Jharkhand High Court
Arun Kumar vs Raj Soni Devi on 24 April, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:12141-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 172 of 2024
1. Arun Kumar, aged about 48 years, son of Late Ram Dev Ram, resident
of Police Line, Sector-12, J.M.P., P.O.-Sector-12, P.S.-B.S. City,
District-Bokaro, permanent resident of Village and P.O.-Sidisopur,
P.S.-Bihta, District-Patna, Bihar.
... ... Appellant/Petitioner
Versus
Raj Soni Devi, wife of Arun Kumar, daughter of Late Lalan Prasad,
resident of C/o Baldev Chaudhary at Sector-4, B.S. City, P.O. & P.S.
Sector-4, B.S. City, District-Bokaro, Jharkhand.
Parents Home Village-Dhibra, P.O.-Ushari Sikarpur, P.S. Sahpur,
District-Patna, Bihar.
... ... Respondent/Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
——-
For the Appellant : Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Om Prakash, Advocate
----------------------------
Order No. 06/Dated: 24th April, 2025
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court Act, 1984 is
directed against the order/judgment dated 31.05.2024 passed by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro in Original Suit No. 179 of
2019, whereby and whereunder, the petition filed under Section 13(1)(i-
a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by the appellant/petitioner
seeking a decree of divorce against his wife, has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the divorce petition by the
appellant/petitioner needs to be referred herein as under:
The marriage of the appellant/petitioner with the respondent
was solemnized on 26.02.1996 as per Hindu rites and custom. After
marriage, they lived together as husband and wife. Out of their wedlock,
they have been blessed with three children. The respondent is never
interested to live in his joint family. She never paid respect to her in-laws.
His parents are ailing but the respondent never taken care of them. She
always tried to create nuisance on trivial issues and wanted to live
1 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
2025:JHHC:12141-DBseparately from his family, for which he remained upset. He had to take
friendly loan of Rs.3,40,000/- for performing death ceremony of his
parents. The respondent pressurized him to purchase ornaments, for which
she tortured him by various means and used to create nuisance and quarrel
in the family in presence of guest and he had purchased ornaments for her.
In spite of that, there was no changes in her behaviour. Rather she had
threatened him to get him killed through his son Ranjeet Kumar and one
Awadhesh Yadav. He had listen the conversation between Ranjeet Kumar
and Awadhesh Yadav about the conspiracy. The respondent wants to take
his P.F., Gratuity and other benefit of his service after getting him killed.
He had seen his wife/respondent to be an uncommon situation with Ranjit
Kumar but due to insult in the society, he did not make hullah or made
complaint anywhere. He is a simple Policeman and an ideal husband.
Whereas, his wife/respondent always doubts about his character. She has
abused him and assassinated his character with his sisters. The respondent
has no interest with him. She is eager to get a heavy amount in her name
and she always demanded money of Rs.20,00,000/- Their children namely
Neha Kumar is aged about 23 years, Prince Raj is aged about 20 years and
Riya Kumari is aged about 16 years and all are earning members. The son
Prince Raj has given blow on his face and other children have insulted
him in filthy languages. The wife/respondent is skilled in tailoring work
and earn Rs.8,000-10,000 (approx.) per month. Despite that, he has
managed to maintain them by giving Rs. 10,000-15,000/- per month
besides other articles such as clothes, laptop and a scooty and household
articles. The respondent never supported him to establish relationship of
husband and wife between them since 15th November, 2016 and till date
she has deserted him and since then there is no relationship of husband
and wife between them. The respondent is too cruel and he apprehends his
life to live with the respondent. Her cruelty and behaviour has defamed
him in the society. She is indulged in voluntarily sexual intercourse with
Ranjit Kumar. He tried to persuade her but in vain. On 15.11.2016, she
left his company and started living with Ranjit Kumar. She came to
Bokaro and lived at Sector-4, B.S.City to disturb him. Said Ranjit Kumar
has also threatened to kill him. The respondent had given an application to2 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
2025:JHHC:12141-DBhis department levelling false and baseless allegations, which caused him
torture, This suit is not presented in collusion with each other. The cause
of action is said to be arisen on 26.02.1996 when their marriage was
solemnized and on 15.11.2016 when they started living separately.
3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant/petitioner had a
motion by filing a petition under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 for decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and
desertion.
4. The learned Family Judge has called upon the respondent-wife. The wife
has filed written statement and altogether five issues have been framed
which are as follows:
(i) Is this suit maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether the petitioner has valid cause of action for the suit?
(iii) Whether the respondent (Wife) has subjected the Petitioner
(husband) to cruelty after marriage?
(iv) Whether the respondent (wife) deserted her husband (petitioner)
since last two years prior to filing of the suit and is entitled to get a
Decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Section
13(1)(ia)(ib)(ic) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
(v) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the relief as prayed for?
5. The evidences have been made on behalf of both the parties. Thereafter,
the judgment has been passed dismissing the suit by holding that none of
the ground either of cruelty or desertion has been established by the
appellant/petitioner which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner:
6. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant/petitioner that the factual
aspect which was available before the learned Single Judge supported by
the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant/petitioner has not
3 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
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properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse,
hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
7. It has been submitted that the issue of cruelty and desertion has not been
taken into consideration in right perspective even though the fact about
living separately has well been established.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner, based upon the aforesaid
ground, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from
perversity, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent:
9. Per contra, Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. Om Prakash, learned counsel for the respondent-wife, while
defending the impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no error in
the impugned judgement. The learned Family Judge has considered the
issue of cruelty and desertion and having come to the conclusion that no
evidence has been adduced to establish either cruelty or desertion, has
dismissed the petition.
10. It has been contended that the allegation so far as alleged of commission
of cruelty is considered, the ground has been raised before the learned
Family Judge that the respondent-wife is not taking care of the in-laws. It
has been submitted that the father-in-law has died after 6-7 months of the
marriage of the parties and mother-in-law has also died sometime in the
year 2016 while the marriage was solemnized sometime in the year 1996
and the petitioner for grant of decree of divorce has been filed in the year
2019, as such, the ground of not taking care of the in-laws is absolutely
incorrect.
11. It has also been submitted that the appellant-husband and the respondent-
wife are having three children, the elder one is a daughter aged about 26
years; second one is a son aged about 22 years and third one is also a
daughter aged about 20 years.
4 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
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12. It has been submitted that the appellant/petitioner has tried to mislead the
Court by filing misleading application on the misleading ground of
committing cruelty by the wife upon the husband.
13. Learned senior counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted
that if on that pretext, the factum of cruelty and desertion has not been
found to be established, based upon which the decree of divorce has been
refused to be granted, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer
from error.
Analysis:
14. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned
judgment.
15. The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the suit
for divorce has been filed on the ground of cruelty and desertion, i.e., by
filing an application under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 and accordingly, issues have been framed wherein primarily
issue nos.3 and 4 pertains to cruelty and desertion.
16. The evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties. For ready
reference, the evidences led on behalf of the parties are being referred as
under:
(i) PW-1 Subodh Kumar has stated that due to estrangement and lack
of faith upon each other both used to level wrong allegations
against each other, due to which there was unrest in the family and
the appellant/petitioner was compelled by the respondent to live
separately from his parents. But in the cross-examination, he has
failed to say as to when the marriage between the parties was
solemnized and how many children they have. P.W.-1 has also not
seen the respondent.
(ii) PW-2 Sunil Kumar Bauri has also deposed like PW-1 in his
examination-in-chief filed on affidavit but he has also not seen the
respondent nor he is knowing her.
5 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
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(iii) PW-3 Manish Singh is classmate of the daughter of the
appellant/petitioner and in his examination-in-chief filed on
affidavit has deposed that the appellant/petitioner and the
respondent are residing separately since 2016 and whensoever the
petitioner was intending to meet with his parents, the respondent
was not allowing him to do so and used to quarrel and abuse him. In
para-17 of his cross-examination he has specifically deposed that no
incident has taken place in his presence.
(iv) PW-4 (Petitioner) has stated in his examination-in-chief filed on
affidavit that his wife was not desiring to reside in joint family,
used to quarrel with his brother, sister and parents and compelled
him to live separately from his parents and she always prevented
him to go to his parents. He has further deposed that his parents
died before time in absence of proper care by him. He has also
deposed that the respondent tried to get him killed so that she could
continue her illicit relationship with one Awadhesh Yadav, a
Constable of C.R.P.F.
17. The respondent-wife has also been examined as R.W.-1. For ready
reference, her evidence is being referred as under:
(i) RW-1 (respondent) has stated in her examination-in-chief filed on
affidavit that out of their wedlock, they have been blessed with
three children and they are living with her. At present, she is living
in her matrimonial home at Patna. The appellant/petitioner kept her
properly for few days and after that he started subjecting her to
cruelty and he is living with another lady namely Pooja Devi from
whom he has three children. Due to his such illicit relationship, the
petitioner stopped providing them maintenance and since
15.03.2016, he without any reasonable cause has no conversation
and taking care of them. She is still ready to live with the
appellant/petitioner. She and the children are fully dependents upon
the petitioner and she is unable to maintain herself. Several times,
she requested the appellant/petitioner for providing maintenance but
he paid no heed. After that she had filed Original Maintenance Case6 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
2025:JHHC:12141-DBNo. 151 of 2019 before the court for maintenance, in which order of
maintenance has been passed vide dated 17.06.2019. Due to filing
of the maintenance case, he has filed this divorce case against her to
pressurize her to withdraw that maintenance case. He with a view to
defame her, has assassinated about her character. She does not
know any other person except the appellant/petitioner and at present
she is still living in the paternal house of the appellant/petitioner
with his family members. On the contrary, the petitioner is living
with one Pooja Devi at Bokaro and out of that relationship, she has
given birth to three children. The petitioner is subjecting her and her
children with cruelty and torture. Due to such illicit relationship,
she has made a complaint to the Department of the petitioner, for
which an inquiry was initiated against him. Several panchayatis
were held but the petitioner did not mend in his behaviour and he is
living with said Pooja Devi. The petitioner has abandoned her
without any rhyme and reason. She has the responsibility to get
married two daughters and due to paucity of money, she is unable
to get them married. The petitioner is A.S.I. in Jharkhand Police.
In her cross-examination it has come that at the time of
her marriage her in-laws were alive, appointment of the petitioner
was on compassionate ground, after 6 or 7 months of her marriage
as her father-in-law expired and after ten years of death of her
father-in-law, her mother-in-law expired, since 15.03.2016 she is
residing separately from her husband/petitioner, the petitioner is
providing Rs.10,000/- per month as maintenance since 2021.
18. The learned Family Judge has gone into the interpretation of the word
“cruelty” and “desertion” and assessing the same from the evidences led
on behalf of the parties as also the submission made in the pleading, i.e.,
plaint and written statement, has found that the element of cruelty and
desertion could not have been established.
19. The learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner has argued that the
evidence of cruelty and desertion has not properly been considered and as
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such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the
eyes of law.
20. While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the
respondent has submitted that the judgment is well considered one and
merely by committing fraud, the suit for divorce has been filed.
21. This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the
parties on the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the interpretation of
the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court
which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
evidence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State
[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206
while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no
doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if
the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is
rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27
of the said judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this
Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings
of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought
on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of
procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry’s (Calcutta) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the
Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the
findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so
perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those
findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading
and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]
the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from
the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct,
etc.8 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
2025:JHHC:12141-DB
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English, 6th
Edn.
“Perverse.–Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way
that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
Edn.
Perverse.–Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.–Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.–Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.–A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.””
22. The ground for divorce has been taken of cruelty and desertion. The
“cruelty” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has
been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct
charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the
petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious
for him to live with the respondent.
23. This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning
of ‘cruelty’ as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani
v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the
husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court
emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.
24. According to the Hon‟ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in
relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial
obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such
cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional.
For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the
night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of
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cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more
“a question of fact and degree.”
25. The Hon‟ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing
with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search
for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in
another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties
are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and
human values to which they attach importance.”
26. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking
for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement
filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to
constitute cruelty.
27. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in
her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental
problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife‟s lawyer also levelled
allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family
while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon‟ble Apex Court
held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”.
28. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6
SCC 334 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has observed by taking into
consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written
statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a
person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital
affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman,
were held to constitute “cruelty” itself.
29. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal
Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while
judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether
that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of
the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with
the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating
treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The
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conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial
irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute
mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
30. It is, thus, evident that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the recent judgment
passed in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar (supra) has
been pleased to lay down that while judging whether the conduct is cruel
or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained
over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to
make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may
take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and
anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be
“grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of
marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
31. The definition of “desertion” is required to be referred herein as defined
under explanation part of Section 13 which means the desertion of the
petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and
without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the
willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.
32. Rayden on Divorce which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th
Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:
“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an
intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation
permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent
of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does
not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.”
The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453
and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol.
12, in the following words:
“In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking
and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other’s consent,
and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of
marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life
involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there
being no general principle applicable to all cases.
Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of
things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge11 F.A. No. 172 of 2024
2025:JHHC:12141-DBof the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may
usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without
previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been
consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is
not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an
allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of
desertion.
33. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently
of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at
least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,
where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a
ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and
cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not
complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a
continuing offence.
34. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion
that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which
differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the
other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or
disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not
amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting
spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1)
the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end.
35. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is
concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving
reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the
necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing
for divorce will have the burden of proving those elements.
36. Recently also, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of
‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex
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Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40
which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court.
The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the
intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of
the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove
that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of
deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other
words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted
spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a
reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home.
The view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court has been incorporated in the
Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The
said Explanation reads thus:
“13. Divorce.–(1) …
Explanation.–In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the
desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without
reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such
party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party
to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly.”
37. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word “cruelty” and
“desertion” has considered the evidences of the witnesses as has been
incorporated by the learned Court in the impugned judgment.
38. It is evident therefrom that the main ground of cruelty has been taken of
not taking care of the in-laws. The ground was taken before the learned
Family Judge that the father-in-law had died after 6-7 months of
solemnization of the marriage of appellant and respondent sometime in
the year 1996. The mother-in-law had also died sometime in the year
2016.
39. The fact about the death of father-in-law and mother-in-law is not in
dispute.
40. The suit has been filed in the year 2019. The sole ground, therefore,
cannot be said to be sufficient to prove the ground of cruelty of not taking
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care of the in-laws since the in-laws had already died way back before
filing of the suit, as such, the said ground has been disbelieved by the
learned Family Judge.
41. The desertion has also been taken as a ground but the desertion has been
defined and interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the desertion will
be said to be desertion if either of the party, on his/her own wish, has left
the matrimonial house. But, no such evidence has been produced by the
appellant/petitioner to prove the element of desertion showing that the
respondent-wife has left her matrimonial house.
42. The learned Family Judge, on consideration of both the issues, has not
found the ground for dissolution of marriage and therefore, dismissed the
suit.
43. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the
appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of perversity in the
impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such, the
instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.
44. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
45. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Saurabh /A.F.R.
14 F.A. No. 172 of 2024