on 21.12.2017, in favour of Shri Sanjeev
Aggarwal. In this case DDA was impleaded as party much
after filing of the Suit and WS was not filed by DDA. Multan
DAV Higher Secondary School filed Appeal RFA No.
367/2018 and DDA is also a party. Therefore, DDA should
also be filed the appeal against the judgment dated
21.12.2017.
15. Due to above said reason, delay has occurred in filing the present
Appeal and the Appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the Appeal
within the limitation and the delay is unintentional and due to circumstances
beyond the control of the Appellant.
16. Therefore, prayer has been made for the condonation of delay of 2241
days, in filing the Appeal.
Submissions heard and record perused.
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17. The first aspect which emerges is that Suit was filed on 04.08.2007,
and decided on 21.12.2017. The present Appeal against Judgment dated
21.12.2017 has been filed on 27.05.2024, with a delay of 2241 days. In the
interim, the Appellant DDA had made deliberations and opined that the
Lease had been determined on 22.12.2006. Instead of preferring an Appeal
against the impugned Order, the Appellant/ DDA initiated proceedings
against the Multan DAV Higher Secondary School for recovery of the
possession, under the Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971. The Eviction
Proceeding was rejected vide Order dated 10.01.2019. The Appellant further
challenged the Order dated 10.01.2019, in the Appeal bearing No. PPA No.
01/2022, under the Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971 which is still
pending.
18. It is evident that DDA, had taken a conscious decision to seek
eviction of Multan DAV Higher Secondary School through the proceedings
under Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971, instead of filing the Appeal
against the judgement/Decree dated 21.12.2017, whereby the possession
decree has been made in favour of Plaintiff/Respondent No.1. Clearly,
present Appeal has been filed only in hindsight. The Appellant has actively
pursued the matter by way of Eviction proceedings under Public Premises
Eviction Act, 1971, and for reasons best known to the Appellant, had chosen
not to file the present Appeal in a time-bound manner. The decision to not
file the Appeal against the impugned Judgment, was a conscious and well
thought decision, and having lost in the proceedings under Public Premises
Eviction Act, 1971, present Appeal had been filed. The circumstances do not
spell out any reason, which is condonable; the Appellant has to bear the
consequences of its well-thought decisions.
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19. The second aspect for consideration is that the Appellant has claimed
that it being a Government Organisation, has to process the file through
various functionaries, before approval could be given finally. It has thus,
taken long to get the approval and to file the Appeal.
20. This contention is absolutely not tenable as it is not a case where the
DDA was not conscious of the Judgment, or that inordinate delay was
because of multi-level approval, but because it had consciously decided to
initiate proceedings under Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971, which has
not resulted in a favourable decision. Such long delay was not on account of
internal indecision amongst various stakeholders as to whether an Appeal
should be filed or not, as the proceedings under Public Premises Eviction
Act, 197, were initiated promptly, which obviously would have been only
with the approval of the Competent Authority. Thus, this stereotypical
reason of hierarchical delay, cannot be considered as any reason whatsoever
for condoning the delay.
21. Pertinently, the only explanation given for the delay is that Appellant
being a Government Organisation, the matter had to be examined at various
departmental levels. Merely because the Appellant is a Government
Organisation, does not confer any special status for it to claim condonation
of such long delay.
22. In the case of Chief Post Master General and Ors. vs. Living Media
India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Apex Court observed that there
cannot be a separate period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of any plausible and acceptable explanation, the delay cannot be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the
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Government, is a party before the Court.
23. It was further observed that while in the matter of condonation of
delay, when there is no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial
justice, but the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier
decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes, cannot be accepted in
view of the modern technologies now available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. Unless there is
some reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and bona fide
effort is spelled out in the Application, such usual explanation that the file
was pending for several months due to degree of procedural red tape in the
process, cannot be accepted merely because it is a Government agency.
They are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties
with diligence and commitment. The law shelters everyone under the same
light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering that
there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay, it
was held that they had miserably failed to give any cogent reasons sufficient
to condone the delay and the Appeal was dismissed.
24. It would also be pertinent to refer to the observations made by the
Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654
wherein it was held that the Apex Court has on earlier occasions as well,
deprecated the practice and process of completing the formality, to save the
skin of the officers who may be at default. The irony is that in none of the
cases any action was taken against the Officers who sit on the files and do
nothing under the presumption that the Court would condone the delay.
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Therefore, it was concluded that where there is inordinate delay by the
Government or the State Authorities in filing the matters before the Court,
they must pay for wastage of judicial time, which has its own value.
25. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead)
by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1969 has held as under:
“261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned
order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before
we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it
appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a
sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want
to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts
that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and
superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient
cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able
to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained
vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to
justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more
particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate
the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also
equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing
litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect
to such callous attitude of State authorities or its
instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the
party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority.
They should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant
of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants
cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations,
wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders
are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate
this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts toThis is a digitally signed order.
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notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until
sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add
insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under
Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is
already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than
the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the
plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest
against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never
exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be
disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party
litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is
unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal,
unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another
round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet
again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that
we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to
seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic
and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to
misuse the process of law.”
26. The third aspect is that the Appellant has only made bald assertions
regarding there being multiple levels of approval and examination. The
Appellant has failed to sufficiently explain the movement of the file in the
Application seeking condonation of delay. Such vague contentions without
being supported with any specifics, especially when at the same time
decision was taken and proceedings under Public Premises Eviction Act,
1971 were initiated, it cannot be considered as ground for condonation of
delay.
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Conclusion:
27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that there is no cogent
explanation or sufficient reasons for condoning the delay of 2241 days in
filing the Appeal.
28. Accordingly, the Application is dismissed. Consequently, the
accompanying RFA 368/2024 along with pending Applications, is also
dismissed.
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J
FEBRUARY 12, 2026/R
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