Delhi High Court
Benetton India Pvt Ltd vs Gini And Jony Ltd on 26 February, 2026
Author: Jasmeet Singh
Bench: Jasmeet Singh
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on:10.11.2025
Judgment pronounced on:26 .02.2026
+ ARB. P. 1035/2024
BENETTON INDIA PVT LTD ....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vinam Gupta, Ms. Pragya Narayan,
Ms. Nabam Yama, Advs.
versus
GINI AND JONY LTD ....Respondent
Through: Ms. Renuka Sahu, Mr. Shivam Singh,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”), seeking directions for the
appointment of a Sole Arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the
parties arising out of a Distribution Agreement dated 01.08.2014 and
Settlement Agreements dated 29.06.2016, 01.10.2019 and 29.12.2020 due
to the failure of the parties to mutually appoint an Arbitrator within a
period of 30 days.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. The petitioner herein, Benetton India Private Limited, incorporated under
the Companies Act, 1956,is a subsidiary of Italy based Benetton Group,
known fashion company in the world and is engaged in a business of
manufacturing, distributing and sale of apparel and accessories in India.
3. The respondent is a company incorporated under Companies Act, 1956
and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and distribution of
textiles apparels and luxury goods.
4. The parties entered into a Distribution Agreement (“DA”) dated
01.08.2014. Under the said DA the petitioner had appointed the
respondent as its distributor to sell and distribute products under the
brand, interalia, United Colors of Benetton and any other brand owned
by the petitioner company through the respondent owned multi brand
retail outlets which were located in different locations across India.
5. In terms of the DA, the petitioner supplied the products and raised
invoices against each supply. As per General Conditions of Sale, as
specified in Clause 10 of Schedule I of the DA, the respondent was bound
to make payments against the invoices raised.
6. The respondent failed to make payments as per the invoices raised,
thereby failing to discharge the liability under the DA to the tune of Rs.
8,97,57,566/- Crores along with the interest rate of 2% per month on the
unpaid amount.
7. The parties, thereafter, agreed to extend the payment deadlines and thus
entered into various Settlement Agreements (“SA”), the details of which
are as follows:
a. SA 1 dated 29.06.2016 for an outstanding amount of Rs. 8,97,57,566/-
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Crores to the petitioner
b. SA 2 dated 01.10.2019 for an outstanding amount of Rs. 3,91,81,453/-
Crores
c. SA 3 dated 29.12.2020 for an outstanding amount of Rs. 2,70,81,454/-
Crores
8. Despite the repayment schedule as per SA 3, a sum of Rs. 96,21,454/-
Lakhs remained due and payable. In furtherance of the default made by
the respondent, the petitioner issued a demand notice dated 09.02.2024
for the release of outstanding amount of Rs. 96,21,454/- Lakhs.
9. Since the respondent failed to clear the outstanding amount, the petitioner
issued a legal notice dated 14.03.2024, invoking arbitration and called
upon the respondent to mutually appoint an Arbitrator in terms of Clause
No. 10 (j) of the DA. The Clause No. 10 (j) reads as under:
“10. GENERAL PROVISIONS:
….
(j) In the event of any difference, dispute, claim or question
arising out of this Agreement or touching any matter or
thing, hereunder during, the continuance of this Agreement
or upon or after the termination thereof, such difference or
dispute shall be referred to arbitration in New Delhi, to the
arbitration of a sole Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by
the Parties to the difference or dispute who shall be retired
Judge of High Court. In the event the Parties are not
mutually agreeable to such appointment, one arbitrator
shall be nominated by both the Parties and such two (2)
arbitrators shall jointly nominate the third arbitrator whoseDigitally Signed
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decision shall be binding on the Parties.This reference shall
be deemed to be a submission to the Arbitration within the
meaning of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and
all the provision of that Act so far as applicable or of any
Act of legislature of the time being in force and passed any
modification thereof shall apply to every reference
hereunder. Any suit, reference or other filing permitted or
required to be made pursuant to the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 in respect of matters arising out of
this agreement shall be instituted only in competent courts
at New Delhi, which are competent courts to hear disputes
arising out of this Agreement and parties specifically agree
to exclude the jurisdiction of any competent court. All
proceedings of arbitration shall take place in English
language and held in New Delhi only. Subject to the
foregoing, the courts at New Delhi shall have jurisdiction.”
10. On 19.04.2024 the respondent paid Rs. 5,00,000/-, however, a sum of Rs.
91,21,454/- Lakhs remained unpaid and parties have failed to mutually
agree upon the appointment an Arbitrator in terms of the arbitration
clause of the DA. Hence, the present petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
11. Mr. Vinam Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the
respondent does not dispute either the execution of the DA or the
existence of the arbitration clause contained in Clause No. 10 (j) thereof.
Thus, the petition satisfies the “prima facie” or “first look” test with
regard to the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. In view of the
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doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, he urges that the dispute be referred to
the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator must be permitted to rule upon its own
jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court in Sanjiv Prakash v. Seema Kukreja, (2021) 9 SCC 732
12. Learned counsel further places reliance on Vidya Drolia v. Durga
Trading Corpn.,(2021) 2 SCC 1 and reiterates his reliance on Sanjiv
Prakash (Supra), to submit that issues relating to the formation,
existence, validity of the contract, as well as questions of non-
arbitrability, are often intertwined with the merits of the dispute. He
contends that such issues involve disputed questions of fact and law
which fall within the domain of the Arbitrator. Reliance is also placed on
BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India)(P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738 to contend
that the Court may refuse reference to arbitration only in a narrow and
limited category of cases. Where even the slightest doubt exists, the
referral Court ought to lean in favour of reference to arbitration.
13. It is also stated that the Subsequent Agreements (SA I, SA II and SA III)
executed between the parties were confined to restructuring or
determining the schedule of payments and did not supersede or novate the
original DA. According to the petitioner, the payment schedules were
intrinsically linked to and flowed from the DA, the substantive terms of
which continued to bind the parties. The SAs are arrangements only
limited to payments operating within the umbrella of the principal DA,
and consequently, the arbitration clause contained therein continues to
govern the parties. Therefore, it would be misconceived to contend that
the execution of the SAs had the effect of extinguishing or rendering
inoperative the arbitration clause. In support of this submission, reliance
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is placed on Collegedunia Web Private Limited v. PDM University &
Ors., ARB. P. 244/2020 and Balasore Alloys Ltd. V. Medima LLC,
(2020) 9 SCC 136.
14. He further states that even in a situation where the DA stands terminated,
substituted, or its performance discharged, the arbitration clause survives
for the purpose of adjudicating disputes arising out of or in connection
with the DA. In this regard, reliance is placed on PVR Ltd. v. Imperia
Wishfield (P) Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3947 to submit that an
arbitration clause is separable and survives the termination of the
underlying contract.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
15. Per Contra, Ms. Renuka Sahu, learned counsel for the respondent, at the
outset states that the present petition under Section 11 of the 1996 Act is
not maintainable as there is no arbitration clause to govern the disputes
between the parties. She states that SA I, SA II and SA III are fresh,
distinct and independent contracts, executed after the commercial
relationship between the parties under the DA had come to an end. The
SAs constitute complete and self-contained agreements governing the
rights and obligations of the parties, particularly with respect to payment
obligations and jurisdiction. Accordingly, the terms embodied in the SAs
are materially different and were consciously agreed upon, thereby giving
rise to independent contractual arrangements unconnected with the earlier
DA.
16. She points out that none of the SAs makes any reference to the DA.
Moreover, the said SAs neither incorporate nor preserve the arbitration
clause contained in the DA, nor do they provide that such clause would
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survive or govern disputes arising thereafter. On the contrary, each of the
SAs contains an express and independent jurisdiction clause conferring
exclusive jurisdiction on specified courts, which are as follows:
SA I: “All disputes arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of Courts at Mumbai.”
SA II: “All disputes arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of Courts at Delhi.”
SA III: “All disputes arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of Courts at Delhi.”
17. She further states that the execution of SAs between the parties amounts
to a novation of the original DA within the meaning of Section 62 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872, and once a contract is superseded by a
subsequent agreement, the rights and obligations arising under the earlier
contract ceases to operate, and the relationship between the parties is
thereafter governed exclusively by the terms of the new contract, Thus, in
the present case, by virtue of such novation, the earlier DA stands
extinguished and substituted by the new contractual arrangements
embodied in the SAs. Consequently, all terms and stipulations of the
original DA, including the arbitration clause contained therein, stand
extinguished.
18. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros., AIR (1959) SC 1362
wherein it has been held that if a contract is superseded or novated by a
new agreement, the arbitration clause, being a component of the old
contract, perishes along with it and cannot be invoked for disputes arising
thereafter. The Supreme Court further held that where a contract is
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repudiated, discharged, or substituted by mutual consent, the arbitration
clause also ceases to have effect. Further she places reliance on
I. Young Achievers v. IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 10
SCC 535;
II. B.L. Kashyap And Sons Ltd. v. Mist Avenue Private Ltd. (2023)
SCC Online Del 3518;
III. L&T Ltd Vs. IREO Victory Valley Private Limited 2024 SCC
Online Del 2882;
IV. Zhuhai Hansen Technology Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre Ltd., Delhi
High Court: (2025) DHC 2490.
19. It is also stated that the parties have consciously and expressly substituted
arbitration with the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts, thereby
establishing a clear and unequivocal intention to exclude arbitration as the
agreed dispute resolution mechanism. The same is evident from the
jurisdiction clauses contained in all three SAs.
20. Learned counsel states that, by mutual consent, the parties have
consciously and expressly substituted the earlier dispute resolution
mechanism from the arbitral mechanism with a stipulation conferring
exclusive jurisdiction upon competent civil courts. This clearly manifests
the intention of the parties to exclude the recourse to arbitration. Reliance
to substantiate this contention is placed on Vidya Drolia v. Durga
Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1 and Wellington Associates Ltd. v.
Kirit Mehta, (2000) 4 SCC 272.
21. She also states that Section 11(6A) of the 1996 Act, as interpreted by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port
Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 limits the scope of examination by the Court at
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the pre-reference stage to a singular and foundational issue, namely, the
existence of an arbitration agreement. While exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11of the 1996 Act, the Court must confine itself to determining
whether a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement exists between the
parties. In the present case, the operative and governing contract between
the parties is the SA III dated 29.12.2020, which admittedly contains no
arbitration clause. On the contrary, the said Agreement expressly
stipulates that disputes arising there under shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts at Delhi. In such circumstances, the
statutory condition precedent under Section 11(6A) of the 1996 Act, i.e.,
the existence of an arbitration agreement governing the disputes in
question, is absent. It is, thus, contended that the petition is liable to be
dismissed at the threshold, as the very foundation for reference to
arbitration is lacking. An Arbitrator, cannot assume jurisdiction in the
absence of a valid arbitration agreement, and the power to determine the
existence of such an agreement vests exclusively in the referral Court.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
22. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
on record.
23. The question that falls for consideration is whether a valid arbitration
agreement exists between the parties.
24. Before examining the question in hand, it is important to set out the scope
of Section 11 of the 1996 Act. In Interplay Between Arbitration
Agreements under Arbitration, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6
SCC 1, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court categorically held that the scope of
examination at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to a
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prima facie assessment of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement:
“81. One of the main objectives of the Arbitration Act is to
minimise the supervisory role of Courts in the arbitral
process. Party autonomy and settlement of disputes by an
Arbitral Tribunal are the hallmarks of arbitration law.
Section 5 gives effect to the true intention of the parties to
have their disputes resolved through arbitration in a quick,
efficient and effective manner by minimising judicial
interference in the arbitral proceedings. [Food Corpn. of
India v. Indian Council of Arbitration, (2003) 6 SCC 564.]
Parliament enacted Section 5 to minimise the supervisory
role of Courts in the arbitral process to the bare minimum,
and only to the extent “so provided” under the Part I of the
Arbitration Act. In doing so, the legislature did not
altogether exclude the role of Courts or judicial authorities
in arbitral proceedings, but limited it to circumstances
where the support of judicial authorities is required for the
successful implementation and enforcement of the arbitral
process. [Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.,
(2001) 8 SCC 470; P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju,
(2000) 4 SCC 539] The Arbitration Act envisages the role of
Courts to “support arbitration process” [Swiss Timing Ltd.
v. Commonwealth Games 2010 Organising Committee,
(2014) 6 SCC 677 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 642] by providing
necessary aid and assistance when required by law in
certain situations.”
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25. A similar position was reiterated in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd.v.
Krish Spinning, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 and Goqii Technologies
Private Limited v. Sokrati Technologies Private Limited, (2025) 2 SCC
192 where the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that the Arbitrator
should be the preferred first authority to look into the questions of
arbitrability and jurisdiction, and the courts at the referral stage should
not get into contested questions involving complex facts.
26. Further, in Sanjiv Prakash (Supra) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court dealt
with the arbitrability of disputes at the stage of reference. The Hon‟ble
Court categorically held that the issue with respect to the novation of
contract containing arbitration clause cannot be decided by a prima facie
perusal of existence of arbitration clause in contract between the parties.
The relevant paragraphs read as under:
“21. Likewise, in BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd.
[BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC
738 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 352] , another Division Bench of
this Court referred to Vidya Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga
Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549]
and concluded : (BSNL case [BSNL v. Nortel Networks
(India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ)
352] , SCC pp. 765-66, paras 46-47)
“46. The upshot of the judgment in Vidya Drolia
[Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC
1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] is affirmation of the
position of law expounded in Duro Felguera
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9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 764] and Mayavati
Trading [Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb
Burman, (2019) 8 SCC 714 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 441] ,
which continue to hold the field. It must be understood
clearly that Vidya Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga
Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ)
549] has not resurrected the pre-amendment position
on the scope of power as held in SBP & Co. v. Patel
Engg. Ltd. [SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8
SCC 618]
47. It is only in the very limited category of cases,
where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the
claim is ex facie time-barred, or that the dispute is
non-arbitrable, that the court may decline to make the
reference. However, if there is even the slightest doubt,
the rule is to refer the disputes to arbitration,
otherwise it would encroach upon what is essentially a
matter to be determined by the tribunal.”
22. Judged by the aforesaid tests, it is obvious that whether
the MoU has been novated by the SHA dated 12-4-1996
requires a detailed consideration of the clauses of the two
agreements, together with the surrounding circumstances in
which these agreements were entered into, and a full
consideration of the law on the subject. None of this can be
done given the limited jurisdiction of a court under Section
11 of the 1996 Act. As has been held in para 148 of Vidya
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Drolia [Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2
SCC 1 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 549] , detailed arguments on
whether an agreement which contains an arbitration clause
has or has not been novated cannot possibly be decided in
exercise of a limited prima facie review as to whether an
arbitration agreement exists between the parties. Also, this
case does not fall within the category of cases which ousts
arbitration altogether, such as matters which are in rem
proceedings or cases which, without doubt, concern minors,
lunatics or other persons incompetent to contract. There is
nothing vexatious or frivolous in the plea taken by the
appellant. On the contrary, a Section 11 court would refer
the matter when contentions relating to non-arbitrability
are plainly arguable, or when facts are contested. The court
cannot, at this stage, enter into a mini trial or elaborate
review of the facts and law which would usurp the
jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.
23. The impugned judgment was wholly incorrect in
deciding that the plea of doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz
and reliance on Section 11(6-A) of the 1996 Act, as
expounded in Duro Felguera [Duro Felguera, S.A. v.
Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729 : (2017) 4 SCC
(Civ) 764] and Mayavati Trading [Mayavati Trading (P)
Ltd. v. Pradyuat Deb Burman, (2019) 8 SCC 714 : (2019) 4
SCC (Civ) 441] were not applicable to the case in hand.
Apart from going into a detailed consideration of the MoU
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and the SHA, which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, the learned Single Judge, while
considering Clause 28 of the SHA to arrive at the finding
that any kind of agreement as detailed in Clause 28.2
between the parties shall stand superseded, does not even
refer to Clause 28.1. No consideration has been given to the
separate and distinct subject-matter of the MoU and the
SHA. Also, Kishorilal Gupta [Union of India v. Kishorilal
Gupta & Bros., (1960) 1 SCR 493 : AIR 1959 SC 1362] and
Damodar Valley Corpn. [Damodar Valley Corpn. v. K.K.
Kar, (1974) 1 SCC 141] are judgments which deal with
novation in the context of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which
had a scheme completely different from the scheme
contained in Section 16 read with Section 11(6-A) of the
1996 Act.
(emphasis supplied)
27. A perusal of the aforesaid judgments delineates the settled and
contemporary position of law governing the scope of jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The referral Court, at the pre-reference stage,
is required to undertake only a prima facie examination with respect to
the existence of an arbitration agreement. The legislative mandate,
particularly post the insertion of Section 11(6A) of the 1996 Act, confines
the scrutiny of the Court to ascertaining whether an arbitration agreement
exists between the parties; it does not extend to an in-depth adjudication
of issues touching upon the issue of novation, as relevant in the present
case, of the underlying contract.
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28. It is well settled in law that questions relating to novation or substitution
of an earlier agreement by any subsequent agreement(s) ordinarily
involve disputed questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law.
Such issues are intrinsically connected with the merits of the dispute and
require appreciation of evidence, examination of contractual intent of the
parties, and consideration of surrounding circumstances. These are
matters which fall squarely within the domain of the Arbitrator in view of
the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz. The referral Court, while
exercising powers under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, cannot embark upon
a detailed enquiry akin to a trial or conduct what would effectively
amount to a “mini trial” on the question whether the original contract
stands novated or extinguished. To do so would be to transgress the
limited jurisdiction conferred at the pre-reference stage. Once a prima
facie arbitration agreement is shown to exist, and the plea of novation or
supersession is not ex facie established so as to render the arbitration
clause non-existent, such objections are required to be left open for
determination by the Arbitrator.
29. In the present case, prima facie it is evident that there exists an arbitration
clause being Clause No. 10. (j) of the DA. The subsequent Agreements
i.e. SA I, SA II and SA III were only entered into on the limited aspect of
restructuring of payment obligation of the respondent. Whether the said
SAs will supersede the original DA and the original DA would stand
novated is purely a question that falls within the domain of the Arbitrator
as it requires the Court to examine the unequivocal intention of the parties
to novate the terms under the original DA. It would also require the Court
to examine whether the original DA survives after the alteration of terms
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of the agreement with respect to payment. A court under Section 11 of the
1996 Act is bound by the statutory restrictions and thus cannot transgress
into the merits of the case.
30. The judgment of Kishorilal Gupta & Bros (Supra) and Young Achievers
(Supra) has been considered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sanjiv
Prakash (Supra) and the law laid down is clear that at the stage of
Section 11 of the1996 Act cannot examine the question of novation of
Contract, thus, does not help the case of the respondent.
31. In my considered view, the reliance placed by the respondent on B.L.
Kashyap (Supra), L&T Ltd. (Supra), and Zhuhai Hansen Technology
Co Ltd (Supra), is also misplaced. None of the aforesaid decisions were
rendered in the context of proceedings under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.
In particular, B.L. Kashyap (Supra) arose at the stage of challenge under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act, where the Arbitral Award had already been
rendered and the issue of novation had been duly examined and
adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator. The scope of judicial scrutiny under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act, which lays down grounds to challenge an
Award, stands on an entirely different footing from the limited and prima
facie examination contemplated under Section 11. Similarly, the
principles enunciated in L&T Ltd. (Supra) and Zhuhai Hansen
Technology Co. Ltd. (Supra) cannot be mechanically applied at the
referral stage under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, where this Court is
confined to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement and is
not required, nor permitted, to enter into a detailed examination of
contentious issues on merits. At this juncture, the Court cannot adjudicate
upon the substantive plea of novation.
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32. Whether by mutual consent, the parties have consciously and expressly
substituted the earlier dispute resolution mechanism from the arbitral
mechanism and conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon civil court is also a
question of fact that is to be examined by the Arbitrator. It is a well
settled law that if the arbitration agreement is contained in a single
undisputed document, the referral court need not conduct a mini trial,
rather only a prima facie proof is required to establish the existence of the
Arbitration Agreement on the touchstone of Section 7 of the 1996 Act.
The undisputed DA, from which the payment obligation flows, contains
an arbitration clause which satisfies the requirements as envisaged under
Section 7 of the 1996 Act. Therefore, whether any deviation is made from
the consensus ad idem of the parties to refer the disputes to Arbitration
shall also be considered by the Arbitrator.
33. For the said reasons, and without commenting on the merits of the case,
the petition is allowed and the following directions are issued:-
i) Mr. Varun Kumar Chopra (Advocate) (Mob. No. 9811851711) is
appointed as a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the
parties.
ii) The arbitration will be held under the aegis and rules of the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre, Delhi High Court, Sher Shah Road,
New Delhi (hereinafter, referred to as the „DIAC‟).
iii) The remuneration of the learned Arbitrator shall be in terms of
DIAC (Administrative Cost and Arbitrators‟ Fees) Rules, 2018.
iv) The learned Arbitrator is requested to furnish a declaration in terms
of Section 12 of the 1996 Act prior to entering into the reference.
v) It is made clear that all the rights and contentions of the parties,
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including as to the arbitrability of any of the claim, any other
preliminary objection, as well as claims/counter-claims and merits of
the dispute of either of the parties, including the issue whether the
arbitration clause is superseded by SA I, II and III, are left open for
adjudication by the Arbitrator.
vi) The parties shall approach the Arbitrator within two weeks from
today.
34. The petition is disposed of in aforesaid terms.
JASMEET SINGH, J.
FEBRUARY 26 , 2026/(MU)
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