Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Bharat Bhushan vs Rano Devi & Others on 12 February, 2026
Author: Javed Iqbal Wani
Bench: Javed Iqbal Wani
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND
LADAKH AT JAMMU
Reserved on: 11.12.2025
Pronounced on: 12.02.2026
Uploaded on: 13.02.2026
Whether operative part or
full judgment is
pronounced: Full
AA No.5/2025
CM Nos.3391/2025, 3972/2025, 6887/2025,
7045/2025,1898/2025, 1899/2025, 1900/2025,
7229/2025, 7230/2025 & 7469/2025
c/w
AA No.4/2025
CM Nos.3392/2025, 3969/2025, 6498/2025,
4268/2025,6886/2025, 7044/2025, 1895/2025,
1896/2025, 1897/2025, 7074/2025, 7076/2025,
7468/2025 & 2747/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024
CM Nos.153/2024, 4921/2024 & 7479/2025
THE HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
THROUGH ITS PROJECT DIRECTOR
BHARAT BHUSHAN
...PETITIONER(S)/APPELLANT(S)
Through: - Mr. Gagan Basotra, Sr. Advocate, with
Mr. Pawan Kumar Hans, Advocate.
Vs.
RANO DEVI & OTHERS
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
...RESPONDENT(S)
Through: - Mr. R. S. Thakur, Sr. Advocate, with Mr.
Vasharan Thakur, Advocate.
Mr. Aseem Kr. Sawhney, Sr. Advocate,
with Mr. Anil Kumar & Ms. Tehseena
Bukhari, Advocate.
Mr. Rajnish Raina, Sr. Advocate, with Mr.
Rishu Rajeshwar, Mr. Om Goswami & Mr.
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 1 of 35
Prabhat Sangotra, Advocates - for R41 &
188 (in AA No.4 & 5 of 2025) and with Mr.
Abid Khan, Advocate - for R-3, 33 & 87 (in
AA Nos.4 &/ 2025)
Mr. Sunil Sethi, Sr. Advocate with Mr.
Paras Gupta, Advocate.
Ms. Monika Kohli, Sr. AAG, with Ms.
Sagira Jafar, Advocate.
Mr. O. P. Thakur, Sr. Advocate, with Ms.
Anandita Thakur, Advocate.
Mr. Parveen Kapahi, Advocate.
Mr. Vinod Kotwal, Advocate.
Mr. Ajaz Chowdhary, Advocate.
Mr. Mohammad Latif Malik, Advocate,
with Ms. Bandhan Panotra, Advocate.
Mr. G. S. Thakur, Advocate.
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAVED IQBAL WANI, JUDGE
JUDGMENT
AA No.4/2025
AA No.5/2025
1) The issues involved in the instant appeals filed under
Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for
short “the Act of 1996”), are akin and analogous to each
other.
2) In AA No.4/2025, the National Highways Authority of
India (appellant herein) has challenged order dated
10.02.2025 (for short “the impugned order”) passed by the
Court of learned Principal District Judge, Reasi (hereinafter
for short “the court below”), in File No.04/2023 titled
“NHAI vs. Rano Devi & Ors.” whereby the application filed
by the appellant herein under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 2 of 35
seeking setting aside of the arbitral award dated
26.08.2023 has been dismissed.
3) In AA No.5/2025, the National Highways Authority of
India (appellant herein) has challenged order dated
10.02.2025 (for short “the impugned order”) passed by the
Court of learned Principal District Judge, Reasi (hereinafter
for short “the court below”), in File No.03/2023 titled “NHAI
vs. Rano Devi & Ors.” whereby application of the appellant
herein filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 seeking
consequential setting aside of the arbitral award dated
26.08.2023 has been dismissed.
FACTS:
AA No.4/2025: Brief Facts:
(i) The land measuring 181 Kanals and 11 Marlas (local),
situated at Village Kundrorian Tehsil Katra District
Reasi, belonging to the respondents herein and other
landowners, came to be acquired for construction of
Delhi-Ludhiana-Amritsar-Katra Expressway and
Notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the
National Highways Act, 1956 (for short, “the Act of
1956) were issued, resulting in vesting of the land in
the Central Government free from all encumbrances.
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 3 of 35
(ii) The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA)
under the Act of 1956, after considering the objections
filed pursuant to notice dated 09.07.2022, passed an
award dated 09.05.2022 under Section 3G(1) of the
Act of 1956, determining the compensation of the land
at the rate of Rs.59,79,263/ per local kanal for rural
areas and Rs.75,35,000/ per local kanal (commercial)
for urban areas.
(iii) Aggrieved of the said determination by the CALA, the
appellant invoked arbitration under Section 3G(5) of
the Act of 1956, while challenging the same, primarily,
on the grounds that the CALA had passed the award
without informing the appellant having taken into
consideration the selective sale deeds which
comprised of small pieces of land (less than 01 Kanal)
and had taken wrong average sale price, while
pleading further that the CALA recommended
payment of compensation at commercial rates for
agriculture land ignoring the fact that the conversion
of land from agricultural to commercial was without
prior permission of the Government.
(iv) The Divisional Commissioner, Jammu, being the
Statutory Arbitrator under the Act of 1956, after
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AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 4 of 35
hearing the parties and examining the material on
record, passed an arbitral award dated 26.08.2023,
whereby the market value of the land was re-assessed
and reduced to Rs.56,62,466/ per local kanal, while
referring to Section 26 of the Right to Fair
Compensation & Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short
“the Act of 2013”), observed that the CALA has
followed the provision of the Act of 1956 as also the
comprehensive guidelines dated 18.12.2017 issued by
the Ministry of Road Transport and Highway
(MoRTH), however, observed that the average sale
price from the sale deeds mentioned in the award
comes to Rs.56,62,466/ per local kanal, which was
required to be considered by the CALA as market
value. The Arbitrator, however, rejected the other
pleas raised by the appellant and consequently, the
Arbitrator set aside the award passed by the CALA
dated 05.09.2022 and its corrigendum dated
18.12.2022 to the limited extent with direction to the
CALA to pass fresh order by considering the market
value at Rs.56,62,466/ per local kanal.
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 5 of 35
(v) Consequent to the passing of aforesaid award by the
Arbitrator, the CALA passed a revised award dated
01.09.2023.
(vi) The appellant herein aggrieved of the same filed an
application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before
the Court of Principal District Judge, Reasi, seeking
setting aside of the arbitral award, primarily, on the
premise that the arbitral award was vague, perverse
and based on incorrect findings of law, hence void;
that the market rate of the land in question had been
fixed without considering the provisions of the Act of
2013; that the award was passed on hypothesis,
surmises and conjectures; that the Arbitrator simply
reduced the average cost per kanal of the land by
reducing the number of sale deeds in the original
award and added few sale deeds which were not
considered by CALA in the original award and that the
impugned was arbitrary and in conflict with the public
policy.
(vii) After considering the relevant provisions of the Act of
1956, the Act of 2013 as also the law regarding the
issue at hand, inasmuch as the scope of interference
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 6 of 35
provided under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, as also
the grounds urged by the appellant herein, the court
below dismissed the application vide order dated
10.02.2025, while observing that the compensation
awarded had been passed after determination of fair
market value of the acquired land by the Arbitrator
and that the sale deeds relied upon were duly
compared with the acquired land and that the
question of similarity was a pure question of fact duly
examined in the correct perspective with findings
neither perverse nor unreasonable and that the
market value of the land in question was determined
in accordance with the procedure prescribed for
assessment of adjoining lands and that the Act of
2013 does not mandate consideration of sale deeds
relating only to larger plots and that although the
acquired land adjoins Katra town and an express
finding on the multiplier would have been desirable,
the Arbitrator had impliedly accepted the multiplier of
two applied by the CALA for a rural area which was
never questioned or argued by the appellant herein
and that the revised award dated 01.09.2023 passed
by the CALA pursuant to the directions of the
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AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 7 of 35
Arbitrator constituted an arbitral award and that in
absence of any allegation of corruption, bias or
illegality, the award was not against public policy and
did not, as such, warrant interference, leading to the
dismissal of the application filed by the appellant
herein under Section 34 of the Act of 1996.
AA No.5/2025: Brief Facts:
i) Land measuring 236 Kanals 4 Marlas, situated at
Village Kundrorian, Tehsil Katra, District Reasi,
belonging to the respondents herein and other
landowners, came to be acquired for construction of
the Delhi-Ludhiana-Amritsar-Katra Expressway and
in this regard Notifications under Sections 3A and 3D
of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short, “the Act
of 1956) were issued, resulting in vesting of the land
in the Central Government free from all
encumbrances.
ii) The Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA)
under the Act of 1956, after considering the objections
filed pursuant to a notice issued in this regard, passed
an award dated 06.09.2022 under Section 3G(1) of the
Act of 1956, thereby determining the compensation at
the rate of Rs.59,79,263/- per local kanal and the
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 8 of 35
total compensation payable was worked atRs.584,32,65,707.00/-.
iii) Aggrieved by the aforesaid determination, the
appellant invoked arbitration under Section 3G(5) of
the Act of 1956, while challenging the same primarily,
on the grounds that the CALA had passed the award
without informing the appellant having taken into
consideration the selective sale deeds comprising of
small pieces of land (less than 01 kanal) and had
taken wrong average sale price and that the CALA
recommended payment of compensation at
commercial rates for agriculture land ignoring the fact
that the conversion of land from agricultural to
commercial was without prior permission of the
Government.
iv) The Statutory Authority under the Act of 1956, i.e.
Divisional Commissioner, Jammu, after hearing the
parties and examining the material on record, passed
an arbitral award dated 26.08.2023, whereby the
market value was reassessed and reduced to Rs.
56,62,466/- per local kanal, while referring to Section
26 of the Act of 2013, observed that the CALA has
followed the provisions of the Act of 1956 as also the
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 9 of 35
comprehensive guidelines dated 18.12.2017 (supra),
however, observed that the average sale price from the
sale deeds mentioned in the award was required to be
considered by the CALA as market value.
Consequently, the Arbitrator set aside the award
passed by the CALA dated 06.09.2022 and its
corrigendum dated 18.12.2022 to the limited extent
with direction to the CALA to pass fresh order by
considering the market value at Rs.56,62,466/ per
local kanal.
v) Consequent to the passing of aforesaid awarded by the
Arbitrator, the CALA passed a revised award dated
01.09.2023.
vi) Aggrieved of the revised award (supra), the appellant
herein filed an application under Section 34 of the Act
before the Principal District Judge, Reasi, seeking
setting aside of the arbitral award on similar and
identical grounds referred to above and after
considering the relevant provisions of the Acts of 1956
& 2013 as also the law regarding the issue at hand
and the scope of interference provided under Section
34 of the Act of 1996 as also the grounds urged by the
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 10 of 35
appellant herein, the said court below dismissed the
said application vide order dated 10.02.2025.
4) The grounds of challenge urged in AA No.5/2025 and
referred hereinabove being similar and identical to those
urged in AA No.4/2025, are not, for the sake of brevity,
being re-stated herein in order to avoid repetition.
5) Order dated 10.02.2025 passed by the court below is
the subject matter of challenge in the present appeals filed
by the appellant herein under Section 37 of the Act of 1996
and is impugned, inter-alia, on the following grounds that
the court below failed to exercise jurisdiction within the
limited scope of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, by
erroneously upholding the arbitral award, being perverse,
illegal, and contrary to the substantive provisions of the Act
of 2013 read with the Act of 1956, and that the Arbitrator
relied upon irrelevant and extraneous material collected by
CALA, without affording the appellant herein any effective
opportunity to lead evidence and instead adopted a
whimsical and arbitrary procedure in violation of settled
principles of arbitration and natural justice, while further
urging that the court below misapplied Section 26(1)(b) of
the Act of 2013 by approving reliance on sale deeds of small
plots for determination of compensation for irrigated and
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 11 of 35
non-irrigated land, despite statutory and notified
distinctions in rates, thereby committed an error going to
the root of the matter, contending further that the court
below impermissibly imported considerations of future
potential and principles under the repealed Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, ignoring the statutory scheme of the
Act of 2013, which already accounts for such factors
through multiplier and solatium, while additionally urging
that grave prejudice came to be suffered by the appellant
herein due to denial of opportunity to establish differential
land rates and non-consideration of binding precedents
relied upon, resulting in miscarriage of justice warranting
appellate interference by this Court.
Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the
record.
6) Mr. Gagan Basotra, Senior Advocate, appearing for the
appellant herein, while making his submissions in line and
tune with the case/s set up in the appeals in hand, would
vehemently argue that the arbitral award as also the
impugned orders are vitiated by serious illegality and
irregularity, as the Arbitrator relied upon sale deeds of
small pieces of land while determining compensation for
large tracts of land and failed to properly classify the land
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 12 of 35
in question as irrigated, non-irrigated or otherwise, and
also ignored applicable valuation guidelines. Mr. Basotra
would further contend that the award passed by the
Arbitrator is in violation of principles of natural justice, and
that the court below as well erred in upholding the award
in question without appreciating these infirmities.
7) On the contrary, the appearing counsels for the
respondents herein, while opposing the submissions of Mr.
Basotra, supported the award in question as also the
impugned orders and would submit that the Arbitrator has
passed the reasoned award after considering the entire
record, while insisting that the scope of interference under
Section 37 of the Act of 1996 is extremely limited and does
not permit re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of the
Court’s view for that of the Arbitrator, contending further
that the appellant herein participated throughout the
arbitral proceedings as also before the court below and
raised all pleas available to it and, thus, cannot be now
permitted to seek a second evaluation of facts under the
guise of perversity or patent illegality.
8) Before proceeding to advert to the merits of the rival
contentions of the appearing counsels for the parties as also
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 13 of 35
the issues involved in the case/s, it is deemed necessary
and appropriate to delineate the scope and ambit of an
appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996, which reads as
follows:
37. Appealable orders. – (1) An appeal shall lie from
the following orders (and from no others) to the
Court authorized by law to hear appeals from
original decrees of the Court passing the order,
namely:-
(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration
under section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure
under section 9:
(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an
arbitral award under section 34
(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of
the arbitral tribunal-
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section
(2) or sub-section (3) of section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim
measure under section 17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed
in appeal under this section, but nothing in this
section shall affect or take away any right to appeal
to the Supreme Court.
9) A reference hereunder to the law laid down by the
Apex Court qua the ambit and scope of Section 37 supra is
also deemed appropriate and imperative.
The Apex Court in case titled Konkan Railway
Corporation Limited Vs. Chenab Bridge Project
Undertaking reported in 2023 INSC 742, has held as
under:-
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 14 of 35
“14………….. At the outset, we may state that the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 37 of the
Act, as clarified by this Court in MMTC Ltd. Vs.
Vedanta Ltd., is akin to the jurisdiction of the
Court under Section 34 of the Act. Scope of
interference by a court in an appeal under Section
37 of the Act, in examining an order, setting aside
or refusing to set aside an award, is restricted and
subject to the same grounds as the challenge
under Section 34 of the Act.
15. Therefore, the scope of jurisdiction under Section
34 and Section 37 of the Act is not akin to normal
appellate jurisdiction. It is well-settled that courts
ought not to interfere with the arbitral award in a
casual and cavalier manner. The mere possibility of
an alternative view on facts or interpretation of the
contract does not entitle courts to reverse the
findings of the Arbitral Tribunal. In Dyna
Technologies Private Limited Crompton Greaves
Limited (2019) 20 SCC 1, this Court held:
“24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award
only on the grounds provided therein or as
interpreted by various courts. We need to be
cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards
should not be interfered with in a casual and
cavalier manner, unless the court comes to a
conclusion that the perversity of the award
goes to the root of the matter without there
being a possibility of alternative
interpretation which may sustain the arbitral
award. Section 34 is different in its approach
and cannot be equated with a normal
appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under
Section 34 is to respect the finality of the
arbitral award and the party autonomy to get
their dispute adjudicated by an alternative
forum as provided under the law. If the courts
were to interfere with the arbitral award in
the usual course on factual aspects, then the
commercial wisdom behind opting for
alternate dispute resolution would stand
frustrated.
25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments
of this Court have categorically held that theAA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 15 of 35
courts should not interfere with an award
merely because an alternative view on facts
and interpretation of contract exists. The
courts need to be cautious and should defer
to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even
if the reasoning provided in the award is
implied unless such award portrays perversity
unpardonable under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act.”
The Apex Court further in the case titled Haryana
Tourism Limited v. M/s Kandhari Beverages Ltd.
reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 38, has held as under:
“8. As per settled position of law laid down
by this Court in a catena of decisions, an
award can be set aside only if the award is
against the public policy of India. The
award can be set aside under Sections
34/37 of the Arbitration Act, if the award is
found to be contrary to, (a) fundamental
policy of Indian Law; or (b) the interest of
India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is
patently illegal……”
The Apex Court has also in the case titled Bombay
Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited vs
Samir Narain Bhojwani reported in 2024 INSC 478
observed as under:
15. We need not dwell on the limited
scope of the interference in the petition
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
That position is very well settled. However,
as far as the appeal under Section 37(1)(c)
of the Arbitration Act is concerned, in the
case of MMTC Limited v. Vedanta
Limited, in paragraph 14, this Court held
thus:
“14. As far as interference with an
order made under Section 34, as per
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Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be
disputed that such interference
under Section 37 cannot travel
beyond the restrictions laid down
under Section 34. In other words, the
court cannot undertake an
independent assessment of the
merits of the award, and must only
ascertain that the exercise of power
by the court under Section 34 has not
exceeded the scope of the provision.
Thus, it is evident that in case an
arbitral award has been confirmed by
the court under Section 34 and by the
court in an appeal under Section 37,
this Court must be extremely cautious
and slow to disturb such concurrent
findings.”
(emphasis added)
In another decision of this Court in the case of UHL. Power
Company Limited v. State of Himachal Pradesh, in paragraph 16, it
was held thus:
“16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on
courts under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act
is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope
of an appeal under Section 37 of the
Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an
appellate court in examining an order,
setting aside or refusing to set all the more
aside an award, is circumscribed. In MMTC
Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd.,
(2019) 4 SCC 163: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293), the
reasons for vesting such a limited jurisdiction
on the High Court in exercise of powers under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act have been
explained in the following words: (SCC pp.
16667, para 11)
“11. As far as Section 34 is concerned,
the position is well settled by now that
the Court does not sit in appeal over the
arbitral award and may interfere on
merits on the limited ground provided
under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 17 of 35
is against the public policy of India. As
per the legal position clarified through
decisions of this Court prior to the
amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a
violation of Indian public policy, in turn,
includes a violation of the fundamental
policy of Indian law, a violation of the
interest of India, conflict with justice or
morality, and the existence of patent
illegality in the arbitral award.
Additionally, the concept of the
“fundamental policy of Indian law” would
cover compliance with statutes and
judicial precedents, adopting a judicial
approach, compliance with the
principles of natural justice, and
Wednesbury [Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA))
reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent
illegality itself has been held to mean
contravention of the substantive law of
India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and
contravention of the terms of the
contract.”
(emphasis added)
In the decision of this Court in the case of Konkan Railway
Corporation Limited u. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking
3, in paragraph 18, it was held thus:
“18. At the outset, we may state that the
jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of the
Act, as clarified by this Court in MMTC Ltd. v.
Vedanta Ltd. [MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019)
4 SCC 163: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 293]. is akin to the
jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of the
Act. [Id, SCC p. 167, para 14:”14. As far as
interference with an order made under Section 34,
as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be
disputed that such interference under Section 37
cannot travel beyond the restrictions laid down
under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot
undertake an independent assessment of the
merits of the award, and must only ascertain thatAA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 18 of 35
the exercise of power by the court under Section
34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision.”]
Scope of interference by a court in an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act, in examining an
order, setting aside or refusing to set aside an
award, is restricted and subject to the same
grounds. challenge under Section 34 of the Act.”
(emphasis added)
What emanates from a closer reading of the aforesaid
provision and position of law, is that the Appellate Court
under Section 37 supra cannot re-appreciate the evidence,
re-evaluate factual findings or substitute its own view
merely because another view is possible and that the errors
of fact or erroneous appreciation of evidence by the
Arbitrator would not constitute valid grounds for
interference, unless such errors go to the root of the matter
and fall within the narrow category of patent illegality or
contravention of fundamental policy of Indian law.
10) From the above, thus, it can safely be concluded that
Section 37 of the Act of 1996 provides a limited statutory
right of appeal only against orders expressly enumerated
therein and does not per se confer a general or unrestricted
right of appeal against all orders arising out of arbitral
proceedings and that an appeal under Section 37 in not a
continuation of arbitral proceedings nor does it partake the
character of a regular first appeal and, therefore, the
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Appellate Court under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 would
not sit as a court of correction over the arbitral award as its
jurisdiction is supervisory and not appellate in the
conventional sense being essentially endorsed by the
legislative intent underlying Section 37 read with Section 5
of the Act of 1996, to ensure minimal judicial interference
in the arbitral matters and to preserve the finality of arbitral
awards.
It is also pertinent to note here that having regard to
the aforesaid position and principles of law that where an
appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996 is directed
against an order passed under Section 34 of the said Act,
the scope of scrutiny becomes even more circumscribed
requiring the Appellate Court to examine only whether the
court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act of
1996 has remained within the statutory confines provided
by the said Section, without independently reassessing the
arbitral award on merits.
It would also be significant to mention here that even
the grounds of public policy and patent illegality
enumerated under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 are to be
construed narrowly, in that, the Appellate Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act of 1996,
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is concerned not with whether it would have arrived at a
different conclusion, but with whether the court under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 has applied the correct legal
tests and exercised its discretion judiciously. In fact,
interference would be warranted only where the Court
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 has acted either in
excess of jurisdiction, ignored settled principles of law or
rendered a decision that is manifestly perverse.
It is also relevant to mention here that, in essence, an
appeal under Section 37of the Act of 1996 is not a second
opportunity provided to a party to assail the arbitral award
on merits. Rather it is a limited remedy designed to correct
jurisdictional or legal errors committed by a Court
exercising power under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and
not to provide a forum for rehearing or re-adjudication of
the arbitral dispute.
11) Keeping in mind the aforesaid position and principles
of law and reverting back to the case/s in hand, perusal of
the arbitral award dated 26.08.2023 tends to show that the
Arbitrator has considered the sale deeds relied upon by the
CALA, examined the average rates and thereafter
reassessed the market value and has, in fact, reduced the
compensation determined by the CALA, which by itself
AA No.5/2025 c/w
AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 21 of 35
belies the contention of the appellant herein that award is
based on irrelevant or extraneous considerations. The plea
of the appellant herein that the sale deeds of small parcels
of land in questions were impermissibly relied upon is a
matter which squarely falls within the domain of
appreciation of evidence and a closer examination of the
record reveals that the Arbitrator has recorded reasons for
adopting the methodology used, having regard to the
location, surrounding development and potential of the
acquired land in question.
12) The next contention of the appellant herein regarding
denial of opportunity by the court/forums below is also
found to be any without any substance, in that, the record
available on the files reflect that the appellant herein has
duly participated in the arbitral proceedings, filed pleadings
and submissions and raised objections to the valuation
methodology and, therefore, in this view of the matter, mere
dissatisfaction with the outcome by the court/forums below
cannot be equated or by any sense of imagination said to
be violation of the principles of natural justice.
13) Further examination and perusal of the record tends
to show that the court below has meticulously examined
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 22 of 35
each ground urged by the appellant herein in the
application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and
has rightly held that none of the grounds fall within the
grounds enumerated in the said Section, being patent
illegality or public policy. Even before this Court the
appellant herein has failed to specifically plead or
demonstrate as to what particular perversity, illegality or
jurisdictional error has been committed by the court below.
Instead, perusal of the impugned orders reflect correct
appreciation of the law laid down by the Apex Court by the
court below in the matter and the impugned orders are
found to be well-reasoned and in tune and consonance with
law, without there being any perversity, illegality or
jurisdictional error warranting interference under Section
37 of the Act of 1996 in the instant appeals by this Court
on account of mere omnibus or vague assertions that the
impugned orders suffer from perversity or illegality, without
pinpointing the precise error or else demonstrating how the
statutory limits of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 have been
transgressed and, therefore, in absence of any specific
pleadings disclosing the precise perversity or illegality
alleged, the instant appeals under Section 37 of the Act of
1996 cannot be sustained on such general or
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AA No.4/2025
WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 23 of 35
unsubstantiated assertions and, thus, the instant appeals,
in essence, cannot, but said to be, an attempt to secure a
re-appreciation of facts and evidence, which is
impermissible in law.
14) For what has been observed, considered and analyzed
hereinabove, the instant appeals are found to be devoid of
any merit and are, accordingly, dismissed, as a
consequence whereof, orders dated 10.02.2025 passed by
the learned Principal District Judge, Reasi, dismissing the
application(s) under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 filed by
the appellant herein, are upheld.
15) The record be sent back.
CM Nos.3392/2025, 3969/2025, 6498/2025, 6886/2025,
1895/2025, 1896/2025, 1897/2025, 7074/2025,
7076/2025, 7468/2025 & 2747/2025 in AA No.4/2024
Having regard to the issues involved in the instant
applications, the determination of the same is left open to
be adjudicated upon by the appropriate court/forums and
in this regard the parties shall be free to approach the
concerned court/forums.
CM Nos.3972/2025, 6887/2025, 7045/ 2025,1898/2025,
1899/2025, 1900/2025, 7229/2025, 7230/2025 &
7469/2025 in AA No.5/2025:
Having regard to the issues involved in the instant
applications, the determination of the same is left open to
AA No.5/2025 c/w
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 24 of 35
be adjudicated upon by the appropriate court/forums andin this regard the parties shall be free to approach the
concerned court/forums.
WP(c) No. 82/2024
1) The petitioner, in the instant petition filed under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeks enforcement
of a statutory award dated 01.09.2023 passed under
Section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short
Act of 1956), revised pursuant to arbitral award dated
26.08.2023 under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956, besides
seeking a direction against the respondents to disburse
compensation together with all statutory components and
interest in respect of land measuring 03 Kanals 06 Marlas
covered under Khasra No.213-min situated at Village
Kundrorian, District Reasi, having acquired title through
registered sale deeds in the year 2013 and since then
reflected in the relevant revenue records, which land has
been acquired by the respondents for the National Highway
project being Construction, Maintenance and Operation of
Delhi-Ludhiana-Amritsar-Katra Expressway notified under
Sections 3A and 3D of the Act of 1956 culminating into the
acquisition of the land in question along with other
adjoining land.
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 25 of 35
2) An award dated 05.09.2022 came to be passed by the
Competent Authority (CALA) in terms of Section 3G(1) of the
Act of 1956 wherein the rate of the land in question was
fixed at Rs.59,79,2631/- per local kanal in rural areas.
Aggrieved whereof, the executing agency, namely the
National Highways Authority of India (for short “NHAI”),
respondents 1 to 3 herein, assailed the said award before
the Arbitrator being the Divisional Commissioner, Jammu,
in terms of Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956, whereupon, the
said Arbitrator in terms of arbitral award dated 26.08.2023,
reduced the rate of land in question to Rs. 56,62,4661/-
per local kanal of land and directed revision of the award
by the CALA, in furtherance whereof, the CALA passed a
revised award dated 01.09.2023, pertaining to various
landowners including the petitioner herein mentioned in
the apportionment statement and the compensation
payable towards the acquired land duly quantified.
3) The grievance projected by the petitioner in the instant
petition is that despite the revised award dated 01.09.2023
having attained finality for not having been thrown
challenge to by the respondents herein, the compensation
qua the said land has not been deposited nor disbursed in
favour of the petitioner in clear violation of Section 3H of
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 26 of 35
the Act of 1956 and the National Highways (Manner of
Depositing the Amount by the Central Government; Making
Requisite Funds Available to the Competent Authority for
Acquisition of Land) Rules, 2019 (for short ‘the Rules of
2019).
4) Reply to the petition has been filed by the
respondents, wherein the petition is being opposed on the
premise that respondent 3 herein vide letter dated
27.12.2023 intimated the Competent Authority/
respondent No.4 herein about the revised award under
Section 3G of the Act of 1956 and the deposition of the
compensation “under protest” and that it is respondent
who has to raise the demand of award after furnishing
details of the landholders/beneficiaries on the Bhoomi
Rashi e-Portal of the Ministry of Road Transport and
Highways and that the arbitral award dated 26.08.2023
and revised award dated 01.09.2023 has been challenged
under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the Court of
Principal District Judge, Reasi.
5) Respondent No.4 has also filed reply to the petition,
wherein, after giving the factual background, it is stated
that the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996
filed by the respondent 3-NHAI stands dismissed by the
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 27 of 35
Court of Principal District Judge, Reasi, vide judgment and
order dated 10.02.2025 and that consequently the
respondent 4 has initiated the process of disbursement of
the compensation amount to the land owners and has, vide
letter dated 17.03.2025, requested the Sub Divisional
Magistrate, Katra, to submit the account details of all the
land owners.
6) During the pendency of the instant petition,
respondent 3 & 4 have filed a supplementary affidavit,
wherein it has been stated that after dismissal of the
application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 by the Court
of Principal District Judge, Reasi, vide judgment and order
dated 10.02.2025, respondent 3-NHAl has, vide
communication dated 23.03.2025, asked the respondent 4
to de-notify the land mentioned therein in the said
communication, which includes the land of the petitioner
herein as well, for the reasons stated therein.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
record of the case.
7) Before adverting to the merits of the case at hand, it
would be advantageous to refer hereunder to the provisions
of Section 3G and 3H of the Act of 1956:
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 28 of 35
3G.Determination of amount payable as
compensation.–(1) Where any land is acquired under
this Act, there shall be paid an amount which shall be
determined by an order of the competent authority.
(2) Where the right of user or any right in the nature of
an easement on, any land is acquired under this Act,
there shall be paid an amount to the owner and any
other person whose right of enjoyment in that land has
been affected in any manner whatsoever by reason of
such acquisition an amount calculated at ten per cent,
of the amount determined under sub-section (1), for
that land.
(3) Before proceeding to determine the amount under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the competent
authority shall give a public notice published in two
local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular
language inviting claims from all persons interested in
the land to be acquired.
(4) Such notice shall state the particulars of the land
and shall require all persons interested in such land to
appear in person or by an agent or by a legal
practitioner referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3C,
before the competent authority, at a time and place
and to state the nature of their respective interest in
such land.
(5) If the amount determined by the competent
authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not
acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall,
on an application by either of the parties, be
determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the
Central Government–
(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of
1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.
(7) The competent authority or the arbitrator while
determining the amount under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (5), as the case may be, shall take into
consideration–
(a)the market value of the land on the
date of publication of the notification under
section 3A;
(b) the damage, if any, sustained by the
person interested at the time of taking
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 29 of 35
possession of the land, by reason of the severing
of such land from other land;
(c) the damage, if any, sustained by the
person interested at the time of taking
possession of the land, by reason of the
acquisition injuriously affecting his other
immovable property in any manner, or his
earnings;
(d) if, in consequences of the acquisition
of the land, the person interested is compelled
to change his residence or place of business, the
reasonable expenses, if any, incidental to such
change.
3H. Deposit and payment of amount.–(1) The amount
determined under section 3G shall be deposited by the
Central Government in such manner as may be laid
down by rules made in this behalf by that Government,
with the competent authority before taking possession
of the land.
(2) As soon as may be after the amount has been
deposited under sub-section (1), the competent
authority shall on behalf of the Central Government
pay the amount to the person or persons entitled
thereto.
(3) Where several persons claim to be
interested in the amount deposited under sub-section
(1), the competent authority shall determine the
persons who in its opinion are entitled to receive the
amount payable to each of them.
(4) If any dispute arises as to the apportionment
of the amount or any part thereof or to any person to
whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the
competent authority shall refer the dispute to the
decision of the principal civil court of original
jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the
land is situated.
(5) Where the amount determined under
section 3G by the arbitrator is in excess of the amount
determined by the competent authority, the arbitrator
may award interest at nine per cent, per annum on
such excess amount from the date of taking possession
under section 3D till the date of the actual deposit
thereof.
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 30 of 35
(6)Where the amount determined by the
arbitrator is in excess of the amount determined by the
competent authority, the excess amount together with
interest, if any, awarded under sub-section (5) shall be
deposited by the Central Government in such manner
as may be laid down by rules made in this behalf by that
Government, with the competent authority and the
provisions of subsections (2) to (4) shall apply to such
deposit.
What emanates from the plain reading of Section 3G
supra is that the same constitutes a self-contained
statutory mechanism for determination of amount payable
as compensation for land acquired under the Act. Sub-
section (1) of the said Section mandates that where land is
acquired, the amount payable shall be determined by the
Competent Authority having due regard to the factors
specified therein including the market value of the land on
the date of publication of the notification under Section 3A
and in the event of disagreement with such determination,
sub-section (5) provides a statutory right to seek reference
to arbitration, whereupon the Arbitrator appointed by the
Central Government is empowered to adjudicate upon the
quantum of compensation and the determination made by
the Arbitrator under Section 3G (5) attains the status of a
statutory adjudication becoming binding upon the parties,
subject only to challenge on the limited grounds available
under the Act of 1996.
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 31 of 35
Thus, what emerges from the above is that the scheme
of Section 3G ensures a balance between expeditious
acquisition of land for public purposes and fair, just and
reasonable compensation to the landowners/ holders, while
consciously restricting judicial interference beyond the
statutory framework. It also emanates from the above that
the statutory obligation under Section 3H of the Act casts a
duty upon the Central Government to deposit the amount
determined under Section 3G while sub-section (2)
obligates the Competent Authority to disburse the amount
of compensation to the persons entitled. The Rules of 2019
(supra) as well operationalize this mandate by prescribing
the mode and manner in which the compensation funds are
to be made available and disbursed.
8) As record tends to show that since the respondent 3-
NHAI was availing the statutory remedy of Section 34, as
provided for in Section 3G of the said Act, therefore, the
respondents cannot be said to have breached the provisions
of the Act so far as the same relate to deposition of the
compensation or payment thereof. Since now the said
remedy under Section 34 availed by respondent 3 herein
and the appeals thereafter filed under Section 37 of the Act
of 1996 by the said respondent 3 herein stand dismissed
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 32 of 35
above, therefore, the respondent 3-NHAI is bound to
compensate the petitioner qua the land in question.
However, the plea which now requires consideration raised
by the respondent No.3-NHAI is regarding de-
notification/de-scoping of a portion of the acquired land,
record available on the file reveals that during the pendency
of proceedings, the executing agency referred to subsequent
project realignment on account of overlapping of the railway
tunnel with the Expressway alignment and addressed
communications inter se seeking de-notification of certain
parcels of land on the ground that the same had become
infructuous for the project.
The aforesaid plea urged by the respondents, however,
is unacceptable while relying upon subsequent
communication as it is aimed at to defeat the petitioner’s
accrued right of receiving compensation for the land in
question, for the reason that there is no provision in the Act
of 1956 providing for de-notifying of the land for which
acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1956 have been
initiated and the same had already culminated into vesting
of land in the Central Government under Section 3D of the
Act of 1956 and permitting the respondents to withhold
payment of compensation to the petitioner herein on the
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 33 of 35
strength of a proposed or contemplated de-notification
would result in grave prejudice to the petitioner herein and,
in essence, would amount to allowing the respondents to
enjoy the benefit of acquisition without bearing its statutory
burden. In law, such a course is impermissible and
contrary to the scheme of the Act of 1956 as well as the
constitutional provisions contained in Article 300A.
9) In view of the aforesaid analysis, the only inescapable
conclusion that could be drawn is that the denial of
compensation to the petitioner herein by the respondents
herein qua land in question, after having vested in the
Central Government, is illegal and violative of the Act of
1956 as also infringement of Article 300A of the
Constitution, in that, the petitioner herein has established
a clear legal right qua the land in question and receipt of
compensation thereof and the respondents herein having
failed to discharge a corresponding statutory duty in this
regard.
10) For what has been observed, considered and analyzed
hereinabove, the instant petition succeeds and as a
consequence whereof, the respondents herein are directed
to disburse the amount of compensation in favour of the
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 34 of 35
petitioner herein qua the land measuring 03 kanals 06
marlas under Khasra No.213-min situated at Village
Kundrorian District Reasi, within a period of two months
from the date a certified copy of this judgment is served
upon the respondents herein, failing which the
compensation amount shall be payable with interest @12%
per annum from the date of award till its final realization.
(Javed Iqbal Wani)
Judge
Srinagar
12.02.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the Judgment is speaking: Yes
Whether the judgment is reportable: YesAA No.5/2025 c/w
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WP(C) No.82/2024 Page 35 of 35