Bombay High Court
Baljinder Kaur Nangal Chopra vs M/S Alfa Laval India Pvt Ltd on 18 April, 2026
Author: Amit Borkar
Bench: Amit Borkar
2026:BHC-AS:18209
wp11408-2025.doc
Sayali
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.11408 OF 2025
Baljinder Kaur Nangal Chopra,
Age 55 years, Park View Apartment,
Society No.129/130, Flat No.11,
Near Sadhu Vaswani Garden,
Pimpri, Pune 411 017 ... Petitioner
Vs.
SAYALI Alfa Laval India Private Limited,
DEEPAK
UPASANI Pune-Mumbai Road, Dapodi,
Digitally signed by
SAYALI DEEPAK
UPASANI Pune 411 012 ... Respondent
Date: 2026.04.18
12:13:41 +0530
Mr. Nitin Kulkarni for the petitioner.
Mr. Nitin Khare with Mr. Akhil Kupade i/by Mr. Akhil
Kupade for respondent for the respondent.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : APRIL 16, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 18, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. By the present petition instituted under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioner calls in question the
legality and correctness of the judgment and order dated 4 August
2025, rendered by the Industrial Court in Revision Application
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(ULP) No. 37 of 2025.
2. The facts leading to the filing of the present petition, briefly
stated, are as follows. The petitioner came to be appointed as a
Stenographer by an order dated 27 June 1994, with effect from 4
July 1994. In terms of the said appointment order and in
accordance with the administrative requirements of the respondent
company, the petitioner was transferred to different departments
from time to time. It is further the case that, by direction dated 9
July 2019, the petitioner was assigned to work as “Impex
Support”, and at the relevant time, he was discharging duties of
feeding data into the system. It is the petitioner’s case that his
services came to be terminated by an order dated 19 June 2020,
purportedly in terms of the conditions of employment contained in
the appointment order dated 27 June 1994. The termination order,
however, did not disclose any reasons whatsoever, nor did it
attribute any misconduct to the petitioner. Being aggrieved by such
termination, the petitioner instituted Complaint (ULP) No. 53 of
2020 on 26 June 2020 before the Labour Court at Pune under the
provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.
3. The respondent company resisted the said complaint by
filing its written statement dated 6 October 2020. The principal
defence raised by the respondent was that the petitioner does not
fall within the definition of a “workman” under the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, and therefore, the complaint itself was not
maintainable. On this basis, a request was made to frame a
preliminary issue regarding maintainability and to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Notably, the
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respondent did not assign any reasons for termination of the
petitioner’s services and confined its defence to the plea that the
petitioner is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the termination was in
accordance with the contract of employment.
4. The Labour Court, by its order dated 24 February 2021,
rejected the respondent’s application for framing a preliminary
issue. The said order was carried in revision by the respondent by
filing Revision Application (ULP) No. 20 of 2021 before the
Industrial Court. The Industrial Court, by order dated 25 August
2021, allowed the said revision application and directed that a
preliminary issue be framed and that the parties lead evidence
thereon. Pursuant thereto, both parties adduced evidence before
the Labour Court on the preliminary issue so framed. Upon
appreciation of the material on record, the Labour Court, by its
order dated 20 May 2022, held that the petitioner is a “workman”
and also an “employee” within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the
MRTU and PULP Act.
5. Being dissatisfied with the said finding, the respondent
preferred Revision Application (ULP) No. 52 of 2022, which came
to be dismissed by judgment and order dated 22 January 2024.
After the said adjudication on the preliminary issue, the petitioner
filed his affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief before the Labour
Court on 14 March 2024. It is significant that, until this stage, the
respondent adhered to the defence as originally taken in the
written statement. However, on 13 August 2024, the respondent
moved an application seeking amendment of the written statement
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by introducing additional pleadings in paragraphs 20(A) to 20(M).
The petitioner opposed the said application, contending that the
proposed amendment seeks to fundamentally alter the nature of
the complaint from one of simpliciter termination to one of
punitive termination based on alleged misconduct. It was further
contended that the attempt to introduce such a case after a lapse
of about four years is an afterthought, particularly when no
allegation of misconduct was made in the termination order dated
19 June 2020. The petitioner pointed out that, by way of the
proposed amendment, especially in paragraph 20(J), the
respondent sought to allege serious misconduct on the part of the
petitioner, which would materially change the nature of the
dispute and cause serious prejudice.
6. The Labour Court, by order dated 1 April 2025, rejected the
respondent’s application for amendment. The Labour Court
recorded a finding that the proposed amendment would alter the
entire nature of the proceedings and would effectively change the
cause of action, thereby causing prejudice to the petitioner.
Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred Revision Application
(ULP) No. 37 of 2025 under Section 44 of the MRTU and PULP
Act, 1971 before the Industrial Court at Pune. The petitioner
opposed the said revision by filing a detailed reply, contending that
the order passed by the Labour Court is well-reasoned and does
not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the record. It was
further contended that the revisional jurisdiction of the Industrial
Court under Section 44 is limited and akin to supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and
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therefore, no interference was warranted. The petitioner also
pointed out that evidence on the preliminary issue had already
commenced on 30 October 2021, followed by recording of
evidence of the respondent’s witnesses on 24 March 2022 and 19
April 2022, and that the preliminary issue was decided on 20 May
2022. It was urged that, in view of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17
of the Code of Civil Procedure, once the trial has commenced, an
amendment can be allowed only upon due diligence being
demonstrated. According to the petitioner, in the present case, the
facts sought to be introduced by amendment were within the
knowledge of the respondent since 2020, and yet, no steps were
taken till 2024. Hence, the requirement of due diligence was not
satisfied, and the amendment application was liable to be rejected.
7. The Industrial Court, however, by its judgment and final
order dated 4 August 2025, allowed Revision Application (ULP)
No. 37 of 2025 and set aside the order passed by the Labour Court
in Complaint (ULP) No. 53 of 2020. Being aggrieved by the said
decision, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the
present writ petition.
8. Mr. Nitin Kulkarni, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of
the petitioner, submitted that the proposed amendment to the
written statement, which travels beyond the scope of the
termination order dated 19 June 2020, could not have been
permitted in law. According to him, such permission reflects clear
non-application of mind and an erroneous understanding of settled
legal principles. He placed reliance upon the judgment of this
Court in Prakash Mahadev Nigampurkar v. Premier Automobiles
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Ltd., (1995) 2 LLN 373, wherein it has been observed that it is not
permissible for the Labour Court to go into any allegation or
charge other than that which forms the very foundation of the
order of dismissal. He, therefore, submitted that the Labour Court
lacks jurisdiction to permit either party to lead evidence beyond
the contents of the termination order, and equally, such a case
cannot be introduced by way of amendment. It was thus
contended that the Industrial Court has misread the binding
precedent and has failed to apply the correct position of law laid
down by this Court.
9. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent, at
the time of issuing the termination order, had consciously chosen
to terminate the petitioner’s services without assigning any reasons
and without alleging any misconduct. According to him, the
respondent deliberately proceeded on the footing that the
petitioner was not a “workman” within the meaning of Section
2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Section 3(5) of the
MRTU and PULP Act, and effected termination by way of a
simpliciter discharge, without casting any stigma upon the
petitioner. It was further submitted that the Industrial Court ought
to have taken into consideration that, as on the date of
termination, the stand of the respondent itself was that no
misconduct had been committed by the petitioner, which is evident
from the fact that notice pay was tendered to him. In such
circumstances, the respondent is precluded from taking a contrary
stand by way of amendment, so as to now contend that the
termination was on account of misconduct. According to the
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petitioner, such a course is barred by principles akin to estoppel
and cannot be permitted.
10. Learned counsel also submitted that the application for
amendment, filed after a lapse of four years from the date of filing
of the written statement, is clearly an afterthought. It was urged
that, by way of the proposed amendment, the respondent seeks to
introduce an entirely new defence by alleging serious misconduct
on the part of the petitioner, which was never the subject matter of
any charge sheet. He submitted that, in the absence of a charge
sheet and a domestic enquiry, such allegations cannot be permitted
to be introduced or adjudicated upon. He relied upon the
judgment in Wai Taluka Sahakari Kharedi Vikri Sangh vs. Shri
Bajirao Mahadeo, 1992 (1) CLR 637, to contend that it is
impermissible for an employer to justify termination by leading
evidence when no enquiry has been conducted. It was further
contended that the Labour Court cannot assume the role of
framing charges suo motu in the absence of a charge sheet and
thereafter permit parties to lead evidence on such charges.
According to him, despite this settled legal position, the Industrial
Court has erroneously allowed the amendment merely on the
ground that amendments can be permitted at any stage, without
appreciating the legal constraints, thereby unnecessarily widening
the scope of adjudication before the Labour Court.
11. He further submitted that the Industrial Court has wrongly
relied upon the judgment in Maruti Krushna Naik vs. Advani
Oerlikon Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3418. It was contended that,
in the said case, the termination order itself was stigmatic in
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nature, and the employer had sought to justify the allegations
forming part of that order by leading evidence. According to him,
the said judgment cannot be read to mean that, in a case of
simpliciter termination, the employer can subsequently introduce
reasons or allegations of misconduct by way of amendment. He
submitted that the Industrial Court has incorrectly extended the
ratio of the said judgment to a situation where the termination
order is ex facie non-stigmatic and silent as to reasons. On this
basis, it was urged that the impugned order deserves to be
quashed and set aside.
12. Per contra, Mr. Nitin Khare, learned Advocate appearing for
the respondent, submitted that the written statement filed by the
respondent primarily addressed the issue of the petitioner’s status
as a workman, as well as the interim reliefs sought. He submitted
that, in the said written statement, the respondent had denied the
allegations of the petitioner, including the contention that the
termination was without reasons. He further submitted that the
respondent is not seeking to reiterate its contention that the
petitioner is not a workman, but is only attempting to place on
record the reasons which led to the termination. It was contended
that even where a termination order does not disclose reasons, the
employer is entitled in law to justify the action by leading evidence
before the Labour Court. According to him, the proposed
amendment does not alter the nature of the complaint, nor does it
cause any prejudice to the petitioner.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that,
although the petitioner has filed his affidavit in lieu of
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examination-in-chief, the stage of cross-examination has not yet
commenced. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial
has effectively commenced. He submitted that the respondent
merely seeks to introduce additional pleas in the written
statement, and the correctness or otherwise of such pleas can be
adjudicated at the stage of final hearing. According to him, no
conclusive findings ought to be rendered at an interlocutory stage
while considering an application for amendment. In support of his
submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the judgment in
Maruti Krishna Naik and others vs. Advani Oerlikon Ltd. and
Another, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3418.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
14. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and
having gone through the record, this Court finds that the
controversy is whether, in the facts of this case, the respondent
could be permitted to bring in by amendment a new and different
case, after the termination order dated 19 June 2020 had already
stood on the record for years, and after the proceedings before the
Labour Court had moved beyond the stage of mere pleading.
15. The petitioner was terminated by a plain order. The record
placed before this Court indicates that such order dated 19 June
2020 does not contain any reason. It also does not contain
allegation of misconduct. It is therefore not possible to read into
that order anything beyond what is stated. The order appears to be
a conscious choice taken by the respondent at the relevant time.
When an employer issues such an unreasoned termination, it must
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be presumed that the employer was aware of the consequences of
issuing an order. In such situation, the respondent had elected its
course of action. It chose to rely only upon the terms of
appointment and proceeded on the footing that the petitioner was
not a workman. That stand is reflected in the written statement
also. Therefore, the defence was specific. Once such a position is
adopted, it is not open for the respondent, after passage of
considerable time, to alter the very basis of the action and contend
that the termination was in fact on account of misconduct. Such a
contention is a substitution of an entirely different case. Law does
permit explanation or clarification. However, law does not permit a
party to rewrite its original stand in a manner which changes the
entire nature of the dispute. If such liberty is granted, then the
sanctity of original action itself will lose meaning.
16. The submission of the petitioner that the amendment travels
beyond the termination order deserves acceptance. The
termination order dated 19 June 2020 must be treated as the
foundational document. It defines the scope of dispute. If the
employer had intention to terminate on account of alleged
misconduct, then indication ought to have been reflected either in
the termination order or in contemporaneous material such as
charge sheet or internal record. However, no such material is
shown. The record is silent on this aspect. In that background, the
attempt of the respondent to introduce detailed allegations of
misconduct through amendment paragraphs 20(A) to 20(M)
cannot be treated as an elaboration. It is creating a new case. The
nature of termination, which was originally non-stigmatic, is
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sought to be converted into a punitive termination. This change
affects the framework of adjudication. A simpliciter termination
stands on a different footing. A termination based on misconduct
requires proof, enquiry, fairness and compliance with principles of
natural justice. Therefore, by permitting such amendment, the
Court would be allowing a complete shift in the character of
proceedings.
17. The reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment in
Prakash Mahadev Nigampurkar is well placed. The principle
emerging from that decision is that the Labour Court cannot travel
beyond the foundation of the termination or dismissal order. The
order itself sets the limits of enquiry. If the order does not contain
any allegation, then the Court cannot permit parties to travel
outside it and create new grounds. The termination order is the
basis of employer’s action. If that basis is absent, the employer
must stand or fall on that silence. It cannot be permitted to later
supplement the order by introducing new allegations through
pleadings. Such exercise would amount to validating an order on
grounds which never existed at the time of its issuance. The
Industrial Court appears to have overlooked this position. It has
treated the amendment as if it is a procedural step, without
appreciating that the amendment strikes at the root of the original
cause of action.
18. The aspect of delay supports the case of the petitioner. The
amendment application was filed on 13 August 2024. The written
statement was of the year 2020. There is thus a gap of about four
years. During this period, the proceedings had substantially
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progressed. The preliminary issue was framed and decided.
Evidence on that issue commenced as early as 30 October 2021.
Witnesses were examined and cross-examined. Thereafter, the
petitioner also filed affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief on 14
March 2024. Therefore, it cannot be said that the matter was at an
initial stage. Once trial has commenced, the proviso to Order VI
Rule 17 becomes applicable. It imposes a restriction. It requires the
party seeking amendment to show due diligence. That means the
party must show that despite reasonable care, the matter could not
have been raised earlier. In the present case, no such explanation is
forthcoming. The alleged facts of misconduct, now sought to be
introduced, were always within the knowledge of the respondent.
They existed at the time of termination. There is no case of
discovery of new material. Therefore, the condition of due
diligence is clearly not satisfied. On this ground alone, the
amendment is liable to be rejected.
19. The reliance placed on Wai Taluka Sahakari Kharedi Vikri
Sangh also supports the petitioner’s case. The principle laid down
is that where no enquiry is conducted, and no charge sheet is
issued, the employer cannot later attempt to justify the termination
by leading evidence on alleged misconduct. The Labour Court is
not expected to assume the role of employer and frame charges on
its own. Such a course would defeat the procedural safeguards
available to an employee. In the present case no charge sheet was
issued, and no enquiry was conducted. The termination order is
silent. Despite this, the respondent now seeks to allege serious
misconduct. If such amendment is permitted, it would indirectly
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allow the respondent to bypass the requirement of enquiry and to
build a case which was never initiated in accordance with law. This
would place an unfair burden on the petitioner and would distort
the adjudicatory process. The Labour Court, therefore, was
justified in refusing such amendment.
20. The submission of the respondent that it has a right to justify
the termination by leading evidence cannot be accepted in the
present factual situation. It is true that in certain cases, the
employer may be permitted to justify its action. However, such
principle is not without limitation. In the present case, the
employer did not disclose any reason in the termination order. It
did not initiate any disciplinary process. It did not frame any
charge. Therefore, the foundation for such justification is itself
absent. What is now sought is not mere justification. It is a
reconstruction of the case by introducing a new basis. Law does
not permit such reconstruction at a belated stage. If such course is
allowed, then any employer can issue a blank termination order
and later build any case according to convenience.
21. The reliance placed on the judgment in Maruti Krushna Naik
is also misplaced. In that matter, the termination order itself
contained allegations which were stigmatic in nature. The
evidence was led to support what was already present in the order.
The Court, in that context, permitted justification. The facts here
are entirely different. The present termination order is completely
silent. It does not contain any stigma. It does not refer to
misconduct. Therefore, the ratio of that judgment cannot be
extended to a case where the very basis of misconduct is sought to
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be introduced for the first time by amendment. The Industrial
Court has failed to notice this basic distinction.
22. The contention that cross-examination has not yet
commenced does not materially assist the respondent. The stage of
trial cannot be seen only in terms of whether cross-examination
has begun or not. The proceedings have already advanced beyond
the initial stage. Evidence has been led on the preliminary issue.
Affidavit of examination-in-chief has been filed on merits.
Therefore, the trial has effectively commenced. Even otherwise,
the issue is not merely the stage of trial. The issue is whether the
amendment changes the nature of defence and whether due
diligence is shown. On both counts, the respondent fails. The
prejudice to the petitioner is also clear and real. The petitioner
challenged a simple termination. If the amendment is allowed, he
will be forced to meet allegations of misconduct, without any prior
notice or enquiry. This would place him in a disadvantageous
position. Such prejudice cannot be ignored.
23. For all these reasons, this Court finds that the amendment
sought by the respondent is not permissible in law. The Labour
Court rightly rejected it. The Industrial Court erred in interfering
with that order.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons recorded
hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) The writ petition is allowed;
(ii) The judgment and order dated 4 August 2025 passed
by the Industrial Court, Pune in Revision Application (ULP)
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No. 37 of 2025 is quashed and set aside;
(iii) The order dated 1 April 2025 passed by the Labour
Court, Pune below the amendment application in Complaint
(ULP) No. 53 of 2020 is restored;
(iv) The application for amendment of the written
statement filed by the respondent stands rejected;
(v) The Labour Court shall proceed with Complaint (ULP)
No. 53 of 2020 in accordance with law and on the basis of
the pleadings as they originally stand, without permitting
introduction of any new case of alleged misconduct by way
of amendment;
(vi) The Labour Court is requested to decide the complaint
as expeditiously as possible;
(vii) Rule is made absolute in the above terms. No order as
to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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