Jammu & Kashmir High Court – Srinagar Bench
At Srinagar vs J&K Projects Construction on 6 March, 2026
Author: Sanjay Dhar
Bench: Sanjay Dhar
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT SRINAGAR
Case: Arb P No.14/2025
c/w
Arb P No.15/2025
Arb P No.16/2025
Arb P No.17/2025
Reserved on: 27.02.2026
Pronounced on : 06.03.2026
Uploaded on : 06.03.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
M/s Ace Consultants
....Petitioners
Through:- Mr. Javaid Ahmed, Advocate
V/s
J&K Projects Construction
Corporation Limited and Ors.
.....Respondents
Through:- Mr. Jahangir Dar, GA
\
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
(JUDGMENT)
01. By this common judgment, the afore-titled four
arbitration petitions involving identical parties and common
questions of law and fact are proposed to be decided together.
02. The petitioner, a proprietorship firm, has filed the
present petitions under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation, 1996 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'Act')
seeking appointment of an independent arbitrator preferably a
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 1 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
retired judge of this Court for adjudication of disputes that
have arisen between the parties.
03. The subject matter of the arbitration petition No. 14
of 2025 is allotment order No. Mech XII/2518-22 dated
10.12.2012 relating to 'Supply, Installation, Testing and
Commissioning of Two No's. G plus four 26 passenger bed
lifts and one No. 400 kgs capacity G plus four dumb
weightier at JLNM Hospital Rainawari Srinagar'. It has
been submitted that whole of the amount due for the work
done has not been released by the respondents and their
outstanding claims have not been cleared so far. The
petitioner has placed on record copy of certificate dated
21.10.2013 issued by respondent No. 3, which shows that in
respect of the contract in question, the total cost of work was
Rs. 67.00 lacs out of which payment of Rs. 40.00 lacs has
been released and the balance outstanding payment is
Rs. 27.00 lacs.
04. The subject matter of the arbitration petition No. 15
of 2025 is allotment order No. Mech XII/2543-47 dated
10.12.2012 relating to 'Supply, Installation, Testing and
Commissioning of one No. G + four 13 passenger electric
traction lift at Sarie Building, Shreen Bagh, Srinagar'. It
has been submitted that the respondents have not cleared
whole of the amount in respect of the aforesaid work.
According to the certificate issued by respondent No. 3 on
21.10.2013, the cost of the allotted work was Rs. 22.50 lacs
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 2 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
out of which an amount of Rs. 5.00 lacs has been released in
favour of the petitioner leaving a balance of Rs. 17.50 lacs.
05. The subject matter of the arbitration petition No. 16
of 2025 is allotment order No. Mech XII/2523-27 dated
10.12.2012 relating to 'Supply, Installation, Testing and
Commissioning of Two No's. (G plus 03 and G plus 04) 26
passenger bed L D at Hospital Hazuri Bagh, Srinagar'.
According to the petitioner, entire outstanding amount has not
been released in its favour and as per certificate issued by
respondent No. 3, total cost of the allotted work was Rs. 58.00
lacs out of which an amount of Rs. 52.20 lacs has been
released in favour of the petitioner, leaving a balance amount
of Rs. 5.80 lacs.
06. The subject matter of the arbitration petition No. 17
of 2025 is allotment order No. Mech XII/2538-42 dated
10.12.2012 relating to 'Supply, Installation, Testing and
Commissioning of Two No's. (G +2) 26 passenger bed lifts
at District Hospital, Baramulla'. It has been submitted that
as per certificate dated 21.10.2013 issued by respondent No. 3
total cost of the work was Rs. 57.00 lacs out of which an
amount of Rs. 39.90 lacs has been released in favour of the
petitioner leaving a balance of Rs. 17.10 lacs.
07. It has been contended by the petitioner that a writ
petition bearing WP(C) No. 2057/2017 was filed by it seeking a
direction upon the respondents for releasing the pending
payments and vide order dated 20.12.2017, the writ petition
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 3 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
was disposed of with a direction that the petition be treated as
representation on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents
to accord consideration to the claim of the petitioner as
detailed in the writ petition and to take a decision in
accordance with law.
08. It has been submitted that despite directions of the
writ court, the respondents did not decide the claim of the
petitioner and ultimately the petitioner was constrained to file
a contempt petition bearing CPOWP No. 214/2018 against the
respondents. During the pendency of the contempt petition,
consideration order No. 166 of 2019 dated 23.12.2019 came to
be issued by the respondents whereby claim of the petitioner
in respect of the aforesaid four allotted works was rejected.
Pursuant to the passing of the aforesaid consideration order,
the contempt petition was disposed of by this Court in terms of
order dated 22.10.2020 whereby liberty was granted to the
petitioner to pursue the appropriate remedy as available under
law.
09. It has been submitted that all the afore-mentioned
four allotment orders contain an arbitration clause providing
that in case of any dispute arising between the parties, the
matter shall be referred to arbitration and that decision of the
arbitrator shall be binding upon both the parties.
10. It has been submitted that the petitioner could not
invoke the arbitration clause immediately upon disposal of the
contempt petition, because of Covid-19 pandemic and it was
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 4 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
only on 16.05.2023 that the petitioner addressed a
communication to the respondents invoking the arbitration
clause and seeking appointment of an arbitrator in all the four
cases. However, when the respondents failed to take any
action in terms of the arbitration clause, the instant petitions
came to be filed before this Court on 15.05.2025 seeking
appointment of arbitrator.
11. No reply has been filed by the respondents to any of
the four petitions and, therefore, right to file reply was closed.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused record of the case.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised
objection with regard to the maintainability of these petitions
on the ground that the claims projected by the petitioners in
these petitions are stale and time barred and thus, have
become dead and non-arbitrable. It has been contended that
even the letter seeking invocation of arbitration clause issued
by the petitioner is hopelessly time barred and, therefore, the
present petitions are not maintainable.
14. This Court has, while analyzing the legal position
with regard to scope of pre-referral jurisdiction under section
11(6) of the Act in the case of Promark Techsolutions Pvt.
Ltd Vs. UT of J&K & ors (Arbitration Petition No. 45 of 2024
along with connected petitions decided on 29.12.2025),
observed as under:
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 5 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
"9. The Supreme Court has, in the case of Vidya Drolia v.
Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1, while dealing
with the scope of power of the Referral Court under Sections
11 and 8, held that at the referral stage, if it is found that the
claims are ex-facie time barred and dead and there is no
subsisting dispute, the reference can be refused. The relevant
observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced as under:
"148. Section 43(1) of the Arbitration Act states
that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to
arbitrations as it applies to court proceedings. Sub-
section (2) states that for the purposes of the
Arbitration Act and Limitation Act, arbitration shall
be deemed to have commenced on the date
referred to in Section 21. Limitation law is
procedural and normally disputes, being factual,
would be for the arbitrator to decide guided by the
facts found and the law applicable. The court at
the referral stage can interfere only when it is
manifest that the claims are ex facie time-barred
and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute. All
other cases should be referred to the Arbitral
Tribunal for decision on merits. Similar would be
the position in case of disputed "no-claim
certificate" or defence on the plea of novation and
"accord and satisfaction". As observed in Premium
Nafta Products Ltd, it is not to be expected that
commercial men while entering transactions inter
se would knowingly create a system which would
require that the court should first decide whether
the contract should be rectified or avoided or
rescinded, as the case may be, and then if the
contract is held to be valid, it would require the
arbitrator to resolve the issues that have arisen.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
154.......154.4. Rarely as a demurrer the court
may interfere at Section 8 or 11 stage when it is
manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration
agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes
are non-arbitrable, though the nature and facet of
non-arbitrability would, to some extent, determine
the level and nature of judicial scrutiny. The
restricted and limited review is to check and
protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when
the matter is demonstrably "non-arbitrable" and to
cut off the deadwood. The court by default would
refer the matter when contentions relating to non-
arbitrability are plainly arguable; when
consideration in summary proceedings would be
insufficient and inconclusive; when facts are
contested; when the party opposing arbitration
adopts delaying tactics or impairs conduct of
arbitration proceedings. This is not the stage for
the court to enter into a mini trial or elaborate
review so as to usurp the jurisdiction of the Arbitral
Tribunal but to affirm and uphold integrity and
efficacy of arbitration as an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism.
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 6 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
10. Taking note of the aforesaid ratio laid down in
Vidya Drolia's case (supra), the Supreme court in the
case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. M/S Nortel
Networks India Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738, observed
as under:
44. The issue of limitation which concerns the
"admissibility" of the claim, must be decided by the
Arbitral Tribunal either as a preliminary issue, or
at the final stage after evidence is led by the
parties.
xxx xxx xxx xx
47. It is only in the very limited category of cases,
where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the
claim is ex facie time-barred, or that the dispute is
non-arbitrable, that the court may decline to make
the reference. However, if there is even the
slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the disputes to
arbitration, otherwise it would encroach upon what
is essentially a matter to be determined by the
tribunal.
48. Applying the law to the facts of the present
case, it is clear that this is a case where the claims
are ex facie time-barred by over 5½ years, since
Nortel did not take any action whatsoever after the
rejection of its claim by BSNL on 4-8-2014. The
notice of arbitration was invoked on 29-4-2020.
There is not even an averment either in the notice
of arbitration, or the petition filed under Section 11,
or before this Court, of any intervening facts which
may have occurred, which would extend the period
of limitation falling within Sections 5 to 20 of the
Limitation Act. Unless, there is a pleaded case
specifically adverting to the applicable section, and
how it extends the limitation from the date on
which the cause of action originally arose, there
can be no basis to save the time of limitation.
49. The present case is a case of deadwood/no
subsisting dispute since the cause of action arose
on 4-8-2014, when the claims made by Nortel were
rejected by BSNL. The respondent has not stated
any event which would extend the period of
limitation, which commenced as per Article 55 of
the Schedule of the Limitation Act (which provides
the limitation for cases pertaining to breach of
contract) immediately after the rejection of the final
bill by making deductions.
11. In NTPCL Limited vs. SPML Infra Limited, (2023) 9
SCC 385, the Supreme Court, while discussing the scope
of jurisdiction of the Court under Section11(6) of the Act,
made the following observations:
25. The abovereferred precedents crystallise the
position of law that the pre-referral jurisdiction of
the Courts under Section 11(6) of the Act is very
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 7 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
narrow and inheres two inquiries. The primary
inquiry is about the existence and the validity of
an arbitration agreement, which also includes an
inquiry as to the parties to the agreement and
the applicant's privity to the said agreement.
These are matters which require a thorough
examination by the Referral Court. The secondary
inquiry that may arise at the reference stage
itself is with respect to the non-arbitrability of the
dispute.
26. As a general rule and a principle, the
Arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to
determine and decide all questions of non-
arbitrability. As an exception to the rule,
and rarely as a demurrer, the Referral Court
may reject claims which are manifestly and ex
facie non-arbitrable. Explaining this position,
flowing from the principles laid down in Vidya
Drolia , this Court in a subsequent decision
in Nortel Networks held (Nortel Networks case
SCC p. 764, para 45)
"45. ... 45.1. ... While exercising
jurisdiction under Section 11 as the
judicial forum, the Court may exercise the
prima facie test to screen and knockdown
ex facie meritless, frivolous, and dishonest
litigation. Limited jurisdiction of the Courts
would ensure expeditious and efficient
disposal at the referral stage. At the
referral stage, the Court can interfere
"only" when it is "manifest" that the
claims are ex facie time-barred and dead,
or there is no subsisting dispute."
27. The standard of scrutiny to examine the non-
arbitrability of a claim is only prima facie.
Referral Courts must not undertake a full review
of the contested facts; they must only be confined
to a primary first review [and let facts speak for
themselves. This also requires the Courts to
examine whether the assertion on arbitrability
is bona fide or not. The prima facie scrutiny of
the facts must lead to a clear conclusion that
there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim
is non-arbitrable. On the other hand, even if there
is the slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the
dispute to arbitration.
28. The limited scrutiny, through the eye of the
needle, is necessary and compelling. It is
intertwined with the duty of the Referral Court
to protect the parties from being forced to
arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably non-
arbitrable [Ibid.]. It has been termed as
a legitimate interference by Courts to refuse
reference in order to prevent wastage of public
and private resources. Further, as noted
in Vidya Drolia , if this duty within the limited
compass is not exercised, and the Court becomes
too reluctant to intervene, it may undermine the
effectiveness of both, arbitration and the Court .
Therefore, this Court or a High Court, as the case
may be, while exercising jurisdiction under
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 8 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
Section 11(6) of the Act, is not expected to act
mechanically merely to deliver a purported
dispute raised by an applicant at the doors of the
chosen arbitrator, as explained in DLF Home
Developers Ltd. v. Rajapura Homes (P) Ltd.
12. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Aslam Ismail
Khan Deshmukh v. Asap Fluids Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 1
SCC 502, after surveying previous judgments on the issue
made the following observations:
43. Therefore, while determining the issue of
limitation in the exercise of powers under Section
11(6) of the 1996 Act, the referral Court must only
conduct a limited enquiry for the purpose of
examining whether the Section 11(6) application
has been filed within the limitation period of three
years or not. At this stage, it would not be proper
for the referral Court to indulge in an intricate
evidentiary enquiry into the question of whether
the claims raised by the petitioner are time-
barred. Such a determination must be left to the
decision of the arbitrator.
44. After all, in a scenario where the referral
Court is able to discern the frivolity in the litigation
on the basis of bare minimum pleadings, it would
be incorrect to assume or doubt that the Arbitral
Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the same
inference, especially when they are equipped with
the power to undertake an extensive examination
of the pleadings and evidence adduced before
them.
45. As observed by us in Krish Spg., the power
of the referral Court under Section 11 must
essentially be seen in light of the fact that the
parties do not have the right of appeal against
any order passed by the referral Court under
Section 11, be it for either appointing or refusing to
appoint an arbitrator. Therefore, if the referral
Court delves into the domain of the Arbitral
Tribunal at the Section 11 stage and rejects the
application of the claimant, we run a serious risk
of leaving the claimant remediless for the
adjudication of their claims.
46. Moreover, the courts are vested with the
power of subsequent review in which the award
passed by the arbitrator may be subjected to
challenge by any party to the arbitration.
Therefore, the courts may take a second look at
the adjudication done by the Arbitral Tribunal at a
later stage, if considered necessary and
appropriate in the circumstances.
13. From the foregoing analysis of the legal position, it is clear
that at the time of considering a petition under Section
11(6) of the Act, unless it is shown that the claim is ex-
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 9 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
facie time barred or hopelessly time barred, the Court
exercising power under Section 11(6) of the Act for
appointment of Arbitrator should not reject such
application. If there is slightest doubt with regard to
arbitrability of the claim on account of it being time
barred, the issue for determination in this regard should
be left to the Arbitrator and the Court while exercising its
power under Section 11 of Act should not venture to
determine the said issue at reference stage."
14. In the same case, this court also considered the
question as to what is the period of limitation for a claim to
become non-arbitrable or stale and what is the period of
limitation for filing a petition under section 11 of the Act. In
this regard, paras 15 to 18 of the said judgment are relevant to
the context and same are reproduced as under:
"15. Section 43 of the Act provides that Limitation Act, 1963,
shall apply to arbitrations as it applies for proceedings in
court. Sub-section (2) of the said provision further provides
that the arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on
the date referred in Section 21 whereas Section 21 of the Act
provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
arbitral proceedings in commenced on the date on which a
request for reference of the dispute to arbitration is received by
the respondent.
16. A conjoint reading of these provisions would show that the
provisions of the Limitation Act apply to all proceedings under
the Act, both in court and in arbitrationexcept to the extent
expressly excluded by the provisions of the Act. In this regard,
support can be drawn from the ratio laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of Consolidated Engineering
Enterprises v. Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169
17. In the Arbitration Act, no limitation period has been
prescribed for filing an application under Section 11.
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 10 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
Therefore, Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act
would apply, meaning thereby that the period of limitation for
filing an application under Section 11 of the Act would arise
when right to apply accrues to the petitioner. There is
distinction between the period of limitation for enforcing a
claim against a party and the period of limitation for filing a
petition under Section 11 of the Act. The Supreme Court has,
in the case of J. C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corporation
Ltd. (2008) 2 SCC 444, explained the distinction between the
period of limitation for filing a petition and the period of
limitation as to the claims being barred by time, in the
following manner:
"25. The learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the limitation would begun to
run from the date on which a difference arose
between the parties, and in this case the
difference arose only when OMC refused to
comply with the notice dated 4-6-1980 seeking
reference to arbitration. We are afraid, the
contention is without merit. The appellant is
obviously confusing the limitation for a petition
under Section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940
with the limitation for the claim itself. The
limitation for a suit is calculated as on the date
of filing of the suit. In the case of arbitration,
limitation for the claim is to be calculated on the
date on which the arbitration is deemed to have
commenced.
26. Section 37(3) of the Act provides that for
the purpose of the Limitation Act, an arbitration
is deemed to have been commenced when one
party to the arbitration agreement serves on the
other party thereto, a notice requiring the
appointment of an arbitrator. Such a notice
having been served on 4-6-1980, it has to be
seen whether the claims were in time as on that
date. If the claims were barred on 4-6-1980, it
follows that the claims had to be rejected by the
arbitrator on the ground that the claims were
barred by limitation. The said period has
nothing to do with the period of limitation for
filing a petition under Section 8(2) of the Act.
Insofar as a petition under Section 8(2) is
concerned, the cause of action would arise
when the other party fails to comply with the
notice invoking arbitration. Therefore, the period
of limitation for filing a petition under Section
8(2) seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot
be confused with the period of limitation for
making a claim. The decisions of this Court
in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh
Rekhi v. DDA, Panchu Gopal Bose v. Board
of Trustees for Port of Calcutta and Utkal
Commercial Corpn. v. Central Coal Fields
Ltdalso make this position clear.
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 11 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
18. From the foregoing analysis of legal position, it is deduced
that the cause of action for filing a petition under Section 11 of
the Act would arise when the opposite party fails to comply
with the notice invoking arbitration clause whereas limitation
for the claim has to be calculated on the day on which the
arbitration is deemed to have commenced. Thus, the cause of
action for filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act would
arise when the respondent fails to respond to the notice for
invocation of arbitration clause and the limitation with regard
to claim, which is subject matter of arbitration, has to be
calculated as on date when the notice for invocation of
arbitration clause is issued. Therefore, if the claim of a party
filing a petition under Section 11 of the Act is time barred as
on date of invocation of the arbitration clause, then, of course,
his claim would qualify to be a dead claim and, as such, non-
arbitrable. Similarly, if a party files a petition beyond a period
of three years after invocation of the arbitration clause, his
petition will be time barred."
15. With the aforesaid legal position in mind, let us now
analyze the facts of the present case. As per the case of the
petitioner, its claim was rejected by the respondents when
consideration order dated 23.12.2019 came to be passed by
the respondents pursuant to directions passed by the writ
court. It is to be noted that in spite of passing of the said
order, the petitioner continued to pursue the contempt
proceedings, which came to be closed on 22.10.2020 leaving it
open to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy.
16. Admittedly the arbitration clause has been invoked
by the petitioner in May 2023. The cause of action for
invoking the arbitration clause arose in favour of the petitioner
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 12 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
only when the respondents declined its claim by passing
consideration order dated 23.12.2019 and thereafter when the
court, exercising contempt jurisdiction, refused to interfere in
the matter leaving it open to the petitioner to avail appropriate
remedy. Thus, when the petitioner invoked the arbitration
clause in May 2023, the same was done by it within the
prescribed period of three years. Thereafter the petitioner has
filed the instant petition in May, 2025 well within the
prescribed period of three years from the date of invocation of
arbitration clause.
17. Thus, it cannot be stated that the claim of the
petitioner is ex facie time barred because it has invoked the
arbitration clause within three years of refusal of respondents
to entertain its claim and the present petition has been filed
within three years of invocation of the arbitration clause.
Though this issue has to be gone into and analyzed by the
arbitral tribunal before considering the claims of the petitioner
on merits, this Court, while exercising its power under Section
11 (6) of the Act, cannot go into this issue and it is only the
arbitral tribunal, who can go into all these issues during
arbitral proceedings.
18. For the aforesaid reasons, the objection raised by
the respondents with regard to maintainability of these
petitions and non-arbitrability of the claims of the petitioner on
account of the same being time barred is rejected. Once it is
held that issue with regard to arbitrability of the claims of the
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 13 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
petitioner/company on the ground of limitation is a matter,
which is required to be gone into by the arbitral tribunal and
once it has been found that there is a arbitration clause
existing between the parties, which has been invoked by the
petitioner without any response from the respondents, there is
no other option available with this Court except to refer the
disputes arising between the parties to arbitral tribunal.
19. Accordingly, the petitions are disposed of by referring
all the disputes and differences covered by the agreements,
to the learned Sole Arbitrator in the following terms:
(I) Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rashid Ali Dar, former
judge of this Court, is appointed as the Sole
Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes
and differences between the parties arising
out of and in connection with the agreement
referred to above.
(II) A copy of this order be communicated to the
learned Sole Arbitrator by the Registry of
this Court within a period of ten days from
today.
(III) The learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to
forward the statutory statement of
disclosure under Section 11(8) read with
Section 12(1) of the Act of 1996 to the
parties within a period of two weeks from
the date of receipt of this order.
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 14 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025
2026:JKLHC-SGR:41
(IV) The parties shall appear before the learned
Sole Arbitrator on a date and place to be
fixed by the learned Sole Arbitrator.
(V) All the arbitral costs and fee of the Arbitral
Tribunal shall be borne by the parties
equally and shall be subject to final award
that may be passed by the learned
Arbitrator in relation to the costs.
(VI) The learned Arbitrator shall, before
proceeding to decide the merits of the
claims, decide the issue with regard to
limitation after hearing the parties.
14.
(SANJAY DHAR)
JUDGE
JAMMU
06.03.2026
Naresh/Secy.
Whether the judgment is speaking: Yes
Whether the judgment is reportable: No
...
Arb P Nos. 14/2025, Page 15 of 15
15/2025, 16/2025 & 17/2025