Punjab-Haryana High Court
Balwinder Singh vs State Of Punjab And Ors on 24 February, 2026
207 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
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CWP-19320-2017 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 24.02.2026
Balwinder Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and Others
...Respondents
CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present:- Mr. Geeteshwar Saini, Advocate for
Mr. R.K. Arya, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Aman Dhir, DAG, Punjab.
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JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner through instant petition under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution of India is seeking setting aside of orders
passed by departmental authorities whereby he was dismissed from
service.
2. The petitioner joined Punjab Police Force on 02.08.1989 as
Constable. On 15.10.2015 he was posted as Guard at the residence of
Yog Raj Sharma, President, Shiv Sena Punjab. He fired four rounds from
his rifle at about 12:00 AM. The respondent registered FIR No.130 under
Sections 336, 166 and 166-A of IPC at Police Station Division No.2,
Pathankot against him. He was not subjected to departmental inquiry. The
respondent dismissed him from service invoking Clause (b) of second
proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. He unsuccessfully
preferred appeal before appellate authority. It is apt to mention here that
Appellate Authority while dismissing his appeal considered his past
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service record. As per his past record, he was found absent from duty on
45 occasions. He was convicted by trial Court vide judgment dated
17.07.2023, however, released on probation.
3. Learned counsel representing the petitioner submits that
respondent did not consider petitioner’s length of service as well as
entitlement to pension while passing impugned order. It was a case of
violation of Rule 16.2 of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (for short, ‘PPR’).
The respondent invoked Clause (b) of second proviso to Article 311 (2)
of the Constitution of India and dispensed with inquiry. There was no
occasion to dispense with inquiry.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel reiterates findings of the
departmental authorities and submits that no interference is warranted.
The petitioner belongs to a disciplined force, thus, his conduct must be
above board. He is bound to maintain high standards of discipline.
5. Heard the arguments and perused the record.
6. The petitioner was dismissed from service without
conducting inquiry as contemplated by Rule 16.24 of PPR read with
Article 311 of the Constitution of India. As per Clause (b) of second
proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, inquiry may be
dispensed with (i) where person is dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a
criminal charge; or (ii) where the competent authority finds that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (iii) where President or the
Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is
not expedient to hold such inquiry. For the ready reference, Article 311(2)
of the Constitution of India is reproduced herein below:-
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“311 (2)- No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed
or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which
he has been informed of the charges against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those
charges.
Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose
upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the
basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not
be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making
representation on the penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply-
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on
a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason,
to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably
practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is
not expedient to hold such inquiry.”
7. A Constitutional Bench in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel,
(1985) 3 SCC 398, has observed that while invoking the rigor of Clause
(b) of second-proviso to Article 311(2), if disciplinary authority failed to
record any reason as to why it is not practicable to hold inquiry, such an
order is void and unconstitutional. The relevant extracts of the judgment
read as:
“133. The second condition necessary for the valid
application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the
disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its
satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the
inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a constitutional
obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order
dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following
thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.”
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8. In the case in hand, while dispensing with departmental inquiry, the
disciplinary authority vide order dated 16.10.2015 has observed as
under:-
“I have perused all the above facts and circumstances very
carefully and as per my wisdom and thinking I have reached to
the conclusion that it is not appropriate to conduct regular
inquiry against this employee, because this employee is very
influential, and during inquiry he can influence the witness and
can create hindrance to bring the truth to light. Therefore to keep
this employee in service in public interest will not be appropriate.
Therefore in exercise of my powers u/s 311 (2) B of Constitution
of India dismiss this employee today dated 16.10.15 before noon
with immediate effect. I pass this order today dated 16.10.15
before noon.”
[Emphasis supplied]
9. The reason advanced by disciplinary authority for dispensing
with inquiry is not plausible reason because same reason is advanced in
every second case where there is FIR against serving police officer. The
respondent can dispense with inquiry if actually it is not practicable to
hold the inquiry. Mere writing one or more lines in the impugned order
that it is not practicable to hold inquiry or assigning vague reason of
influencing witnesses is not compliance of mandate of either Constitution
of India or Rule 16.24 of PPR. It would have been in the interest of both
sides and better course, had the respondent instead of straight away
dismissing the petitioner put him under suspension and thereafter
conducted inquiry.
10. The petitioner is claiming that his conduct was neither
gravest misconduct nor continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and
complete unfitness for police service, thus, he could not be dismissed
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from service. The argument of the petitioner needs to be examined in the
light of Rule 16.2 of PPR, which is reproduced as below:-
“16.2. Dismissal. – (1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for
the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of
continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete
unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard
shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim
to pension.
(2) If the conduct of an enrolled police officer leads to his
conviction on a criminal charge and he is sentenced to
imprisonment, he shall be dismissed :
Provided that a punishing authority may, in an exceptional case
involving manifestly extenuating circumstances for reasons to be
recorded and with the prior approval of the next higher authority
impose any punishment other than that of dismissal:
Provided further that in case the conviction of an enrolled police
officer is set aside in appeal or revision, the officer empowered to
appoint him shall review his case keeping in view the instructions
issued by the Government from time to time in this behalf.
(3) When a police officer is convicted judicially and dismissed, or
dismissed as a result of a departmental enquiry, in consequence
of corrupt practices, the conviction and dismissal and its cause
shall be published in the Police Gazette. In other cases of
dismissal when it is desired to ensure that the officer dismissed
shall not be re-employed elsewhere, a full descriptive roll, with
particulars of the punishments, shall be sent for publication in the
Police Gazette.”
11. The question of interpretation of Rule 16.2 of PPR came up
before the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Ram Singh, (1992) 4 SCC
54 wherein it was held that an officer may be dismissed in two situations
i.e. on account of gravest misconduct or cumulative effect of continued
misconduct. A single act may constitute gravest misconduct. The colour
of gravest misconduct must be gathered from the surroundings or
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attending circumstances. The relevant extracts of the said judgment read
as:
“7. Rule 16.2 (1) consists of two parts. The first part is
referable to gravest acts of misconduct which entails awarding an
order of dismissal. Undoubtedly there is distinction between
gravest misconduct and grave misconduct. Before awarding an
order of dismissal it shall be mandatory that dismissal order
should be made only when there are gravest acts of misconduct,
since it impinges upon the pensionary rights of the delinquent
after putting long length of service. As stated the first part relates
to gravest acts of misconduct. Under General Clauses Act
singular includes plural, “act” includes acts. The contention that
there must be plurality of acts of misconduct to award dismissal
is fastidious. The word “acts” would include singular “act” as
well. It is not the repetition of the acts complained of but its
quality, insidious effect and gravity of situation that ensues from
the offending ‘act’. The colour of the gravest act must be gathered
from the surrounding or attending circumstances. Take for
instance the delinquent who put in 29 years of continuous length
of service and had unblemished record; in thirtieth year he
commits defalcation of public money or fabricates false records
to conceal misappropriation. He only committed once. Does it
mean that he should not be inflicted with the punishment of
dismissal but be allowed to continue in service for that year to
enable him to get his full pension. The answer is obviously no.
Therefore, a single act of corruption is sufficient to award an
order of dismissal under the rule as gravest act of misconduct.
8. The second part of the rule connotes the cumulative effect of
continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete
unfitness for police service and that the length of service of the
offender and his claim for pension should be taken into account
in an appropriate case. The contention that both parts must be
read together appears to us to be illogical. Second part is
referable to a misconduct minor in character which does not by
itself warrant an order of dismissal but due to continued acts of
misconduct would have insidious cumulative effect on service
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morale and may be a ground to take lenient view of giving an
opportunity to reform. Despite giving such opportunities if the
delinquent officer proved to be incorrigible and found completely
unfit to remain in service then to maintain discipline in the
service, instead of dismissing the delinquent officer, a lesser
punishment of compulsory retirement or demotion to a lower
grade or rank or removal from service without affecting his
future chances of re-employment, if any, may meet the ends of
justice. Take for instance the delinquent officer who is habitually
absent from duty when required. Despite giving an opportunity to
reform himself he continues to remain absent from duty off and
on. He proved himself to be incorrigible and thereby unfit to
continue in service. Therefore, taking into account his long length
of service and his claim for pension he may be compulsorily
retired from service so as to enable him to earn proportionate
pension. The second part of the rule operates in that area. It may
also be made clear that the very order of dismissal from service
for gravest misconduct may entail forfeiture of all pensionary
benefits. Therefore, the word ‘or’ cannot be read as “and”. It must
be disjunctive and independent. The common link that connects
both clauses is “the gravest act/acts of misconduct”.
12. A conspectus of Rule 16.2 (1) of PPR and afore-cited
judgment reveals that following are attributes of Rule 16.2:
(i) The police officer is accused of gravest misconduct; or
(ii) The cumulative effect of continued misconduct proves that
police officer is incorrigible and completely unfit for the
service;
(iii) The authority passing order shall consider length of service
as well as claim of pension; or
(iv) Having regard to length of service and claim of pension, an
employee instead of dismissal from service may be
compulsorily retired.
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13. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 16.2 is a general rule which permits
authorities to dismiss an officer on the occurrence of an event as
contemplated therein. The said Rule is an open ended rule. It is a
discretionary provision and discretion is always subject to judicial
review. An officer may or may not be guilty of gravest misconduct. It is
always subject to judicial review to ascertain whether the officer is guilty
of gravest misconduct or not. The question whether an officer is guilty of
cumulative effect of misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete
unfitness is also a question of fact and has always remained subject
matter of judicial review. Sub-Rule (2) carves out an exception to Sub-
Rule (1) and in a way it is a proviso to Sub-Rule (1) which leaves no
discretion with authorities and enjoins that an officer shall be liable to be
dismissed if he has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment on a
criminal charge. The petitioner although was convicted but was not
sentence to imprisonment. He was released on probation, thus, his case
ought to be examined in the light of Rule 16.2(1). The petitioner no doubt
was guilty of mis-conduct, however, impugned order was passed without
complying with mandate of Rule 16.2(1). Act of petitioner was not
declared gravest mis-conduct or incorrigible. Thus, impugned order was
contrary to Rule 16.2(1).
14. The question of punishment other than dismissal from
service, in case of conviction and sentence of an employee, has been
considered by Supreme Court in Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern
Rly. v. T.R. Chellappan, (1976) 3 SCC 190. The Court has held that in
case of trivial or petty offences, an employee cannot be subjected to harsh
punishment of dismissal. The relevant extracts of the judgment read as:
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“21………… It may be that the conviction of an accused
may be for a trivial offence as in the case of the respondent T.R.
Challappan in Civil Appeal 1664 of 1974 where a stern warning
or a fine would have been sufficient to meet the exigencies of
service. It is possible that the delinquent employee may be found
guilty of some technical offence, for instance, violation of the
transport rules or the rules under the Motor Vehicles Act and so
on, where no major penalty may be attracted. It is difficult to lay
down any hard and fast rules as to the factors which the
disciplinary authority would have to consider, but I have
mentioned some of these factors by way of instances which are
merely illustrative and not exhaustive. In other words, the
position is that the conviction of the delinquent employee would
be taken as sufficient proof of misconduct and then the authority
will have to embark upon a summary inquiry as to the nature and
extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee
and in the course of the inquiry if the authority is of the opinion
that the offence is too trivial or of a technical nature it may refuse
to impose any penalty in spite of the conviction.”
15. A Constitution Bench in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel,
(1985) 3 SCC 398 approved T.R. Challappan’s case to the extent that
proviso to Article 311 (2) is not mandatory and Disciplinary Authority
may consider circumstances set out in the said judgment before imposing
a penalty upon a delinquent Government servant. The Court further held
that it is not mandatory that major penalty of dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank should be imposed upon the concerned Government
servant. The penalty which can be imposed may be some other major
penalty or even a minor penalty depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case. In order to arrive at a decision as to which
penalty should be imposed, Disciplinary Authority will take into
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consideration various factors set out in T.R. Challappan’ case. The
relevant extracts of the judgment read as:
“114. So far as Challappan case is concerned, it is not
possible to find any fault either with the view that neither clause
(a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) nor clause (i) of Rule
14 of the Railway Servants Rules is mandatory or with the
considerations which have been set out in the judgment as being
the considerations to be taken into account by the disciplinary
authority before imposing a penalty upon a delinquent
government servant. Where a situation envisaged in one of the
three clauses of the second proviso to Article 311(2) or of an
analogous service rule arises, it is not mandatory that the major
penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank should be
imposed upon the concerned government servant. The penalty
which can be imposed may be some other major penalty or even a
minor penalty depending upon the facts and circumstances of the
case. In order to arrive at a decision as to which penalty should
be imposed, the disciplinary authority will have to take into
consideration the various factors set out in Challappan case.”
16. There is another conundrum which needs to be looked into.
The departmental inquiry is adumbrated in Rule 16.24 of PPR. The said
Rule prescribes complete procedure of inquiry which is reproduced as
below:
“16.24. Procedure in departmental enquiries.-(1) The
following procedure shall be followed in departmental enquiries
–
(i) The police officer accused of misconduct shall be brought
before an officer empowered to punish him, or such
superior officer as the Superintendent may direct to
conduct the enquiry. That officer shall record and read out
to the accused officer a statement summarizing the alleged
misconduct in such a way as to give full notice of the
circumstances in regard to which evidence is to be
recorded. A cop of the statement will also be supplied to10 of 17
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the accused officer free of charge.
(ii) If the accused police officer at this stage admits the
misconduct alleged against him, the officer conducting the
enquiry may proceed forthwith to frame a charge, record
the accused officer’s plea and any statement he may wish
to make in extenuation and to record a final order, if it is
within his power to do so, or a finding to be forwarded to
an officer empowered to decide the case. When the
allegations are such as can form the basis of a criminal
charge, the Superintendent shall decide at this stage,
whether the accused shall be tried departmentally first and
judicially thereafter.
(iii) If the accused police officer does not admit the
misconduct, the officer conducting the enquiry shall
proceed to record such evidence, oral and documentary, in
proof of the accusation, as is available and necessary to
support the charge. Whenever possible, witnesses shall be
examined direct, and in the presence of the accused, who
shall be given opportunity to take notes of their statements
and cross- examine them. The officer conducting the
enquiry is empowered, however, to bring on to the record
the statement of any witness whose presence cannot, in the
opinion of such officer, be procured without undue delay
and expense or inconvenience, if he considers such
statement necessary, and provided that it has been
recorded and attested by a police officer superior in rank
to the accused officer or by a magistrate, and is signed by
the person making it. This statement shall also be read out
to the accused officer and he shall be given an opportunity
to take notes. The accused shall be bound to answer any
questions which the enquiring officer may see fit to put to
him with a view to elucidating the facts referred to in
statements or documents brought on the record as herein
provided.
(iv) When the evidence in support of the allegations has been
recorded the enquiring officer shall, (a) if he considers
that such allegations are not substantiated, either
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discharge the accused himself, if he is empowered to
punish him, or recommend his discharge to the
Superintendent, or other officer, who may be so
empowered, or (b) proceed to frame a formal charge or
charges in writing, explain them to the accused officer and
call upon him to answer them.
(v) The accused officer shall be required to state the defence
witnesses whom he wishes to call and may be given time,
in no case exceeding forty eight hours, to prepare a list of
such witnesses, together with a summary of the facts as to
which they will testify. The enquiring officer shall be
empowered to refuse to hear any witnesses whose evidence
he considers will be irrelevant or unnecessary in regard to
the specific charge framed. He shall record the statements
of those defence witnesses whom he decides to admit in the
presence of the accused, who shall be allowed to address
questions to them, the answers to which shall be recorded;
provided that the enquiring officer may cause to be
recorded by any other police officer superior in rank to the
accused the statement of any such witness whose presence
cannot be secured without undue delay or inconvenience,
and may bring such statement on to the record. The
accused may file documentary evidence and may for this
purpose be allowed access to such files and papers, except
such as form part of the record of the confidential office of
the Superintendent of Police, as the enquiring officer
deems fit. The supply of copies of documents to the
accused shall be subject to the ordinary rules regarding
copying fees.
(vi) At the conclusion of the defence evidence, or, if the
enquiring officer so directs, at any earlier stage following
the framing of a charge, the accused shall be required to
state his own answer to the charge. He may be permitted
to file a written statement and may be given time, not
exceeding one week, for its preparation, but shall be
bound to make an oral statement in answer to all questions
which the enquiring officer may see fit to put to him,
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arising out of the charge, the recorded evidence, or his
own written statement.
(vii) The enquiring officer shall proceed to pass orders of
acquittal or punishment, if empowered to do so, or to
forward the case with his finding and recommendations to
an officer having the necessary powers. Whenever the
officer passing the orders of punishment proposes to take
into considerations the adverse entries on the previous
record of the accused police officer, he shall provide
reasonable opportunity to the defaulter to defend himself;
and a copy or at least a gist of those entries shall be
conveyed to the defaulter and he shall be asked to give
such explanation as he may deem fit. The explanation
furnished by the defaulter shall be taken into account by
the officer before passing orders in the case.
(viii) Nothing in the foregoing rule shall debar a Superintendent
of Police from making or causing to be made a preliminary
investigation into the conduct of a suspected officer. Such
an enquiry is not infrequently necessary to ascertain the
nature and degree of misconduct which is to be formally
enquired into. The suspected police officer may or may not
be present at such preliminary enquiry, as ordered by the
Superintendent of Police or other gazetted officer
initiating the investigation, but shall not cross-examine
witnesses. The file of such a preliminary investigation
shall form no part of the formal departmental record, but
statements therefrom may be brought to the formal record
when the witnesses are no longer available in the
circumstances detailed in clause (iii) above. All statements
recorded during a preliminary investigation should be
signed by the person making them and attested by the
officer recording them.
(ix) No order of dismissal or reduction in rank shall be passed
by an officer empowered to dismiss a police officer or
reduce him in rank until that officer has been given a
reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the
action proposed to be taken in regard to him, provided that
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this shall not apply-
(a) where a police officer is dismissed or reduced in rank
on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a
criminal charge; or
(b) where the officer empowered to dismiss him or reduce
him in rank is satisfied that for some reasons to be
recorded by that officer in writing, it is not reasonably
practicable to give to that police officer an opportunity of
showing cause.
Before an order of dismissal or reduction in rank is
passed, the officer to be punished shall be produced before the
officer empowered to punish him, and shall be informed of the
charges proved against him, and called upon to show cause why
an order of dismissal or reduction in rank should not be passed,
Any representation that he may make shall be recorded, shall
form part of the record of the case, and shall be taken into
consideration by the officer empowered to punish him before the
final order is passed:
Provided that if, owing to the complicated nature of the
case or other sufficient reason to be recorded, the officer
empowered to impose the punishment considers this procedure
inappropriate, he may inform the officer to be punished in writing
of the charges proved against him, and call upon him to show
cause in writing why an order of dismissal or reduction in rank
should not be passed. Any written representation received shall
be placed on the record of the case and taken into consideration
before the final order is passed.
(2) (i) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1)
a Superintendent of Police or any officer of rank higher than
Superintendent, may institute, or cause to be instituted, ex parte
proceedings in any case in which he is satisfied that the defaulter
cannot be found or that inspite of notice to attend the defaulter is
deliberately evading service or refusing to attend without due
cause.
(ii) The procedure in such ex parte proceedings shall, as
far as possible, confirm to the procedure laid down in sub-rule
(1): Provided that the defaulter shall be deemed-
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(a) not to have admitted the allegations contained in
the summary of misconduct, and
(b) to have entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge:
Provided further that the defaulter, if he subsequently
appears at any stage during the course of the proceedings shall
not be entitled to claim de nova proceedings or to recall for
cross-examination any witness whose evidence has already been
recorded. He shall, however, be fully informed of the evidence
which has been led against him and shall be permitted to take
notes thereof. He shall also be furnished with a copy of the
summary of misconduct and of the charge or charges framed.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
17. As per Rule 16.24(1)(vii) of PPR, a disciplinary authority
may consider past service record of a delinquent employee, however,
authority is bound to confront the delinquent employee with adverse
service record which authority is going to rely upon. In the case of
petitioner, inquiry was dispensed with and Appellate Authority without
complying with Rule 16.24(1)(vii) relied upon past service record of the
petitioner. Action of respondent was bad in the eye of law.
18. It is a settled proposition of law that punishment should be
commensurate to alleged offence. The principle of proportionality should
be followed by all quasi- judicial and judicial authorities while awarding
punishment irrespective of nature of offence. As per principle of
proportionality, even punishment prescribed by legislation must be
incommensurate to alleged offence. If punishment is disproportionate to
alleged offence, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
19. In Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386,
Supreme Court vide order dated 4.5.2000 proposed to re-open the land of
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the DDA allotted to M/s. Skipper Construction Co. It was proposed to
consider imposition of higher degree of punishments in view of role of
these officers in the said matter. The question posed before the court was
whether the right punishment was awarded to the officers in accordance
with well-known principles of law or whether the punishments required
any upward revision. The Court has highlighted proportionality as a
constitutional doctrine.
20. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1983) 2
SCC 442, the Apex Court held that any penalty which is disproportionate
to the gravity of misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. The relevant extracts of the judgment read as:
“15. … It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be
commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any
penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would
be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. …”
21. In the instant case, by no means or reasons, awarded
punishment can be called proportionate to alleged misconduct. The
petitioner at the time of passing impugned order of dismissal from service
was having 26 years’ service to his credit. He was implicated on the basis
of firing four rounds in the air while he was on Guard duty. He faced trial
and came to be convicted vide judgment dated 17.07.2023. He was
released on probation by trial Court. He was not involved in any other
criminal case. He was not subjected to departmental inquiry. Inquiry was
dispensed with without plausible reason. His past record was relied upon
without complying with Rule 16.24(1)(vii) of PPR. There is no finding
that he was incorrigible or his conduct was gravest mis-conduct. He is not
claiming back wages. Thus, awarded punishment cannot be called
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proportionate to alleged misconduct. The respondent was bound to award
punishment proportionate to alleged offence.
22. The Supreme Court has held that in case Court finds that
punishment awarded by authority is disproportionate to alleged
misconduct, the Court should remand the matter back to competent
authority to reconsider quantum of punishment. Thus, in the normal
course matter ought to be remanded to authorities to reconsider quantum
of punishment. However, in this particular case, this Court does not find
it appropriate to remand the matter back to departmental authorities
because a period of more than a decade from the date of alleged offence
has already passed away. The authorities have passed impugned orders
mechanically and there are all possibilities that remand would multiply
the litigation. Thus, to cut short the litigation and considering the alleged
misconduct, this Court deems it appropriate to modify the punishment of
dismissal from service to compulsory retirement. The petitioner shall be
deemed to be compulsorily retired w.e.f. 16.10.2015 i.e. date of dismissal
from service. As conceded by petitioner, he would be entitled to pension
w.e.f. 01.02.2026. He is entitled to gratuity and leave encashment. He
shall not be entitled to salary or pension for the past period. The
respondent shall release gratuity, leave encashment and pension within
three months from today failing which would be liable to pay interest @
9% per annum on the expiry of said period.
23. Allowed in above terms.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE
24.02.2026
Prince Chawla
Whether Speaking/reasoned Yes/No
Whether Reportable Yes/No
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