Patna High Court
Bijay Kumar vs The State Of Bihar on 19 February, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 3723 of 2025
======================================================
1. Bijay Kumar Son of Ram Prakash Mahto, Resident of village- Nawada, P.S-
Phulwarisharif, District- Patna.
2. Chandani Kumari, D/o- Rohit Kumar, Resident of village- Nawada, P.S-
Phulwarisharif, District- Patna.
3. Vivek Bhardwaj, Son of Gaya Shanker Dubey, Resident of Mohalla- Ward
no. 40, Nai Sarak, Panch Mohalla, P.S- Vishnupad, District- Gaya.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Additional Chief Secretary, General Administration Department,
Government of Bihar, Patna.
3. The Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department, Bihar, Patna.
4. The Director General, Bihar State Sports Authority, Patna.
5. The Under Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of
Bihar, Patna.
6. The Deputy Secretary, General Administration Department, Government of
Bihar, Patna.
7. The Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports,
Government of India, New Delhi.
8. The Under Secretary, Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Department of
Sports, Hall No. 103, Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium, Lodhi Road, New Delhi.
9. The JU-JITSU Association of India, through its General Secretary having its
office of DEEP-GIRI2-361/1, Tulsi Nagar, Polysheet, Kathgodam, Nainital,
263126, Uttarakhand, India.
10. The JU-JITSU Association, through its President, having its office of DEEP-
GIRI 2-361/1, Tulsi Nagar, Polysheet, Kathgodam, Nainital, 263126,
Uttarakhand India.
11. The JU-JITSU Association of India, through its the Secretary, having its
office of DEEP-GIRI 2-361/1, Tulsi Nagar, Polysheet, Kathgodam, Nainital,
263126, Uttarakhand India.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Rama Kant Sharma, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma, Advocate
For the Union of India : Mr. Krishna Nandan Singh, Sr. Advocate
For the State : Mr. Jitendra Kumar Roy, SC-13
Mr. U. K. Singh, AC to SC-13
Mr. Shivaditya Dhari Sinha, Advocate
For the Respondent Nos. 9 to 11: Mr. Manmeet Singh Gulati, Advocate
Mr. Harishikesh, Advocate
Mr. Chandramauli Kumar, Advocate
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
2/33
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIBEK CHAUDHURI
CAV JUDGMENT
Date: 19-02-2026
1. This writ petition, filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, presents a poignant intersection of
administrative discretion, sports governance, and
constitutional rights. The petitioners, three dedicated Ju-Jitsu
athletes: Bijay Kumar, Chandani Kumari, and Vivek
Bhardwaj, seek to quash the impugned memo no. 1397, dated
23.01.2025
issued by the Under Secretary, General
Administration Department (respondent no. 5), which upheld
the Bihar State Sports Authority’s (BSSA) enquiry report,
dated 28.02.2024. This report, in turn, affirmed the
cancellation of their recommendations for direct appointment
as Sub-Inspectors in the Bihar Police under the Bihar
Outstanding Sports Persons Direct Appointment Rules, 2023
(hereinafter referred to as “the 2023 Rules” for short).
Additionally, the petitioners challenge memo no. 6732, dated
30.04.2024, which initially cancelled their candidatures, and
pray for directions commanding the respondents to appoint
them based on certificates issued by the Ju-Jitsu Association
of India (JAI, Respondent Nos. 9 to 11), to accept supporting
documents verified through the National Sports Portal, and to
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
3/33
furnish the enquiry report as mandated by this Court’s earlier
order, dated 30.07.2024 passed in CWJC No. 8484/2024.
They also invoke broader reliefs under the law, framing their
grievance as a violation of natural justice, arbitrariness, and
constitutional guarantees under Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the
Constitution of India.
2. To fully appreciate the substantive merits of this
case, it is essential to delve into the factual backdrop, which
reveals a narrative of initial promise thwarted by layers of
administrative scrutiny and institutional lapses. The
petitioners are graduates and accomplished players in Ju-Jitsu,
a martial art recognized in Asian Games but still emerging in
the global Olympic ecosystem. They assert participation and
medal wins – silver for Bijay Kumar and Chandani Kumari,
gold for Vivek Bhardwaj, at the Senior National Ju-Jitsu
Championship held in Devas, Madhya Pradesh, from March
2022 to 2023, organized under the auspices of JAI. Buoyed by
the 2023 Rules, which were notified on 02.03.2023 to reward
outstanding sports-persons with government jobs, the
petitioners applied through the General Administration
Department’s (GAD) portal, submitting certificates from JAI
attesting to their achievements.
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
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3. Their applications progressed smoothly at first.
They featured prominently in the provisional merit list dated
04.10.2023 and the final merit list, dated 02.11.2023, securing
serial numbers 1, 2, and 3 under the Ju-Jitsu category. This led
to formal recommendations for appointment via memo no.
22720, dated 14.12.2023, and even preparatory instructions
for medical and physical verification on 11.01.2024. Adding
to their legitimate expectations, the petitioners were felicitated
by the BSSA (respondent no. 4) on National Sports Day,
29.08.2023, with certificates and cash prizes following what
they describe as thorough verification. However, storm clouds
gathered when JAI issued conflicting reports. An initial email
on 05.01.2024 denying the petitioners’ participation based on
a volunteer’s telephonic input, followed by rectifications on
20.01.2024 and 10.02.2024 affirming their medals.
4. These inconsistencies prompted the cancellation
of recommendations on 30.04.2024, citing unreliable
documentation. Aggrieved, the petitioners approached this
Court in CWJC No. 8484/2024, resulting in a directive for the
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MYAS, Respondent
Nos. 7 and 8) to conduct an impartial enquiry, gathering inputs
from all stakeholders and making the report available to
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
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interested parties. The ensuing enquiry, detailed in the report,
dated 30.10.2024, uncovered profound irregularities in the
championship’s organization: absence of athlete IDs,
fragmented record-keeping across locations, unsigned
notifications and score sheets, lack of official videography or
photography, casual communications via WhatsApp and
Facebook without formal cut-off dates or minimum
participant rules, and a glaring conflict of interest in JAI’s
internal enquiry committee, whose members were directly
involved in the event as referees or organizers. Critically,
JAI’s national recognition, granted in 2021 and renewed for
2022, lapsed for 2023 due to non-compliance with the NSF
Portal requirements, and no registered Bihar Ju-Jitsu
Association existed until August 2023, post the March event,
raising questions about the petitioners’ state representation.
5. The petitioners contend that these findings are
perfunctory, ignoring their submitted evidence like train
tickets, personal mobile videos and photos, and portal
uploads, while unfairly penalizing them for organizers’
resource limitations. They argue that videography is not
mandatory and that the enquiry breached natural justice by
withholding the report and issuing no show-cause notices,
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
6/33
rendering the process arbitrary and discriminatory in violation
of constitutional mandates. The respondents, through their
counter-affidavit, robustly defend the enquiry as diligent and
compliant, emphasizing ample opportunities afforded to all
parties, including multiple hearings for JAI and virtual
sessions for the petitioners, and clarifying that the “National
Sports Portal” is a misnomer, with the NSF Portal serving
only administrative purposes unrelated to medal
authentication.
6. At the heart of this dispute lies the interpretation
and application of the 2023 Rules, which must be examined
substantively to resolve whether the petitioners’ claimed
achievements qualify them for the benefits envisioned therein.
Notified under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution,
these Rules represent a progressive policy to harness sports
talent for public service in Bihar. Rule 1 delineates the
framework’s scope, extending to the whole of Bihar and
commencing upon gazette publication, underscoring its intent
as a statewide incentive mechanism.
7. Rule 2 provides critical definitions that shape
eligibility. Notably, sub-rule (v) defines an “outstanding
sportsperson” as a native of Bihar who has either won a medal
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
7/33
or participated in international competitions on India’s behalf,
or won a medal in national competitions while representing
any state. This definition is not isolated. It implicitly draws
from the broader ecosystem of sports governance in India,
where “national competitions” derive legitimacy from events
organized by National Sports Federations (NSFs) recognized
by the MYAS under the National Sports Development Code of
India, 2011 (hereinafter referred as the “Code” for short). The
Code, a comprehensive guideline for NSF operations,
mandates transparency, accountability, and adherence to
international standards, ensuring that championships are not
mere ad-hoc gatherings but structured platforms of national
stature. In the absence of explicit stipulation in the 2023
Rules, this Court must interpret “national competitions”
purposively, aligning with the legislative intent to reward
verifiable, high-calibre achievements rather than dubious or
irregularly conducted events.
8. Rule 3 further elaborates qualifications, requiring,
inter alia, minimum achievements calibrated to pay levels. For
the Sub-Inspector post (Pay Band-II Grade Pay 4200, Level
6), candidates must secure gold or silver in National Games or
Senior National Championships, or participate in prestigious
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
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international fora like the Asian or Commonwealth Games.
This tiered structure reflects a deliberate emphasis on
competitions of undisputed national recognition, where the
organizing body’s credibility is paramount. As the Delhi High
Court observed in Rahul Mehra v. Union of India, reported
in 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2438, NSF recognition is not a mere
formality but a cornerstone of legitimacy. The relevant
paragraph of the aforesaid judgement is as hereunder:
“102. As has been discussed
hereinabove, the legal regime apropos
sports administration in India has to be
implemented fully and effectively.
Compliance with the Sports Code is non-
negotiable. If a sports federation does not
comply with the law of the land, it will
receive no recognition from the
Government. All benefits and facilities to
it will stop promptly. It is better that a
legitimate body represents the cause of
sportspersons than one simply
masquerading as the real champion of
Indian sports. Fairness and legitimacy
needs to imbue all public affairs.
Recalcitrant entities which defy
adherence to rules of the game, while
continuing to unjustly enjoy government’s
largesse and patronage, must be called-
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
9/33out.
103. Governmental monitoring
of compliance is expected to be prompt,
robust and meticulous at all times.
Annual compliances are mandatory for
continued recognition. What is the
compliance status of the NSFs currently,
is not on record. The perceived non-
monitoring or selective monitoring or
permissive monitoring by the authorities
gives cause to citizens to seek judicial
review of the same. This needs to be
remedied.”
9. In the present case, JAI’s recognition, while valid
through 2022, was not renewed for 2023 due to failures in
submitting requisite data on the NSF Portal: a digital platform
introduced by MYAS in 2023 for annual compliance and
renewal. This lapse cannot be excused as a mere
administrative oversight. Federations bear an inescapable
responsibility to maintain recognition, as it underpins the
authenticity of their events. The enquiry report substantively
documents how this non-renewal compounded irregularities.
The championship lacked centralized records, formal athlete
registrations, minimum participant thresholds, and even basic
safeguards like signed score sheets or official documentation.
For instance, in Vivek Bhardwaj’s +94 kg category, only three
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
10/33
of five entrants competed, with inconsistencies in entry forms
(e.g., absent names like Vikas Kumar from Haryana appearing
in waivers but not team lists), rendering the event’s “national”
character doubtful.
10. When such doubts arise regarding an NSF’s
recognition or the event’s integrity, athletes cannot derive
benefits under schemes like the 2023 Rules. This principle
safeguards public resources from potential fraud or
mismanagement, as seen in analogous cases involving sports
quotas. In Rahul Mehra (supra), Delhi High Court upheld
the government’s suspension of the Indian Olympic
Association for non-compliance with the Sports Code, holding
as hereunder:
“114. Consequently, this Court
is of the view that the Sports Code must
be made applicable to every constituent
of every NSF, including IOA as well as its
constituents. This is conceded by Union
of India in its affidavit dated 3rd October,
2012, wherein it is stated, “In response to
para 17 it is submitted that the
Government Guidelines of 1st May, 2010
are binding on the National Sports
Federations recognized by this Ministry.
Be that as it may, as a matter of Basic
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
11/33Principles of Good governance and
International Best Practices including
restrictions on age and tenure as
mandated in the Olympic Charter, what is
good for the parent NSF’s including IOA
should also be good for their Members
State/District Level Federations and/or
Associations.” Accordingly, respondent
No. 1/Union of India is directed not to
grant recognition or any facility
(monetary or otherwise) to the IOA or to
any NSF and/or any of its affiliated
Associations, if they refuse to comply with
the Sports Code as directed by this
Court.”
11. Here, JAI’s casual approach by relying on
WhatsApp for notifications, Facebook for invitations, and
telephonic verification exemplifies a departure from
professional standards, further exacerbated by the conflict of
interest in its internal enquiry committee. Members like
Pawan Sirohi and Siraj Ahmed, who served as mat in-charges
during the event, investigated the very participation they
oversaw, violating the bias test laid down in the case of A. K.
Kraipak v. Union of India, reported in (1969) 2 SCC 262.
The relevant paragraphs of the said judgement is quoted
hereinbelow:
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
12/33“15. It is unfortunate that
Naqishbund was appointed as one of the
members of the selection board. It is true
that ordinarily the Chief Conservator of
Forests in a State should be considered as
the most appropriate person to be in the
selection board. He must be expected to
know his officers thoroughly, their
weaknesses as well as their strengths. His
opinion as regards their suitability for
selection to the All-India Service is
entitled to great weight. But then under
the circumstances it was improper to have
included Naqishbund as a member of the
selection board. He was one of the
persons to be considered for selection. It
is against all canons of justice to make a
man judge in his own cause. It is true that
he did not participate in the deliberations
of the committee when his name was
considered. But then the very fact that he
was a member of the selection board must
have had its own impact on the decision
of the selection board. Further admittedly
he participated in the deliberations of the
selection board when the claims of his
rivals particularly that of Basu was
considered. He was also party to the
preparation of the list of selected
candidates in order of preference. At
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
13/33every stage of his participation in the
deliberations of the selection board there
was a conflict between his interest and
duty. Under those circumstances it is
difficult to believe that he could have
been impartial. The real question is not
whether he was biased. It is difficult to
prove the state of mind of a person.
Therefore what we have to see is whether
there is reasonable ground for believing
that he was likely to have been biased. We
agree with the learned Attorney General
that a mere suspicion of bias is not
sufficient. There must be a reasonable
likelihood of bias. In deciding the
question of bias we have to take into
consideration human probabilities and
ordinary course of human conduct. It was
in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out
his rivals in order to secure his position
from further challenge. Naturally he was
also interested in safeguarding his
position while preparing the list of
selected candidates.”
12. The absence of a pre-event Bihar affiliation adds
another layer. Rule 2(v) requires representation of “any of the
state,” implying affiliation through a recognized state body.
The Bihar Ju-Jitsu Association’s registration in August 2023,
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
14/33
months after the March championship undermines this,
suggesting the petitioners’ participation lacked formal state
sanction.
13. Turning to procedural fairness, the petitioners’
allegation of natural justice violations merits close scrutiny.
They decry the enquiry as perfunctory, pointing to non-supply
of the report and absence of show-cause notices, contravening
this Court’s directive in CWJC No. 8484/2024. However, the
counter-affidavit substantively rebuts this by chronicling a
meticulous process. JAI was granted extensions and multiple
hearings on 07.10.2024 and 15.10.2024, culminating in
written statements; the petitioners participated virtually on
23.10.2024, submitting evidence like personal videos; and
BSSA was solicited for inputs, albeit without response. The
report was furnished to BSSA, as MYAS is not directly
involved in recruitment, aligning with its letters dated
13.11.2024 and 19.11.2024. This constitutes substantial
compliance with audi alteram partem, as enunciated in the
case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, reported in (1978)
1 SCC 248, that natural justice is a flexible concept. What
matters is a reasonable opportunity to present one’s case, not
rigid formalities. The relevant paragraph is reproduced
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
15/33
hereinbelow:
“14. Now, as already pointed
out, the doctrine of natural justice
consists principally of two rules, namely,
nemo debet esse judex in propria causa:
no one shall be a judge in his own cause,
and audi alteram partem: no decision
shall be given against a party without
affording him a reasonable hearing. We
are concerned here with the second rule
and hence we shall confine ourselves only
to a discussion of that rule. The learned
Attorney-General, appearing on behalf of
the Union of India, fairly conceded that
the audi alteram partem rule is a highly
effective tool devised by the courts to
enable a statutory authority to arrive at a
just decision and it is calculated to act as
a healthy check on abuse or misuse of
power and hence its reach should not be
narrowed and its applicability
circumscribed. He rightly did not plead
for reconsideration of the historic
advances made in the law as a result of
the decisions of this Court and did not
suggest that the Court should retrace its
steps. That would indeed have been a
most startling argument coming from the
Government of India and for the Court to
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
16/33accede to such an argument would have
been an act of utter retrogression. But
fortunately no such argument was
advanced by the learned Attorney-
General. What he urged was a very
limited contention, namely, that having
regard to the nature of the action involved
in the impounding of a passport, the audi
alteram partem rule must be held to be
excluded, because if notice were to be
given to the holder of the passport and
reasonable opportunity afforded to him to
show cause why his passport should not
be impounded, he might immediately, on
the strength of the passport, make good
his exit from the country and the object of
impounding the passport would be
frustrated. The argument was that if the
audi alteram partem rule were applied,
its effect would be to stultify the power of
impounding the passport and it would
defeat and paralyse the administration of
the law and hence the audi alteram
partem rule cannot in fairness be applied
while exercising the power to impound a
passport. This argument was sought to be
supported by reference to the statement of
the law in S.A. de Smith’s Judicial Review
of Administrative Action, 2nd Edn., where
the learned author says at p. 174 that “in
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
17/33administrative law a prima facie right to
prior notice and opportunity to be heard
may be held to be excluded by
implication…… where an obligation to
give notice and opportunity to be heard
would obstruct the taking of prompt
action, especially action of a preventive
or remedial nature”. Now, it is true that
since the right to prior notice and
opportunity of hearing arises only by
implication from the duty to act fairly, or
to use the words of Lord Morris of Borth-
y-Gest, from “fair-play in action”, it may
equally be excluded where, having regard
to the nature of the action to be taken, its
object and purpose and the scheme of the
relevant statutory provision, fairness in
action does not demand its implication
and even warrants its exclusion. There
are certain well recognised exceptions to
the audi alteram partem rule established
by judicial decisions and they are
summarised by S.A. de Smith in Judicial
Review of Administrative Action, 2nd
Edn., p. 168 to 179. If we analyse these
exceptions a little closely, it will be
apparent that they do not in any way
militate against the principle which
requires fair-play in administrative
action. The word “exception” is really a
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
18/33misnomer because in these exclusionary
cases, the audi alteram partem rule is
held inapplicable not by way of an
exception to “fair-play in action”, but
because nothing unfair can be inferred by
not affording an opportunity to present or
meet a case. The audi alteram partem
rule is intended to inject justice into the
law and it cannot be applied to defeat the
ends of justice, or to make the law
“lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-
defeating or plainly contrary to the
common sense of the situation”. Since the
life of the law is not logic but experience
and every legal proposition must, in the
ultimate analysis, be tested on the
touchstone of pragmatic realism, the audi
alteram partem rule would, by the
experiential test, be excluded, if
importing the right to be heard has the
effect of paralysing the administrative
process or the need for promptitude or the
urgency of the situation so demands. But
at the same time it must be remembered
that this is a rule of vital importance in
the field of administrative law and it must
not be jettisoned save in very exceptional
circumstances where compulsive
necessity so demands. It is a wholesome
rule designed to secure the rule of law
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
19/33and the court should not be too ready to
eschew it in its application to a given
case. True it is that in questions of this
kind a fanatical or doctrinaire approach
should be avoided, but that does not mean
that merely because the traditional
methodology of a formalised hearing may
have the effect of stultifying the exercise
of the statutory power, the audi alteram
partem should be wholly excluded. The
court must make every effort to salvage
this cardinal rule to the maximum extent
permissible in a given case. It must not be
forgotten that “natural justice is
pragmatically flexible and is amenable to
capsulation under the compulsive
pressure of circumstances”. The audi
alteram partem rule is not cast in a rigid
mould and judicial decisions establish
that it may suffer situational
modifications. The core of it must,
however, remain, namely, that the person
affected must have a reasonable
opportunity of being heard and the
hearing must be a genuine hearing and
not an empty public relations exercise.
That is why Tucker, L.J., emphasised in
Russel v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All
ER 109] that “whatever standard of
natural justice is adopted, one essential is
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
20/33that the person concerned should have a
reasonable opportunity of presenting his
case”. What opportunity may be regarded
as reasonable would necessarily depend
on the practical necessities of the
situation. It may be a sophisticated full-
fledged hearing or it may be a hearing
which is very brief and minimal : it may
be a hearing prior to the decision or it
may even be a post-decisional remedial
hearing. The audi alteram partem rule is
sufficiently flexible to permit
modifications and variations to suit the
exigencies of myriad kinds of situations
which may arise. This circumstantial
flexibility of the audi alteram partem rule
was emphasised by Lord Reid in Wiseman
v. Borneman [1971 AC 297 : (1969) 3 All
ER 275] when he said that he would be
“sorry to see this fundamental general
principle degenerate into a series of hard
and fast rules” and Lord Hailsham, L.C.,
also observed in Pearlberg v. Varty
[(1971) 1 Weekly Law Reports 728] that
the courts “have taken in increasingly
sophisticated view of what is required in
individual cases”. It would not, therefore,
be right to conclude that the audi alteram
partem rule is excluded merely because
the power to impound a passport might
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
21/33be frustrated, if prior notice and hearing
were to be given to the person concerned
before impounding his passport The
Passport Authority may proceed to
impound the passport without giving any
prior opportunity to the person concerned
to be heard, but as soon as the order
impounding the passport is made, an
opportunity of hearing, remedial in aim,
should be given to him so that he may
present his case and controvert that of the
Passport Authority and point out why his
passport should not be impounded and
the order impounding it recalled. This
should not only be possible but also quite
appropriate, because the reasons for
impounding the passport are required to
be supplied by the Passport Authority
after the making of the order and the
person affected would, therefore, be in a
position to make a representation setting
forth his case and plead for setting aside
the action impounding his passport. A fair
opportunity of being heard following
immediately upon the order impounding
the passport would satisfy the mandate of
natural justice and a provision requiring
giving of such opportunity to the person
concerned can and should be read by
implication in the Passports Act, 1967. If
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
22/33such a provision were held to be
incorporated in the Passports Act, 1967
by necessary implication, as we hold it
must be, the procedure prescribed by the
Act for impounding a passport would be
right, fair and just and it would not suffer
from the vice of arbitrariness or
unreasonableness. We must, therefore,
hold that the procedure “established” by
the Passports Act, 1967 for impounding a
passport is in conformity with the
requirement of Article 21 and does not
fall foul of that article.”
14. While non-direct supply of the report to
petitioners raises a nuance, potentially breaching transparency,
their awareness of adverse materials from prior cancellations
mitigates this. No mala fides are evident, distinguishing this
from cases like Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan,
reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588, where wholesale non-
disclosure led to quashing. The relevant paragraph of the
judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“15. Deletion of the second
opportunity from the scheme of Article
311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to
do with providing of a copy of the report
to the delinquent in the matter of making
his representation. Even though the
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
23/33
second stage of the inquiry in Article
311(2) has been abolished by amendment,
the delinquent is still entitled to represent
against the conclusion of the Inquiry
Officer holding that the charges or some
of the charges are established and
holding the delinquent guilty of such
charges. For doing away with the effect
of the enquiry report or to meet the
recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in
the matter of imposition of punishment,
furnishing a copy of the report becomes
necessary and to have the proceeding
completed by using some material behind
the back of the delinquent is a position
not countenanced by fair procedure.
While by law application of natural
justice could be totally ruled out or
truncated, nothing has been done here
which could be taken as keeping natural
justice out of the proceedings and the
series of pronouncements of this Court
making rules of natural justice applicable
to such an inquiry are not affected by the
Forty-second Amendment. We, therefore,
come to the conclusion that supply of a
copy of the inquiry report along with
recommendation, if any, in the matter of
proposed punishment to be inflicted
would be within the rules of natural
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
24/33
justice and the delinquent would,
therefore, be entitled to the supply of a
copy thereof. The Forty-second
Amendment has not brought about any
change in this position.”
15. Constitutionally, the impugned actions
withstand scrutiny under Articles 14, 16, and 21. Article 14
demands non-arbitrariness, and here the respondents’
classification: distinguishing verified achievements from those
mired in doubt, is founded on an intelligible differentia with a
rational nexus to the 2023 Rules’ objective of rewarding
genuine excellence. In the landmark decision in E. P.
Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 3,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court authoritatively held that equality
and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of
law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of
an absolute monarch. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State
action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The
quoted paragraph of the judgment where the law is attributed
is as hereunder:
“85. The last two grounds of
challenge may be taken up together for
consideration. Though we have
formulated the third ground of challenge
as a distinct and separate ground, it is
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
25/33really in substance and effect merely an
aspect of the second ground based on
violation of Articles 14 and 16. Article 16
embodies the fundamental guarantee that
there shall be equality of opportunity for
all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office
under the State. Though enacted as a
distinct and independent fundamental
right because of its great importance as a
principle ensuring equality of opportunity
in public employment which is so vital to
the building up of the new classless
egalitarian society envisaged in the
Constitution, Article 16 is only an
instance of the application of the concept
of equality enshrined in Article 14. In
other words, Article 14 is the genus while
Article 16 is a species. Article 16 gives
effect to the doctrine of equality in all
matters relating to public employment.
The basic principle which, therefore,
informs both Articles 14 and 16 is
equality and inhibition against
discrimination. Now, what is the content
and reach of this great equalising
principle? It is a founding faith, to use the
words of Bose. J., “a way of life”, and it
must not be subjected to a narrow
pedantic or lexicographic approach. We
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
26/33cannot countenance any attempt to
truncate its all-embracing scope and
meaning, for to do so would be to violate
its activist magnitude. Equality is a
dynamic concept with many aspects and
dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed,
cabined and confined” within traditional
and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic
point of view, equality is antithetic to
arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one
belongs to the rule of law in a republic
while the other, to the whim and caprice
of an absolute monarch. Where an act is
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is
unequal both according to political logic
and constitutional law and is therefore
violative of Article 14, and if it effects any
matter relating to public employment, it is
also violative of Article 16. Articles 14
and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State
action and ensure fairness and equality of
treatment. They require that State action
must be based on valid relevant
principles applicable alike to all similarly
situate and it must not be guided by any
extraneous or irrelevant considerations
because that would be denial of equality.
Where the operative reason for State
action, as distinguished from motive
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
27/33inducing from the antechamber of the
mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is
extraneous and outside the area of
permissible considerations, it would
amount to mala fide exercise of power
and that is hit by Articles 14 and 16.
Mala fide exercise of power and
arbitrariness are different lethal
radiations emanating from the same vice:
in fact the latter comprehends the former.
Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16.”
16. Under Article 16, the guarantee of equal
employment opportunity is not infringed, as verification
remains an essential filter, as in Dayaram v. Sudhir Batham,
reported in (2012) 1 SCC 333, where certificate doubts
justified exclusion without violating equality. The relevant
portion of the quoted judgment is as follows:
“8. This Court in Madhuri Patil
case also observed that as the aforesaid
procedure by providing for a fair and just
verification, could shorten the undue
delay and also prevent the avoidable
expenditure for the State on the education
of the candidate admitted/appointed on
false social status or further continuance
therein, every State should endeavour to
give effect to it and see that the
constitutional objectives intended for the
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
28/33benefit and advancement of the genuine
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes are
not defeated by unscrupulous persons.”
17. The doctrine of legitimate expectation, invoked
by the petitioners from their merit list inclusions and
preparatory directives, merits particular attention. This
principle, as evolved in Indian law, protects reasonable
reliance on official promises or practices but is not absolute. It
yields to overriding public interest, such as preventing quota
misuse through fraudulent or irregular claims. As articulated
in Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India,
reported in (1992) 4 SCC 477:
“15. It also appears to us that
in any event the new policy decision as
contained in the impugned memorandum
of January 20, 1990 should not have been
implemented without making such change
in the existing criterion for allotment
known to the Group Housing Societies if
necessary by way of a public notice so
that they might make proper
representation to the concerned
authorities for consideration of their
viewpoints. Even assuming that in the
absence of any explanation of the
expression “first come first served” in
Rule 6(vi) of Nazul Rules there was no
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
29/33statutory requirement to make allotment
with reference to date of registration, it
has been rightly held, as a matter of fact,
by the High Court that prior to the new
guideline contained in the memo of
January 20, 1990 the principle for
allotment had always been on the basis of
date of registration and not the date of
approval of the list of members. In the
brochure issued in 1982 by the DDA even
after Gazette notification of Nazul Rules
on September 26, 1981 the policy of
allotment on the basis of seniority in
registration was clearly indicated. In the
aforesaid facts, the Group Housing
Societies were entitled to ‘legitimate
expectation’ of following consistent past
practice in the matter of allotment, even
though they may not have any legal right
in private law to receive such treatment.
The existence of ‘legitimate expectation’
may have a number of different
consequences and one of such
consequences is that the authority ought
not to act to defeat the ‘legitimate
expectation’ without some overriding
reason of public policy to justify its doing
so. In a case of ‘legitimate expectation’ if
the authority proposes to defeat a
person’s ‘legitimate expectation’ it should
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
30/33afford him an opportunity to make
representations in the matter. In this
connection reference may be made to the
discussions on ‘legitimate expectation’ at
page 151 of Volume 1(1) of Halsbury’s
Laws of England, 4th edn. (re-issue). We
may also refer to a decision of the House
of Lords in Council of Civil Service
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service
[(1984) 3 All ER 935] . It has been held
in the said decision that an aggrieved
person was entitled to judicial review if
he could show that a decision of the
public authority affected him of some
benefit or advantage which in the past he
had been permitted to enjoy and which he
legitimately expected to be permitted to
continue to enjoy either until he was
given reasons for withdrawal and the
opportunity to comment on such
reasons.”
18. Here, the initial recommendations created a
procedural expectation of fairness, which was met through the
enquiry’s hearings, but no substantive right to appointment
arose, given the 2023 Rules’ emphasis on verifiable national
achievements. Nuances arise in edge cases, such as
federations’ resource constraints, but JAI’s lapses on non-
renewal and event irregularities provide cogent reasons for
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
31/33
departure, aligning with precedents like Food Corporation of
India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, reported in
(1993) 1 SCC 71, where expectations were subordinated to
anti-arbitrariness. Relevant paragraph of the said judgement is
extracted below:
“8. The mere reasonable or
legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such
a situation, may not by itself be a distinct
enforceable right, but failure to consider
and give due weight to it may render the
decision arbitrary, and this is how the
requirement of due consideration of a
legitimate expectation forms part of the
principle of non-arbitrariness, a
necessary concomitant of the rule of law.
Every legitimate expectation is a relevant
factor requiring due consideration in a
fair decision-making process. Whether
the expectation of the claimant is
reasonable or legitimate in the context is
a question of fact in each case. Whenever
the question arises, it is to be determined
not according to the claimant’s perception
but in larger public interest wherein other
more important considerations may
outweigh what would otherwise have
been the legitimate expectation of the
claimant. A bona fide decision of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
32/33public authority reached in this manner
would satisfy the requirement of non-
arbitrariness and withstand judicial
scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate
expectation gets assimilated in the rule of
law and operates in our legal system in
this manner and to this extent.”
19. Article 21‘s protections against deprivation of
life or liberty are not engaged, with procedural safeguards
amply provided.
20. Substantively, this case illuminates broader
implications for sports governance in India, particularly in
resource-constrained states like Bihar. While the 2023 Rules
admirably promote talent, they must be insulated from
federations’ lapses. Edge cases like Ju-Jitsu highlight
vulnerabilities in emerging sports, where limited sponsorships
excuse neither poor documentation nor recognition failures.
Penalizing athletes for organizers’ faults risks discouraging
participation, yet allowing unverified claims invites fraud.
Reforms, such as mandatory digitized records or pre-event
affiliation checks, could bridge this gap, aligning with the
Sports Code’s vision.
21. In conclusion, the petitioners’ claims, though
sympathetic, falter against the substantive requirements of the
Patna High Court CWJC No.3723 of 2025 dt.19-02-2026
33/33
2023 Rules and the enquiry’s findings. The doubts on JAI’s
recognition and event authenticity are insurmountable.
Federations cannot evade responsibility on any pretext.
22. For the reasons stated above, the instant writ
petition stands dismissed.
23. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
(Bibek Chaudhuri, J)
skm/-
AFR/NAFR AFR CAV DATE 05.02.2026 Uploading Date 19.02.2026 Transmission Date N/A
