Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Bharat Hi-Tech (Cement) Private … vs Damodar Valley Corporation on 30 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
BEFORE:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE OM NARAYAN RAI
C.O. 694 of 2026
Bharat Hi-Tech (Cement) Private Limited
-vs-
Damodar Valley Corporation
For the Petitioner : Mr. Kishore Dutta, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Aniruddha Chatterjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Nilay Sengupta, Adv.
Mr. Ankit Agarwal, Adv.
Mr. Sujit Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. Pallav Chowdhury, Adv.
For the Opposite Party : Mr. S.N. Mookherjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rajarshi Dutta, Adv.
Mr. Subhrojyoti Mookherjee, Adv.
Mr. Soorjya Ganguli, Adv.
Mr. Somdutta Bhattacharya, Adv.
Mr. Aritra Deb, Adv.
Ms. Arti Bhattacharya, Adv.
Hearing Concluded on : 10.03.2026
Order on : 30.03.2026
OM NARAYAN RAI, J.:-
1. This revisional application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
directed against an order dated February 19, 2026 passed by the State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, West Bengal (hereafter "the
State Commission") whereby an order dated September 03, 2024 passed by
the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Purulia (hereafter
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"the District Commission") thereby restraining the opposite party from
disconnecting the petitioner's electricity supply has been vacated.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
2. Briefly summed up the relevant facts, as may be gathered from the material
on record, are as follows:-
a. A complaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
(hereafter “the 1986 Act”) had been filed by the petitioner before the
District Commission alleging deficiency in service by the opposite party
herein. The complaint was registered as C.D.F. Case No. 35 of 2009.
b. Initially, the opposite party filed an application challenging the
maintainability of the complaint before the District Commission asserting
that the petitioner was not a consumer in terms of the relevant provisions
of the 1986 Act. The application of the opposite party was allowed by the
District Commission by an order dated June 17, 2010.
c. The said order was challenged in appeal before the State Commission by
the petitioner. Such appeal was allowed by the State Commission by an
order dated February 15, 2011 and the matter was remanded to the
District Commission for afresh decision on merits.
d. The opposite party assailed the appellate order dated February 15, 2011
in revision before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
(hereafter “the National Commission”). However, such revision was
ultimately withdrawn on December 04, 2012.
e. The District Commission, thereafter, heard the parties and dismissed the
petitioner’s complaint once again by an order dated March 04, 2013
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thereby observing that the petitioner was not a consumer in terms of therelevant provisions of the 1986 Act.
f. The petitioner carried such order in appeal before the State Commission.
The State Commission allowed such appeal in part by an order dated
September 23, 2021 and remanded the matter to the District Commission
for fresh adjudication on merits.
g. The opposite party challenged the said order by filing a revisional
application before the National Commission. An application for stay of all
further proceedings before the District Commission was also filed before
the National Commission.
h. In the meantime, pursuant to the remand order dated September 23,
2021 passed by the State Commission, the District Commission took up
the petitioner’s complaint case again and allowed the same by an order
dated January 18, 2024.
i. Such order dated January 18, 2024 has been challenged by the opposite
party by filing an appeal being First Appeal No. 28 of 2024 before the
Asansol Circuit Bench of the State Commission. Such appeal is still
pending.
j. In the said appeal, an application for stay of all further proceedings before
the District Commission was also filed. The said Circuit Bench of the
State Commission disposed of such application and stayed all further
proceedings before the District Commission by an order dated April 26,
2024 till the next date.
k. Being aggrieved by such order of stay, passed by the said Circuit Bench of
the State Commission the petitioner approached this Court by filing C.O.
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2369 of 2024. The said application was entertained by a Co-ordinateBench of this Court and an interim order staying all further proceedings
before the said State Commission for a limited period was passed. Such
application is still pending.
l. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for execution of the order
dated January 18, 2024 passed by the District Commission which was
registered as EA 2 of 2024.
m. During pendency of execution case, the opposite party issued a notice
dated August 26, 2024 , thereby calling upon the petitioner to pay up the
arrears of electricity dues pertaining to the year 2017-18 following a
clarification issued by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (hereafter
“APTEL”) in an appeal against the tariff revision order passed by the West
Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission (Hereafter “WBERC”) whereby
the protection of interim order against coercive action granted to
consumers other than those who had challenged the tariff revision before
APTEL was removed. By the said notice the petitioner was cautioned that
the petitioner’s supply would be disconnected if payment as demanded
was not made within fifteen days of the notice.
n. The petitioner approached the District Commission against such
disconnection notice by filing an application in the pending execution
case, whereupon, by an order dated September 03, 2024 the District
Commission restrained the opposite party from disconnecting the
electricity supply of the petitioner on the strength of the said notice dated
August 26, 2024 as well as on the strength of any other notice.
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o. Challenging the said order dated September 03, 2024, the opposite partyapproached this Court by filing C.O. No. 3323 of 2024. The same was
dismissed by this Court by an order dated September 19, 2024 holding
that the said application was not maintainable as there was an alternative
remedy of appeal available to the petitioner.
p. Upon C.O. No. 3323 of 2024 being dismissed, the opposite party filed a
revisional application being R.P. No. 18 of 2024 before the Asansol Circuit
Bench of the State Commission challenging the said order dated
September 03, 2024 passed by the District Commission.
q. Such revisional application was admitted by the said Bench of the State
Commission on November 06, 2024 and notice was directed to be issued
upon the petitioner while fixing the revisional application on December
02, 2024 for service return and appearance.
r. Upon getting notice of the revisional proceeding, the petitioner filed an
application being I.A. No. 131 of 2024 challenging the maintainability of
the revisional proceeding before the said State Commission. While the
said revisional application remained pending before the said State
Commission, the opposite party approached this Court by filing C.O. No.
1562 of 2025 thereby in effect praying for expeditious disposal of the
revision being R.P. 18 of 2024 along with the connected application
pending before the Asansol Circuit Bench of the State Commission.
s. The said revisional application was taken up by this Court from time to
time and was ultimately disposed of by an order dated July 24, 2025 by
granting liberty to the petitioner to file an application for transfer of the
pending proceedings from Asansol Circuit Bench of the State Commission
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to the Principal Bench of the State Commission in physical form sincefiling of such application for transfer in online mode was becoming
difficult due to technical issues.
t. After the said order was passed, an application being CAN 1 of 2025 was
filed seeking recalling of the said order dated July 24, 2025. The said
application was disposed of by this Court by an order dated September
09, 2025 thereby transferring the revisional application being R.P. No. 18
of 2024 and the appeal being Appeal No. 28 of 2024 along with all
connected applications in both the proceedings from the Asansol Circuit
Bench of the State Commission, West Bengal to the Principal Bench of the
State Commission, West Bengal. The relevant portion of the said order is
as follows:-
“In view thereof, the prayer for transfer is allowed. Let the entire records of the
revisional application being R.P. No. 18 of 2024 (Damodar Valley Corporation Vs.
Bharat Hi-tech Cement Private Limited) and Appeal No. 28 of 2024 (Damodar Valley
Corporation & Ors. Vs. Bharat Hi-tech Cement Private Limited) along with all
connected applications in both the proceedings be transferred from the Asansol
Circuit Bench of the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, West Bengal
to the Principal Bench of the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, West
Bengal. The office of the Asansol Circuit Bench of the State Consumer Dispute
Redressal Commission is directed to transmit the records of R.P. No. 18 of 2024 and
Appeal No. 28 of 2024 along with all connected applications forthwith through
Special Messenger and the cost of special messenger shall be put in by the
petitioner before the Asansol Circuit Bench within a period of three days from the
date of receipt of a server copy of this order. Immediately upon receipt of a server
copy of this order and upon deposit of the special messenger cost, the office of the
Asansol Circuit Bench of the State Commission shall forthwith transmit the records
of the aforesaid proceedings to the Principal Bench of the State Consumer Dispute
Redressal Commission, West Bengal. Immediately upon receipt of the records of
R.P. No. 18 of 2024 and Appeal No. 28 of 2024 along with all connected
applications filed in connection therewith from the Asansol Circuit Bench, the officePage 6 of 35
of the Principal Bench of the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, West
Bengal shall place the records before the Learned President of the West Bengal
State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission forthwith and the Learned
President of the State Commission is requested to fix an early date of hearing of
R.P. No. 18 of 2024 along with the interlocutory applications and Appeal No. 28 of
2024 along with all connected applications.
Parties will be at liberty to mention this matter before the Learned President of
the State Commission with regard to the urgency involved in the matter.
The application being CAN 1 of 2025 stands disposed of with the hope and trust
that the President of the State Commission shall dispose of the connected
applications as well as the Revision Petition and the Appeal expeditiously.”
u. On September 25, 2025 when the revisional application being R.P. No. 18
of 2024 was listed before the Asansol Circuit Bench of the State
Commission, then in terms of the aforesaid order dated September 09,
2025 passed by this Court, the said Circuit Bench of the State
Commission transmitted the case records pertaining to R.P. No. 18 of
2024 and Appeal No. 28 of 2024 from the said Circuit Bench to the
Principal Bench of the State Commission and directed the parties to
appear before the Transferee Bench of the State Commission on November
14, 2025.
v. The said case i.e. R.P. No. 18 of 2024 was not listed before any of the
Benches at the Principal Bench of the State Commission on November 14,
2025.
w. In the meantime, on October 17, 2025 the National Commission passed
an order of stay of all further proceedings in the execution case pending
before the District Commission. Such order was challenged by the
petitioner before this Court by filing C.O. No. 3866 of 2025. The said
application (C.O. No. 3866 of 2025) was disposed of by this Court by an
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order dated November 26, 2025 by inter alia setting aside the order dated
October 17, 2025 passed by the National Commission.
x. On February 19, 2026 the State Commission took up R.P. No. 18 of 2024
(which was renumbered as R.P. No. 12 of 2026) for hearing and vacated
the interim order dated September 03, 2024 whereby the District
Commission had restrained the opposite party from disconnecting the
electricity supply of the petitioner. Hence the present revisional
application.
3. It is recorded that in course of hearing, two compilations – one being
compilation of documents running into 296 pages and the other being
compilation of bills raised by the opposite party on the petitioner running
into 273 pages – were handed up to Court on behalf of the opposite party.
The petitioner also produced a bunch of email print outs running into 12
pages in support of its submissions.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF THE PETITIONER:
4. Mr. Dutta, learned Senior Advocate and Mr. Chatterjee, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the petitioner have made the following submissions
on behalf of the petitioner:-
a. The order impugned dated February 19, 2026 is wholly without
jurisdiction inasmuch as the same has been passed by a forum which did
not have the requisite quorum.
b. In terms of Section 16(1B) (i) and (ii) of the 1986 Act, any Bench of the
State Commission must comprise at least two members. In the case at
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hand, the order impugned has been passed by a single member Bench.The order is therefore hit by coram non-judice.
c. In support of such contention, a judgment of the Hon’ble High Court at
Rajasthan in the case of Kamal Travels Kokks International vs. The
State of Rajasthan & Others1 was relied upon. It was demonstrated
that the said judgment remained unaltered in appeal before the Hon’ble
Division Bench of the said Hon’ble Court and for such purpose the order
of the Hon’ble Division Bench in the case of State of Rajasthan &
Others vs. Kamal Travels Kokks International & Others2 was also
cited. It was demonstrated that the aforesaid orders stood affirmed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Others vs.
Kamal Travels Kokks International & Others3.
d. It was further submitted that the order impugned was passed without
serving any notice on the petitioner.
e. Attention of this Court was invited to Ground no. (XIII) in CO 1562 of
2025 filed before this Court to demonstrate that the opposite party had
itself approached this Court asserting that the State Commission could
not hear the matter in the absence of at least two members and that in
such context jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India had been invoked by the opposite party in such
context.
1 Civil Writ Petition No. 18 of 2012, decided on March 14, 2018
2 Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1779 of 2018, decided on July 04, 2019
3 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3718
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f. The orders dated July 24, 2025 and September 09, 2025 passed in C.O.No. 1562 of 2025 evince the consistent case of the opposite party that a
single member Bench of the State Commission would be coram non-judice.
g. The order dated February 19, 2026 has been passed in absolute violation
of principles of natural justice.
h. The petitioner had furnished a Bank guarantee for a sum in excess of
Rs.1.21 crore to the opposite party by way of security deposit for the
purpose of the electricity supply. The same has been invoked/encashed
by the opposite party after the impugned order was passed.
i. The order dated September 09, 2025 clearly directed the learned
President of the State Commission to dispose of the revision petition, the
appeal as well as the connected applications and that being so, no other
member of the State Commission could have unilaterally taken up the
matter and passed the order impugned.
j. The sudden disconnection of electricity has caused incalculable harm to
the petitioner and losses are mounting.
k. The order passed by the District Commission was one under Section 72 of
the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereafter “the 2019 Act”) and in such
view of the matter, the revision petition in which the order impugned had
been passed was not maintainable in view of a specific provision for
appeal under Section 73 of the 2019 Act. Attention of this Court was
invited to the order dated September 19, 2024 passed in C.O. No. 3323 of
2024 where a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had observed that an order
passed under Section 72 of the 2019 Act is appealable under Section 73
thereof.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF THE OPPOSITE PARTY:
5. Mr. Mookherjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party
has made the following submissions on behalf of the opposite party:-
a. In terms of Section 47 of the 2019 Act, the revisional application filed by
the opposite party is very well maintainable since the State Commission
has the requisite power under Section 47(1)(b) thereof to entertain any
challenge to an order if it finds that the District Commission has
exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise
jurisdiction that is vested in it or has in exercising its jurisdiction acted
with illegality or material irregularity.
b. In terms of Section 29A of the 1986 Act, no proceeding of the District
Commission or State Commission or National Commission would be
invalid by reason of any defect in the constitution thereof. Similarly, in
terms of Section 64 of the 2019 Act proceedings conducted before the
Commission cannot be said to be invalid due to defect in its constitution.
c. The order dated September 09, 2025 passed by this Court in CAN 1 of
2025 filed in connection with C.O. No. 1562 of 2025 cannot be read to
mean that only the President of the State Commission has been directed
to decide the revision petition filed by the opposite party. The same must
be understood as a direction on the Principal Bench to decide the same,
while leaving the President of the Principal Bench free to allocate the
matter to any Bench in exercise of the President’s administrative power of
roster allocation.
d. In terms of the provisions of Section 47(2) of the 2019 Act, a Bench may
be constituted by the President with one or two members as the President
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may deem fit. Thus, the 2019 Act has given liberty to the President toconstitute even a single member Bench.
e. The complaint filed before the District Commission related to an alleged
deficiency in service pertaining to harmonic distortion in electricity supply
to the petitioner. Inviting the attention to the prayers in the complaint
filed before the District Commission, it was submitted that such
complaint was filed in the year 2009 and bills with effect from November
2006 were put to challenge.
f. The bills which are raised upon the petitioner after the order dated
January 18, 2024 passed by the District Commission pertained to tariff
revision for the period 2017-18.
g. It was submitted that the tariff revision order passed by the WBERC on
May 05, 2022 in respect of the period 2017-18 were challenged by some
consumers by way of writ petitions but such challenges failed before the
Hon’ble Single Bench and the writ petitions stood dismissed by an order
dated February 17, 2023. The disconnection notices issued by the
opposite party to its consumers were also challenged by way of writ
petitions which were allowed by setting aside the disconnection notices by
an order dated March 16, 2023. Two sets of several appeals were then
preferred against the said two orders. One set of appeals had been
preferred by the consumers (being MAT 395 OF 2023 and other allied
appeals) against the order dated February 17, 2023 and the other set of
appeals by the opposite party (being MAT 508 OF 2023 and other allied
appeals) against the order dated March 16, 2023. In the said appeals the
ultimate interim order that is now operating is one whereunder all
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consumers who had challenged the tariff revision orders and thedisconnection notices have been directed to pay 50% of the arrears based
on tariff as determined and to secure the balance 50% by way of Bank
Guarantee.
h. The tariff revision order passed by WBERC on May 05, 2022 is also
challenged before APTEL and in such appeal an interim order was passed
on July 01, 2022 thereby injuncting the opposite party from
disconnecting the supplies of all consumers who may be affected by the
tariff revision subject to payment of current dues. Such order was
however modified later on August 22, 2024 whereby the injunction cover
over non-parties was removed. Such order was assailed before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court but the challenge failed. The order passed by the APTEL
on August 22, 2024 has thus attained finality.
i. The petitioner has never challenged the tariff revision and as such it is
not entitled to any protection.
j. An order adjudicating challenge to bills owing to harmonic distortion of
supply could not have been extended to injunct disconnection for non-
payment of arrears of electricity dues for the year 2017-18 that had been
demanded upon tariff revision orders being passed by WBERC after the
injuction order earlier passed by APTEL being modified on August 22,
2024.
k. The order dated January 18, 2024 passed by the District Commission
awarded a total sum of Rs.49,62,532/- to the petitioner, therefore,
disconnection for non-payment by the petitioner of any sum beyond (or in
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excess of) the said amount awarded by the District Commission to thepetitioner could not have been injuncted.
l. The petitioner enjoyed electricity supply in respect of two Units i.e. Unit-I
and Unit-II. Supply to Unit-I was disconnected upon the petitioner’s
request. Before getting such supply disconnected, the petitioner filed a
suit being Title Suit No. 335 of 2021 before the learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Additional Court, Purulia and got an ex-parte ad interim order
of injunction restraining the opposite party from disconnecting the
electricity supply to the petitioner’s premises subject to deposit of the sum
of Rs.10 lakh. Such order was extended subsequently by an order dated
January 17, 2026.
m. In terms of Regulation 4.4.1 of the West Bengal Electricity Regulatory
Commission (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2013, a consumer is
duty bound to clear all the outstanding payable by him to the electricity
licensee except the last bill for supply till the date of disconnection before
making a request for disconnection. Despite such provision, the petitioner
has not paid the outstanding dues in respect of Unit-I that got
disconnected at the request of the petitioner on September 30, 2025.
n. A sum of Rs.12,12,81,320/- is due and owing from the petitioner in
respect of Unit-I and a sum of Rs.1,96,13,365/- is due and owing from
the petitioner in respect of Unit-II.
o. The opposite party tried to correct the harmonic supply but the petitioner
resisted the corrective course. In support of such submission an email
dated August 08, 2025 (at page 271 to 275 of the compilation of
documents) was pressed.
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p. Inviting the Court’s attention to the cause list published by the StateCommission it was argued that the official website of the said Commission
showed the revision as listed for being heard by the relevant Bench of the
Commission on February 19, 2026. Such publication in the list
constituted sufficient notice and therefore it could not be contended that
the order impugned was passed without putting the petitioner on notice.
PETITIONER’S REJOINDER SUBMISSIONS
6. Mr. Chatterjee learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner made
the following submissions in rejoinder:-
a. It is incorrect to state that order dated January 18, 2024 passed by the
District Commission only awarded a sum of Rs.49, 62,532. The same was
also followed by an injunction on disconnection “until the proper
adjustment of the adverse effect of harmonic flow of electricity or for the
matter removing the harmonic flow of power supply by any means”.
b. The petitioner would be entitled to further sums on account of adjustment
of the harmonic distortion of supply and till such adjustment was made
supply of electricity could not be disconnected.
c. The order impugned was in any event passed without hearing the
petitioner and the petitioner had no opportunity to rebut the submissions
made on behalf of the opposite party before the State Commission.
d. The compilation of bills and documents handed up to the Court does not
form part of the records of the State Commission.
e. No effort was taken to rectify the harmonic distortion of supply at all. The
email dated August 08, 2025 relied on by the opposite party was a notice
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for consumer satisfaction survey to be conducted by M/s. Deloitte and notfor remedying the effect of harmonic distortion of supply.
f. It was contended that Section 64 of the 2019 Act would not cure the defect
in the constitution of a Bench of the State Commission.
g. E-mails dated August 12, 2025 and September 09, 2025 were placed
before the Court to show that the only demand that had been raised by the
opposite party was for a sum of Rs.29,41,012/- and not more than that.
ANALYSIS & DECISION:
7. The first contention raised by the petitioner was that the order impugned
was passed by a forum coram non-judice. Section 16(1-B) of the 1986 Act
was placed to support such contention which reads as follows:-
“(1-B) (i) The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the State Commission may be
exercised by Benches thereof.
(ii) A Bench may be constituted by the President with one or more members as the
President may deem fit.
(iii) If the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point, the points shall be
decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, but if the
members are equally divided, they shall state the point or points on which they differ,
and make a reference to the President who shall either hear the point or points himself
or refer the case for hearing on such point or points by one or more or the other
members and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the
majority of the members who have heard the case, including those who first heard it.”
8. Judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Single and Hon’ble Division Benches of
the High Court of Rajasthan in the case of Kamal Travels Kokks
International (supra) and the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
dismissing the SLP in the case of Kamal Travels Kokks International
(supra) were placed before this Court to assert that any order passed by a
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single member Bench of the State Commission would be void being passed
by a forum coram non-judice.
9. The opposite party has sought to counter the salvo by demonstrating that
the order dismissing the SLP was passed in the context of the predecessor
Act of 1986 and the present case would be governed by the 2019 Act.
Inviting the attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 64 of the
2019 Act, it was submitted that no order passed by the Commission would
be rendered invalid by reason of defect in the constitution of the
Commission.
10. Section 47(2) of the 2019 Act was also referred to argue that it was open to
the President to constitute a Bench with one or more members as the
President may deem fit.
11. Section 47(2) of the 2019 Act is not only in pari materia with the provisions
of Section 16(1-B) (i) and (ii) of the 1986 Act taken cumulatively but also
identically worded. The same is extracted hereinbelow:-
“(2) The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the State Commission may be
exercised by Benches thereof, and a Bench may be constituted by the President with
one or more members as the President may deem fit:
Provided that the senior-most member shall preside over the Bench.”
12. Similarly, Section 47(3) of the 2019 Act is also in pari materia with and
analogously worded as the provisions of Section 16(1-B) (iii) of the 1986 Act.
The same is reproduced hereunder:-
“(3) Where the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point, the points shall
be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, but if the
members are equally divided, they shall state the point or points on which they differ,
and make a reference to the President who shall either hear the point or points himself
or refer the case for hearing on such point or points by one or more of the otherPage 17 of 35
members and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the
majority of the members who have heard the case, including those who first heard it:
Provided that the President or the other members, as the case may be, shall give
opinion on the point or points so referred within a period of one month from the date of
such reference.”
13. That being the situation, the order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
thereby dismissing the SLP in the case of Kamal Travels Kokks
International (supra) cannot be said to be inapplicable to the facts of the
present case merely because the same is governed by the provisions of the
2019 Act. This is all more so since the Hon’ble Supreme Court quoted the
provisions of Section 16(1-B) of the 1986 Act in the said order and taking
specific note thereof did “not find any error” in the order of the Hon’ble
Rajasthan High Court which was impugned before it. This, in the considered
view of this Court, constitutes an affirmation of the legal position regarding
Section 16(1-B) of the 1986 Act (which is worded similarly to Section 47(2) of
the 2019 Act).
14. This Court is cognizant of the legal position that dismissal of an SLP is not
always a binding precedent on merits, but an order that quotes the specific
Section while dismissing the SLP and then asserts that upon noting the
provision quoted, no error is found in the order impugned constitutes a clear
judicial stance of the Hon’ble Supreme Court thereby elevating the order
from one of mere dismissal of SLP to an order affirming the legal principle
regarding validity of Bench formation which binds all the Courts and
Tribunals across the country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
In such regard, the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
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the case of Kunhayammed & Others vs. State of Kerala & Another4
deserve notice:-
“27. A petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be dismissed by a non-
speaking order or by a speaking order. Whatever be the phraseology employed in the
order of dismissal, if it is a non-speaking order, i.e., it does not assign reasons for
dismissing the special leave petition, it would neither attract the doctrine of merger so
as to stand substituted in place of the order put in issue before it nor would it be a
declaration of law by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution for there
is no law which has been declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by reasons
then also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted because the jurisdiction
exercised was not an appellate jurisdiction but merely a discretionary jurisdiction
refusing to grant leave to appeal. We have already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still
the reasons stated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the
Constitution if there is a law declared by the Supreme Court which obviously would be
binding on all the courts and tribunals in India and certainly the parties thereto. The
statement contained in the order other than on points of law would be binding on the
parties and the court or tribunal, whose order was under challenge on the principle of
judicial discipline, this Court being the Apex Court of the country. No court or tribunal
or parties would have the liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one
expressed by this Court. The order of Supreme Court would mean that it has declared
the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. The
declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 but still, the case not being one
where leave was granted, the doctrine of merger does not apply. The Court sometimes
leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes briefly lays down the principle, may
be, contrary to the one laid down by the High Court and yet would dismiss the special
leave petition. The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. This is so
done because in the event of merely dismissing the special leave petition, it is likely
that an argument could be advanced in the High Court that the Supreme Court has to
be understood as not to have differed in law with the High Court.”
[Emphasis added]
15. It is equally well settled that interpretation of a provision in an earlier
statute applies to a later statute that is in pari materia and identically
worded.
4 (2000) 6 SCC 359
Page 19 of 35
16. A few more Sections deserve notice before moving to the effect of Section 64
of the 2019 Act. Section 49 of the 2019 Act provides the “Procedure
applicable to State Commission”. It reads thus:-
“49. (1) The provisions relating to complaints under Sections 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39
shall, with such modifications as may be necessary, be applicable to the disposal of
complaints by the State Commission.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-Section (1), the State Commission may
also declare any terms of contract, which is unfair to any consumer, to be null and
void.”
17. Thus Sections 35 to 39 of the 2019 Act which apply to District Commission
have been made applicable to State Commission as well with such
modifications as may be necessary. Section 49 of the 2019 Act incorporates
the provisions of Section 35 to 39 of the 2019 Act by reference, applying
them mutatis mutandis to State Commission. In the present context, Section
36 and Section 39(4) of the 2019 Act are relevant.
18. Section 36 of the 2019 Act provides for “Proceedings before District
Commission” in the following manner:-
“36. (1) Every proceeding before the District Commission shall be conducted by the
President of that Commission and at least one member thereof, sitting together:
Provided that where a member, for any reason, is unable to conduct a proceeding till
it is completed, the President and the other member shall continue the proceeding from
the stage at which it was last heard by the previous member.
(2) On receipt of a complaint made under Section 35, the District Commission may,
by order, admit the complaint for being proceeded with or reject the same:
Provided that a complaint shall not be rejected under this Section unless an
opportUnity of being heard has been given to the complainant: Provided further that the
admissibility of the complaint shall ordinarily be decided within twenty-one days from
the date on which the complaint was filed.
(3) Where the District Commission does not decide the issue of admissibility of the
complaint within the period so specified, it shall be deemed to have been admitted.”
[Emphasis by underlining]
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19. Section 36 of the 2019 Act (which has been made applicable to the State
Commission as aforesaid), reads in almost mandatory terms that the Bench
must comprise of the President and at least one member. Consequently, a
minimum of two members is compulsory to satisfy the requisite quorum for
a functional Bench.
20. Section 39 of the 2019 Act provides for “Findings of District Commission”.
Sub-section 4 thereof deserves notice in the present context. The same is
extracted hereinbelow:-
“(4) Every order made by the District Commission under sub-section (1) shall be
signed by the President and the member who conducted the proceeding:
Provided that where the order is made as per majority opinion under sub-section
(3), such order shall also be signed by the other member.”
21. The aforequoted provision which also applies to State Commission in terms
of Section 49 of the 2019 Act, is yet another indicator that a single member
cannot constitute the quoram for a Bench of the State Commission.
22. A cumulative reading of Section 47(2), Section 36 and 39 (3) of the 2019 Act
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the expression “with” used after the
expression “President” in Section 47(2) of the 2019 Act must be read in the
sense of accompaniment. The provision “a Bench may be constituted by the
President with one or more members as the President may deem fit” thus
should mean that the President has the option to constitute a Bench
comprising the President and one or more members. It may also be noted
that the proviso to Section 47 of the 2019 Act indicates that there may be a
Bench without the President where the senior-most member would preside.
However, there is no option for the President to constitute a single member
Bench. The quorum is therefore of two members only and not one.
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23. Now what would happen if the President is not there or one of the members
is not there?
24. A somewhat similar question was answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
taking recourse to the provisions of Section 29A of the predecessor 1986 Act
(equivalent to Section 64 of the 2019 Act) and the relevant provisions of
West Bengal Consumer Protection Rules, 1987 in the case of Gulzari Lal
Agarwal vs. Accounts Officer5. The following observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court are apposite to the present context:-
“17. After giving careful thought to the rival contentions raised before us, we are of
the considered opinion that the relevant provisions which we have quoted hereinabove
will have to be construed harmoniously to promote the cause of the consumers under
the Act. As indicated earlier, the definition of member includes the President and a
member of a District Forum/State Commission. It is true that sub-Section (2) of Section
14 read with Section 18 requires that every proceeding referred to under sub-Section
(1) shall be conducted by the President of the District Forum/State Commission and at
least one member thereof sitting together. Sub-Section (2-A) is consequential in the
sense that every order made by the State Commission under sub-Section (1) shall be
signed by its President and the member or members who conducted the proceeding.
The procedure applicable to the District Forum is made applicable to the State
Commission vide Section 18 with such modifications as may be necessary. Plain
reading of sub-Sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 14 may support the view taken by the
National Commission but if these provisions are read with Section 29-A of the Act and
sub-rules (9) and (10) of Rule 6, it would be quite clear that it could never be the
intention of the legislature to stall or render the State Commission non-functional in the
absence of the President either having not been appointed in time due to some valid
reasons or if the President is on leave due to certain reasons beyond his control. Sub-
Sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 14 and Section 18-A of the Act were brought into force
with effect from 18-6-1993 whereas Section 29-A was made applicable from 15-6-
1991. The Rules of 1987 were brought into force immediately. The complaint before
the District Forum by the appellant was filed on 14-10-1993. Therefore, all these
amended provisions were very much brought into force when the complaint was filed.
5 (1996) 10 SCC 590
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Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 is a presumptuous provision where the President of the
State Commission is functional but it would not be correct to say that if the President
of the State Commission is non-functional because of one or the other reason, the State
Commission would stop its functioning and wait till the President is appointed. In
order to avoid such a situation, the State Government has framed the Rules and sub-
rules (9) and (10) quoted hereinabove unmistakably provide answer to such a situation
as in the present case. The only harmonious construction that could be given to sub-
Sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 14 read with sub-rules (9) and (10) is that as and
when the President of the State Commission is functional, he along with at least one
member sitting together shall conduct the proceeding but where the President being
non-functional, sub-rules (9) and (10) of Rule 6 will govern the proceedings. Sub-rule
(9) provides that where any such vacancy occurs in the office of the President of the
State Commission, the seniormost (in order of appointment) member holding office for
the time being, shall discharge the function of the President until a person is appointed
to fill such vacancy. This sub-rule is made with a view to make the State Commission
functional in the absence of the President and not to allow the State Commission to
render non-functional for want of the President. It is well settled that every provision in
the Act needs to be construed harmoniously with a view to promote the object and
spirit of the Act but while doing so, no violence would be done to the plain language
used in the Section. It is this principle that needs to be made applicable while
construing the provision of sub-Sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 14 read with sub-rules
(9) and (10).”
25. Importantly, in the case of Gulzari Lal Agarwal (supra) there was no lack
of quorum. The Bench was said to be defective due to the absence of the
President. The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the validity of the order
passed by a Bench of two members sans the President taking resort to
Section 29A of the 1986 Act. In the said case the post of the President in the
State Commission was vacant as the incumbent therein had retired and
consequently the case was decided by the other two members comprising
the Bench.
26. Following the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gulzari
Lal Agarwal (supra), the two questions posed above can also be answered
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on the basis of the relevant provisions of the 2019 Act and the Rules framed
thereunder.
27. Insofar as the situation involving absence of the President in the State
Commission is concerned, the answer thereto may be found in the West
Bengal Consumer Protection (Salary, allowances and conditions of service of
President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission)
Rules, 2022. Rule 6 of the said Rules provide as follows:-
“6. Casual vacancy: – In case of a casual vacancy in the office of President in the
State Commission or District Commission, as the case may be, the State Government
shall have the power to appoint the senior most Member to officiate as President.”
28. Remedy in case of absence of a member of the State Commission has been
directly provided for in the proviso to Section 36(1) of the 2019 Act which
has already been quoted hereinabove and which is applicable to the State
Commission as well in terms of Section 49 of the 2019 Act. It provides that
in case of absence of a member, the President and the other member shall
continue the proceeding from the stage at which it was last heard by the
previous member.
29. Having regard to the aforesaid, Section 64 of the 2019 cannot be used to
validate lack of quorum. As is evident from the marginal note/ head note of
Section 64 of the 2019 Act, the same is designed to shield orders from
invalidation due to vacancies and defects in appointments. The main body of
the section clarifies that it protects proceedings affected by the defects in the
constitution of the District Commission, State Commission and National
Commission and not necessarily the Benches thereof. Every defect in the
constitution of the Commission may not lead to a defect in a Bench thereof
Page 24 of 35
however, if a defect in the Commission causes defect in a Bench the same
would save the proceeding conducted by such Bench by the application of
Section 64 of the 2019 Act as was one in the case of Gulzari Lal Agarwal
(supra). However, a defect in the Bench without there being a defect in the
Commission may not be cured by Section 64 of the 2019 Act.
30. The order impugned is therefore hit by coram non judice. While on this, it
cannot also be lost sight of that it has been the opposite party’s consistent
case that a single member Bench of the State Commission did not constitute
the requisite quorum and the matter was transferred to the Principal Bench
form the Asansol circuit Bench only due to lack of quorum. Despite all this
the matter was heard by a single member Bench and the impugned order
was passed.
31. Even otherwise, the order impugned deserves interference as it has been
passed in derogation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner’s
contention that the order under challenge was passed without notice was
countered by the opposite party by asserting that inclusion of the matter in
the cause list itself amounted to sufficient notice.
32. While publication of a matter in the cause list of a Court ordinarily
constitutes constructive notice to the parties, but such rule may not be aptly
applicable to the facts of the present case. The reasons for such observation
would be clear from the following paragraphs.
33. The revision that was originally filed before the Asansol Circuit Bench of the
State Commission stood transferred to the Principal Bench of the said
Commission by an order dated September 09, 2025 passed by this Court in
CAN 01 of 2025 filed in connection with C.O. 1562 of 2025. The records of
Page 25 of 35
the said revision were actually transferred from the Asansol Circuit Bench to
the Principal Bench of the State Commission by an order dated October 15,
2025 with a direction to the parties to appear before the principal Bench on
November 14, 2025. It is the petitioner’s case that on November 14, 2025
the matter was not listed before the Principal Bench and no further date was
fixed by the Principal Bench. Nothing to the contrary has been produced
before this Court. It is thus clear that February 19, 2026 – the date when
the matter was heard and the order impugned was passed – was not a
prescheduled date.
34. If on a particular date which is fixed for appearance of parties before the
State Commission, the case is not taken up and no subsequent date is fixed,
it would be fairly reasonable for a party to expect that a notice would be
served upon to it before the case is taken up on a date that was never fixed
in the presence of the parties. It is true that in the age of digital proficiency,
status of a case may be available at the click of a button but it would be too
unreasonable to expect of a litigant that it should keep on checking the case
status everyday without there being any indication or clue as regards the
date on which the matter is supposed to be taken up, in order to avert an ex
parte order. Furthermore, since it is the petitioner’s case that the matter was
to be heard by the President (or the Bench presided over by the President)
the petitioner may not have checked the lists pertaining to other Benches at
all.
35. For all the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order dated February 19, 2026
passed by the State Commission cannot be sustained. The same stands set
aside.
Page 26 of 35
36. Now once the impugned order is set aside, the order dated September 03,
2024 passed by the District Commission gets resuscitated, but the position
that was prevailing at the time when the said order dated September 03,
2024 was passed no longer remains. The question which will then arise is
whether this Court should order restitution of the earlier position i.e. pass
an order of status quo ante.
37. It is well settled that power to direct restitution is inherent in every Court
and is to be exercised like a duty when situation demands. However, the
nature and extent of restitution will be required to be decided so that the
order does not trump real justice and such that equities are balanced. This
Court is in any case exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, which is supervisory in scope, discretionary in
exercise and equitable in nature.
38. Upon the order of injunction dated September 03, 2024 being vacated, the
opposite party has disconnected the petitioner’s supply of electricity and
encashed the Bank Guarantee that was there as security deposit.
39. It had been argued on behalf of the opposite party that the order of
injunction on disconnection of electricity had been passed by the District
Commission without appreciating that the disconnection notice had been
issued for reasons wholly unconnected with the lis before the District
Commission. Relying on APTEL’s order, it was submitted that the petitioner
had not challenged the tariff revision order before APTEL and upon the
protective umbrella of injunction initially granted by APTEL being removed
by it by the order dated August 22, 2024 which had attained finality, it was
not open to the petitioner to resist disconnection of electricity which was
Page 27 of 35
resorted to by the opposite party for non-payment of dues demanded by it
on the basis of tariff revision in terms of orders of APTEL.
40. It was further contended that the petitioner was in any event liable for
further dues in respect of Unit I, electricity supply whereof had been
disconnected at the request of the petitioner.
41. The petitioner on the other hand has opposed such contention and relied on
the concluding portion of the order passed by the District Commission
which reads thus:-
“that this case be and the same is decreed in part ex-parte against the OPs with
cost of Rs. 1,00,000/-(One Lakh Only). The complainant do get decree for damages of
Rs. 46,62,532/- (Forty-six Lakh Sixty-two Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-two only)
and compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Two Lakh only) along with a decree in the form of
direction/restraining the OPs not to disconnect the electric supply of the factory of the
complainant until the proper adjustment of the adverse effect of the harmonic flow of
power supply or for the matter removing the harmonic power supply by any means so
that the complainant shall get harmonic free flow of electricity in terms of the
agreement in between the parties.
The OPs are hereby directed to comply the above order by way of making payment
of the litigation cost of Rs. 1,00,000/-(One Lakh only), damages charge of Rs.
46,62,532/- (Forty-six Lakh Sixty-two Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-two only) and
compensation Rs. 2,00,000/- (Two Lakh only) i.e. Rs. 46,62,532/- + Rs. 2,00,000/- +
Rs. 1,00,000/- i.e. total amount of Rs. 49,62,532/- (Forty-nine Lakh Sixty-two
Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-two only) to the complainant within 60 days from the
date of this Judgment/Order. The Opposite Parties are hereby restrained from
disconnecting the supply of electricity to the factory of the complainant until the proper
adjustment of the adverse effect of harmonic flow of electricity or for the matter
removing the harmonic flow of power supply by any means.”
42. Further, e-mails dated August 12, 2025 and September 09, 2025 were
placed before the Court to show that the only demand that had been raised
by the opposite party was for a sum of Rs.29,41,102/- and not more than
that.
Page 28 of 35
43. It is however noticed by this Court that the said e-mails pertain to a tariff
revision for the period 2018-20 and not 2017-18.
44. The order dated January 18, 2024 passed by the District Commission thus
injuncts the opposite party from disconnecting electricity till either the
adverse effect of harmonic supply is adjusted or the harmonic supply is
corrected/removed. The parties are at loggerheads on the point that
correction was attempted by the opposite party but it was impeded by the
petitioner or not permitted by the petitioner. Such correction is, therefore,
yet to be done.
45. Two compilations of documents and bills have been produced before this
Court in support of the contention of the opposite party and a separate
bunch of emails has been produced by the petitioner in support of its
contention
46. There is nothing on record to show that these were placed before either the
District Commission or even before the single member Bench of the State
Commission. It is however, an entirely different aspect that even if the same
had been placed before the single member Bench, the same would have
made no difference in the facts of the present case where the order itself has
been found to be bad for the reasons mentioned hereinabove. Still, it needs
to be recorded just for the sake of completeness.
47. While the pleadings of the opposite party before the State Commission in
revision indicates that some submission was made before the District
Commission as regards the un-connectedness of the issue before the
District Commission and the subject of the disconnection notice, there is
nothing either in the order passed by the District Commission or in the one
Page 29 of 35
impugned before this Court that would suggest that such submission was
made and not considered by the District Commission. In any case the
pleadings before State Commission do not refer to the several materials that
were placed before this Court on behalf of the opposite party. The order
impugned also does not reflect the same.
48. The issue therefore needs to be finally decided by the State Commission
upon considering the material that might be placed before it and upon
hearing the parties. It would not be appropriate for this Court to appreciate
the said documents while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India and return any finding even prima facie.
49. However, a prima facie opinion can always be formed on the basis of the
material already on record before the District and State forums for the
purpose of deciding as to whether an order of restitution should be granted
or refused or as to the imposition of condition for restitution.
50. In the instant case the complaint case of the petitioner, the order dated
January 18, 2024 and the opposite party’s revision on the basis of which the
order impugned was passed would suffice for the moment.
51. The consumer complaint was filed by the petitioner in the year 2009 alleging
abnormality in bills owing to harmonic supply of electricity as also claiming
damages due to such harmonic supply. The order dated January 18, 2024
passed by the District Commission rejected the petitioner’s challenge to the
bills but found that there was harmonic supply which needed correction and
at the same time injuncted the opposite party from disconnecting the supply
till the time the adverse effect of harmonic supply was adjusted or the
harmonic supply was corrected.
Page 30 of 35
52. The revisional application filed by the opposite party before the State
Commission indicates that the claim on the basis whereof disconnection
notice had been issued to the petitioner pertains to arrears of electricity
dues that have arisen upon tariff revision which date back to 2017-18. The
period for which arrears of electricity dues have been claimed upon tariff
revision is therefore prior to the date of the order of the District Commission.
It would therefore be required to be examined as to whether the injunction
on disconnection granted by the order dated January 18, 2024 would apply
to the claim for arrears for the period 2017-18. The notice dated August 26,
2024 which has been issued to the petitioner clearly refers to the APTLE
order as well as the tariff revision for the period 2017-18.
53. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has been paying the consumption bills
regularly. It was therefore not the understanding of the petitioner also that
the order of injunction on disconnection would protect it even from non-
payment of the consumption bills. In fact the petitioner has clearly stated in
the revisional application before this Court that it has “till this date, cleared
all running electricity consumption bills without any default”.
54. Such bills were/are for realizing charges for consumption of electricity. What
is the basis for calculating and demanding such charges? The short one –
word answer would be “Tariff” i.e. the rate at which electricity is sold by the
electricity distribution/generation licensee to the consumer. What is being
demanded by the opposite party then? The demand is of an amount which
the opposite party has become entitled to by reason of revision of the tariff
by WBERC and removal of protection of injunction granted earlier by APTEL.
That is to say that if tariff was “x” in 2017-18 and bills have been raised by
Page 31 of 35
calculating consumption charges taking x as the tariff upon the same being
revised to “x+y” the incremental component is payable by the petitioner to
the opposite party. If the tariff had been “x+y” from the very beginning the
same would have been paid by the petitioner at that rate only. Therefore
prima facie it appears that the order of injunction may not extend to
disconnection for non-payment of arrears of tariff revision. To put it simply if
the injunction does not apply to consumption bills it should reasonably and
by parity of reasoning not apply to revision of consumption bills also.
55. There is another way to look at it. Once the challenge thrown to the bills in
the consumer complaint filed by the opposite party was repelled by the
District Forum, the issue as regards inflated charging no longer remained.
The tariff at which the bills were raised earlier got revised and that being so
a further bill was raised by the opposite party for the year 2017-18. Such
bills, in the prima facie view of the Court could not be assailed before the
consumer forum in the proceeding for execution of the order dated January
18, 2024. The notice of disconnection issued for non-payment of such bills
was only consequential in nature. The same, therefore, could also not be
challenged in the said execution case.
56. By the order dated January 18, 2024 the District Commission had injuncted
the opposite party “from disconnecting the supply of electricity to the factory
of the complainant until the proper adjustment of the adverse effect of
harmonic flow of electricity or for the matter removing the harmonic flow of
power supply by any means.” It was submitted by the petitioner that in
terms of the same, the petitioner is entitled to further sums in terms of such
observation.
Page 32 of 35
57. That may be one way of interpreting the order dated January 18, 2024 in
the light of prayer (e) of the consumer complaint filed by the petitioner.
However, the same may not be the only interpretation possible. The actual
meaning thereof would ultimately be decided by the State Commission
where the said order is pending in appeal. The present stage is one where
the question as to the nature and extent of restitution is being considered.
In such context, the interpretation appears to be prima facie reasonable.
58. Insofar as the opposite party’s claim pertaining to Unit -I is concerned, this
Court is not minded to consider the same for the purpose of restitution for
two reasons. Firstly a suit is pending between the parties concerning Unit- I.
Secondly, the scope of this application is disconnection of electricity supply
to Unit -II upon the order impugned having been passed and restoration
thereof.
59. Having taken such prima facie view of the matter, equities will be balanced if
an order directing restoration of supply to Unit-I of the petitioner is made
subject to the petitioner putting in/furnishing security for such supply in
accordance with law.
60. This Court has held that equity would be balanced upon passing the
aforesaid order for the following reasons:
a. The opposite party’s claim as regards Unit-II is Rs.1,96,13,365/-.
b. The same contains four sub-heads- (i) Dues for the year 2017-18
amounting to Rs.84,85,351/- (ii) Dues for the year 2018-20 amounting
to Rs.29,41,012/- (iii) Cumulative TDS dues amounting to Rs.51,740/-
and (iv) Provisional accrued DPS to the tune of Rs. 81,35,262/-
Page 33 of 35
c. Out of the said total sum of Rs.1,96,13,365/-, the opposite party hasalready recovered a sum of Rs.1, 21,48,000/- by encashing the Bank
Guarantee towards security deposit upon disconnection of the supply.
d. The opposite party is liable to the petitioner in the sum of Rs.
49,62,532/- in terms of the order dated January 18, 2024 passed by
the District Commission (at least as at present and till such time the
said order is set aside or interfered with in appeal)
e. Insofar as the sum of Rs.29,41,012/- is concerned, the same pertains to
arrears of tariff revision for the period 2018-20.
f. That being so, a sizeable portion of the dues of the opposite party appear
to have been be taken care of. All the more so when the compensation
aspect pertaining to adjustment of harmonic distortion is also there
which cannot also be lost sight of at this stage.
g. Upon encashment of the Bank Guarantee, the security deposit in respect
of the petitioner’s supply has been depleted fully and has come to nil.
Therefore, the petitioner would be required to replenish the same so as
to enjoy restoration of supply to its Unit- II.
61. In view of the aforesaid, it is directed that the opposite party shall restore
supply to the petitioner immediately upon the petitioner furnishing security
deposit therefor in accordance with law.
62. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the legality or
validity or otherwise of the encashment of Bank Guarantee and the order
dated January 18, 2024 passed by the District Commission. All observations
made hereinabove for the purpose of granting restoration are tentative and
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prima facie. The State Commission shall decide the matter afresh, in
accordance with law, without being influenced by any of the observations
made hereinabove excepting those that have been made while concluding
that a single member Bench is coram non judice and that the order
impugned has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice.
63. C.O. 694 of 2026 stands disposed of with the above observations. No costs.
64. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
to the parties upon compliance of all formalities.
(Om Narayan Rai, J.)
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