Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Cm Nos. 3880-3881/2025 vs Ravinder Kanta And Others on 28 April, 2026
Author: Rajnesh Oswal
Bench: Rajnesh Oswal
2026:JKLHC-JMU:1222-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Case No: LPA No. 126/2025 in
WP(C) No.1439/2024
CM No. 8057/2025
CM Nos. 3880-3881/2025
Reserved on: 07.04.2026
Pronounced on:28.04.2026
Uploaded on: 28.04.2026
Whether the operative part or full
Judgment is pronounced : Full
Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir
and others
...Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)
Through: Ms. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG
v/s
Ravinder Kanta and others
Through: Mr. Jagpaul Singh, Advocate
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNESH OSWAL, JUDGE.
JUDGMENT
PER OSWAL-J
1. This intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment dated
05.08.2024 rendered by the learned writ Court in WP(C) No.
1439/2024, titled “Ravinder Kanta and Others v. UT of J&K and
Others“, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondents came to be
allowed, and the appellant No. 2 was directed to issue Fard Intekhab
qua the subject land in favour of the respondents, subject to there
LPA 126/2025 Page 1 of 6
2026:JKLHC-JMU:1222-DB
being no other legal impediment and the appellant No. 3 was directed
to admit and register the document upon its presentation, strictly in
accordance with law.
2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the
respondent Nos. 1-4, claiming to be owners in possession of the land
measuring 09 Kanals falling under Khasra No. 153, situated at Village
Bara, Tehsil Vijaypur, District Samba, applied online for issuance of
Fard Intikhab before appellant No. 2, i.e., Tehsildar Vijaypur, qua the
said land for the purpose of sale. The said application, however, came
to be rejected by the Tehsildar on the ground that the same was in
violation of Government Order No. S-432 of 1966 dated 03.06.1966.
Aggrieved thereof, the respondents preferred a writ petition, which
came to be allowed by the learned writ Court vide judgment dated
05.08.2024, by placing reliance upon the judgments rendered by the
learned Single Judge in Mohammad Akbar Shah v. State of J&K and
Others, AIR 2017 J&K 14, and Angrez Singh v. UT of J&K and
Others, AIR Online 2023 J&K 553.
3. Appellants, being aggrieved of the impugned judgment (supra), have
preferred this intra-court appeal, inter alia, on the ground that
Government Order No. S-432 of 1966 dated 03.06.1966 categorically
stipulates that the grantee shall utilize the land solely for agricultural
purposes and shall not be entitled to alienate the same without prior
permission of the Government. It is contended that, inasmuch as the
respondents never applied to the Government for grant of such
permission qua the subject land, their application was rightly rejected
by appellant No. 2.
LPA 126/2025 Page 2 of 6
4. Pursuant to a specific query made by this Court as to whether 2026:JKLHC-JMU:1222-DB
the
judgment rendered by the learned writ Court in Mohammad Akbar
Shah v. State of J&K and Others, AIR 2017 J&K 14, had been
assailed by the Government, Mrs. Monika Kohli, learned Senior
AAG, fairly conceded that the said judgment was never challenged.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the present appeal
has been rendered infructuous with the passage of time. It is
contended that the Fard Intikhab has already been issued, and the
subsequent sale deeds have been duly executed and registered, leaving
no surviving cause of action.
6. The contention of the appellants is that the land in respect whereof
proprietary rights have been conferred under Government Order No.
S-432 of 1966 dated 03.06.1966 cannot be alienated without prior
permission of the Government, and that the grantee is under a
continuing obligation to use the said land exclusively for agricultural
purposes.
7. In Mohammad Akbar Shah v. State of J&K and Others, AIR 2017
J&K 14, it has been observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment as
under :-
“13. In earlier times, agriculture activity was the backbone of
economy of the State. The land, which was given for agriculture
purposes to a State subject, was to ameliorate the sufferings of such
person/his family. Now the times have changed. The agriculture
activity is no more the main economic activity of the State. The
condition of seeking previous permission of the Government for
alienation of land, which was given for agriculture purposes, in terms
of paragraph 04 of the order of 1966, is rendered otiose and will not
effect right of the owner of land to alienate the same provided other
statutory requirements are fulfilled for such alienation.”
LPA 126/2025 Page 3 of 6
2026:JKLHC-JMU:1222-DB
6. Learned Single Judge, while placing reliance upon the judgment
(supra), has held that no prior permission of the Government for
alienation of land under the guise of the aforesaid Government Order
can be insisted upon.
7. The law on this point has held the field for a decade. Once the initial
judgment declaring the condition of prior permission as otiose has
attained finality, it became a benchmark for all subsequent cases. The
Government cannot be permitted to resort to policy of ‘pick and
choose’ which judgments it accepts and which it assails years later.
Such selective challenges undermine the principle of finality and
violate the mandate of judicial discipline, which requires that settled
positions remain undisturbed.
8. In the realm of jurisprudence, legal certainty is as indispensable as the
administration of justice. Where a ruling by a Single Judge has held
the field for a significant duration without being disturbed or reversed,
it attains the character of a settled position of law and should not
ordinarily be unsettled, as doing so would undermine judicial stability,
unless the decision is demonstrably per incuriam or palpably
erroneous.
9. In “Raj Narain Pandey v. Sant Prasad Tewari“, (1973) 2 SCC 35,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed as under:
“10. It was also observed that to take a contrary view from the law
laid down in those five propositions would have the effect of
unsettling the law established for a number of years. Mr Agarwal has
not questioned the correctness of the above mentioned five
propositions and, in our opinion, rightly so. In the matter of the
interpretation of a local statute, the view taken by the High Court
over a number of years should normally be adhered to and not
disturbed. A different view would not only introduce an element
LPA 126/2025 Page 4 of 6
2026:JKLHC-JMU:1222-DB
of uncertainty and confusion, it would also have the effect of
unsettling transactions which might have been entered into on the
faith of those decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis can be aptly
invoked in such a situation. As observed by Lord Evershed M.R. in
the case of Brownsea Haven Properties v. Poole Corpn. [(1958) 1 All
ER 205] there is well-established authority for the view that a
decision of long-standing on the basis of which many persons will
in the course of time have arranged their affairs should not lightly
be disturbed by a superior court not strictly bound itself by the
decision.”
(emphasis added)
10. In “Kattite Valappil Pathumma v. Taluk Land Board, (1997) 4 SCC
114″, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:
“6. We are further of the view, that even if another view is possible,
we are not inclined to take a different view at this distance of time.
Interpretation of the law is not a mere mental exercise. Things
which have been adjudged long ago should be allowed to rest in
peace. A decision rendered long ago can be overruled only if this
Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong or
unfair and not merely on the ground that another interpretation
is possible and the court may arrive at a different conclusion. We
should remember that the law laid down by the High Court in
the above decision has not been doubted so far. The Act in
question is a State enactment. These are weighty considerations
to hold that even if a different view is possible, if it will have the
effect of upsetting or reopening past and closed transactions or
unsettling titles all over the State, this Court should be loathe to
take a different view. On this ground as well, we are not inclined
to interfere with the judgment under appeal.”
(emphasis added)
11.The Appellants have failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity in the
judgment rendered in Mohammad Akbar Shah v. State of J&K and
Others. In the absence of any compelling argument that the said
decision is contrary to law, this Court finds no reason to deviate from
a view that has held the field for nearly a decade.
LPA 126/2025 Page 5 of 6
2026:JKLHC-JMU:1222-DB
12.Accordingly, we are not inclined to interfere, and the present appeal is
dismissed by upholding the judgment rendered by the learned writ
Court. Before parting, it is necessary to note a discrepancy in the
record; the appellants have annexed a copy of a different writ petition
in lieu of WP(C) No. 1439/2024. The correct petition, titled ‘Ravinder
Kanta and Others v. UT of J&K and Others‘, was subsequently
brought on record by the respondents in their reply to the condonation
of delay application.
(Rajnesh Oswal) (Arun Palli)
Judge Chief Justice
Jammu
28.04.2026
Madan Verma-Secy
Whether order is speaking? Yes.
Whether order is reportable? Yes.
LPA 126/2025 Page 6 of 6