Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Bharat Singh S/O- Late Shri Ramesh Chand vs The State Of Rajasthan … on 11 February, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:6524]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2637/2026
Bharat Singh S/o Late Shri Ramesh Chand, aged about 19 years,
R/o Village Ajau, Tehsil Kumher, Dist Bharatpur, Raj.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan, through Principal Secretary,
Home Department Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur, Raj.
2. The Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Lalkothi Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Dausa, Raj.
----Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Naveen Dhuwan Advocate.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
11/02/2026
1. The present writ petition has been filed seeking
issuance of direction to the respondents to grant compassionate
appointment to the petitioner on account of the death of the
petitioner’s father, who was serving as Constable (Driver) with the
respondents. The petitioner contends that the family suffered
financial hardship upon the demise of the deceased employee and
that the denial of compassionate appointment is arbitrary and
unjust.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Late
Shri Ramesh Chand, father of the petitioner was working on the
substantive post of Constable in Police Department. However,
father of the petitioner died on 27.09.2015, leaving behind his
widow, one daughter and son (the petitioner) who, at that time,
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was 9 years old only. Mother of the petitioner moved an
application before the respondents seeking appointment of the
petitioner (minor son of the deceased-employee) on
compassionate ground. However, vide order dated 20.12.2024,
application filed by mother of the petitioner seeking appointment
of the petitioner on compassionate ground was dismissed by the
respondents. Hence, the petitioner has approached this Court by
way of filing instant writ petition. It is submitted that the action of
the respondents in declining benefit of appointment on
compassionate ground to the petitioner is unjustified, unwarranted
and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned
counsel for the petitioner argued that when the compassionate
appointment rules entitles the petitioner for compassionate
appointment for saving the family of deceased employee from
starvation, there is no justification in not providing the same to
the petitioner, dependent of the deceased employee. Therefore,
learned counsel for the petitioner has prayed for allowing the writ
petition as also issuance of direction to the respondents for grant
of appointment to the petitioner on compassionate ground.
3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
carefully perused the material on record.
4. The relevant facts, which are not in dispute, disclose
that the deceased employee died in harness on 27.09.2015
several years prior to the filing of the present writ petition. It is an
admitted position that no immediate claim for compassionate
appointment was pursued and the present writ petition has been
instituted after a substantial and unexplained lapse of time. The
respondents have rejected the application filed by mother of the
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petitioner claiming appointment on compassionate ground for her
son, i.e., the petitioner primarily on the ground of inordinate delay
stating that the very object of compassionate appointment stands
frustrated and further, in view of the instructions of the State
Government issued from time to time, matters of compassionate
appointment having delay of more than three years cannot be
forwarded to the State Government for condonation of delay.
5. The central issue that arises for consideration is
whether a claim for compassionate appointment can be sustained
after a long and unexplained delay and whether such a claim
survives the settled legal principles governing compassionate
appointment under public service jurisprudence.
6. At the outset, it must be reiterated that compassionate
appointment is not a matter of right, nor an alternative mode of
recruitment. It constitutes a narrowly carved exception to the
general rule of public employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India, intended solely to provide immediate
financial assistance to the family of a deceased employee who dies
in harness, leaving the family in sudden penury. The underlying
purpose is to mitigate an unforeseen financial crisis and to ensure
that the family is not left without means of subsistence.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma
Gosain & Others vs Union of India & Others, (1989) 4 SCC
468, authoritatively held that compassionate appointment must
be provided without delay, as the very rationale of the scheme is
to relieve the family from immediate destitution caused by the
death of the sole breadwinner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
emphasised that appointments should be made promptly and that
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the creation of supernumerary posts, if necessary, is permissible
to serve the humanitarian purpose of the scheme. However, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court also cautioned that undue delay defeats
the very object of compassionate appointment, rendering such
claims unsustainable.
8. In the case of Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs State of
Haryana & Others, (1994) 4 SCC 138, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court explained that compassionate appointment is an exception
to the general rule of public employment and is intended solely to
enable the family of a deceased employee, left in dire financial
straits, to tide over the immediate financial crisis caused by the
sudden death of the breadwinner. It is not a source of permanent
recruitment or a vested right that can be exercised at any time in
the future. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mere death in
service does not automatically entitle the family to compassionate
employment, and that compassionate appointment cannot be
granted after the lapse of a reasonable period, because after such
delay the very purpose of providing immediate relief is lost. The
entitlement, thus, depends on immediacy of need and the financial
condition of the family at the time of the employee’s death, not on
abstract entitlement.
9. The above legal position has been reiterated and
fortified in subsequent decisions. In the case V. Sivamurthy vs
State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, (2008) 13 SCC 730, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that compassionate appointment is
an exception designed to meet a transient crisis and cannot be
invoked years after the death of the employee. The Court
categorically observed that when a family survives for a long
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period after the demise of the employee, it must be presumed
that the immediate financial crisis no longer exists. Claims raised
after considerable delay, therefore, cannot be entertained, as they
convert a humanitarian exception into a vested employment
entitlement, which is impermissible in law.
10. More recently, in State of West Bengal v. Debabrata
Tiwari & Others, (2025) 5 SCC 712, after having regard to the
object of granting compassionate appointment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reaffirmed that prolonged delay, whether
attributable to the claimant or to administrative inaction, creates a
strong presumption that the family has overcome the initial
financial hardship. The Court held that compassionate
appointment cannot be granted as a matter of course after years
have elapsed and such belated claims are non-maintainable unless
exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. It was further held
that no vested right accrues to a dependent merely because an
application was once made. Para 32, 33, 35 to 46 of the above
judgment are relevant and quoted as under:-
“32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, the following principles emerge:
32.1. That a provision for compassionate appointment
makes a departure from the general provisions providing
for appointment to a post by following a particular
procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables
appointment being made without following the said
procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general
provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve
the stated objectives i.e. to enable the family of the
deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.
32.2. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a
source of recruitment. The reason for making such a
benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector
undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased
are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables
the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial
crisis.
32.3. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right
which can be exercised at any time in future.
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Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered
after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over.
32.4. That compassionate appointment should be provided
immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is
improper to keep such a case pending for years.
32.5. In determining as to whether the family is in
financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind
including the income of the family, its liabilities, the
terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age,
dependency and marital status of its members, together
with the income from any other source.
33. The object underlying a provision for grant of
compassionate employment is to enable the family of the
deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to
the death of the breadearner which has left the family in
penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure
humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact
that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the
family would not be in a position to make both ends meet,
a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one
of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for
such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it
would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment
to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the
crisis which arose on account of death of a breadwinner,
has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need
to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning
compassionate appointment because on failure to do so,
the object of the scheme of compassionate appointment
would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has
occurred since the date of death of the deceased
employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking
compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus
lose its significance and this would be a relevant
circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in
determining as to whether a case for the grant of
compassionate appointment has been made out for
consideration.
34. xxxxxx
35. Considering the second question referred to above, in
the first instance, regarding whether applications for
compassionate appointment could be considered after a
delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case
where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of
the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or
the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of
immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial
circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have
changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the
government employee. In such circumstances, courts or
other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that
for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the
deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably
by availing gainful employment from some other source.
Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as
noted by this Court in Hakim Singh Haryana SEB v. Hakim
Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 would amount to treating a claim
for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter
of inheritance based on a line of succession which is
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contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate
appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative
to the financial condition and hardship faced by the
dependants of the deceased government employee as a
consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate
appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a
considerable period of time since the death of the
government employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a
person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for
obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for
grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes
Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 as under : (LR pp. 239-40)
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because
the party has, by his conduct, done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation, in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances, always important in such cases,
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either
party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in
taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates
to the remedy.”
37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled
grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could
disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court
in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our
Constitution, came up for consideration before a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R.
Meher, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117. In the said case, it was
regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of
relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary
power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566
this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier
pronouncements in the following words : (SCC pp. 594-95,
para 24)
24. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does
not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate
delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court
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does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its
train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the
effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It
was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked,
unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-
party rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period
of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be
filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of
Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9
SCC 278.
40. Further, simply because the respondent-writ
petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant
authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that
they diligently pursued the matter and had not slept over
their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to
the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the
following observations were made: (SCC p. 184, para 19)
“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as
crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for
consideration of representations relating to a stale
claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a
fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot
rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of
representation to the competent authority does not
arrest time.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case,
we hold that the respondent-writ petitioners, upon
submitting their applications in the year 2006-2005 did
nothing further to pursue the matter, till the year 2015 i.e.
for a period of ten years. Notwithstanding the tardy
approach of the authorities of the appellant State in
dealing with their applications, the respondent-writ
petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a
writ in the nature of a mandamus against the authorities of
the State. In fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching
the High Court, may even be regarded as a waiver of a
remedy, as discernible by the conduct of the respondent-
writ petitioners. Such a delay would disentitle the
respondent-writ petitioners to the discretionary relief under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the order of the
High Court dated 17-3-2015 [Debabrata Tiwari v. State of
W.B., WPA No. 3243 of 2015, order dated 17-3-2015
(Cal)], whereby the writ petition filed by some of the
respondents herein was disposed of with a direction to the
Director of Local Bodies, Government of West Bengal to
take a decision as to the appointment of the respondent-
writ petitioners, cannot be considered to have the effect of
revival of the cause of action.
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42. It may be apposite at this juncture to refer to the
following observations of this Court in Malaya Nanda Sethy
v. State of Orissa, (2024) 15 SCC 766, as to the manner in
which the authorities must consider and decide
applications for appointment on compassionate grounds:
(SCC paras 14-16)
“14. Before parting with the present order, we are
constrained to observe that considering the object
and purpose of appointment on compassionate
grounds i.e. a family of a deceased employee may be
placed in a position of financial hardship upon the
untimely death of the employee while in service and
the basis or policy is immediacy in rendering of
financial assistance to the family of the deceased
consequent upon his untimely death, the authorities
must consider and decide such applications for
appointment on compassionate grounds as per the
policy prevalent, at the earliest, but not beyond a
period of six months from the date of submission of
such completed applications.
15. We are constrained to direct as above as we have
found that in several cases, applications for
appointment on compassionate grounds are not
attended in time and are kept pending for years
together. As a result, the applicants in several cases
have to approach the High Courts concerned seeking
a writ of mandamus for the consideration of their
applications. Even after such a direction is issued,
frivolous or vexatious reasons are given for rejecting
the applications. Once again, the applicants have to
challenge the order of rejection before the High Court
which leads to pendency of litigation and passage of
time, leaving the family of the employee who died in
harness in the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further,
for reasons best known to the authorities and on
irrelevant considerations, applications made for
compassionate appointment are rejected. After
several years or are not considered at all as in the
instant case.
16. If the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds as envisaged under the
relevant policies or the rules have to be achieved then
it is just and necessary that such applications are
considered well in time and not in a tardy way. We
have come across cases where for nearly two decades
the controversy regarding the application made for
compassionate appointment is not resolved. This
consequently leads to the frustration of the very
policy of granting compassionate appointment on the
death of the employee while in service. We have,
therefore, directed that such applications must be
considered at an earliest point of time. The
consideration must be fair, reasonable and based on
relevant consideration. The application cannot be
rejected on the basis of frivolous and for reasons
extraneous to the facts of the case. Then and then
only the object and purpose of appointment on
compassionate grounds can be achieved.”
(emphasis supplied)
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43. In Malaya Nanda Sethy case, the claim of the
appellant-applicant therein for compassionate appointment
was directed by this Court to be considered by the
competent authority. This Court noted that in the said
case, there was no lapse on the part of the appellant-
applicant therein in diligently pursuing the matter. The
delay in considering the application of the appellant therein
was held to be solely attributable to the authorities of the
State, and no part of it was occasioned by the appellant-
applicant. Further, in the said case, the appellant-applicant
was prejudiced not only because of the prolonged delay in
considering his application but also by the fact that in the
interim, the policy of the State governing compassionate
appointment had changed to his detriment. Therefore, the
facts of the said case were distinct from the facts involved
herein. In the present case, the conduct of the respondent-
writ petitioners cannot be said to be blameless in that they
did not pursue their matter with sufficient diligence.
However, the observations made in the said case as to the
manner in which applications for compassionate
appointment are to be considered and disposed of are
relevant to the present case.
44. As noted in Malaya Nanda Sethy case, the operation of
a policy/scheme for compassionate appointment is founded
on considerations of immediacy. A sense of immediacy is
called for not only in the manner in which the applications
are processed by the authorities concerned but also in the
conduct of the applicant in pursuing his case, before the
authorities and if needed before the courts.
45. In the present case, the applications for
compassionate appointment were made by the
respondent-writ petitioners in the year 2005-2006.
Admittedly, the first concrete step taken by the Chairman
of Burdwan Municipality was in the year 2013, when the
said authority forwarded a list of candidates to be
approved by the Director of Local Bodies, Burdwan
Municipality. The respondent-writ petitioners knocked on
the doors of the High Court of Calcutta only in the year
2015 i.e. after a lapse of nearly ten years from the date of
making the application for compassionate appointment.
The respondent-writ petitioners were not prudent enough
to approach the courts sooner, claiming that no concrete
step had been taken by the appellant State in furtherance
of the application by seeking a writ in the nature of
mandamus.
46. The sense of immediacy in the matter of
compassionate appointment has been lost in the present
case. This is attributable to the authorities of the appellant
State as well as the respondent-writ petitioners. Now,
entertaining a claim which was made in 2005-2006, in the
year 2023, would be of no avail, because admittedly, the
respondent-writ petitioners have been able to eke out a
living even though they did not successfully get appointed
to the services of the Municipality on compassionate
grounds. Hence, we think that this are therefore not fit
cases to direct that the claim of the respondent-writ
petitioners for appointments on compassionate grounds,
be considered or entertained.”
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11. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the
present case, this Court finds that the petitioner has approached
this Court after a long lapse of time. The very fact that the family
has managed to subsist for several years after the death of the
employee clearly indicates that the immediate financial crisis,
which alone justifies compassionate appointment, no longer
subsists.
12. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that granting
compassionate appointment after such a prolonged delay would
amount to converting a welfare-oriented exception into a regular
source of employment, thereby violating the constitutional
mandate of equal opportunity in public employment. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has consistently deprecated such an approach and
has cautioned that compassionate appointment must not be
allowed to become a parallel mode of recruitment.
13. The contention of the petitioner that rejection of the
claim is arbitrary cannot be accepted. Adherence to the settled
legal principles governing compassionate appointment is neither
arbitrary, nor unreasonable. On the contrary, granting relief in the
present case would run counter to the law declared by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and would undermine the very purpose of the
scheme.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the claim of the petitioner for
compassionate appointment is barred by inordinate and
unexplained delay and is wholly unsustainable in law. The
respondents have committed no illegality or arbitrariness in
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rejecting application filed by mother of the petitioner claiming
appointment on compassionate ground for her son, i.e., the
petitioner.
15. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
16. Applications, if any, stand disposed off.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI /47
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