Patna High Court
Binod Kumar Mishra vs The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Regd. … on 20 February, 2026
Author: Alok Kumar Sinha
Bench: Alok Kumar Sinha
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Letters Patent Appeal No.140 of 2025
In
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.12241 of 2018
======================================================
Binod Kumar Mishra S/o Sri Kamla Kant Mishra, Resident of Village- Simri,
P.S.- Simri, District- Buxar.
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Regd. Office, G-9, Ali Yavar Jung Marg,
Bandra (East) Mumbai -400051
2. The General Manager G.M. Vigilance Indian Oil Corporation, 3079/3 Sadig
Nagar, J.B. Titto Marg, New Delhi
3. The Senior Vigilance Manager, Indian Oil Corporation, Indian Oil Bhawan,
Mumbai.
4. The Executive Director HR Appellate Authority, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
Mumbai.
5. The Chief Divisional Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Marketing
Division, Patna Divisional Office, Maurya Lok Complex, Patna 800001
6. Dealers Selection Board, Patna-II, through its Non Member Secretary,
Batika, Kurji More, Industrial Estate Road, Patna
7. The Deputy Manager Sales, Patna-2 Sales Area, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.
Marketing Division, Marketing Division, Maurya Lok Complex Dak
Bunglow Road, Patna
8. Central Public Information Officer-cum-General Manager, Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd. M.D. Patna.
9. Lab Technician, Market Test, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. M.D. Patna.
10. Prop. Punam Kumari through Punam Kumari, W/o Not known, C/o
Proprietor Baba Brahmeshwar Nath Feeling Station, Brahampura P.O.P.S.-
Brahmpur, District- Buxar.
11. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Oil and Natural Gas,
Govt. of India, New Delhi.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Y.V. Giri, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Pranav Kumar, Advocate
Ms. Dimpal Kumari, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Additional Solicitor General
Mr. Anil Kumar Jha, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Ankit Katriar, Advocate
Mr. Mithlesh Kumar Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Sanat Kumar Mishra, Adv.
Mr. Anil Kumar Jha, Sr. Adv.
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR SINHA
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CAV JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK KUMAR SINHA)
Date :20-02-2026
Heard the parties.
2. The present Letters Patent Appeal is directed against
the judgment and order dated 13.12.2024 passed in CWJC No.
12241 of 2018, whereby the learned Single Judge has been pleased
to dismiss the writ petition filed by the appellant.
The main ground of challenge is that the learned Single
Judge has erred in holding that no irregularity was committed by
the respondent Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) in selecting
Respondent No. 10 for the dealership in question.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
genesis of the dispute lies in the advertisement dated 31.10.1999
inviting applications for grant of SKO/LDO dealership at
Brahmpur, District Buxar. The selection process initially
culminated in the placement of Respondent No. 10 at Serial No. 1.
The matter was subjected to judicial scrutiny and ultimately
travelled up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which by order dated
21.04.2008
(Annexure: 1) directed reconsideration of the matter by
the District Selection Committee on the basis of materials already
on record. Pursuant thereto, fresh interviews were conducted in
July 2008 and a select list dated 25.07.2008 was published,
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wherein once again Respondent No. 10 was placed at Serial No. 1
and the appellant at Serial No. 2.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
core issue which arises for consideration in the present appeal is
whether Respondent No. 10 suppressed material facts relating to
pendency of a criminal case at the time of submission of the
application form and at the time of swearing the affidavit dated
22.07.2008. It is submitted that the impugned judgment has failed
to appreciate that the selection stood vitiated at its inception on
account of deliberate non-disclosure of material information.
It is submitted that Clause 4 of the advertisement and
Paragraph 20 of the application form specifically mandated
disclosure regarding pendency of any criminal case, framing of
charges, and conviction. The eligibility guidelines clearly
stipulated that candidates convicted of offences involving moral
turpitude or economic offences, as well as those against whom
charges have been framed by a competent court, would not be
eligible for dealership. The conditions further provided that any
incorrect or false statement at any stage would render the
candidature liable to rejection and, if appointed, the dealership
liable to termination.
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5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that
Buxar Town P.S. Case No. 197/1989 was admittedly pending
against Respondent No. 10. Cognizance of offence had been taken
and charges had been framed on 16.03.2007. It is further submitted
that at the relevant point of time, Respondent No. 10 had been
declared as an absconder by the competent court, and therefore,
the proceedings had not progressed in the ordinary course. It is
emphatically submitted that despite full awareness of the pendency
of the said criminal case, Respondent No. 10, in her application
form as well as in the affidavit dated 23.07.2008 (Annexure: 15),
categorically declared that no criminal case was pending against
her and that no charges had been framed by any court. The
language of the affidavit is unequivocal and leaves no scope for
ambiguity. Such declaration is factually incorrect and amounts to a
clear case of suppression and misrepresentation.
6. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge
has erroneously confined the consideration to the aspect of
conviction and has failed to appreciate that the requirement of
disclosure was much wider. The obligation was not limited to
disclosure of conviction alone, but extended to disclosure of
pendency of criminal proceedings and framing of charges. Even
assuming arguendo that conviction had not been recorded at the
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relevant time, the non-disclosure of the pendency of proceedings
itself constitutes a material violation of the eligibility conditions.
The affidavit dated 23.07.2008 was furnished pursuant to the
direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the earlier round of
litigation, when the matter was reconsidered. The purpose of
obtaining a fresh affidavit was to ensure transparency and strict
compliance with eligibility norms. Furnishing a false affidavit in
such circumstances strikes at the very root of the selection process
and renders the selection non est in the eye of law.
7. Learned counsel further submits that it is a settled
proposition of law that fraud and suppression of material facts
vitiate all proceedings. When a candidate seeking public
dealership, suppresses facts within his/her exclusive knowledge,
the authority is misled into granting a benefit which would
otherwise not have been conferred. Such misrepresentation cannot
be cured by lapse of time or subsequent developments. It is
contended that the learned Single Judge has also erred in placing
reliance upon the alleged investment made by Respondent No. 10
in the dealership. It is submitted that equity cannot operate in
favour of a person who has obtained a benefit by suppression of
material facts. Moreover, the finding regarding substantial
investment is factually incorrect, as the retail outlet is run and
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managed by the Oil Corporation itself. Even otherwise, equity
cannot override statutory or contractual disqualifications.
8. Learned counsel further submits that the eligibility
guidelines expressly provide that if any statement made in the
application or documents submitted therewith is found to be
incorrect or false, the dealership is liable to be terminated without
assigning any reason. The conditions are mandatory in nature and
leave no scope for discretionary relaxation once suppression is
established. It is respectfully submitted that the learned Single
Judge has failed to appreciate that the respondent’s declaration that
“no allegation of any kind is pending before any criminal court”
was a categorical assertion, which stands contradicted by the
judicial record of the pending criminal case and framing of
charges. Such a false statement goes to the root of eligibility and is
not a mere technical lapse. When material information is withheld
in breach of explicit conditions, the resultant selection stands
vitiated irrespective of comparative merit or marginal difference in
marks. The appellant’s challenge is not based merely on inter se
ranking, but on the legality and validity of the very selection of
Respondent No. 10.
9. It is further contended that the impugned judgment
suffers from misappreciation of material documents, erroneous
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interpretation of eligibility conditions, and failure to apply settled
principles governing suppression of material facts and thus, the
selection of Respondent No. 10 is vitiated by deliberate non-
disclosure and filing of a false affidavit, and therefore, the
impugned judgment and order dated 13.12.2024 is liable to be set
aside and the dealership granted in favour of Respondent No. 10
deserves to be cancelled in accordance with the governing
guidelines and settled principles of law.
10. While assailing the decision of IOCL of having
selected respondent No. 10 for the dealership in question on the
ground that the respondent No. 10 had suppressed vital facts,
which clearly violated Clause 4 of the advertisement, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants also tried to
countenance the argument that even if the disqualification didn’t
get attracted on strict interpretation of Clause 4 of the
advertisement, but by not disclosing about the pendency of the
criminal case as on the date of submitting the application form, the
respondent No. 10 has clearly violated Clause 10 of the
advertisement, which required the application form and enclosure
to be complete in all respects. He, therefore, submitted that the
learned single judge failed to consider this aspect of the matter and
incorrectly confined the entire adjudication of the case only with
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respect to alleged violation of Clause 4 of the advertisement. The
decision of the IOCL to select respondent No. 10 for dealership
and the decision of the learned single judge was ,therefore, not
correct, thereby requiring interference.
11. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 10 points out
that the said advertisement was a re-advertisement of the earlier
notification dated 18.05.1998 published in newspapers and
30.05.1998 in Employment News. As per the terms of the
advertisement, candidates were required to fulfill the eligibility
criteria as on the last date of submission of application. The
appellant and Respondent No. 10 were among the applicants.
It is submitted that after evaluation of the applications
and interviews conducted by the Dealer Selection Board, marks
were awarded under various prescribed parameters. A merit panel
was prepared on the basis of total marks obtained, wherein
Respondent No. 10 secured the highest marks and was placed at
Rank No. 1. Upon due verification of her documents and
credentials, and finding no error or shortcoming in her application,
she was appointed as Retail Outlet dealer. It is further submitted
that following her appointment, the outlet was commissioned and
Respondent No. 10 made substantial investments towards
obtaining statutory NOCs, licenses, and development of
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infrastructure. Except for a brief interruption pursuant to court
proceedings, she has been operating the retail outlet successfully
for nearly twenty-five years.
12. Learned counsel for the Respondent.10 further
submits that the initial selection of Respondent No. 10 was
challenged by one Jai Prakash Pandey, who had secured second
rank in the merit panel, primarily on the ground that his father had
provided land to the Corporation and, therefore, he ought to have
been selected. It is submitted that the allotment of land and
selection of dealer were two distinct and independent transactions
under the advertisement. The matter ultimately reached the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, which by order dated 21.04.2008 directed
the competent authority of IOCL to reconsider the matter by taking
into account all materials already on record and those to be placed
by the parties.
13. In compliance with the directions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the parties were called upon vide letter dated
04.07.2008 to submit fresh affidavits and produce original
documents earlier submitted with the application. It is emphasized
that eligibility was to be determined on the basis of documents
existing at the time of the original application. Respondent No. 10
accordingly submitted her fresh affidavit dated 23.07.2008 along
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with original documents. In the said affidavit, she declared that no
court of law had framed charges against her nor had she been
convicted of any criminal offence involving moral turpitude or
economic offence.
14. Learned counsel further submits that pursuant to
reconsideration, fresh interviews were conducted and a new merit
panel dated 25.07.2008 was prepared, wherein Respondent No. 10
was again placed at Rank No. 1. The dealership was accordingly
revived, and since then she has continued to operate the outlet. It is
further submitted that the appellant thereafter filed CWJC No.
10224 of 2009 challenging the selection on the ground of alleged
pendency of a criminal case against Respondent No. 10. The writ
petition was disposed of by order dated 30.01.2015, wherein this
Court declined to grant the relief sought and merely granted liberty
to the petitioner to approach the IOCL authorities to satisfy them
regarding alleged disqualification. It is contended that the said
order virtually rejected the substantive challenge to the selection.
Pursuant to the liberty granted, the appellant made
representations before the Corporation. After conducting due
enquiry and examining the materials on record, the competent
authority of IOCL, namely the Deputy General Manager (Retail
Sales), passed a reasoned order dated 20.12.2017 holding that no
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charges had been framed against Respondent No. 10 as on the date
of submission of affidavit and, therefore, the allegation of filing a
false affidavit was not substantiated.
15. Learned counsel submits that the present writ
petition, which culminated in the impugned judgment dated
13.12.2024, was directed against the aforesaid order of the
Corporation dated 20.12.2017. The learned Single Judge, upon
detailed consideration of the facts and governing conditions,
dismissed the writ petition by a reasoned order.
With respect to the eligibility criteria, it is submitted that
Clause 11 of the Selection Brochure and Clause 4 of the
Advertisement prescribed disqualification only in cases where a
candidate had been convicted for offences involving moral
turpitude or economic offences, or where charges had been framed
by a competent court. It is contended that as on the date of
submission of application in the year 2000, no charge had been
framed against Respondent No. 10 and she had never been
convicted.
16. Learned counsel clarifies that Buxar P.S. Case No.
197/1989 was registered when Respondent No. 10 was a juvenile.
Although a charge sheet had been submitted in 1990, the matter
was subsequently transferred to the Juvenile Justice Board. Charge
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was framed against her only on 05.07.2018, long after submission
of the application and the 2008 reconsideration process.
Ultimately, she was exonerated by order dated 06.03.2020 passed
by the Juvenile Justice Board. Therefore, at the relevant time, no
charge had been framed nor was she convicted.
Addressing the issue of Clause 20 of the application
form, learned counsel submits that Respondent No. 10 furnished
the affidavit strictly in accordance with the Selection Brochure and
Advertisement. It is stated that there was an inadvertent
typographical variation in the Hindi version of the application
form, which differed from the terms contained in the Brochure and
Advertisement and in place of “Kya aap kabhi kisi aapradhik
Kritya jisme Chartraheenta wa /ya aarthik apraadh (swatantrta-
sangram se bhinna) ke doshi paye gaye hai ya aapke viruddh
nayayalaya me koi mamla lambit hai jisme nyayalaya dwara aap
par koi aarop lagaye gaye hain yadi aisa hai to kripya uska vivran
de. Aur agar aisa nahi hai to parishisht A ke anusar shapath patra
snlagna kare”, inadvertently due to typing mistake “Kya aap
sabhi kisi aapradhik Kritya jisme Chartraheenta wa /ya aarthik
apraadh (swatantrta sangram se bhinna) ke doshi paye gaye hai
ya aapke viruddh nayayalaya me koi mamla lambit hai ya
nyayalaya dwara aap par koi aarop lagaye gaye hain? yadi aisa
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hai to kripya uska vivran de. Aur agar aisa nahi hai to parishisht
A ke anusar shapath patra snlagna kare” was typed. Upon seeking
clarification, she was advised to follow the terms of the Brochure
and accordingly she wrote “Aisa Nahi Hai” (it is not so) and
furnished the affidavit, as no charges had been framed nor was she
convicted as on the relevant date.
17. Learned counsel further submits that even
subsequently, when charge was framed by the Juvenile Justice
Board in 2018, Respondent No. 10 was tried as a juvenile and
ultimately exonerated. It is contended that under Section 19 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, even
a conviction of a juvenile does not entail disqualification. The
legislative intent is to prevent stigma and future prejudice to
juveniles. It is also submitted that allegations regarding
malpractice, marker test failure, and blacklisting of truck tanker
are factually incorrect and stand negated by replies furnished by
the Corporation under the Right to Information Act. It is further
contended that the issue regarding alleged pendency of criminal
case had already been raised in the earlier writ petition and no
substantive relief was granted. The liberty granted was limited to
approaching the authorities, which was duly considered and
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decided by a reasoned order. Therefore, the present proceedings
were not maintainable.
It is lastly submitted that the competent authority of
IOCL, after considering the representation of the appellant, passed
a detailed order dated 20.12.2017 finding no illegality or
suppression on the part of Respondent No. 10. The learned Single
Judge, upon independent examination, affirmed the same. There is
no perversity, illegality, or jurisdictional error warranting
interference in intra-court appeal. The present Letters Patent
Appeal, therefore, is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
18. Learned counsel for the Respondent N0.1 -IOCL
submits at the outset that upon perusal of the exoneration order
dated 06.03.2020 passed by the learned Juvenile Justice Board
(Annexure R/10-2), certain foundational facts are not in dispute. It
is not disputed that a chargesheet dated 09.02.1990 had been filed
against Respondent No. 10 and others, and that cognizance was
taken. However, it is emphasized that charges against Respondent
No. 10 were framed only on 05.07.2018, which is much
subsequent to the submission of her first affidavit dated
13.10.2000 and the second affidavit dated 23.07.2008. Thus, as on
the relevant dates of declaration, no charges had been framed
against her.
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Learned counsel further submits that IOCL confines its
submissions to the core issues arising in the present appeal, which
may be considered under three broad heads: (i) the effect of
remand by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2008 and the
requirement of fresh affidavits; (ii) the precedence of the Brochure
and Advertisement over the Application Form; and (iii) the bar of
delay and laches disentitling the appellant to any discretionary
relief.
19. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of IOCL
submits that after the matter was remanded by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by judgment dated 21.04.2008 for fresh
consideration, the entire process stood reopened and, in effect, the
slate was wiped clean. After remand, IOCL required fresh
affidavits in a prescribed format. Notably, the format supplied in
2008 did not require any declaration regarding “pendency of a
case” but was confined to conviction and framing of charges.
Respondent No. 10 furnished her fresh affidavit dated 23.07.2008
in compliance with the format provided.
It is contended that once fresh affidavits were sought
and furnished pursuant to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, any alleged infirmity in the earlier affidavit of the year 2000
lost relevance. The eligibility of the candidates was reconsidered
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on the basis of the documents and declarations furnished in the
fresh process of 2008.
20. Learned counsel further submits that IOCL, being
the authority conducting the selection, did not attach determinative
significance to any additional or variant wording in Column 20 of
the application form. This is evident from the reasoned order dated
20.12.2017 passed by the competent authority, wherein the issue of
pendency of a case was examined and it was concluded that no
false affidavit had been submitted. The said order demonstrates
IOCL’s considered view that the additional reference to
“pendency” in the application form had no bearing when measured
against the governing eligibility clauses.
It is also submitted that in matters of selection for
dealership, the Selection Brochure and Advertisement constitute
the governing framework. In the absence of any statutory rules, the
Brochure partakes the character of binding guidelines and operates
as the controlling instrument regulating eligibility. Clause 11 of the
Brochure delineates only two disqualifying circumstances: (i)
conviction for any criminal offence involving moral turpitude
and/or economic offence (other than freedom struggle), and (ii)
cases where charges have been framed by a competent court (other
than freedom struggle). The Advertisement dated 01.09.2000
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mirrors the same stipulations in Clause 4 and does not expand the
scope of disqualification beyond what is contained in the
Brochure.
21. Learned counsel submits that it is a settled principle
that an advertisement or application form cannot prescribe
conditions inconsistent with or beyond the governing guidelines.
Therefore, if there appears to be any variation in the wording of
Column 20 of the application form referring to “pendency of a
case,” such wording cannot override or enlarge the eligibility
criteria set out in the Brochure and Advertisement. IOCL, being
the author of the selection documents, is best placed to interpret
and understand its own requirements. Reliance is placed upon the
authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Caretel Infotech Ltd. v. HPCL reported in (2019) 14 SCC 81,
wherein it has been held that the author of the document is the best
person to appreciate its requirements and courts should exercise
restraint in substituting their own interpretation for that of the
authority, unless the decision is arbitrary or perverse.
It is argued that IOCL’s interpretation, as reflected in its
order dated 20.12.2017, that only conviction or framing of charges
would attract disqualification, deserves deference and ought not to
be interfered with in writ or intra-court appellate jurisdiction.
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22. Learned counsel further submits that even
assuming, without admitting, that the appellant’s contention has
some substance, no relief can be granted at this stage in view of
gross delay and laches attributable to the appellant. The re-
selection of Respondent No. 10 took place on 25.07.2008, yet the
appellant approached this Court by filing CWJC No. 10224 of
2009 only on 25.08.2009, after a lapse of more than one year.
Thereafter, upon disposal of the writ petition on 30.01.2015
granting liberty to approach IOCL, the appellant filed a
representation on 24.02.2015 but did not pursue the matter
diligently. A reminder was submitted only on 09.09.2017, after a
further lapse of approximately two and a half years. During this
prolonged period of inaction, Respondent No. 10 continued to
operate the retail outlet and substantial investments had already
been made in infrastructure, statutory compliance, and operations.
The position has thus been irreversibly altered.
Reliance is placed on the judgment in Kaushal Kishore
v. Union of India (2000 (2) PLJR 475), wherein it was held that
even if some infirmity exists, the Court may decline relief where
the position has become irreversible due to delay and substantial
investments have been made. Further reliance is placed on the
decision in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport
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Authority (1979) 3 SCC 489, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that where a party allows time to elapse and the selected
candidate alters position by incurring expenditure, it would be
inequitable to set aside the selection.
23. Learned counsel submits that the appellant has, on
more than one occasion, slept over his alleged rights and cannot
now seek to unsettle a long-standing arrangement. The
extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, and by
extension in Letters Patent Appeal, ought not to be exercised in
favour of a litigant guilty of unexplained delay. It is further
submitted that in the earlier writ proceedings, the primary
grievance was related to violation of Clause 4 of the advertiseent
as pleaded by the appellant in the earlier writ. This fact is further
evident from the stand taken by the appellant in the written
submissions, but the plea regarding violation of Clause 10 of the
advertisement was developed subsequently during oral
submissions. This conduct reflects an attempt to shift grounds and
reopen settled issues, which ought not to be countenanced. It is,
therefore, respectfully submitted that the present Letters Patent
Appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.
ISSUES IN QUESTION:
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1. Whether, under Clause 4 of the advertisement dated
01.09.2000, the mere pendency of a criminal case–where charges
had not been framed as on the date of submission of the
application–renders a candidate ineligible for allotment of a retail
outlet dealership?
2. Whether, in case of any apparent variance between the
eligibility conditions set out in the advertisement and the wording
contained in the application form, the advertisement constitutes the
governing instrument, or whether the application form can
independently enlarge the scope of disqualification?
3. Whether the decision of the Indian Oil Corporation
disposing of the appellant’s representation, pursuant to liberty
granted in the earlier round of litigation, suffers from arbitrariness,
illegality, or non-application of mind so as to warrant interference
in appellate jurisdiction?
4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
including the lapse of time, operationalisation of the retail outlet,
and substantial investments made by Respondent No. 10, the
learned Single Judge rightly declined to grant relief on equitable
considerations, and whether such exercise of discretion warrants
interference in this Letters Patent Appeal?
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5. Whether the appellant is entitled to raise, in the
present Letters Patent Appeal, a new plea of violation of Clause 10
of the advertisement, which was neither pleaded nor urged in the
earlier proceedings, or whether such plea is barred by the doctrine
of constructive res judicata and the principle of finality of
pleadings?
FINDINGS ON ISSUE NO.1
1. Whether, under Clause 4 of the advertisement dated
01.09.2000, the mere pendency of a criminal case–where
charges had not been framed as on the date of submission of the
application–renders a candidate ineligible for allotment of a
retail outlet dealership?
Upon a careful re-appreciation of the factual matrix, the
rival submissions and the reasoning contained in the impugned
judgment, it becomes clear that the controversy under Clause 4 of
the advertisement dated 01.09.2000 cannot be decided merely by
isolating the expression “pendency of a criminal case” from its
contextual and textual setting. The appellant’s principal contention,
as urged before the learned Single Judge and reiterated in this
appeal, is that since a criminal case had been registered and
cognizance taken prior to the submission of the application, the
ineligibility under Clause 4 stood automatically attracted,
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irrespective of whether charges had been framed. The submission
proceeds on the premise that the term “pendency” must be given
its widest possible amplitude. Respondent no. 10, who is presently
operating the retail outlet, and the Indian Oil Corporation have,
however, consistently contended that Clause 4, when read as a
whole and in the light of the scheme of the advertisement, does not
contemplate automatic disqualification at a mere preliminary stage
of proceedings, and that the authority was required to assess
whether the nature and stage of the criminal case were such as to
attract the intended bar.
The impugned judgment, which is detailed and
reasoned, records that as on the cut-off date, though a criminal
case had been registered, charges had not been framed against
respondent no. 10 and the matter had not crystallised into a stage
where culpability could even prima facie be inferred. The learned
Single Judge examined the language of Clause 4 and observed that
eligibility clauses, particularly those which operate as
disqualifications, must receive a strict construction. It was noticed
that the object of such a clause is to exclude persons whose
involvement in serious criminal proceedings casts a real and
substantial doubt on their suitability. A mechanical or literal
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construction divorced from context would defeat both fairness and
proportionality.
It is well settled that disqualification clauses in public
notices must be construed strictly and not expansively. In Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India,
(1979) 3 SCC 489, the Supreme Court emphasised adherence to
declared norms; however, the same line of authority also mandates
that conditions must be interpreted as they are written and not
extended by implication. If Clause 4 does not expressly stipulate
that mere registration of an FIR or pendency at a pre-charge stage
results in automatic ineligibility, the Court cannot supply such
words. The decision underscores that pendency by itself is not a
uniform or inflexible ground of disqualification in every context;
the employer or authority must consider the attendant
circumstances.
Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has relied
upon Ramchandra Singh v. Savitri Devi & Ors : (2003) 8 SCC
319 to invoke the principle that fraud vitiates all acts;
Krishnamoorthy v. Shivakumar & Ors (2015) 3 SCC 467 to
contend that non-disclosure of material facts amounts to fraud;
Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner : (1978) 1
SCC 405 to submit that an order must stand or fall on the reasons
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recorded therein; and Kunwar Pal Singh (Dead) by LRS v. State
of U.P. & Ors. : (2007) 5 SCC 85 to emphasise that a statutory act
must be performed in the prescribed manner. The legal
propositions enunciated in these decisions are well settled;
however, they do not advance the appellant’s case in the present
factual matrix. No foundational pleading or material establishing
fraud or deliberate suppression by respondent no. 10 has been
demonstrated; the decision of IOCL has been examined on the
basis of the reasons contemporaneously recorded, without any
supplementation; and the selection process has been conducted
strictly in accordance with the governing advertisement.
Consequently, the aforesaid authorities are distinguishable on facts
and do not warrant interference.
In the present case, as noted in the impugned order, the
Corporation considered the status of the criminal proceedings, the
absence of framing of charge on the relevant date, and the
surrounding facts before arriving at its decision. The learned
Single Judge, after examining the material, found that the
appellant had not demonstrated that Clause 4 mandated automatic
rejection at a stage anterior to framing of charge. It was further
held that eligibility must be assessed on a rational and contextual
interpretation of the clause, and that no perversity or arbitrariness
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was established in the Corporation’s understanding thereof.
Respondent no. 10’s selection, therefore, was not shown to be
contrary to the governing advertisement.
It is also significant that the appellant’s interpretation
would require reading Clause 4 in a manner that enlarges the scope
of disqualification beyond what is expressly provided. Such an
approach would run contrary to settled principles of interpretation,
particularly where civil consequences ensue.
In the limited jurisdiction of a Letters Patent Appeal,
interference is warranted only where the interpretation adopted is
manifestly erroneous or contrary to law. The view taken in the
impugned judgment–that mere pendency of a criminal case at a
stage where charges had not been framed does not ipso facto
render a candidate ineligible under Clause 4, absent an express
stipulation to that effect–is a plausible and legally sustainable
construction. It aligns with principles of strict interpretation of
disqualification clauses and with the broader jurisprudence on
assessment of antecedents.
Accordingly, this Court finds no infirmity in the
conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge on this issue.
Clause 4 does not mandate automatic ineligibility merely on
account of pendency of a criminal case where charges had not
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been framed as on the date of submission of the application. The
contention of the appellant to the contrary is devoid of merit, and
the finding in favour of respondent no. 10 warrants no interference
in this intra-court appeal.
FINDINGS ON ISSUE NO.2
2. Whether, in case of any apparent variance between
the eligibility conditions set out in the advertisement and the
wording contained in the application form, the advertisement
constitutes the governing instrument, or whether the application
form can independently enlarge the scope of disqualification?
The second issue which arises for consideration is
whether, in the event of any apparent variance between the
eligibility conditions stipulated in the advertisement dated
01.09.2000 and the wording employed in the application form, the
advertisement constitutes the governing instrument of the selection
process, or whether the application form can independently enlarge
or modify the scope of disqualification. The respondent-
Corporation, supported by respondent no. 10, has consistently
maintained that the advertisement is the foundational document of
the selection process and that the application form is merely a
procedural vehicle to elicit information in furtherance of the
eligibility conditions already prescribed.
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At the outset, it must be emphasised that in matters of
public selection, whether in employment or in contractual
allotments such as retail outlet dealerships, the advertisement
inviting applications is the charter that governs the rights and
obligations of the parties. It sets out the eligibility criteria, the
conditions of participation, and the parameters within which the
selection is to be conducted. The application form, by contrast, is
an ancillary instrument designed to operationalise the
advertisement; it does not and cannot exist independently of it. The
legal position in this regard is no longer res integra. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, held that a public
authority is bound by the norms and standards which it professes
in the advertisement and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. The
advertisement thus acquires binding force and operates as the
“rules of the game,” which must remain constant throughout the
selection process.
It necessarily follows that the advertisement cannot be
diluted, modified, or enlarged by a subsequent document such as
an application form, unless such modification is expressly notified
and made uniformly applicable to all aspirants. To permit the
application form to independently expand the scope of
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disqualification would be to introduce uncertainty and arbitrariness
into the process. Conversely, if the form were interpreted as
narrowing or contradicting the advertisement, such an
interpretation would undermine the sanctity of the eligibility
conditions publicly declared at the threshold. In Monarch
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal
Corporation, (2000) 5 SCC 287, the Supreme Court reiterated that
the terms of the invitation are sacrosanct and cannot be altered to
the prejudice or advantage of any participant. The rationale
underlying this principle is that transparency and predictability are
essential attributes of fairness in public dealings.
In the present case, as noticed in the impugned order, the
learned Single Judge undertook a detailed comparative analysis of
Clause 4 of the advertisement and the relevant column of the
application form. The impugned judgment records that the
advertisement clearly stipulated disqualification in the event of
pendency of a criminal case, whereas the application form required
disclosure of criminal antecedents through an affidavit and
declaration. The learned Single Judge, after examining the
language of both documents in juxtaposition, rightly concluded
that the application form was not intended to redefine or
circumscribe the eligibility criteria, but rather to secure a
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declaration in aid of verifying compliance with the advertisement.
IOCL, being the author of the selection documents, is best placed
to interpret and understand its own requirements. Reliance is
placed by IOCL upon the authoritative pronouncement of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Caretel Infotech Ltd. v. HPCL (2019)
14 SCC 81, wherein it has been held that the author of the
document is the best person to appreciate its requirements and
courts should exercise restraint in substituting their own
interpretation for that of the authority, unless the decision is
arbitrary or perverse The reasoning reflects a correct appreciation
of the hierarchical relationship between the two documents. The
advertisement was the source of eligibility; the form was a
medium for disclosure and verification.
The appellant’s attempt to rely upon the wording of the
application form to contend that the scope of disqualification stood
confined or altered cannot be countenanced. Firstly, the
advertisement was a public document addressed to all prospective
applicants and constituted the primary representation of eligibility
norms. Secondly, the application form must be read harmoniously
with the advertisement, not in isolation. A harmonious construction
would require that both documents be read together, with the
advertisement prevailing in the event of any inconsistency.
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Thirdly, it is settled that a candidate who participates in a selection
process with full knowledge of the terms of the advertisement
cannot subsequently challenge or reinterpret those very terms to
suit her convenience.
It is also pertinent to note that the respondent-
Corporation, including IOCL, has acted consistently on the basis
that the advertisement governed eligibility. There is nothing on
record to suggest that the Corporation sought to enlarge the scope
of disqualification beyond what was prescribed in Clause 4. On the
contrary, the impugned order demonstrates that the authority and
the learned Single Judge confined their consideration strictly
within the four corners of the advertisement. The detailed
reasoning of the learned Single Judge, which meticulously
examined the interplay between the advertisement and the form,
does not reveal any misdirection in law. Rather, it reinforces the
settled proposition that the application form cannot operate as an
independent source of eligibility or disqualification.
In an intra-court appeal, the scope of interference is
circumscribed. Unless it is shown that the learned Single Judge
misconstrued the governing document or adopted an interpretation
that is manifestly erroneous or perverse, the Division Bench would
be slow to substitute its own view. In the present case, the
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conclusion that the advertisement constitutes the governing
instrument and that the application form cannot independently
enlarge or curtail the scope of disqualification is firmly anchored
in established principles of administrative and contractual law. To
hold otherwise would unsettle the uniform application of eligibility
conditions and open the door to subjective interpretation of
ancillary documents.
Accordingly, this Court holds that in the event of any
apparent variance between the advertisement and the application
form, the advertisement must prevail as the controlling and
authoritative instrument. The application form is merely
supplemental and cannot independently enlarge, modify, or dilute
the scope of disqualification prescribed therein. The view taken in
the impugned order is legally sound and does not warrant
interference in Letters Patent Appeal. The issue is, therefore,
answered against the appellant.
FINDINGS ON ISSUE NO.3
3. Whether the decision of the Indian Oil Corporation
disposing of the appellant’s representation, pursuant to liberty
granted in the earlier round of litigation, suffers from
arbitrariness, illegality, or non-application of mind so as to
warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction?
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The third issue which falls for determination is whether
the decision of the Indian Oil Corporation (IOCL), rendered while
disposing of the appellant’s representation pursuant to liberty
granted in the earlier round of litigation, is vitiated by
arbitrariness, illegality, or non-application of mind so as to warrant
interference in intra-court appellate jurisdiction. The appellant has
assailed the said decision on the ground that the authority
mechanically reiterated its earlier stand without independently
examining the factual and legal nuances highlighted in the
representation, particularly with regard to the stage of the criminal
proceedings and the interpretation of Clause 4 of the
advertisement. It is urged that the order lacks objective
consideration and is, therefore, liable to be set aside as arbitrary.
The respondent-Corporation, on the other hand, has submitted that
the representation was considered in detail, relevant records were
scrutinized, and a reasoned decision was rendered strictly in
accordance with the governing eligibility criteria. Respondent no.
10 has supported this stand, contending that the decision was
neither perfunctory nor predetermined, but rather a lawful
reaffirmation of the ineligibility which existed on the cut-off date.
From a perusal of the impugned judgment, it is evident
that the learned Single Judge undertook an exhaustive examination
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of the decision-making process adopted by IOCL while disposing
of the appellant’s representation. The impugned order specifically
records that liberty had earlier been granted to the appellant to
approach the Corporation with a representation, and that the
authority, in compliance with the judicial direction, considered the
same and passed a speaking order assigning reasons. The authority
had adverted to the relevant clause of the advertisement, the status
of the criminal proceedings as on the crucial date, and the legal
implications thereof. The reasoning was not confined to a bare
recital but reflected application of mind to the material placed
before it. This aspect, as observed in the impugned order, negates
the allegation of non-application of mind.
The scope of judicial review over administrative
decisions in contractual or dealership matters is well
circumscribed. It is not the function of the Court to sit in appeal
over the merits of the decision, but only to examine the decision-
making process. The parameters laid down in Tata Cellular v.
Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, though in the context of tender
matters, are equally applicable here: judicial review is concerned
with illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. So long as
the authority acts within the bounds of the governing terms and
applies its mind to relevant considerations, the Court does not
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substitute its own view merely because another view is possible.
The impugned judgment has, in fact, adverted to these principles
while declining to interfere.
The appellant’s submission that the authority acted
mechanically does not find support from the record. As noticed in
the impugned order, the decision of IOCL specifically dealt with
the contention that charges had not been framed and explained
why, in its view, pendency of the criminal case itself did not attract
the disqualification under Clause 4. The authority also considered
the timeline of events and reaffirmed that eligibility had to be
determined with reference to the last date of submission of
applications. These aspects, which are clearly reflected in the
reasoning portion of the administrative order and noted by the
learned Single Judge, demonstrate due consideration rather than
arbitrariness. The mere fact that the authority did not accept the
appellant’s interpretation does not render the decision arbitrary.
It is equally significant that respondent no. 10, who
stood to be affected by any alteration of the selection outcome,
emphasized before the learned Single Judge that the decision was
taken after affording the appellant an opportunity to place her case
and that the Corporation acted uniformly in applying the eligibility
criteria. The impugned judgment records this submission and finds
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no material to suggest mala fides, bias, or extraneous
considerations. In the absence of any allegation of personal malice
or demonstrable procedural violation, the plea of arbitrariness
remains unsubstantiated.
In an intra-court appeal, the Division Bench exercises
supervisory jurisdiction over the correctness of the judgment under
challenge. Unless it is shown that the learned Single Judge failed
to consider a material aspect, misapplied settled principles, or
upheld a decision that is patently unreasonable, interference would
not be justified. The impugned order reflects a detailed and
reasoned analysis of the administrative decision, accords due
weight to the submissions of all parties, and applies the settled
principles of judicial review. The decision of IOCL, as examined
therein, cannot be characterised as suffering from illegality,
irrationality, or non-application of mind. Rather, it represents a
considered reiteration of the eligibility position based on the
governing advertisement.
Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that
the decision of IOCL disposing of the appellant’s representation
does not warrant interference in appellate jurisdiction. The
impugned judgment, having scrutinised the administrative action
within the permissible contours of judicial review and having
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found no infirmity therein, does not call for reversal. The issue is,
therefore, answered against the appellant.
FINDINGS ON ISSUE NO.4
4. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
including the lapse of time, operationalisation of the retail
outlet, and substantial investments made by Respondent No. 10,
the learned Single Judge rightly declined to grant relief on
equitable considerations, and whether such exercise of
discretion warrants interference in this Letters Patent Appeal?
The final issue which arises for consideration is whether,
in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, including
the lapse of considerable time, the operationalisation of the retail
outlet, and the substantial investment made by respondent no. 10,
the learned Single Judge was justified in declining relief on
equitable considerations, and whether such exercise of judicial
discretion calls for interference in the present Letters Patent
Appeal.
The appellant has contended that once it is demonstrated
that the initial selection suffered from legal infirmity, equitable
considerations such as passage of time or investment made by a
successful candidate cannot be pressed into service to perpetuate
an illegality. It is urged that equity cannot override law and that if
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the selection was vitiated at inception, subsequent developments
cannot validate it. It has further been submitted that the appellant
had been diligently pursuing remedies, including the earlier round
of litigation culminating in liberty to file a representation, and
therefore the doctrine of delay and laches ought not to be invoked
against her.
On the other hand, respondent no. 10 has emphatically
submitted that the retail outlet was commissioned long ago
pursuant to a concluded selection process; that substantial capital
investment was made in infrastructure, manpower, statutory
compliances and day-to-day operations; and that the dealership has
been functioning continuously without interruption. It is contended
that unsettling the allotment at this stage would cause grave
prejudice, not merely to respondent no. 10 but also to third-party
interests and the public at large. The respondent-Corporation,
IOCL, has supported this stand, pointing out that the selection
process had attained finality, the dealership agreement was
executed, and the outlet has been operational for a considerable
period. It is further submitted that interference at such a belated
stage would disrupt an established commercial arrangement and
adversely impact the distribution network.
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The impugned order of the learned Single Judge, which
is under challenge before us, has dealt with this aspect in
considerable detail and has taken note of the chronology of events,
the lapse of time between the original allotment and the institution
of the challenge, and the fact that respondent no. 10 had altered his
position irreversibly by investing substantial resources in the
establishment and running of the outlet. The impugned judgment
records that even assuming arguendo that a debatable issue existed
on interpretation of eligibility, the grant of relief after such
prolonged delay would result in manifest inequity.
The doctrine of delay and laches is well entrenched in
constitutional jurisprudence. It is settled that a person who seeks
equitable relief must approach the Court with reasonable
promptitude. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC
683, the Supreme Court held that unexplained delay coupled with
the creation of third-party rights constitutes a valid ground to
decline relief in writ jurisdiction. The Court held that persons
sleeping over their rights for an unreasonable period cannot seek
discretionary relief, as the court should not aid those who are not
prompt in pursuing their remedies.These principles are particularly
relevant where commercial arrangements have been acted upon
and substantial investments have been made.
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In the present case, it is not disputed that the retail outlet
stood commissioned and has been operational for a significant
period. Respondent no. 10, as noticed in the impugned order, has
made substantial financial commitments in land development,
infrastructure, equipment, manpower and statutory compliances.
These are not ephemeral or reversible steps; they represent a
complete alteration of position based on a concluded selection.
The doctrine of fait accompli, though not a shield for illegality, is a
relevant consideration in moulding relief. Courts are slow to
unsettle long-standing arrangements unless a glaring and
foundational illegality is established.
It is also pertinent that the learned Single Judge did not
rest the dismissal solely on equitable considerations; rather, after
examining the merits of the challenge and upholding the decision
of the Corporation, the Court additionally observed that even on
equitable grounds, interference would not be warranted. This
layered reasoning demonstrates a judicious exercise of discretion
rather than an abdication of adjudicatory duty. The impugned order
reflects a conscious balancing of competing interests — the
appellant’s grievance on the one hand, and the settled commercial
rights and public interest on the other.
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In an intra-court appeal, the scope of interference with a
discretionary order is limited. It is a settled principle that an
appellate court will not lightly substitute its own discretion for that
exercised by the court of first instance, unless it is shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or on wholly
untenable grounds. The exercise of discretion by the learned
Single Judge in the present case is supported by cogent reasons,
rooted in established doctrines of delay, laches, and equitable
balance. No perversity or misapplication of principle has been
demonstrated before us.
Ultimately, writ jurisdiction is not exercised in a
vacuum; it operates within the framework of equity, fairness and
public interest. Even where a technical infraction is alleged, the
Court must weigh the consequences of granting relief. In the facts
at hand, the prolonged lapse of time, the operationalisation of the
retail outlet, the substantial and irreversible investment by
respondent no. 10, and the absence of any demonstrable mala fides
or patent illegality collectively justify the refusal of relief. The
learned Single Judge, in declining to unsettle a concluded and
operational arrangement, exercised discretion in a manner
consistent with settled legal principles.
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Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to interfere with
the discretionary conclusion reached in the impugned judgment.
The issue is answered against the appellant, and the exercise of
discretion by the learned Single Judge does not warrant
interference in this Letters Patent Appeal.
FINDINGS ON ISSUE NO.5
5. Whether the appellant is entitled to raise, in the
present Letters Patent Appeal, a new plea of violation of Clause
10 of the advertisement, which was neither pleaded nor urged in
the earlier proceedings, or whether such plea is barred by the
doctrine of constructive res judicata and the principle of finality
of pleadings?
The appellant has, during the course of arguments in the
present Letters Patent Appeal, sought to contend that even
assuming the disqualification under Clause 4 of the advertisement
was not attracted on a strict construction, respondent no. 10 was
nonetheless ineligible on account of alleged non-disclosure of the
pendency of the criminal case in the application form, thereby
violating Clause 10 of the advertisement which mandated that the
application and its enclosures be complete in all respects. It is
urged that such suppression of material facts vitiates the very
selection process and that the learned Single Judge erred in
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confining the adjudication primarily to Clause 4 without
independently examining the alleged breach of Clause 10.
At the outset, it must be noted that the pleadings
constitute the foundation of adjudication in writ proceedings. It is
a settled principle that parties are bound by their pleadings, and
courts ordinarily adjudicate upon issues that arise from the
pleadings placed on record. A perusal of the appeal, as well as the
earlier rounds of litigation culminating in the liberty granted to
submit a representation, indicates that the principal challenge was
anchored in the alleged violation of Clause 4 of the advertisement.
The specific plea that respondent no. 10 had violated Clause 10 by
suppressing material facts, independent of Clause 4, was neither
distinctly pleaded nor developed as a separate ground in the writ
proceedings. Even in the memorandum of appeal in the present
LPA, no specific foundation has been laid asserting Clause 10 as a
standalone ground of challenge. The contention has surfaced only
during oral submissions.
The doctrine of constructive res judicata, embodied in
Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
been consistently held to be applicable in principle to prevent
multiplicity of litigation and to secure finality in judicial
determinations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
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party cannot be permitted to raise in subsequent proceedings a
ground which might and ought to have been raised in the earlier
round. The principle is rooted in public policy, ensuring that
litigation attains finality and that parties do not engage in
piecemeal challenges by keeping grounds in reserve.
In the present case, the factual basis for the alleged non-
disclosure was very much within the knowledge of the appellant at
the time of filing the writ petition. If the appellant intended to
assail the selection of respondent no. 10 on the independent
ground of violation of Clause 10, nothing prevented him from
expressly pleading and substantiating that contention before the
learned Single Judge. The failure to do so cannot now be cured by
raising a fresh legal submission at the appellate stage, particularly
in an intra-court appeal where the scope of interference is already
circumscribed.
It is equally well settled that an appellate court,
especially in Letters Patent jurisdiction, does not ordinarily permit
a wholly new factual or mixed question of fact and law to be
raised for the first time, unless it goes to the root of jurisdiction or
involves a pure question of law not requiring further factual
inquiry. The plea of suppression under Clause 10 is a matter which
ought to have been specifically pleaded and adjudicated upon in
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the writ proceedings. To entertain such a contention at this stage
would not only enlarge the scope of the appeal but also cause
prejudice to respondent no. 10, who had no occasion to meet such
a distinct plea before the learned Single Judge.
Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the
appellant is not entitled to raise, at the stage of the present Letters
Patent Appeal, a new and independent ground alleging violation of
Clause 10 of the advertisement, when such plea was neither
specifically pleaded nor urged in the earlier proceedings. The
attempt is clearly hit by the principles analogous to constructive
res judicata and the settled doctrine of finality of pleadings.
Accordingly, the issue is answered against the appellant.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion on all the issues
framed for consideration, and having found no error of law,
perversity of reasoning, or jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned
judgment, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned
Single Judge has rightly appreciated the factual matrix, correctly
interpreted the governing eligibility conditions, and judiciously
exercised discretion within the well-settled parameters of judicial
review. The administrative decision of the Corporation has been
examined on the touchstone of legality, rationality, and procedural
propriety and has been found to withstand scrutiny. No ground is
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made out for interference in the limited scope of intra-court
appellate jurisdiction.
25. Accordingly, the Letters Patent Appeal stands
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Alok Kumar Sinha, J)
(Sangam Kumar Sahoo, CJ)
Prakash Narayan
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 11.02.2026
Uploading Date 20.02.2026
Transmission Date NA
