Court On Its Own Motion vs Shiv Narayan Sharma Adv. And Anr on 21 April, 2026

April 22, 2026

Delhi High Court

Court On Its Own Motion vs Shiv Narayan Sharma Adv. And Anr on 21 April, 2026

1. These Contempt Petitions have been registered on the reference
dated 15.01.2025 addressed by Ms. Charu Asiwal, the learned
ACJ/CCJ-ACR, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi; and the
reference dated 10.03.2025 addressed by Mr. Ajay Singh Parihar, the
learned ACJ-CCJ-ARC, North, Rohini Courts, respectively, making
complaints regarding contentious videos and banners (dated
29.10.2024 and 05.01.2025 as far as Contempt Case (Crl) 3/2025 is
concerned, and dated 03.03.2025 and 07.03.2025 as far as Contempt
Case (Crl) 4/2025 is concerned) uploaded by Mr. Gulshan Pahuja,
who is the respondent no.2 in both of these petitions, on his YouTube

SPONSORED

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 2 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
channel “Fight 4 Judicial Reforms”.

CONT. CAS. (CRL) 3/2025:

2. In the YouTube video uploaded on 29.10.2024, the respondent
no. 2 interviews Mr.Shiv Narayan Sharma, Advocate (respondent no.1
in the said contempt case), and the introduction itself gives the tenor
of the interview. A photo transcript of the same is as under:-

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Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 3 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40

3. The interview is primarily aimed towards a demand for having
audio-video recordings of the Court proceedings in general and
discusses two cases which had been allegedly dealt with by the above
named judicial officers.

4. The respondent no.1, Mr. Shiv Narayan Sharma, in the course
of the interview, details his alleged experience in two cases; one
before the Court of Ms. Charu Asiwal and the other before the Court
of Mr. Ajay Narwal. In the course of the interview, however,
respondent no. 1 makes some objectionable and derogatory remarks
against the judicial officers and the judicial institution as a whole. We
are not giving complete details of the same as respondent no. 1, Mr.
Shiv Narayan Sharma, has filed a reply dated 19.08.2025, tendering
his unconditional and unqualified apology for the same. He has also
appeared in person before us and has reiterated his apology with an
undertaking not to make such scandalous and derogatory remarks in
future. We find the apology to be genuine and, therefore, accept the
same. For the said reason, we drop the proceedings and discharge
respondent no. 1, Mr. Shiv Narayan Sharma in Cont. Cas. (Crl.)
3/2025.

5. The respondent no. 2, however, has continued to justify his
actions and, therefore, we shall be proceeding with further
consideration of the two Contempt Cases against him.

6. As noted hereinabove, in the reference dated 15.01.2025, Ms.
Charu Asiwal has also made a reference to a second YouTube video
uploaded by respondent no. 2, Mr. Pahuja, on 05.01.2025 on his

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 4 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
YouTube channel “Fight 4 Judicial Reforms”. The said video starts
with the banner, as under:-

7. In the video, after a brief introduction wherein the respondent
no.2, without naming anyone, makes a complaint regarding some
judges not working or being corrupt. Thereafter, the entire interview
of respondent no. 1, Mr. Shiv Narayan Sharma, as contained in video
no.1 dated 29.10.2024, reference to which has been made

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 5 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
hereinabove, appears.

8. Ms. Asiwal, in her reference dated 15.01.2025, has stated that
the second video was posted by the respondent no. 2 only because the
first video did not attract many viewers and that the respondent no. 2
wanted to make it more scandalous by adding the banner at the
inception of the video, as has been reproduced hereinabove. His intent
has been fulfilled as almost immediately the video started attracting
attention and had almost 13,000 views, which compelled her to write a
complaint dated 11.10.2024 to the Joint C.P., IFSO/Special Cell,
Delhi Police.

9. At the outset, we would note and clarify that as far as the
campaign launched by the respondent no. 2 for having audio-visual
recording of the court proceedings is concerned, there can be no
objection, certainly not in contempt jurisdiction, as this is his
campaign on an issue which he believes will bring about a reform in
the justice dispensation system. We must at the very outset emphasise
that contempt jurisdiction is not to be exercised nor is being exercised
herein for, in any manner, opposing the said campaign. Every person
is entitled to hold an opinion, and to express it, on the manner in
which the justice dispensation system can be improved. However, in
our view, naming of the two specific judicial officers and the manner
of doing so in the banner, is not intended to promote the said
campaign of having audio-video recording of the court proceedings,
but to create sensationalism and distrust against the two named
judicial officers, thereby lowering their authority.

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 6 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40

CONT. CAS. (CRL) 4/2025:

10. As far as Contempt Case (Crl.) 4/2025 is concerned, the video
dated 03.03.2025 uploaded by the respondent no. 2 starts with the
banner as under:-

11. The video contains an interview of the respondent no.1 in the
said case, that is, Mr.Deepak Singh, wherein he narrates the alleged
proceedings of a case before the Court of Mr.Ajay Singh Parihar, who
was holding the Electricity Court. It also contains certain derogatory
and contentious remarks made by the respondent no.1, Mr. Deepak
Singh, against the Court. However, respondent no. 1, Mr. Deepak

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 7 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
Singh, has also filed a reply dated 19.08.2025, tendering an
unconditional and unqualified apology to the Court. He has also
appeared in person and reiterated his apology, which the Court finds
to be genuine. He has undertaken to the Court that he will not repeat
such actions of making scandalous remarks against any judicial officer
or the judicial institution in future. For the said reason, we drop the
proceedings and discharge respondent no. 1, Mr. Deepak Singh, in this
regard.

12. As far as the first video is concerned, the respondent no. 2 again
pleads that it, along with its banner, has been uploaded bona fide and
in public interest. We shall consider the said plea in detail in the later
part of our judgment.

13. Contempt Case (Crl.) 4/2025 is also based on the second video
which was uploaded by the respondent no.2, Mr.Pahuja, on
07.03.2025. The said video starts with a banner, as under:-

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 8 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40

14. It also contains, almost at the inception (00.00.22 seconds),
another banner, as under:-

15. The respondent no.2 introduces the said video by stating as
under:-

“Namashkar mai Delhi se Gulshan Pahuja,
Fight for Judicial Reform se. Capital ‘C’, (At
0.17) “Supreme Court aur Adaalatein kaise
Captial ‘C’ banati hai.”

00:00:22 (Banner appears on the screen)
Abhi jo Ranveer Allahbadia ka jo mamla aaya
tha abhi Samay Raina ke saath mein ki usne
show ke andar kaafi galat aisi cheese kahi jo
maafi ke layak nahi hai
Par kaise Capital ‘C” banaya jata hai ye
maamla ek acha udaharan hai. (At 0.42 min)
“Capital ‘C’ shayad samaj gaye honge aap ki
mai kya keh raha hu mai?” Agar mai
kahunga toh Ranveer Allahbadia aur Apporva
Arora se pehle jisne ‘Hostage’ naam ki koi web
series banayi thi, (At 0.55 min) “usko toh
baksh diya, par mereko nahi
bakshenge. Unko toh mauka chahiye hota
hai dikhane ka ki humne ye nyay kiya, ki
samaj se humne gandaşi saaf kar di.” Humne
ye kar diya, humne woh kar diya, par karte
kya hai woh alag baat hai.

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 9 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40

Capital “C” banaya jata hai Salman Khan ke
jaise maamlon ke andar.

xxxxx
(At 3.27 min) “Capital ‘C” word yaad
rakhiyega mera. C se bohot saare shabdh
shuru hote hai. Unhi mein se ek shabdh ye
bhi hai. ‘C’ ‘H’ CH-A!”

xxxxx
(At 7.09 min) “Toh humare desh ki
adaalaton se aap ye samajhe ki humare desh
ke andar apradh ko rok taan mil jayegi, kami
mil jayegi, koi benefits milenge. Mereko toh
nahi lagta”. Aapko lagta hai toh aap apni
khushfehmi paalte rahiye aap.

xxxxx
Dosh hota hai sarkaar ke upar ke sarkaar gala
ghot rahi hai. (At 10.34 min) “Supreme Court
kaunsa gala nahi ghot rahi?” Kitne letter
likhke dete hai aap log? Kya letter ka jawab
milta hai apko? Ye bhi gala ghotna hi hai!
(At 10.46 min) “Isiliye mai keh raha hu ki
Capital ‘C’ hi banati hai Supreme Court bhi.
” Kanoon sabke liye barabar nahi hai humare
desh ke andar, sirf likha hua hai. Ambedkar ji
ne likh diya “Kanoon barabar hai”, par kya
kanoon barabar hai sabke liye?”

16. Herein we would emphasise that we are not proceeding against
the respondent for the explicits used by him, but his intent to
scandalise and lower the authority of not only the Supreme Court but
the entire judiciary.

PROCEEDINGS IN THESE REFERENCES:

17. Before proceeding further with our judgment, we must also note
that we, in our order dated 26.02.2026, had recorded the statement of
the respective respondent no.1 in both these cases, that is, Mr. Shiv
Narayan Sharma and Mr.Deepak Singh, wherein they had stated that

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 10 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
they had not given any consent or permission for the uploading or
publication of the videos of their interviews and were not aware of the
thumbnails or posters/banners posted and used in the videos and had
also filed affidavit to this effect. We had also given an opportunity to
the respondent no.2, Mr.Gulshan Pahuja, in these contempt cases to
respond to the said stand of the respective respondent no. 1. As far as
the banners are concerned, he stated that the respondent no.1 did not
have any role in the same. We reproduce the relevant extract of the
order as under:-

“1. Pursuant to our order dated 23.12.2025,
affidavits have been filed by the respondent
no.1, namely, Mr. Shiv Narayan Sharma and
Mr.Deepak Singh, respectively, in both the
above contempt cases, stating therein that,
they had not given any consent or permission
for the uploading and publication of the videos
of their interviews given to the respondent
no.2-Mr. Gulshan Pahuja. They further state
that they were not aware about the thumbnail
and the poster pasted and used in the
aforesaid interviews and that no
permission/consent had been taken from them
by the respondent no.2 for adding such
thumbnail and poster.

2. In terms of the opportunity granted to
the respondent no.2 vide our order dated
19.01.2026, Mr. Gulshan Pahuja has filed a
reply under Diary No.71753. The reply,
however, merely states that since the
respondent no.1 in both the contempt cases
have not sought any enquiry against him, he
does not wish to state anything further in that
regard.

3. On a specific query of this Court, in
answer of both the above issues, that is,
whether videos of the interviews of the
respondent no.1 in both the contempt cases

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 11 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
were uploaded with their permission/consent
and as to whether the respondent no.1 in both
the contempt cases had any role in uploading
the thumbnail and poster or whether the same
had been uploaded with their consent and
knowledge, Mr. Pahuja has answered by
stating that once the respondent no.1 in the
respective contempt cases were giving
interviews in front of the camera, they were
well aware that the same would be uploaded
on the YouTube channel run by the respondent
no.2-Mr. Gulshan Pahuja.

4. As far as the uploading of the thumbnail
and poster is concerned, he admits that the
respondent no.1 in the respective contempt
cases had no role in the creation or uploading
of the same and that their permission/consent
had not been obtained by him.”

(Emphasis supplied)

18. This Court, by its order dated 23.12.2025, had framed the
following charges against the respondent No. 2 in both matters,
respectively:-

“CONT.CAS.(CRL) 3/2025
xxxxx

10. At the moment, we deem it proper to
summarize the accusations appearing against
respondent No.2 which are as under:-

i) You published an interview which you
had with respondent No.1 Shri Shiv
Narayan Sharma, Advocate on your
YouTube Channel “Fight 4 Judicial
Reforms”, firstly on 29.10.2024 and a
revised video of such interview of
05.01.2025, and one such video,
uploaded on 05.01.2025, has the
following thumbnail/title/banner:-

“क्या आपका मुकदमा
जज अजय नरवाल

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 12 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
जज चारू असिवाल
या इन जैिे जज की अदालत में है ?

सिर तो न्याय की उम्मीद छोड़ ही दीिजए”

xxxxxx
CONT.CAS.(CRL) 4/2025
xxxxxx

19. The accusations/charges against
respondent No.2 with respect to this contempt
petition are as under: –

(i) You published one video on your
YouTube Channel “Fight 4 Judicial
Reforms” on 03.03.2025 and the
banner/title/thumbnail of the abovesaid
video is as under:-

“ददल्ली की रोहहणी कोर्ट के जज
ऄजय ससह पररहार की ऄदालत में
अपका मुकदमा है तो भगवान् ही
अपका माहलक है”

(ii) In the second video posted by you,
on your such You Tube Channel on
07.03.2025, you have used derogatory,
disparaging and abusive words, in the
banner as well as in the video, for the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court and other
Courts.”

19. The respondent No. 2, as recorded in the order dated
23.12.2025, had refused the assistance of a counsel and has continued
to appear in person. By the same order, his application, that is, Crl.
M.A. 28644/2025, filed in Cont. Cas. (CRL) 3/2025, seeking audio-
video recording of the Court proceedings in the present Contempt
Petition, was also allowed and it was directed that the Court Master
shall ensure that the proceedings of the present cases are recorded
through the Webex platform from then onwards.

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 13 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40

20. The respondent no. 2 had also claimed that he is not well versed
in the English language and, therefore, by the order dated 19.01.2026,
this Court had directed that all his pleadings filed in Hindi be taken on
record by the Registry, and further, the Court proceedings were also
conducted in the Hindi language. Translated copies of the orders
passed were supplied to him.

21. Mr. Pahuja, apart from filing various applications, as far as the
substance of the allegations against him is concerned, has filed a reply
by way of e-mail dated 04.12.2025, wherein he states that he, as a
concerned citizen, expressed his concern about the present judicial
system which, according to him, can be improved only by making
systematic reforms in the same. He states that when any offender is
not given just punishment, he feels emboldened to commit further
offences. He states that his intention was bona fide and he should not
be made to stop criticising the Judges by invoking the contempt
jurisdiction against him. He states that he had filed a case for eviction
against his tenant in the year 1988, however, the same has been
pending and his experience of the court proceedings has been bad. He
states that the concerned Judge had not even read his file for the last
six months and the case had not been admitted for last six months and
for six dates, though it is complete in all respects. He then narrates
another experience on a complaint filed by him regarding some money
owned by his friend which the friend had refused to return and he was
made to go to the Police Station a number of times, however, the
Police took no action on his complaint. Importantly, he does not state

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 14 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
that the judicial officers named by him are the ones where his cases
were pending. He, however, makes the following statement with
respect to the three Judicial Officers named in his banners:-

“न्यायलयों को मैंने बहुत करीब से देखा है मैं दावे से
कह सकता हूँ दक ऐसा हो ही नहीं सकता जज चारु
ऄहसवाल, जज ऄजय ससह पररहार, जज ऄजय
नरवाल जी की ऄदालत में अज तक हबला वजह
तारीख पर तारीख न लगी हो चाहे ईसमें दकसी वकील
साहब का हलहाज़ ही दकया गया, न्याय की दृहि से
हलहाज़ भी पीह़ित के साथ ऄन्याय है। पीह़ित का एक
एक ददन कीमती होता है। ऄगर ऐसा हुअ है तो क्या
आन पर ऄवमानना का मुकदमा लगा कर क्या ईस
पीह़ित को हजाटना ददया जाएगा?”

22. He also makes a plea that there should be audio-video recording
of the Court proceedings in all Courts. He then makes the following
generalized statements:-

“1. न्याय हमलने में ऄत्यहधक देरी से जनता का
हवश्वास कम होता है।

2. ऄदालतों में भ्रिाचार के मामलों में जजों की कहथत
संहलप्तता जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

3. जजों द्वारा ररश्वत मांगने या स्वीकार करने के
अरोप से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

4. कु छ जजों का ऄत्यहधक ऄवकाश लेना, हजससे
मुकदमों में और देरी होती है हजस से जनता का
हवश्वास कम होता है।

5. कु छ जजों का ऄदालत में पूरा समय न देना, आस से
भी हवश्वास कम होता है।

6. मामलों में लगातार सुनवाइ स्थहगत करने से जनता
का हवश्वास कम होता है।

7. फै सलों में पारदर्शशता की कमी और ऄस्पि तकट से
जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 15 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40

8. कु छ जजों का पक्षपातपूणट व्यवहार या दकसी हवशेष
समूह के प्रहत झुकाव से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता
है।

9. जजों द्वारा लंबी और जरर्ल कानूनी प्रदियाओं को
बढावा देने से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

10. कमजोर और गरीबों के प्रहत संवेदनहीनता के
अरोप लगने से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।।

11. ब़िे और प्रभावशाली लोगों के पक्ष में फै सले सुनाने
के अरोप लगने से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

12. ऄदालती ऄवमानना के नाम पर अलोचना को
दबाने से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

13. जजों की हनयुहि प्रदिया में ऄपारदर्शशता और
भाइ-भतीजावाद से से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता
है।

14. न्याहयक जवाबदेही की कमी और जजों के हखलाफ
कारट वाइ के ऄभाव से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

15. कु छ जजों के ऄहंकारी या हनरं कुश व्यवहार से
जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

16.महत्वपूणट मामलों में जनहहत को नजरऄंदाज
करना से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता है।

17. वकीलों के साथ कहथत हमलीभगत कर तारीख पर
तारीख को बढावा देने से जनता का हवश्वास कम होता
है।

18. खुद को आतना खास बना देने से न्याय प्रदिया को
अम अदमी की पहुंच से दूर होने से जनता का हवश्वास
कम होता है।

19. सामाहजक और अर्शथक ऄसमानताओं को
संबोहधत करने में हवफलता !

20. जजों द्वारा कठोर रर्प्पहणयां करना जो जनता की
भावनाओं को ठे स पहुंचाती हैं”

23. He states that other persons are also posting similar complaints
on social media and against them no action has been taken.

24. He gives various moral lectures and other generalized
statements, however, specifically does not deal with the allegations on
basis of which the present contempt cases have been registered against

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.CASs.(CRL) 3/2025 & 4/2025 Page 16 of 44
By:REYMON VASHIST
Signing Date:21.04.2026
17:49:40
him.

25. The respondent no. 2 further filed written arguments vide Index
dated 22.03.2026, in which he claims truth as a defence. He also
invoked Section 13(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟), stating that if the statements are
made in public interest and bona fide, the same shall be accepted as a
defence to the contempt proceedings. He further invoked Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the Court must
enquire as to why he had made the statements attributed to him rather
than proceeding against him in contempt. He stated that he is
performing a public duty by raising the issues and, therefore, invoked
Article 51A of the Constitution of India. He again reiterated his
allegations against the Judicial Officers, stating therein, as under:-

“11. माननीय, वादी पक्ष ( हशकायतकताट न्यायाधीश
सुश्री चारु ऄहसवाल जी, श्री ऄजय ससह पररहार जी
एवं न्याहयक प्रणाली) स्वयं स्थाहपत कानून और
प्रदियाओं का पूणटतः पालन नहीं कर रहे हैं। वादी पक्ष
स्वयं स्वच्छ हाथों (Clean Hands) के साथ न्यायालय
के समक्ष ईपहस्थत नहीं हुअ है”

26. He also made allegations on certain judicial orders passed in
these proceedings, stating that they were non-speaking and were being
passed without giving him an opportunity of a full hearing.

27. When the matter was listed for final hearing on 25.03.2026, the
respondent no. 2 filed yet another application, being Crl. M.A.
9152/2026, praying for the following relief:-

“न्यायहहत में ऄपेहक्षत है दक:

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“न्यायहहत और हनष्पक्षता सुहनहित करने हेत,ु मुझे
ऄंहतम बहस ( Final Arguments) के हलए पयाटप्त
समय प्रदान दकया जाए। मेरा हवनम्र हनवेदन है दक
मुझे प्रहत सत्र ( Session) एक से दो घंर्े और कु ल
हमलाकर कम से कम 20 घंर्ों का समय ईपलब्ध
कराया जाए, तादक मैं ऄपने पक्ष को समस्त तथ्यों और
साक्ष्यों के साथ माननीय न्यायालय के समक्ष
हवस्तारपूवटक रख सकूूँ ।

चूूँदक यह प्रकरण मेरे जीवन और भहवष्य का ऄत्यंत
महत्वपूणट प्रश्न है, ऄतः न्याय के हसद्ांतों को ध्यान में
रखते हुए, न्यायालय को मुझे हबना दकसी व्यवधान के
यह समय सुहनहित करना चाहहए ।” तथा प्रत्येक
अदेश reasoning speaking प्रदान दकया जाए”

28. The respondent no. 2 was granted an oral hearing spreading to
almost two and a half hours, wherein he started reading through his
application, previous reply and the written arguments filed by him.
After hearing him at length, the cases were reserved for judgment.
However, he then filed an application, being Crl.M.A. 10002/2026,
claiming that he had not said “I REST MY CASE” and therefore, in
compliance with principles of natural justice, he should be given
further opportunity to present his case.

29. Though we had already granted full opportunity of presenting
his defence to the respondent no. 2, in the interest of justice, we
allowed the said application and listed these cases for further hearing
on 06.04.2026.

30. On 06.04.2026, the respondent no. 2 read through his
application, that is, Crl. M.A. 10002/2026, and made further
submissions, primarily contending that he had acted in a bona fide
manner in posting the subject videos on his YouTube channel. Placing

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reliance on decisions in Hari Das & Anr v. State of West Bengal &
Ors, (1964) SCC OnLine SC 264; P. Mohanraj v. Shah Bros. (2021)
6 SCC 258; and Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati, (1953) 1 SCC 726, he
submitted that in these proceedings, he enjoys the same rights as
available to an accused in a criminal case.

31. Further, placing reliance on decisions in Power, Privileges and
Immunities of State, In Re. Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, (1964)
SCC OnLine SC 21; and Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney
General of Trinidad & Tobago, (1936) SCC OnLine PC 15, he
submitted that the jurisdiction for proceeding with criminal contempt
must be exercised extremely carefully and with restraint and due
application of mind. He submitted that the jurisdiction must be
invoked rarely, as repeated invocation of the same may cause damage
to the repute of the judicial institution rather than protecting the same.
In support, he placed reliance on decision in T.C. Gupta v. Hari Om
Prakash, (2013) 10 SCC 658.

32. After again hearing the respondent no. 2 at length on
06.04.2026, we reserved these cases for pronouncement, however, the
respondent no. 2 circulated his written submissions by way of an
email dated 07.05.2026 addressed to our Court Master. We have also
considered the same in our judgment.

33. In the written submissions filed by the respondent no. 2, he
contends that in In Re, Bhilwara (Raj.), [2026:RJ-JD:6479-DB], the
Rajasthan High Court has clarified that every citizen has a right to
bona fide criticize the courts, and by curtailing such criticism, the

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authority of the court will not increase. In the judgment, it was also
clarified that a statement may be derogatory but that does not amount
to contempt; it can be contempt only when the statement causes a
genuine and grave damage to the judicial system and is intended to
bring the same to disrepute with mala fide intent. If it is made in
public interest, based on facts and without any ill-intent, the same is
protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

34. The respondent no. 2 has also placed reliance on the judgment
of the Supreme Court in Nirbhay Singh Suliya v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 8, to submit that the Supreme
Court has held that anyone making a false complaint, including
insulting the judicial officer, should be visited with harsh punishment.
However, if such complaint is found to be prima facie correct, then
such judicial officer must be immediately and in accordance with law,
proceeded against. Every harsh criticism/statement is not contempt
and every citizen has a right to criticize the judicial system. It is only
when it is made with an ill-intent that it will amount to contempt.

35. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Court on its own Motion v. DSP Jayant Kashmiri & Ors., 2017 SCC
OnLine Del 7387, to submit that this Court has held that the
magnanimity of this Court is in proceeding with a contempt
jurisdiction with restraint.

36. He also placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court
in Re: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339, State of M.P. v. Narmada
Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 and in T.C. Gupta (supra). He

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submits that, on the contrary, the recent trend is that the government
advocates do not present the case as an officer of the court and without
any favour, but as an opposing party. He submits that this had forced
the Supreme Court in Mahabir & Ors. v. State of Haryana, 2025
SCC OnLine SC 184, to hold that in case the government advocates
hide material facts or mislead the court, they must be proceeded
against.

37. He submits that in the present case, the charge does not specify
the statements made by the respondent no. 2 which have been found to
be objectionable, because of which he is unable to give a proper reply.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

38. We have considered the above submissions of the respondent
no. 2.

39. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the term „criminal contempt‟ as
under:-

“2. Definitions.-

(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication
(whether by words, spoken or written, or by
signs, or by visible representations, or
otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any
other act whatsoever which–

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or
lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any
court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to
interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with,
or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other
manner;”

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40. In Brahma Prakash Sharma & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1953) 1 SCC 813, the Supreme Court was considering a resolution
passed by the District Bar Association at Muzaffarnagar criticising the
working of the two Judicial Officers. The Supreme Court highlighted
that the object of the contempt proceeding is not to afford protection
to judges personally from imputations to which they may be exposed
as individuals, but is intended to be a protection to the public, whose
interests would be very much affected if, by the act or conduct of any
party, the authority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence
which people have in the administration of justice is weakened.
Casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character or
ability of the Judges amounts to contempt, as it tends to create distrust
and impair the confidence of the people. Where such comment is
made in exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism, it may
not amount to contempt. However, when attacks or comments are
made which are disparaging in character and derogatory to their
dignity, distinction should be made between defamation and what is
calculated to interfere with the due course of justice and proper
administration of law by the Court. We may quote from the judgment
as under:-

“9. It admits of no dispute that the summary
jurisdiction exercised by superior courts in
punishing contempt of their authority exists for
the purpose of preventing interference with the
course of justice and for maintaining the
authority of law as is administered in the
courts. It would be only repeating what has
been said so often by various Judges that the

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object of contempt proceedings is not to afford
protection to Judges personally from
imputations to which they may be exposed as
individuals; it is intended to be a protection to
the public whose interests would be very much
affected if by the act or conduct of any party,
the authority of the court is lowered and the
sense of confidence which people have in the
administration of justice by it is weakened.

10. There are indeed innumerable ways by
which attempts can be made to hinder or
obstruct the due administration of justice in
courts. One type of such interference is found
in cases where there is an act or publication
which “amounts to scandalising the court
itself” –an expression which is familiar to
English lawyers since the days of Lord
Hardwicke [Read and Huggonson, In re,
(1742) 2 Atk 469 at p. 471 : 26 ER 683]. This
scandalising might manifest itself in various
ways but, in substance, it is an attack on
individual Judges or the court as a whole with
or without reference to particular cases
casting unwarranted and defamatory
aspersions upon the character or ability of the
Judges. Such conduct is punished as contempt
for this reason that it tends to create distrust in
the popular mind and impair confidence of
people in the courts which are of prime
importance to the litigants in the protection of
their rights and liberties.

xxxxxx

13. It seems, therefore, that there are two
primary considerations which should weigh
with the court when it is called upon to
exercise the summary powers in cases of
contempt committed by “scandalising” the
court itself. In the first place, the reflection on
the conduct or character of a Judge in
reference to the discharge of his judicial
duties, would not be contempt if such
reflection is made in the exercise of the right
of fair and reasonable criticism which every

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citizen possesses in respect of public acts done
in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling
criticism that confidence in courts can be
created. “The path of criticism”, said Lord
Atkin [Ambard v. Attorney General for
Trinidad and Tobago, 1936 AC 322 at p. 335
(PC)] “is a public way. The wrong-headed are
permitted to err therein; provided that
members of the public abstain from imputing
motives to those taking part in the
administration of justice and are genuinely
exercising a right of criticism and not acting in
malice, or attempt to impair the administration
of justice, they are immune.”

14. In the second place, when attacks or
comments are made on a Judge or Judges,
disparaging in character and derogatory to
their dignity, care should be taken to
distinguish between what is a libel on the
Judge and what amounts really to contempt of
court. The fact that a statement is defamatory
so far as the Judge is concerned does not
necessarily make it a contempt. The distinction
between a libel and a contempt was pointed
out by a Committee of the Privy Council, to
which a reference was made by the Secretary
of State in 1892 [Special Reference from the
Bahama Islands, In re, 1893 AC 138 (PC)] . A
man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter
published in a colonial newspaper criticised
the Chief Justice of the Colony in an extremely
ill-chosen language which was sarcastic and
pungent. There was a veiled insinuation that
he was an incompetent Judge and a shirker of
work and the writer suggested in a way that it
would be a providential thing if he were to die.
A strong Board constituting of 11 members
reported that the letter complained of, though
it might have been made the subject of
proceedings for libel, was not, in the
circumstances, calculated to obstruct or
interfere with the course of justice or the due
administration of the law and therefore did not

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constitute a contempt of court. The same
principle was reiterated by Lord Atkin in Debi
Prasad Sharma v. King Emperor [Debi
Prasad Sharma v. King Emperor, (1942-43)
70 IA 216 : 1943 SCC OnLine PC 31] referred
to above. It was followed and approved of by
the High Court of Australia in R. v. Nicholls
[R. v. Nicholls, (1911) 12 CLR 280 (Aust)] ,
and has been accepted as sound by this Court
in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of
Madras [Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State
of Madras, (1952) 1 SCC 154 : 1952 SCR
425]. The position therefore is that a
defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel
so far as the Judge is concerned and it would
be open to him to proceed against the libeller
in a proper action if he so chooses. If,
however, the publication of the disparaging
statement is calculated to interfere with the
due course of justice or proper administration
of law by such court, it can be punished
summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done
to the Judge personally while the other is a
wrong done to the public. It will be an injury
to the public if it tends to create an
apprehension in the minds of the people
regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of
the Judge or to deter actual and prospective
litigants from placing complete reliance upon
the court’s administration of justice, or if it is
likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of
the Judge himself in the discharge of his
judicial duties. It is well established that it is
not necessary to prove affirmatively that there
has been an actual interference with the
administration of justice by reason of such
defamatory statement; it is enough if it is
likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with
the proper administration of law .”

41. In Re: S. Mulgaokar (supra), the then Chief Justice, Justice
M.H. Beg, while observing that the judiciary cannot be immune from

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criticism, held that when such criticism is based on obvious distortion
or gross misstatement or is made with design to lower respect for the
judiciary and destroy public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored.
While it may be better in many cases for the judiciary to adopt a
magnanimously charitable attitude even when utterly uncharitable and
unfair criticism of its operations is made out of bona fide concern for
improvement, but when there appears some scheme and a design to
bring about results which would damage confidence in our judicial
system and demoralize Judges by making malicious attacks, the same
must be severely dealt with.

42. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in his concurring opinion, observed
that not every commission of contempt should result in committal or
punishment; it is to be used wisely and economically. It must also be
harmonized with constitutional values of fair criticism. It exists to
protect public confidence in administration of justice, and if the Court
considers the attack on the judges as scurrilous, offensive,
intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of
the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a
blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law. The
principles applicable were summarized by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in
the said judgment, as under:-

“26. What then are the complex of
considerations dissuasive of punitive action?
To be exhaustive is a baffling project; to be
pontifical is to be impractical; to be flexible is
to be realistic. What, then, are these broad
guidelines not a complete inventory, but
precedentially validated judicial norms?

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27. The first rule in this branch of contempt
power is a wise economy of use by the Court of
this branch of its jurisdiction. The Court will
act with seriousness and severity where justice
is jeopardised by a gross and/or unfounded
attack on the Judges, where the attack is
calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial
process. The Court is willing to ignore, by a
majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offences

– the dogs may bark, the caravan will pass.
The Court will not be prompted to act as a
result of an easy irritability. Much rather, it
shall take a noetic look at the conspectus of
features and be guided by a constellation of
constitutional and other considerations when
it chooses to use, or desist from using, its
power of contempt.

28. The second principle must be to
harmonise the constitutional values of free
criticism, the Fourth Estate included, and the
need for a fearless curial process and its
presiding functionary, the Judge. A happy
balance has to be struck, the benefit of the
doubt being given. generously against the
Judge, slurring over marginal deviations but
severely proving the supremacy of the law
over pugnacious, vicious, unrepentant and
malignant contemners, be they the powerful
press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran
columnists of Olympian establishmentarians.
Not because the Judge, the human symbol of a
high value, is personally armoured by a regal
privilege but because “be you the contemner
ever so high, the law the People’s expression
of justice is above you”. Curial courage
overpowers For, it blesseth him that gives and
him that takes. Where freedom of expression,
fairly exercised, subserves public interest in
reasonable measure, public justice cannot gag
it or manacle it, constitutionally speaking A
free people are the ultimate guarantors of
fearless justice. Such is the cornerstone of our
Constitution; such is the touchstone of our
Contempt Power, oriented on the confluence

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of free speech and fair justice which is the
scriptural essence of our Fundamental Law.
Speaking of the social philosophy and
philosophy of law in an integrated manner as
applicable to contempt of court, there is no
conceptual polarity but a delicate balance,
and judicial “sapience” draws the line. As it
happens, our Constitution-makers foresaw the
need for balancing all these competing
interests. Section 2(1)(c) of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 provides:

“‘Criminal contempt’ means the
publication (whether by words, spoken
or written, or by signs, or by visible
representations, or otherwise) of any
matter or the doing of any other act
whatsoever which-

(i) scandalises or tends to
scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower
the authority of any court”

This is an extremely wide definition But, it
cannot be read apart from the conspectus of
the constitutional provisions within which the
Founding Fathers of the Constitution intended
all past and future statutes to have meaning.
All laws relating to contempt of court had,
according to the provisions of Article 19(2), to
be “reasonable restrictions” on the exercise of
the right of free speech. The courts were given
the power-and, indeed, the responsibility to
harmonise conflicting aims, interests and
values. This is in sharp contrast to the
Phillimore Committee Report on Contempt of
Court in the United Kingdom which did not
recommend the defence of public interest in
contempt cases.

29. The third principle is to avoid confusion
between personal protection of a libelled
Judge and prevention of obstruction of public
justice and the community’s confidence in that
great process. The former is not contempt, the
latter is, although overlapping spaces abound.

30. Because the law of contempt exists to
protect public confidence in the administration

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of justice, the offence will not be committed by
attacks upon the personal reputation of
individual Judges as such. As Professor
Goodhart has put it:

“Scandalising the court means any
hostile criticism of the Judge as Judge; any
personal attack upon him, unconnected with
the office he holds, is dealt with under the
ordinary rules of slander and libel”

Similarly, Griffith, C.J. has said in the
Australian case of Nicholls that:

“In one sense, no doubt, every
defamatory publication concerning a Judge
may be said to bring him into contempt as that
term is used in the law of libel, but it does not
follow that everything said of a Judge
calculated to bring him into contempt in that
sense amounts to contempt of court”.

Thus in In the matter of a Special Reference
from the Bahama Islands, the Privy Council
advised that a contempt had not been
committed through a publication in the Nassau
Guardian concerning the resident Chief
Justice, who had himself previously criticised
local sanitary conditions. Though couched in
highly sarcastic terms the publication did not
refer to the Chief Justice in his official, as
opposed to personal, capacity. Thus while it
might have been a libel it was not a contempt.

31. The fourth functional canon which
channels discretionary exercise of the
contempt power is that the fourth estate which
is an indispensable intermediary between the
State and the people and necessary
instrumentality in strengthening the forces of
democracy, should be given free play within
responsible limits even when the focus of its
critical attention is the court, including the
highest Court.

32. The fifth normative guideline for the
Judges to observe in this jurisdiction is not to
be hypersensitive even where distortions and
criticisms overstep the limits, but to deflate
vulgar denunciation by dignified bearing, con-

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descending indifference and repudiation by
judicial rectitude.

33. The sixth consideration is that, after
evaluating the totality of factors, if the Court
considers the attack on the Judge or Judges
scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious
beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of
the law must, in the name of public interest
and public justice, strike a blow on him who
challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by
fouling its source and stream.

34. Speaking generally. there are occasions
when the right to comment may be of supreme
value (for instance, the Thalidomide Babies
cases in England) and the law of contempt
must adjust competing values and be modified,
in its application by the requirements of a free
society and the shifting emphasis on
paramount public interest in a given
situation.”

43. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (Smt) & Ors., (2007) 14
SCC 1, the Supreme Court emphasized that the vehemence of the
language used alone is not the measure of the power to punish for
contempt of Court; at the same time, the stream of administration of
justice has to remain unpolluted and, therefore, polluters of the
judicial firmament are required to be strictly dealt with. While Judges
and Courts alike are open to criticism, where it is found that the
intention of such criticism is to interfere with the proper
administration of justice or to lower its dignity, it must be severely
dealt with. We quote from the judgment as under:-

“12. There is guarantee of the Constitution of
India that there will be freedom of speech and
writing, but reasonable restrictions can be
imposed. It will be of relevance to compare the
various suggestions as prevalent in America

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and India. It is worthwhile to note that all
utterances against a Judge or concerning a
pending case do not in America amount to
contempt of Court. In Article 19 the expression
“reasonable restrictions” is used which is
almost on a par with the American
phraseology “inherent tendency” or
“reasonable tendency”. The Supreme Court of
America in Bridges v. California said:

“What finally emerges from the „clear and
present danger‟ cases is a working
principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before utterances
can be punished.”

13. The vehemence of the language used is not
alone the measure of the power to punish for
contempt of court. The fires which it kindles
must constitute an imminent, not merely a
likely, threat to the administration of justice.
The stream of administration of justice has to
remain unpolluted so that purity of court’s
atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs
of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament
are, therefore required to be well taken care of
to maintain the sublimity of court’s
environment; so also to enable it to administer
justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all
concerned. To similar effect were the
observations of Lord Morris in Attorney
General v. Times Newspapers. It was observed
that when
“unjustifiable interference is suppressed
it is not because those charged with the
responsibilities of administering justice
are concerned for their own dignity : it
is because the very structure of ordered
life is at risk if the recognised courts of
the land are so flouted that their
authority wanes and is supplanted.”

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14. To similar effect were the observations of
Hidayatullah, C.J. (as the learned Judge was
then) in Rustom Cowasjee Cooper v. Union of
India, [(1970) 2 SCC 298].

“6. There is no doubt that the court like
any other institution does not enjoy
immunity from fair criticism. This Court
does not claim to be always right
although it does not spare any effort to
be right according to the best of the
ability, knowledge and judgment of the
Judges. They do not think themselves in
possession of all truth or hold that
wherever others differ from them, it is so
far error. No one is more conscious of
his limitations and fallibility than a
Judge but because of his training and
the assistance he gets from learned
counsel he is apt to avoid mistakes more
than others. … while fair and temperate
criticism of this Court … even if strong,
may not be actionable, attributing
improper motives, or tending to bring
judges or courts into hatred and
contempt or obstructing directly or
indirectly with the functioning of courts
is serious contempt of which notice must
and will be taken. Respect is expected
not only from those to whom the
judgment of the court is acceptable but
also from those to whom it is repugnant.
Those who err in their criticism by
indulging in vilification of the institution
of courts, administration of justice and
the instruments through which the
administration acts, should take heed
for they will act at their own peril.”

15. There is an abundance of empirical
decisions upon particular instances of conduct
which have been held to constitute contempt of

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court. We shall now refer to a few. Lord
Russell of Killowen, L.C. has laid down
in R. v. Gray, as follows: (All ER p. 62 C)
“Any act done or writing published,
calculated to bring the court or a judge
of the court into contempt or to lessen
his authority, is a contempt of court.”

16. It cannot be denied that judgments are
open to criticism and in the said case it was
observed:

“Judges and courts are alike open to
criticism if reasonable argument or
expostulation is offered against any
judicial act as contrary to law or the
public good. No court could or would
treat that as [contempt of court].”

Indeed, Section 5 of the Act now
provides that a person shall not be guilty
of contempt of court for publishing any
fair comment on the merits of any case
which has been heard and finally
decided. But, if such a defence is taken,
it is always open to test whether the
publication alleged to be offending was
by way of fair comment on the merits of
the case or was personal scurrilous
abuse of a Judge as a Judge, for abuse
of a Judge or a court or attacks on the
personal character of a Judge are
clearly punishable contempt. As stated in
Para 27 at p. 21 of Vol. 9 of Halsbury’s
Laws of England, 4th Edn.:

“The punishment is inflicted, not for the
purpose of protecting either the court as
a whole or the individual judges of the
court from a repetition of the attack, but
of protecting the public, and especially
those who either voluntarily or by

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compulsion are subject to the
jurisdiction of the court, from the
mischief they will incur if the authority
of the tribunal is undermined or
impaired.”

17. The view was echoed by this Court in D.C.
Saxena (Dr.) v. Chief Justice of India. In the
same volume of Halsbury’s Laws of England at
Para 27 it is stated thus:

“27. Scandalising the court.–Any act
done or writing published which is calculated
to bring a court or a judge into contempt or to
lower his authority, or to interfere with the due
course of justice or the lawful process of the
court, is a contempt of court.”

18. The above proposition has been approved
and followed by Lord Atkin in Andre Paul
Terence Ambard v. Attorney General of
Trinidad and Tobago [AIR 1936 PC 141]. It
was observed as follows:

“[N]o wrong is committed by any member
of the public who exercises the ordinary right
of criticising in good faith in private or public
the public act done in the seat of justice. The
path of criticism is a public way : the wrong-
headed are permitted to err therein : provided
that members of the public abstain from
imputing improper motives to those taking part
in the administration of justice, and are
genuinely exercising a right of criticism and
not acting in malice or attempting to impair
the administration of justice, they are immune.
Justice is not a cloistered virtue : she must be
allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful
even though outspoken comments of ordinary
men.”

19. Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney
General v. Butterworth after making reference
to R. v. Odham’s Press Ltd. ex p A-G said:

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“whether or not there was an intention
to interfere with the administration of
justice is relevant to penalty not to
quit”.

This makes it clear that an intention to
interfere with the proper administration of
justice is an essential ingredient of the offence
of contempt of court and it is enough if the
action complained of is inherently likely to so
interfere. In Morris v. Crown Office, Lord
Denning, M.R. said that:

The course of justice must not be deflected
or interfered with. Those who do it strike at the
very foundations of our society.
In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke :

“The sole purpose of proceedings for
contempt is to give our courts the power
effectively to protect the rights of the public by
ensuring that the administration of justice
shall not be obstructed or prevented.”

20. Frankfurter, J. in Offutt v. U.S. expressed
his view as follows: (L Ed p. 16)
“It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of
law, in its active manifestation, against
obstruction and outrage.”

21. In Jennison v. Baker [(1972) 2 QB 52] , it
was stated:

“The law should not be seen to sit by
limply, while those who defy it go free, and
those who seek its protection lose hope.”

22. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the
Bench in Advocate General, State of
Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries citing those two
decisions in Offutt and Jennison stated thus:

“[I]t may be necessary to punish as a
contempt, a course of conduct which abuses
and makes a mockery of the judicial process
and which thus extends its pernicious influence
beyond the parties to the action and effects the

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interest of the public in the administration of
justice. The public have an interest, an abiding
and a real interest, and a vital stake in the
effective and orderly administration of justice,
because, unless justice is so administered,
there is the peril of all rights and liberties
perishing. The court has the duty of protecting
the interest of the public in the due
administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted
with the power to commit for contempt of
court, not in order to protect the dignity of the
court against insult or injury as the expression
„Contempt of Court‟ may seem to suggest, but,
to protect and to vindicate the right of the
public that the administration of justice shall
not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or
interfered with.”

23. Krishna Iyer, J. in his separate judgment
in S. Mulgaokar, In re [(1978) 3 SCC 339:

1978 SCC (Cri) 402] while giving broad
guidelines in taking punitive action in the
matter of contempt of court has stated:

“…if the Court considers the attack on the
Judge or Judges scurrilous, offensive,
intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable
limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the
name of public interest and public justice,
strike a blow on him who challenges the
supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its
source and stream.”

24. In Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of
U.P., [(1953) 1 SCC 813] this Court after
referring to various decisions of the foreign
countries as well as of the Privy Council stated
thus:

“It will be an injury to the public if it tends
to create an apprehension in the minds of the
people regarding the integrity, ability or
fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and
prospective litigants from placing complete

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reliance upon the Court’s administration of
justice, or if it is likely to cause
embarrassment in the mind of the Judge
himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.
It is well established that it is not necessary to
prove affirmatively that there has been an
actual interference with the administration of
justice by reason of such defamatory
statement; it is enough if it is likely or tends in
any way, to interfere with the proper
administration of law,…”

25. It may be noted here that in the illustrious
case S. Mulgaokar case it was held that:

“16. The judiciary cannot be immune from
criticism. But, when that criticism is based on
obvious distortion or gross misstatement and
made in a manner which seems designed to
lower respect for the judiciary and destroy
public confidence in it, it cannot be ignored.”

26. Though certain imputations against the
Judge may be only libellous against that
particular individual, it may at times amount
to contempt also depending upon the gravity of
the allegations. In Brahma Prakash Sharma
case this Court held that:

“[A] defamatory attack on a Judge may be
a libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it
would be open to him to proceed against the
libeller in a proper action if he so chooses. If,
however, the publication of the disparaging
statement is calculated to interfere with the
due course of justice or proper administration
of law by such court, it can be punished
summarily as contempt.”

The same view has been taken in Perspective
Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra
and C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta . Therefore,
apart from the fact that a particular statement
is libellous, it can constitute criminal contempt

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if the imputation is such that the same is
capable of lowering the authority of the court.
The gravity of the aforesaid statement is that
the same would scandalise the court.

27. “The right to criticise an opinion of a
court, to take issue with it upon its conclusions
as to a legal proposition, or question its
conception of the facts, so long as such
criticisms are made in good faith, and are in
ordinarily decent and respectful language and
are not designed to wilfully or maliciously
misrepresent the position of the court, or tend
to bring it into disrepute or lessen the respect
due to the authority to which a court … is
entitled, cannot be questioned. … The right of
free speech is one of the greatest guarantees to
liberty in a free country like [ours], even
though that right is frequently and in many
instances outrageously abused. …

If any considerable portion of a community
is led to believe that, either because of gross
ignorance of the law, or because of a worse
reason, it cannot rely upon the courts to
administer justice to a person charged with
crime, that portion of the community, upon
some occasion, is very likely to come to the
conclusion that it is better not to take any
chances on the courts failing to do their duty.”
[Ed. : As observed in Peter Breen, Re, 17
Lawyers Reports Annotated, New Series, p.
572 as quoted in C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta.

28. Judiciary is the bedrock and handmaid of
democracy. If people lose faith in justice
parted by a court of law, the entire democratic
set-up would crumble down. In this
background, observations of Lord Denning,
M.R. in Metropolitan Properties
Ltd. v. Lannon are relevant :

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“Justice must be rooted in confidence; and
confidence is destroyed when right-minded
people go away thinking: „The Judge was
biased.‟ ”

44. Recently, in Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media Private
Limited and Others, (2025) 10 SCC 353, the Supreme Court, while
highlighting and emphasising the importance of open Courts and the
duty of the Court to uphold the Fundamental Right under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India though the words spoken or
written may not be liked by them, held that if a member of the public
or a litigant or for that matter even the media tries to scandalize the
court by making sweeping unfounded allegations against the court or
the Judge(s) or by imputing motives against the Judge or Judges who
had passed a judicial order or had conducted the court proceedings,
certainly the courts would be justified in initiating criminal contempt
proceedings against such contemnors. It was further held that, for
improvement of any system, including the judiciary, introspection is
the key, which can happen only if there is a robust debate even on
issues which are before the Court, and such debates and constructive
criticism should be welcomed, however, those who offer criticism
should remember that Judges cannot respond to such criticism and if a
publication scandalizes the court or a Judge or Judges, the Courts
should take action.

45. In Andre Paul Terence Ambard (supra), Lord Atkin had also
emphasized that no wrong is committed by any member of the public
who exercises the ordinary right of criticizing in good faith, in private

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or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. It was also
emphasized that the path of criticism is a public way and the wrong-
headed are permitted to err therein, provided that members of the
public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in
the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising the right of
criticism and not acting in malice, or attempting to impair the
administration of justice.

46. In T.C. Gupta (supra), the Supreme Court emphasized that the
power to punish for contempt must be exercised with great care and
caution and only where “silence is no longer an option”.

47. In Nirbhay Singh Suliya (supra), the Supreme Court
emphasized that while great caution and circumspection must be
shown in exercise of a contempt jurisdiction, a balance must be drawn
between a fair criticism which would be in genuine public interest and
a motivated criticism and attack which is unfounded and, therefore,
against public interest. Public interest also lies in protecting the
district judiciary from motivated criticism and attack.

48. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present cases,
the campaign of the respondent no. 2 to have audio-video recording of
the Court proceedings and to generate a debate regarding the same,
cannot be said to amount to contempt. In this regard, even if he
highlights the cases where, according to him, the audio-video
recording of the judicial proceedings would have had a vital bearing, it
would not amount to a contempt, but would be intended to generate a
healthy debate on what is required to further strengthen the judicial

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system keeping in view the „open Court‟ concept as highlighted in
Wikimedia Foundation Inc. (supra).

49. The general comments of the respondent no. 2 on the ills of the
judicial system as a whole, would also not have persuaded us to
proceed against him in exercise of our contempt jurisdiction and we
would have let it pass, may be as a fair criticism or as a venting of
anger by a person who feels that he did not get the justice he deserved
or felt that the same was delayed. We must remember that one or the
other party may leave disgruntled with the order passed by the Court
and may some time vent out his/her frustration by making
uncharitable remarks; these are to be taken in our stride and not in an
oversensitive manner. However, in the present case, the respondent
no. 2 has not confined himself to this debate nor is his venting out
frustration aimed to be a fair criticism. He has personally attacked
three Judicial Officers and even imputed that in case a litigant‟s case
is listed before them, such litigant should not expect justice. What is
the foundation of such over-sweeping remarks against the Judicial
Officers? Even upon our repeated queries, the respondent no. 2
justifies these sweeping statements only on basis of the interviews
given by the respondent no. 1 in these contempt references. To a query
if the respondent no. 2 had even got the facts of these cases talked
about in the interviews verified from the judicial record, the answer is
in the negative from the respondent no. 2. While the interviews given
by respondent No. 1 were on the premise that if the proceedings of
those cases were being recorded, the outcome may have been

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different, the respondent no. 2 twisted the same to a narration that
these Judicial Officers themselves were not dispensing justice and any
litigant before them should not expect so. The intent of respondent no.
2 is, therefore, writ large of only scandalising and lowering the image
of these Judicial Officers in the general public, thereby lowering the
authority of the Court. It is not to generate a healthy debate but to
scandalize the Court. It is not bona fide but is mala fide to bring to
disrepute the judicial system and to lower the authority of the courts.

50. If one has to attack a Judicial Officer on his integrity or
competence, it must be done with cogent evidence; it cannot be made
lightly. We must remember that such an attack, if made without any
basis, undermines the authority of the Judicial Officer and interferes
with dispensation of justice by him/her without fear or favour. Any
such criticism must therefore be well founded, specially because the
Judicial Officer, unlike the complainant, has no means to justify his
actions in public. When a Judicial Officer dispenses justice, he/she is
bound to make mistakes; no judicial officer is or can be expected to be
100% correct all the time; it is for this reason that we have a hierarchy
of courts, where a litigant can approach the higher court if he/she is
dissatisfied by the verdict. In such remedy, may be the order is set
aside, however, this also does not mean that the judicial officer
passing the original order did not act with integrity or was
incompetent. In the present case, even this stage had not reached. The
respondent no. 2 pronounced his verdict against the concerned Judicial
Officers without any basis and thereby undermined their authority.

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This is a classic case of criminal contempt being committed by him.

51. In Cont. Cas (Crl.) 4/2025, the banner and the introduction to
the YouTube video uploaded by the respondent No. 2 on 07.03.2025,
though aimed at the Supreme Court, is in effect to lower the dignity of
the judicial system as a whole. It is not just the use of the derogatory
term against the Supreme Court, but against the entire judicial system.
It is intended to mock the system, bringing it to disrepute and to lower
its dignity and authority. It is not the criticism of the orders/judgments
passed by the Supreme Court, but of the judicial system as a whole.
To our view, it is a criminal contempt of the Court, which is
unpardonable and for which strict action is required to be taken
against the respondent no. 2.

52. The plea of the respondent no. 2 that the respondent no.2 was
acting bona fide or had no intention to lower the dignity of the Court,
cannot be accepted. The acts attributed to the respondent no.2 speak
for themselves and it is a case of res ipsa loquitur. There can be no
justification for the same. It is certainly not protected under Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

53. The submission of the respondent no. 2 that the Charges framed
against him do not specify the allegation on which he has been
proceeded against, does not hold any water. The Charges are clear and
specific and from the reply of the respondent no. 2, it is quite evident
that he understands the same fully.

54. We, therefore, find the respondent no. 2 guilty of having
committed criminal contempt of Court as defined in Section 2(c) of

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the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

55. To give him an opportunity to make submissions on the
punishment to be awarded to him under Section 12 of the Act, we give
him notice for the same under Rule 13(1) of the Contempt of Courts
(Delhi High Court) Rules, 2025. He may file his submissions on
punishment within a period of two weeks.

56. As we have accepted the apology tendered by the respondent
nos.1 in the two references, that is, Mr.Shiv Narayan Sharma and
Mr.Deepak Singh, they are discharged from their respective contempt
cases.

57. List on 12th May, 2026, when the respondent no. 2 shall remain
personally present.

58. A copy of this judgment, translated into Hindi, be supplied by
the Registry to the respondent no.2.

59. A copy of this judgment be given dasti under the signatures of
the Court Master.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.

RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.

APRIL 21, 2026/rv/sg/as

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Court On Its Own Motion vs Shiv Narayan Sharma Adv. And Anr on 21 April, 2026

Delhi High Court