Bharani Venkat Karthik, vs The State Of Telangana, on 10 July, 2025

Telangana High Court

Bharani Venkat Karthik, vs The State Of Telangana, on 10 July, 2025

 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E. V. VENUGOPAL
        CRIMINAL PETITION No.1896 of 2025


ORDER:

The present criminal petition is filed under Section 528 of

BNSS, seeking to quash the proceedings against the

petitioner/accused in Crime No.31 of 2025, on the file of Police

Station, Bhadrachalam Town, Bhadradri Kothagudem District,

registered for the offences under Section 69 of BNS.

2. The petitioner herein is the accused and respondent No.2

herein is the complainant before the trial Court. For the sake of

convenience hereinafter parties are referred to as accused and the

complainant.

3. The brief facts of the case are that the complainant lodged a

complaint against the accused stating that she was separated

with her husband over family disputes and living at YSR colony,

Bhadrachalam along with her son and to proceed legally against

her husband, the complainant approached the accused, who is an

advocate believed her to take-up case and to do justice and took

advantage as she is separated from her husband and living alone,

saying deceitful words to her by making false promises to marry,

took her to his house at Medical colony, Bhadrachalam in the

temporary absence of his parents and sexually participated with
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her several times with her consent and coexistence with her.

When the complainant got pregnant and asked the accused about

marriage, the accused refused to marry her and threatened her to

got aborted the pregnancy, if not, he will post all her pictures in

social media. Hence, the complainant lodged a complaint against

the accused.

4. On receipt of the said complaint, the Inspector of Police,

Bhadrachalam Town, Bhadradri Kothagudem, registered a case in

Crime No.31 of 2025, under Sections 69 of BNS.

5. Heard Sri V.Raghunath, learned Senior Counsel

representing Sri S.M.Rizwan Akhtar, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Sri B.Srinivas Rao, learned counsel for respondent

No.2 and E.Ganesh, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor

appearing for respondent No.1-State and perused the record.

6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner

contended that respondent No.2 is a married woman, got married

in the year 2012, thereafter, disputes arose between her and her

husband, she left the conjugal society of her husband and started

living separately with her son. Respondent No.2 voluntarily

engaged in the sexual intercourse with the petitioner. Except

stating that she became pregnant in the year 2023 and
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subsequently in the year 2024, no details were furnished in the

said complaint. The facts of the case do not attract the provision

under Section 69 of BNS.

7. To support his case, learned counsel relied on the catena of

judgments, which reads as under:

7.1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of XXXX vs.

State of Maharashtra 1 observed the following, while quashing the

FIR registered under Section 376(n) and 506 of IPC, under similar

facts and circumstances. The relevant portion reads as under:

12. In any case, even on the dates when the complainant
alleges that the parties had physical relations, she was already
married. She falsely claimed that divorce from her earlier marriage
took place…… It is not a case where the complainant was of an
immature age who could not foresee her welfare and take right
decision. She was a grown up lady about ten year elder to the
appellant. She was matured and intelligent enough to understand
the consequences of the moral and immoral acts for which she
consented during subsistence of her earlier marriage. In fact, it
was a case of betraying her husband.

7.2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of XXX vs.

State of Maharashtra 2 held as under:

22. Applying the said proposition of law to the present case,
the Respondent No. 2 herself has stated in her complaint that
while her marriage was in subsistence, she has indulged in
physical relationship with the Petitioner and she on her own has
left him on ground of infidelity. Hence, the case of the Petitioner is

1
(2024) 3 SCC 496
2
(2024) SCC OLine Bom 3645 496
4

fully covered by the prepositions of the law as laid by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of
Maharashtra (supra).

23. Yet in another decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of
Naim ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 Live Law (SC) 66: (2023)
1 SCR 1061, a view has been taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court
with the facts similar to that of present Petition, wherein the
prosecutrix was a married woman and a mother of three children,
who engaged in physical relationship with the accused, later on
accusing him of rape. She had also gone to stay with the accused
during the subsistence of marriage with her husband. In the facts
of this case only when the some dispute arose between the
accused and the prosecutrix, she filed complaint alleging him
commission of rape within the meaning of Section 375 of the IPC.

In the facts of this case it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court
that, on the background of the fact that she had resided with the
accused during the subsistence of her marriage leaving her
husband, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix had given her
consent for sexual relationship with Appellant so as to hold
Appellant under the misconception of fact guilty for having
committed rape within the meaning of Section 357 of IPC.

7.3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Naim

Ahmed vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 3, which has extensively dealt

with the issue of a married woman engaging in sexual relation

with third person on the alleged false promise of marriage, and

acquitted the accused therein. The relevant portion reads as

under:

22. In the instant case, the prosecutrix who herself was a
married woman having three children, could not be said to have
acted finder the alleged false promise given by the appellant or
under the misconception of fact while giving the consent to have
sexual relationship with the appellant Undisputedly, she continued
to have such relationship with hint at least for about five years till

3
(2023) 15 SCC 385
5

she gave complaint in the year 2015. Even if the allegations made
by her in her deposition before the courts are taken on their face
value, then also to construe such allegations as rape by the
appellant, would be stretching the case too far. The prosecutrix
being a married woman and the mother of three children was
matured and intelligent enough to understand the significance and
the consequences of the moral or immoral quality of act she was
consenting to. Even otherwise, her entire conduct during the course
of such relationship with the accused, is closely seen, it appears
that she had betrayed her husband and three children by having
relationship with the accused, for whom she had developed liking
for him. She had gone to stay with him during the subsistence of
her marriage with her husband, to live a better life with the
accused. Till the time she was impregnated by the accused in the
year 2011, and she gave birth to a male child through the loin of
the accused, she did not have any complaint against the accused
of he having given false promise to marry her or having cheated
her. She also visited the native place of the accused in the year
2012 and came to know that he was a married man having
children also still she continued to live with the accused at another
premises without any grievance. She even obtained divorce from
her husband by mutual consent in 2014, leaving her three children
with her husband. It was only in the year 2015 when some
disputes must have taken place between them, that she fled the
present complaint. The accused in his further statement recorded
Section 313 Cr.P.C had stated that she had filed the complaint as
he refused to fulfil her demand to pay her huge amount. Thus,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could
not be said by any stretch of imagination that the prosecutrix had
given her consent for the sexual relationship with the appellant
under the misconception of fact, so as to hold the appellant guilty
of having committed rape within the meaning of Section 375 I.P.C.

23. In that view of the matter, the accused deserves to be quitted
from the charges levelled against him. Of course, the direction for
payment of compensation given by the courts below shall remain
unchanged as the appellant had accepted the responsibility of the
child, and has also paid the amount of compensation to the
prosecutrix.

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7.4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Davendra

vs. State of Maharashtra, through Police Station Officer and

another 4, reads as under:

12. Indisputably, the marriage of non-applicant no. 2 is still in
subsistence. If that is so, the question of making the promise of
marriage by the applicant does not arise. Further, perusal of F.I.R.

shows that the alleged promise of marriage was not given before
committing of the sexual acts by the applicant, it is stated to have
been given by the applicant after physical relations were
established. Thus, the alleged promise of marriage was not having
direct nexus to non-applicant No. 2’s decision to engage in the
initial sexual intercourse with the applicant. In view of this, the
consent was not vitiated by a “misconception of fact” as has been
held in case of Pramod Pawar (supra). That apart, it seems that
from 30/09/2017 onwards, there were various instances of sexual
intercourse between the applicant and non-applicant No. 2 without
any fuss. This continued for a considerable time and almost after
more than four years, non-applicant No. 2 decided to register F.I.R.
Non-applicant no. 2 is a married woman and her marriage is still in
subsistence. Non-applicant no. 2 was aware that there exists
obstacle in marrying with the applicant. Having earlier marriage in
subsistence and also having tanagers children, still she continued
to engage herself in sexual relations. All these factums lead to a
conclusion that the alleged story of promise of marriage is
inherently improbable.

14. In the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), the Apex Court, in paragraph
102 of the judgment gave categories of cases by way of
illustration, wherein power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers of given under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, which read thus:

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.

4

2022 SCC OnLine Bom 7364
7

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient around for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of
the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance
of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

15. The case of the applicant is covered in guideline Nos. (1) and
(5) mentioned in paragraph 102 in the judgment of Bhajan Lal
(supra). In view thereof, we find that registration of F.I.R. in the
present case is abuse of criminal process. The application,
therefore, deserves to be allowed.

8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.2 would contend that respondent No.2 is a married
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women and having one son. She approached the petitioner with

clean hands for obtaining divorce from her husband. Taking the

same as advantage, the petitioner with a maladife intention made

false promise to respondent No.2 stating that he will marry

respondent No.2 after obtaining divorce and had physical

relationship with her. Due to which, respondent No.2 became

pregnant in the year 2023, petitioner forcibly aborted her

pregnancy. Later, in the year 2024, respondent No.2 became

pregnant. When respondent No.2 asked the petitioner about the

marriage, he threatened her with dire consequences.

9. Learned counsel further contended that the judgments

relied upon by the petitioners are not applicable to the present

case. The respondent-police have rightly and appropriately

imposed Section 69 of BNS. The truth or otherwise would be

revealed only after full-fledged trial. Hence seeks to dismiss the

present criminal petition

Section 69 of BNS, reads as under:

Sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means, etc.

Whoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry
a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, and has
sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting
to the offence of rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years and
shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation: “deceitful means” shall include the false
promise of employment or promotion, inducement or marring after
suppressing identity.

10. Per contra, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor

vehemently contended that that the crime is at the investigation

stage and interference of this Court at this stage is unwarranted.

Due to stay in operation, the investigation could not carry on.

Unless and until full-fledged trial is conducted by examining the

evidence and facts before it, truth will not be elicited. Hence

seeks to dismiss this criminal petition.

11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of (1) Pramod

another 5, which has extensively dealt with the issue of sexual

relationship established between the complainant and the

accused on multiple occasions – complainant was aware of

obstacles. The relevant portion reads as under:

11. The primary contention advanced by the complainant
is that the appellant engaged in sexual relations with her on the
false promise of marrying her, and therefore her “consent”, being
premised on a “misconception of fact” (the promise to marry),
stands vitiated.

12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with
respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active
understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences
of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice

5
(2019) 9 SCC 608
10

to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as
well as the various possible consequences flowing from such
action or inaction, consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Sonar
which was a case involving the invoking of the jurisdiction under
Section 482, this Court observed:

“15. An inference as to consent can be drawn if
only based on evidence or probabilities of the case.
“Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason
coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in
mind of a person to permit the doing of the act
complained of.”

This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of
this Court in Kaini Rajan v State of Kerala8:

“12. … “Consent”, for the purpose of Section
375, requires voluntary participation not only after
the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge
of the significance of the moral quality of the act but
after having fully exercised the choice between
resistance and asset. Whether there was consent or
not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of
all relevant circumstances.”

14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged
by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her.
Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has
observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given
on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the
breach of a promise which is made in good faith but
subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v State of
Chhattisgarh, this Court held:

“37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid
decisions would be that if it is established and
proved that from the inception the accused who gave
the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have
any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the
consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance
by the accused that he would marry her, such a
consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a
misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC
and, in such a case, such a consent would not
excuse the offender and such an offender can be
said to have committed the rape as defined under
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Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the
offence under Section 376 of the IPC.”

Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v
State of Haryana (“Deepak Gulati“):

“21. … There is a distinction between the mere
breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused…”

16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention
of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to
abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in
sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates
the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise,
the maker of the promise should have had no intention of
upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a
woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
“misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis
for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this
Court observed:

“21. … There is a distinction between the mere
breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false
promise. Thus, the court must examine whether
there was made, at an early stage a false promise of
marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence.
There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to
have sexual intercourse on account of her love and
passion for the accused, and not solely on account of
circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry
her, despite having every intention to do so. Such
cases must be treated differently.

…

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be
adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time
i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no
intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
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marry the victim. There may, of course, be
circumstances, when a person having the best of
intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to
various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to
keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very
clear from the evidence available, does not always
amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term “misconception of
fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”.

Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and
fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court
is assured of the fact that from the very beginning,
the accused had never really intended to marry her.”

18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section
375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the
proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by
a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two
propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must
have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no
intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false
promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct
nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.

(2) Amol Bhagwan Nehul vs. The State of Maharashtra

and another 6 which has dealt with a consensual relationship

turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for

invoking criminal machinery of the State. The relevant paras

reads as under:

9. In our considered view, this is also not a case where there was
a false promise to marry to begin with. A consensual relationship
turning sour or partners becoming distant cannot be a ground for
invoking criminal machinery of the State. Such conduct not only
burdens the Courts, but blots the identity of an individual

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2025 SCC OnLine SC 1230
13

accused of such a heinous offence. This Court has time and again
warned against the misuse of the provisions, and has termed it a
folly3 to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise
and prosecute a person for an offence under section 376 IPC.

12. Having regard to the submissions made by all the parties

and upon considering the judgments relied upon by the

petitioners, this Court is of the opinion that respondent No.2 has

admitted that she was married and having one child and she had

approached the petitioner to help her for obtaining divorce from

her husband. Later on, respondent No.2 voluntarily involved in

the sexual intercourse with the petitioner that does not amount to

rape. Therefore, the said section does not apply to the facts of the

present case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of XXXX

vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) has rightly held that the

complainant was a married lady having a son and claiming that

she is in physical relations with the accused with her own

consent. There could not be any question of promise to marry

given by the appellant to her at that stage and continuation of

proceedings against the petitioner herein is nothing but an abuse

of process of law and hence, the proceedings are liable to be

quashed.

13. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the

proceedings against the petitioner in Crime No.31 of 2025, on the

file of Police Station, Bhadrachalam Town, Bhadradri Kothagudem
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District, registered for the offences under Section 69 of BNS is

hereby quashed.

Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.

____________________________
JUSTICE E.V.VENUGOPAL
Dated: 10.07.2025
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