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Contract And Construction Society & Anr vs Debabrata Sarkar And Anr on 27 April, 2026

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Calcutta High Court

Contract And Construction Society & Anr vs Debabrata Sarkar And Anr on 27 April, 2026

                     IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                          COMMERCIAL DIVISION                                  2026:CHC-OS:139

                             ORIGINAL SIDE
                        RESERVED ON: 01.04.2026
                        DELIVERED ON: 27.04.2026
                                PRESENT:
                     HON'BLE JUSTICE GAURANG KANTH
                             AP-COM 835 OF 2025
                 BALURGHAT CO-OPERATIVE LABOUR
             CONTRACT AND CONSTRUCTION SOCIETY & ANR.

                                     VERSUS
                       DEBABRATA SARKAR AND ANR.


Mr. Soumya Ray, Adv.
Ms. Anwesha Saha, Adv.
Ms. Reshmi Mukherjee, Adv.
Mr. Ashok Halder, Adv.
                                                           ..... for the petitioners

Mr. Srijan Nayak, Adv.
Ms. Rituparna Moitra, Adv.
Mr. Saurav Chaudhuri, Adv.
                                                    ..... for the respondent No. 1


Mr. Prisanka Ganguly, Adv.

                                                      ...for the respondent no.2

                                  JUDGMENT

Gaurang Kanth, J.:-

1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator for

adjudication of disputes that have arisen between the parties out of a

Development Agreement dated 06.01.2022, registered on 14.01.2022,

executed between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1.

2. The facts giving rise to the present Petition are set out hereunder:
2

2026:CHC-OS:139

3. Petitioner No. 1 is a Co-operative Society registered under the West Bengal

Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, and Petitioner No. 2 is its Director. The

Petitioners are engaged in the business of civil construction and

infrastructure development. Respondent No. 1 is the owner of land

measuring 14.82 and 14.81 decimals, purchased from Balurghat Town

Commercial Company Ltd., being R.S. Plot No. 202, L.R. Khatian No. 2353,

L.R. No. 723, Mouza – Khadimpur, J.L. No. 110, P.S. Balurghat, Premises

No. 17/12, Ward No. 22, under Balurghat Municipality.

4. Petitioner No. 2, on behalf of Petitioner No. 1, entered into a Development

Agreement dated 06.01.2022 (registered on 14.01.2022) with Respondent

No. 1 for construction of two six-storied buildings comprising 55

residential units, 35 commercial units, and associated car parking spaces.

5. It is the case of the Petitioners that Respondent No. 2 subsequently

expressed willingness to invest in the said development project, pursuant

to which a supplementary agreement dated 09.11.2022 was executed

between Petitioner No. 2 (in his capacity as Director of Petitioner No. 1),

Respondent No. 1, and Respondent No. 2. However, the said tripartite

arrangement did not subsist, as Respondent No. 2 exited the project

without any formal communication.

6. Thereafter, a final arrangement was arrived at between the Petitioners and

Respondent No. 1, whereby it was agreed that the Petitioners would retain

the sale proceeds of all residential units, commercial units, and car

parking spaces, except for 9 units (flats/shops) allocated to Respondent

No. 1.

7. In furtherance of the said arrangement, Respondent No. 1 executed a

General Power of Attorney dated 24.02.2025 (registered on 25.02.2025) in
3
2026:CHC-OS:139
favour of Petitioner No. 2, authorising him to act on behalf of Respondent

No. 1 in respect of the owner’s allocation, including execution of deeds and

completion of necessary formalities.

8. Pursuant thereto, Petitioner No. 2 entered into multiple agreements for sale

concerning the said 9 units, and payments aggregating to Rs.

3,80,55,582/- were remitted to Respondent No. 1.

SPONSORED

9. Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties in relation to, inter alia,

accounting of sale proceeds, alleged excess remittances, and issues

concerning registration of conveyances. Thereafter, by letter dated

18.06.2025, Respondent No. 1 purported to revoke the aforesaid registered

Power of Attorney.

10. The Petitioners, by letter dated 20.08.2025, raised their claims and called

upon the Respondents to resolve the disputes. However, in the absence of

any response, the Petitioners invoked the arbitration clause contained in

Section XVI(3) of the Development Agreement dated 06.01.2022 (registered

on 14.01.2022), by issuing a notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996. The said notice was addressed to Respondent

No. 1, with a copy marked to Respondent No. 2.

11. Despite receipt of the said notice, the Respondents failed to respond or take

any steps towards resolution of the disputes.

12. In these circumstances, the Petitioners have approached this Hon’ble Court

under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking

appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the

parties.

4

2026:CHC-OS:139
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners

13. Mr. Soumya Roy, learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the

present petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 is fully maintainable, as the Development Agreement dated

06.01.2022 (registered on 14.01.2022) contains a valid and binding

arbitration clause governing the disputes between the parties. It is

contended that disputes have arisen in relation to accounting of sale

proceeds, alleged excess remittances, and the unilateral revocation of the

registered General Power of Attorney, all of which squarely fall within the

scope of the arbitration clause. Despite issuance of a notice invoking

arbitration under Section 21 of the Act, the Respondents have failed to

respond or take steps for constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, thereby

necessitating the present petition.

14. It is further submitted that Petitioner No. 1, being a Co-operative Society

registered under the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, is not

precluded from invoking arbitration in the facts of the present case. The

dispute does not pertain to the internal affairs or management of the

Society, but arises out of a commercial development agreement entered

into with third parties. In such circumstances, there is no statutory

embargo under the said Act against reference of disputes to arbitration. In

support, reliance is placed on Jaipur Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari

Sangh Ltd. v. Ajay Sales & Supplies reported as 2021(17) SCC 248

and Judgment of Karnataka High Court in CMP 04/2025, titled as Sri

Ramakrishna House Building Co-operative Society v. M/s Skilltech

Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.

5

2026:CHC-OS:139

15. Learned counsel further submits that the tripartite agreement dated

09.11.2022 executed between the Petitioners, Respondent No. 1, and

Respondent No. 2 is merely a continuation and extension of the original

Development Agreement. It is argued that Respondent No. 2, having

entered into the transaction as an investor and being directly involved in

the performance of the project, is bound by the terms of the principal

agreement, including the arbitration clause, as the agreements form part

of a composite transaction.

16. It is further contended that the disputes raised are ex facie arbitrable and

do not fall within any of the limited categories of non-arbitrable disputes

as settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Drolia v. Durga

Trading Corporation reported as 2021 (2) SCC 1. The present disputes

are purely contractual in nature and do not involve any element that

would render them non-arbitrable. In view of the limited scope of

examination under Section 11 of the Act, this Hon’ble Court is only

required to prima facie ascertain the existence of a valid arbitration

agreement.

17. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the disputes between the

parties are live and arbitrable, and in view of the failure of the

Respondents to act upon the invocation notice, this Court ought to

exercise its jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act and appoint a Sole

Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties.

Submission on behalf of the Respondent No.1

18. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 submits that the present petition

under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not

maintainable in view of the statutory bar contained under Sections 108
6

and 109 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.It 2026:CHC-OS:139
is

contended that Section 108 of the said Act provides for reference of

disputes touching the constitution, management, or business of a co-

operative society to the Registrar, while Section 109 bars the jurisdiction of

civil courts and other fora in respect of such disputes. It is contended that

Petitioner No. 1 is admittedly a Co-operative Society, and the disputes, as

pleaded by the Petitioners themselves, arise in connection with

transactions involving a Co-operative Bank, namely the Dakshin Dinajpur

District Central Co-operative Bank. In such circumstances, the special

statutory mechanism provided under the said Act for adjudication of

disputes would prevail, thereby excluding recourse to arbitration under the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

19. Learned counsel further draws attention to the pleadings in the petition to

submit that it is the Petitioners’ own case that Respondent No. 1, in his

capacity as Director of the said Co-operative Bank, persuaded Petitioner

No. 2 to enter into dealings with the Bank and obtained signatures on

blank papers. It is thus contended that the substratum of the dispute is

intrinsically connected with the affairs and business of a Co-operative

Society/Co-operative Bank. Consequently, the dispute is essentially one

which falls within the scope of Sections 108 and 109 of the West Bengal

Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, and is required to be adjudicated by the

statutory forum prescribed therein, thereby rendering the present

proceedings under Section 11 not maintainable.

20. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance is placed on the judgment

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar

Power Ltd. reported as 2008 (4) SCC 755, wherein it has been held that
7

where a special statute provides for an exclusive forum for adjudication 2026:CHC-OS:139
of

disputes, the jurisdiction under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act

stands excluded. It is thus submitted that the Petitioners cannot bypass

the statutory remedy under the Co-operative Societies Act by invoking

arbitration.

21. Without prejudice to the above, learned counsel fairly submits that the

existence of the Development Agreement dated 06.01.2022 and the

arbitration clause contained therein is not in dispute, and it is also not

disputed that certain differences have arisen between the parties. However,

in view of the statutory bar and the nature of disputes as disclosed in the

pleadings, the same are not arbitrable and the present petition deserves to

be dismissed.

Submission on behalf of the Respondent No. 2

22. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 submits that the present petition

under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not

maintainable as against Respondent No. 2, inasmuch as Respondent No. 2

is not a party to the arbitration agreement contained in the Development

Agreement dated 06.01.2022. The invocation of arbitration is founded

solely on the said Development Agreement, to which Respondent No. 2 is

admittedly not a signatory. It is contended that the subsequent tripartite

agreement dated 09.11.2022 does not amount to a continuation or

incorporation of the terms of the original Development Agreement, nor

does it bind Respondent No. 2 to the arbitration clause contained therein.

In the absence of a clear and unequivocal arbitration agreement binding

Respondent No. 2, no reference to arbitration can be made against it.
8

2026:CHC-OS:139

23. It is further submitted that Respondent No. 2 had merely expressed an

intention to invest in the project and had entered into the tripartite

arrangement on a limited understanding. However, upon finding that the

project was not financially viable, Respondent No. 2 independently exited

the arrangement at an early stage and has had no further role or

involvement in the project. The present disputes, as raised by the

Petitioners, pertain to alleged financial transactions, accounting issues,

and revocation of power of attorney between the Petitioners and

Respondent No. 1, with which Respondent No. 2 has no nexus whatsoever.

Accordingly, Respondent No. 2 cannot be compelled to participate in

arbitral proceedings concerning disputes to which it is neither a necessary

nor a proper party.

24. Learned counsel further submits that there has been no valid invocation of

arbitration as against Respondent No. 2 in terms of Section 21 of the Act.

The purported notice placed on record was issued to Respondent No. 1,

with only a copy marked to Respondent No. 2. Such marking of a copy

does not constitute a valid notice invoking arbitration against Respondent

No. 2. In the absence of a proper notice invoking arbitration, the

precondition for commencement of arbitral proceedings against

Respondent No. 2 has not been satisfied. In these circumstances, it is

submitted that the present petition, insofar as it seeks reference of

disputes to arbitration against Respondent No. 2, is liable to be dismissed.

Legal Analysis

25. This Court has heard the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the

parties and has perused the material placed on record.
9

26. At the outset, the objection raised by Respondent No. 1 with respect 2026:CHC-OS:139
to

maintainability on the ground that the Petitioner is a Co-operative Society

registered under the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, is

considered. It is the contention of Respondent No. 1 that in view of

Sections 108 and 109 of the said Act, the present dispute is not arbitrable

as the same pertains to dealings involving a Co-operative Bank. However,

this contention does not merit acceptance. A perusal of the pleadings and

documents on record indicate that Respondent No. 1 has been arrayed in

the present proceedings in his individual capacity as the owner of the

subject property, who entered into the Development Agreement dated

06.01.2022 with the Petitioners. The mere allegation that Respondent No.

1 was, at some stage, associated with a Co-operative Bank or acted as its

Director does not alter the nature of the present dispute, which arises out

of a contractual arrangement concerning development of immovable

property.

27. In this context, the reliance placed by Respondent No. 1 on the provisions

of Sections 108 and 109 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act,

1961 is misplaced, as the present dispute neither touches upon the

constitution, management, or business of a Co-operative Society nor

constitutes a dispute required to be adjudicated by the statutory forum

under the said Act. On the contrary, the dispute is purely contractual in

nature between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1 in his personal

capacity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Dugdh Utpadak

Sahakari Sangh Ltd. (supra) support the proposition that disputes

arising out of commercial transactions between a co-operative society and

third parties are arbitrable. The ratio clearly recognizes that contractual
10

disputes with third parties remain arbitrable notwithstanding the status 2026:CHC-OS:139
of

one party as a co-operative society. Similarly, in Sri Ramakrishna House

Building Co-operative Society (supra), the Karnataka High Court in an

identical case has reiterated that disputes arising out of development or

construction agreements entered into by a co-operative society with

independent contractors or developers are purely commercial in nature

and do not attract the bar under the Co-operative Societies enactments.

The said judgment reinforces the principle that the determinative test is

the nature of the dispute and not merely the character of one of the

parties.

28. In the judgment relied upon by Respondent No. 1, namely Gujarat Urja

Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a

special statute creates a specific adjudicatory mechanism and confers

exclusive jurisdiction upon a designated authority in respect of disputes

arising under that statute, the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals stands

impliedly excluded. However, the ratio of the said judgment is applicable

only where (i) the dispute arises directly under the special statute, and (ii)

the statute evinces a clear intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction on a

statutory forum. In the present case, neither of the aforesaid conditions is

satisfied. The dispute does not arise under the West Bengal Co-operative

Societies Act, 1961, nor does it involve adjudication of rights or obligations

created by the said statute. Rather, the dispute emanates from a

Development Agreement executed between the Petitioners and Respondent

No. 1 in his individual capacity as the owner of the subject property.

Therefore, the statutory mechanism under Sections 108 and 109 of the

said Act is not attracted. Consequently, the ratio in Gujarat Urja Vikas
11
2026:CHC-OS:139
Nigam Ltd.
(supra) is clearly distinguishable and does not advance the

case of Respondent No. 1.

29. Insofar as Respondent No. 2 is concerned, this Court is unable to accept

the contention of the Petitioners that the arbitration clause in the

Development Agreement dated 06.01.2022 can be invoked against it. While

it is settled that, in appropriate cases, a non-signatory may be referred to

arbitration under the “group of companies” or composite transaction

doctrine, such reference is contingent upon a clear demonstration of a

mutual intention to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement,

and the existence of a composite, interdependent transaction where

performance of the agreements is so intrinsically linked that they cannot

be segregated. In the present case, the subsequent tripartite agreement

dated 09.11.2022 does not, prima facie, incorporate or adopt the

arbitration clause contained in the Development Agreement, nor does it

indicate any intention on the part of Respondent No. 2 to be bound by the

said arbitration agreement. The said agreement appears to be an

independent commercial arrangement whereby Respondent No. 2

expressed willingness to invest in the project. Further, the material on

record indicates that Respondent No. 2 exited the arrangement at an early

stage upon finding the project to be financially unviable, and there is no

material to demonstrate its continued participation in the performance of

the Development Agreement.

30. Significantly, the disputes raised by the Petitioners pertain to accounting of

sale proceeds, alleged excess remittances, and consequences arising from

revocation of the Power of Attorney, issues which arise out of obligations

between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1. These disputes are neither
12

dependent upon nor inextricably connected with any obligation 2026:CHC-OS:139
of

Respondent No. 2. Thus, the requirement of a composite transaction,

where the agreements are so interlinked that they must be performed

together, is not satisfied. In the absence of (i) any express or implied

incorporation of the arbitration clause, (ii) any demonstrated mutual

intention to bind Respondent No. 2, and (iii) any inextricable linkage

between the agreements, this Court is of the considered view that

Respondent No. 2 cannot be compelled to arbitrate. The principles

governing reference of non-signatories, as recognized in Vijay Drolia

(supra), do not extend to the facts of the present case.

31. Insofar as Respondent No. 1 is concerned, there is no dispute regarding the

execution of the Development Agreement dated 06.01.2022 or the

existence of the arbitration clause contained therein. Disputes have

admittedly arisen between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1. Applying

the principles laid down in Vijay Drolia (supra), this Court is required at

this stage to undertake only a prima facie examination as to the existence

of an arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of disputes. In the present

case, this Court is satisfied that there exists a valid arbitration agreement

between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1, and that the disputes

raised are arbitrable in nature.

32. In view of the above, the objection raised by Respondent No. 1 is rejected.

The present petition is allowed insofar as it seeks reference of disputes

between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1 to arbitration. However, the

petition is dismissed as against Respondent No. 2, as no arbitration

agreement exists between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 2, and no

valid notice under Section 21 of the Act has been issued to it.
13

2026:CHC-OS:139

33. Accordingly, this Court is prima facie satisfied that an arbitrable dispute

exists between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1, warranting

appointment of a Sole Arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, Justice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay, a

former Judge, of this Court is appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to

adjudicate the disputes between the Petitioners and Respondent No. 1,

subject to furnishing disclosure in terms of Section 12 of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996.

34. The learned sole Arbitrator shall communicate his acceptance to the

Registrar, Original Side within a period of two weeks from the date of

communication of this order.

35. The learned Arbitrator shall be at liberty to fix his/her fees in accordance

with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may be agreed between the

parties.

36. All rights and contentions of the parties are kept open to be decided by the

learned Arbitrator.

37. The petition is accordingly allowed against Respondent No. 1 and dismissed

against Respondent No. 2.

(GAURANG KANTH, J.)

Sakil Amed P.A.



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