Punjab-Haryana High Court
Anuj Kumar Singh vs Union Of India on 16 April, 2026
1
CRM-
CRM-M-2979-
2979-2026 (O&M)
(O&M)
138
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CRM-
CRM-M-2979-
2979-2026 (O&M)
Anuj Kumar Singh
Petitioner
....Petitioner
versus
Union of India
....Respondent
Respondent
Date of Decision: April 16,
16, 2026
Date of Uploading: April 17,
17, 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:
Present Mr. Preetinder Singh Ahluwalia, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Rahil Mahajan, Advocate,
Ms. Kadambari Bhan, Advocate and
Mr. Lovejeet Poonia, Advocate for the pe
petitioner.
Mr. Sourabh Goel, Special Public Prosecutor with
Ms. Deify Jindal, Advocate and
Ms. Anju Bansal, Advocate for the respondent - NCB.
*****
SUMEET GOEL,
GOEL, J.
The concept of personal liberty is the bedrock of a
constitutional democracy, a primordial right so inextricably linked to human
dignity, that one cannot conceive of meaningful existence in its absence. It is
neither a gift of the state nor a creature of th
the codified statutes, rather it is a
pre-political
political and inherent attribute
attribute of humanity that the law merely seeks to
recognize and fortify. The antiquity of this reverence is evidenced by the fact
that as early as 13th Century, long before the contemporary lexicon of human
rights was articulated, Clause 39 of Magna Carta (1215) decreed that no free
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man shall be disseised of his liberties save by the per legem terrae, i.e. the
law of land, relevant whereof (translated version) reads thus:
“No free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised, or
outlawed, or exiled, or in any other way ruined, nor will we go
against him or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land.”
The recognition of and protection of this first freedom acts as
the very marrow of a legal system, the maturity whereof, is fathomed by the
vehemence and zeal with which it stands as a sentinel on the qui vive to
protect the inalienable sanctity of personal freedom. A legal system
governed by the Rule of Law, attains its full stature only when it recognizes
libertas est res inestimabilis i.e. liberty is a thing beyond all price. Indeed,
the protection of one’s personhood from unlawful restraint is a duty so
sacred that it transcends the ordinary business of courts. Highlighting this
judicial imperative, Lord Denning in his seminal work, Freedom under the
Law (1949) recorded a venerable rule of practice: that whenever a cause
concerning the personal freedom is espoused, the judge must cast aside all
other temporal matters to afford it an immediate hearing. The relevant
excerpt from Freedom under the Law (1949) reads thus:
“Let me start with an instance of how the courts approach the subject.
Whenever one of the King’s judges takes his seat, there is one application
which by long tradition has priority over all others. Counsel has but to say
‘ My Lord, I have an application which concerns the liberty of the subject ‘
and forthwith the judge will put all other matters aside and hear it. It may
be an application for a writ of habeas corpus, or an application for bail,
but, whatever form it takes, it is heard first. This is of course only a matter
of procedure, but the English law respecting the freedom of the individual
has been built up from the procedure of the courts : and this simple
instance of priority in point of time contains within it the fundamental
principle that, where there is any conflict between the freedom of the
individual and any other rights or interests, then no matter how great or
powerful those others may be, the freedom of the humblest citizen shall
prevail over it.”
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Whenever the monolithic overreach or arbitrary high-
handedness of a State instrumentality, infringing upon the sanctity of
personal liberty or culminating in an unlawful/extra-legal restraint, is
brought to judicial notice, the same must be subjected to exacting scrutiny.
An age old adage, which met with approval from the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, reads thus:
“2. Albert Schweitzer, highlighting on Glory of Life, pronounced with
conviction and humility, “the reverence of life offers me my fundamental
principle on morality”. The aforesaid expression may appear to be an
individualistic expression of a great personality, but, when it is understood in the
complete sense, it really denotes, in its conceptual essentiality, and connotes, in its
macrocosm, the fundamental perception of a thinker about the respect that life
commands. The reverence of life is insegragably associated with the dignity of a
human being who is basically divine, not servile. A human personality is endowed
with potential infinity and it blossoms when dignity is sustained. The sustenance
of such dignity has to be the superlative concern of every sensitive soul. The
essence of dignity can never be treated as a momentary spark of light or, for that
matter, ‘a brief candle’, or ‘a hollow bubble’. The spark of life gets more
resplendent when man is treated with dignity sans humiliation, for every man is
expected to lead an honourable life which is a splendid gift of “creative
intelligence”. When a dent is created in the reputation, humanism is paralysed.
There are some megalomaniac officers who conceive the perverse notion that they
are the ‘Law’ forgetting that law is the science of what is good and just and, in
very nature of things, protective of a civilised society. Reverence for the nobility
of a human being has to be the corner stone of a body polity that believes in
orderly progress. But, some, the incurable ones, become totally oblivious of the
fact that living with dignity has been enshrined in our Constitutional philosophy
and it has its ubiquitous presence, and the majesty and sacrosanctity dignity
cannot be allowed to be crucified in the name of some kind of police action.”
2. The petition in hand has been preferred by the accused – Anuj
Kumar Singh with the following substantive prayer(s):
"i. xx xx xx xx
ii. Hold and declare the arrest of the Petitioner by the
respondent investigating agency to be wholly illegal, non-
est, arbitrary and violative of the principles laid to rest by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabir Purkayastha v. State
(NCT of Delhi) 2024 SCC OnLine SC 934; Vihaan Kumar
vs. State of Haryana & Anr, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269;
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and anr. 2025
SCC OnLine SC 2356 and Directorate of Enforcement vs.
Subhash Sharma, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240 as the
petitioner was not produced before the Magistrate within 24
hours of his detention and further no Grounds of Arrest
were ever provided to the petitioner either while arresting
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him or during remand which is in clear violation of Article
22 of the Constitution of India thereby warranting his
forthwith release from custody.
iii. Quash and set-aside the Impugned Remand Orders dated
02.11.2025 (Annexure P-3), 07.11.2025 (Annexure P-5),
11.11.2025 (Annexure P-7) & 13.11.2025 (Annexure P-9)
as well as all subsequent and consequential remand orders
passed by the Ld. CJM, Amritsar in case NCB Crime No.
04/2025 dated 07.02.2025 under Sections 8, 8-A, 21, 22,
23, 25, 26,27-A, 27-B, 29 & 60 NDPS Act,PS Narcotics
Control Bureau, Amritsar Zonal Unit, Amritsar as the
impugned remand orders so passed are mechanical in
nature which cannot cure the constitutional infirmities as
guaranteed under Article 21 and 22(1) & (2) of the
Constitution.
iv. Direct the forthwith release of the petitioner from custody
as any further incarceration would be anathema to law and
gravely detrimental to the cause of justice.”
3. The relevant factual backdrop of the lis in hand is adumbrated
thus:
(i) The genesis of the present case lies in the seizure of 5,000
tablets of Tramadol Hydrochloride 100 mg on 07.02.2025 from accused
Aashu @ Ashu Arora at Jandiala Guru, Amritsar. As per the investigation
conducted, three pharmaceutical distributors i.e. M/s Tiwari Medical
Agencies, Dehradun, M/s Maa Jagdamba Medicose, Jodhpur & M/s Rama
Medicose, Jodhpur were surfaced out as diversion points of the psychotropic
medicines. It is the case of the prosecution that said distribution firms do not
exist physically, but firms including the firm of the petitioner used to bill
such medicines in the name of the non-existent firms which were actually
diverted in the illicit market. Further, the investigation revealed that M/s
Digital Vision, 176 Mouza Ogli, Kala-Amb, Distt. – Sirmour, Himachal
Pradesh used to supply various psychotropic medicines illegally to said non-
existing firms i.e. M/s Tiwari medical Agencies, Dehradun, M/s Maa
Jagdamba Medicose, Jodhpur & M/s Rama Medicose, Jodhpur.
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Accordingly, a follow up action was conducted by NCB team at M/s Digital
Vision, 176 Mouza Ogli, Kala-Amb, Distt. – Sirmour, Himachal Pradesh on
12.08.2025 which resulted in seizure of 1368 capsules of Tramadol
Hydrochloride and 16 bottles of Codeine phosphate Cough Syrup. Out of the
seized illegal medicines, 656 capsules of Tramadol Hydrochloride belong to
M/s Tiwari Medical Agencies Dehradun; 192 capsules of Tramadol
Hydrochloride belong to M/s Rama Medicose, Jodhpur and 520 capsules of
Tramadol Hydrochloride + 16 bottles of Codeine phosphate Cough Syrup
belong to M/s Maa Jagdamba Medicose, Jodhpur, Rajasthan. As per
prosecution case, the firm M/s Tiwari Medical Agencies Dehradun, M/s
Rama Medicose, Jodhpur and M/s Maa Jagdamba Medicose, Jodhpur,
Rajasthan are physically not in existence. It is further case of the prosecution
that M/s Digital vision had supplied 13,79,232 capsules of Tramadol to
Tiwari Medical Agencies Dehradun in the year 2024; 9,21,600 capsules of
Tramadol to M/s Rama Medicose Jodhpur in the year 2024 and 11,49,120
Capsules of Tramadol and 11,970 bottles of Codeines Phosphate cough
syrup 100 ml in the year 2024 and 23,01,696 Capsule of Tramadol in the
year, 2025 (till June month) to M/s Maa Jagdamba Medicose, Jodhpur
Rajasthan. The petitioner is involved in inter-state illegal diversion of
Psychotropic medicine through his firm M/s Digital Vision which
contravene the provision of NDPS Act. As per prosecution case, on
12.08.2025, during search of the house of Manic Goyal (Partner of M/s
Digital Vision) S/o – Parshotam Lal Goyal (owner of house), R/o-House
No.28-A, Gobind Nagar, Ambala Cantt., Ambala Haryana, sale proceeds of
drug crime worth Rs.32,44,360/- INR were seized by the NCB team. The
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family of Manic Goyal could not explain the source of the recovered money.
As per prosecution case, M/s Digital vision has been sending the
Psychotropic medicines illegally to aforesaid non-existing firms and the
diversion of the controlled medicines by the firm is apparent on record. In
order to ascertain illegal supply of controlled medicines and trace the source
of the recovered illegal money, notices u/s 67 of NDPS Act, 1985 dated
12.08.2025 were issued to Manic Goyal and Parshotam Lal Goyal to appear
on 13.08.2025 and 14.08.2025 respectively at NCB Chandigarh Zonal Unit,
Mohali and notices u/s 67 of NDPS Act, 1985 dated 14.08.2025, 29.08.2025
and 18.09.2025 were issued in the name of Manic Goyal, Konic Goyal, Anuj
Kumar Singh (petitioner herein) (Partners of M/s Digital Vision) and
Parshotam Lal Goyal to appear at NCB Chandigarh Zonal Unit, Mohali on
19.08.2025, 02.09.2025 and 22.09.2025 respectively. However, they failed
to appear in response to the notice. During investigation, another firm M/s
Vellinton Healthcare, Kala-amb, Sirmour, HP whose partners are Konic
Goyal, Manic Goyal, Anuj Kumar Singh (petitioner herein) and Parshotam
Lal Goyal and one company named Parb Pharmaceuticals Private Limited,
Dehradun whose directors are Konic Goyal, Manic Goyal and Anuj Kumar
Singh (petitioner herein) was surfaced.
(ii) It is also the case of NCB that, during further investigation, a
follow-up action was conducted by the NCB on 31.10.2025 at the residential
address of the petitioner & notice dated 31.10.2025 under Section 67 of the
NDPS Act, 1985 was issued and was served to him on the same date, i.e.,
31.10.2025. Along with the said service of summons, the premises of the
petitioner were searched and panchnama dated 31.10.2025 was prepared.
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The said notice called upon the petitioner to appear in person before the
NCB office at Mohali at 11:00 A.M. on 01.11.2025.
(iii) As per case set up by the NCB, the petitioner voluntarily stated
that he would accompany the NCB team to NCB office and a statement to
that effect was recorded by the NCB.
(iv) The petitioner departed, along with NCB team, from
Uttarakhand to Chandigarh at around 11:00 P.M. on 31.10.2025 and reached
the NCB office at Chandigarh between 3:00 A.M. to 4:00 A.M. on
01.11.2025.
(v) It is the specific plea of the NCB that the petitioner was
provided with all necessary facilities/ assistance during the travel time, i.e.,
from 11:00 P.M. to 03:00 A.M./ 04:00 A.M. and thereafter as well. Further,
the petitioner was permitted to use his mobile phone.
(vi) However, it is not in dispute that the petitioner continued to
remain either with the NCB team or in the NCB office from 11:00 P.M. on
31.10.2025 till about 10:30 A.M. on 01.11.2025, wherein NCB commenced
recording the statement of the petitioner.
(vii) The petitioner came to be formally arrested by NCB at 9:00
P.M. on 01.11.2025. In the morning of 02.11.2025, the NCB team took the
petitioner to Amritsar from Chandigarh and his medical examination was got
conducted at Amritsar at 11:30 A.M. Thereafter, the petitioner, after
conclusion of his medical examination was produced before the concerned
Duty Magistrate at around 2:00 P.M.
(viii) A remand application was preferred on 02.11.2025 by NCB
(hereinafter referred to as “remand application dated 02.11.2025”), pleading
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therein for grant of police remand of the petitioner, relevant whereof reads
thus:
“7. That, during investigation on 31.10.2025 the accused Anuj Kumar
Singh was apprehended by the officials of the NCB from
Dehradun, Uttarakhand and notice under section 67 of NDPS Act,
1985 was served to him and thereafter, the accused Anuj Kumar
Singh came along with NCB officials at NCB office Chandigarh
Zonal Unit, Mohali and his statement under section 67 of NDPS
Act, 1985 was recorded on 01.11.2025. xx xx xx”
With similar averments, NCB filed applications on 07.11.2025,
11.11.2025 and 13.11.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “remand application
dated 07.11.2025, remand application dated 11.11.2025 and remand
application dated 13.11.2025”) seeking police/ judicial remand of the
petitioner. At present, the petitioner is in judicial custody.
It is in this factual backdrop that the petition in hand has come
up for hearing before this Court.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS
4. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner, at the outset, gave up
the plea of non-supply of requisite grounds of arrest and has confined the
prayer(s) in petition regarding arrest/ detention of the petitioner being illegal
as he was detained beyond the period of 24 hours without requisite judicial
order(s).
4.1. Learned senior counsel has asserted that the petitioner was in
the custody of NCB right from the time when search of the premises of the
petitioner was being conducted. Learned senior counsel has submitted that,
even if it is assumed that the petitioner was not detained till conclusion of
search of his premises at about 10:45 P.M., the very factum of petitioner
being in continuous custody/ detention of NCB right since 10:45 P.M. on
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31.10.2025 till 9:00 P.M. on 01.11.2025, whereinafter, formal arrest of the
petitioner was recorded, cannot be denied. Learned senior counsel has urged
that the “custody” does not essentially mean formal arrest, but it also
includes restriction of movement of person concerned by the police. Learned
senior counsel has, thus, urged that once a person is deprived of his personal
liberty to go wherever he pleases irrespective of the label, which
investigating officer may affix on the act of restraint, the period of 24 hours,
as mandated under Section 57 Cr.P.C./ Section 58 BNSS/ Article 22(2) of
the Constitution of India, commences. Learned senior counsel has urged that
factum of arrest is to be deciphered from totality of the facts/ circumstances
of the case as the petitioner was in continuous custody of NCB atleast from
about 10:45 P.M. on 31.10.2025 till his production before the concerned
Court on 02.11.2025 at about 2:00 P.M. Learned senior counsel has further
urged that even if total custody is counted excluding the investigation
period, i.e., 11:00 A.M. to 09:00 P.M. on 01.11.2025 till the custody from
08:00 P.M. on 31.10.2025 at 11:00 A.M. on 01.11.2025 and 09:00 P.M. on
01.11.2025 to 02:00 P.M. on 02.11.2025 comes out to 32 hours, which is
more than 24 hours. Learned senior counsel has, thus, urged that once it is
found that the petitioner was detained for a period of more than 24 hours
without requisite order(s), arrest/ detention becomes ipso facto illegal and
hence, deserves to be set aside. On the strength of these submissions, learned
senior counsel has sought for grant of petition in hand by directing for
forthwith release of the petitioner.
5. Reply by way of affidavit dated 03.01.2026 of the Respondent
through Amit Kumar, Investigating Officer, NCB, Amritsar Zonal Unit has
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been filed by the NCB. Further, NCB has filed additional affidavit dated
07.04.2026 of the Respondent through Amit Kumar, Investigating Officer,
NCB, Amritsar Zonal Unit.
While raising submissions in tandem with the said reply/
additional affidavit, learned Special Public Prosecutor has urged that the
petitioner himself volunteered to accompany the NCB team on 01.11.2025
and his statement to that effect was also duly recorded as well. Learned
Special Public Prosecutor has further urged that time period from around
11:00 P.M. on 31.10.2025 to 03:00 A.M/ 04:00 A.M. on 01.11.2025 was on
account of sheer travel time between Dehradun (Uttarakhand) to
Chandigarh. Learned counsel has further urged that the petitioner was
permitted unbridled use of his mobile phone, which is reflectable from call
detail record of the petitioner, and hence, the time period from 11:00 P.M.
on 31.10.2025 to 03:00 A.M./ 04:00 A.M. on 01.11.2025 (travel time from
Dehradun to Chandigarh) as also thereafter, uptil 10:30 A.M. when the
petitioner’s statement was recorded in the NCB office, cannot be termed to
be a period, wherein, the petitioner stood arrested. Learned Special Public
Prosecutor has further submitted that the petitioner was arrested at 09:00
P.M. on 01.11.2025 and was served with requisite arrest memo/ grounds of
arrest. Learned Special Public Prosecutor has submitted that his statements
are as per records documented with the NCB and no material has been
brought forth to raise any shadow of doubt towards their genuineness.
Learned Special Public Prosecutor has urged that the petitioner stands
arrested in NDPS case, wherein, huge recovery has been made. On the
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strength of these submissions, dismissal of the petition in hand is entreated
for.
6. I have heard counsel for the parties and have gone through the
available records of the case.
Prime issue
7. The issue that arises for consideration is as to whether the
petitioner was detained by the NCB for more than 24 hours without requisite
order from the concerned Court/ Magistrate.
The seminal legal issue that arises for cogitation is as to the
time from when 24 hours period referred in Section 58 of the BNSS, 2023
(erstwhile Section 57 of the Cr. P.C., 1973) commences.
8. Relevant statutory provisions
(i).
(i). Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
1973
Section 57. Person arrested not to be detained more than twenty-twenty-four
hours.–No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without
hours.
warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is
reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of a
Magistrate under section 167, exceed twenty-four hours exclusive of the
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s
Court.
(ii)
(ii). Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
Section 58. Person arrested not to be detained more than twentytwenty–four
hours. No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested
hours.–
without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the
case is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special
order of a Magistrate under section 187, exceed twenty-four hours
exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to
the Magistrate’s Court, whether having jurisdiction or not.
(iii).
(iii). Constitution of India
22.. (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in
Article 22
custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for
such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended
by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall
be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four
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hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the
place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be
detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a
magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply–
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien;
or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law
providing for preventive detention.
xx xx xx xx."
Relevant Case Law
9. The precedents, apropos, to the matter(s) in issue, are as
follows:
(i) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as Niranjan
Singh and Another Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Another; 1980 AIR
Supreme Court 785, has held as under:
“7. When is a person in custody, within the meaning of Section 439 Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 ? When he is in duress either because he is held by the
investigating agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control
of the court having been remanded by judicial order, or having offered
himself to the court’s jurisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical
presence. No lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to come to
the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in
the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the
purpose of Section 439. This word is of elastic semantics but its core meaning
is that the law has taken control of the person. The equivocatory quibblings
and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in court that the police have
taken a man into informal custody but not arrested him, have detained him
for interrogation but not taken him into formal custody and other like
terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of the straight forwardness of the
law. We need not dilate on this shady facet here because we are satisfied that
the accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge and the
jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose.”
(ii). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as Manoj
versus State of Madhya Pradesh, 1999(2) RCR (Criminal) 426; has held as
under:
“10. The police officer who conducts investigation cannot obviate the
legal obligation to perform two requisites if he knows that investigation
cannot be completed within 24 hours after arrest of the accused. One
requested is, to transmit a copy of the case diary to the nearest judicial
magistrate. The other is, to forward the accused to such magistrate
simultaneously. The only exceptional ground on which the police officer
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can avoid producing the arrested person before such magistrate is when
the officer concerned is satisfied that there are no grounds for believing
that the information or accusation was well-founded. In such a case, the
accused must be released from custody to which he was interred pursuant
to the arrest.
xx xx xx
12. If the police officer is forbidden from keeping an arrested person
beyond twenty four hours without order of a magistrate, what should
happen to the arrested person after the said period. It is a constitutional
mandate that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in
accordance with the procedure established in law. Close to its heels the
Constitution directs that the person arrested and detained in custody shall
be produced before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest.
The only time permitted by Article 22 of of the Constitution to be
excluded from the said period of 24 hours is “the time necessary for going
from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate”. Only under two
contingencies can the said direction be obviated. One is when the person
arrested is an “enemy alien”. Second is when the arrest is under any law
for preventive detention. In all other cases the Constitution has prohibited
peremptorily that “no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the
said period without the authority of a magistrate”.”
(iii). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as Directorate
of Enforcement versus Subhash Sharma, 2025(1) RCR (Criminal) 817; has
held as under:
“7. The requirement of clause 2 of Article 22 has been
incorporated in Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for
short ‘the Cr.P.C). There is no inconsistency between the provisions of the
PMLA and Section 57 of Cr.P.C. Hence, by virtue of Section 65 of the
PMLA, Section 57 of the Cr.P.C applies to the proceedings under the
PMLA.
8. Once a Court, while dealing with a bail application, finds that
the fundamental rights of the accused under Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution of India have been violated while arresting the accused or
after arresting him, it is the duty of the Court dealing with the bail
application to release the accused on bail. The reason is that the arrest in
such cases stands vitiated. It is the duty of every Court to uphold the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution.”
(iv). The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in a judgment titled as Ashak
Hussain Allah Detha alias Siddique and another versus Assistant Collector
of Customs (P.), Bombay and another, 1990 SCC Online Bom 3; has held as
under:
“7. Admittedly, the Applicants were detained without any
authority from the midnight of 20th July, 1989 to 5.20 p.m. of 21st July,MAHAVIR SINGH
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141989 – for 17 hours. Their arrest has been so recorded that their production
before the Magistrate falls within 24 hours stipulated by Article 22(2) of
the Constitution of India and Section 57 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Prosecution urges that after the “arrest” they were not
detained beyond 24 hours. This submission is a distortion of the true
meaning of the constitutional guarantee against detention without the
sanction of judicial Tribunal. The word “arrest” has not been defined in
the Code of Criminal Procedure or in any other law. The true meaning
needs to be understood. The word “arrest” is a term of art. It starts with the
arrester taking a person into his custody by action or on words restraining
him from moving anywhere beyond the arrester’s control, and it continues
until the person so restrained is either released from custody or, having
been brought before a Magistrate, is remanded in custody by the
Magistrate’s judicial act. In substance “arrest” is the restraint on a man’s
personal liberty by the power or colour of lawful authority (The Law
Lexicon – P. Ramanatha Aiyar Reprint Edition 1987, page 85]. In its
natural sense also “arrest” means the restraint on or deprivation of one’s
personal liberty (The Law Lexicon – T.P. Mukherjee, (1989) page 177-
178.].
1. Christie v. Leachinsky, (1947)1 All England Reporter 567,
Holgate Mohammed v. Duke, (1984)1 All England Reporter 1054.
Both quoted in WORDS AND PHRASES LEGALLY DEFINED
Vol. 1, Third Edition – page 113.
It is thus clear that arrest being a restraint on the personal liberty, it is
complete when such restraint by an authority, commences (The Law
Lexicon – P. Ramanatha Aiyar Reprint Edition 1987, page 85]. Whether a
person is arrested or not does not depend on the legality of the Act. It is
enough if an authority clothed with the power to arrest, actually imposes
the restraint by physical act or words. Whether a person is arrested
depends on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go
where he pleases (The Law Lexicon – T.P. Mukherjee (1989), Page 177-
178]. It stands to reason, therefore, that what label the investigating officer
affixes to his act of restraint is irrelevant. For the same reason, the record
of the time of arrest is not an index to the actual time of arrest. The arrest
commences with the restraint placed on the liberty of the accused and not
with the time of “arrest” recorded by the Arresting Officers.
The argument that the applicants were not arrested at the mid-night of 19th
July, 1989 but were detained for interrogation is untenable. Since the
offences under the Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances Act are
cognisable (Section 37(1) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act), the Investigating Officers possess the authority to arrest
without warrant. They arrest a suspect or do not arrest at all. The detention
in custody for interrogation is known to law. A person may be lawfully
interrogated. But during such interrogation he is a free man. If he is
detained, not allowed to leave the office of the Respondent No. 1 and
compelled to eat and sleep there, he is under detention. This restraint is in
reality an arrest.
In this case, the applicants were not allowed to leave the Office of the
Respondent No. 1 after the mid-night of 19th July, 1989. In the
circumstances of this case, the applicants were arrested at the mid-night of
19th July, 1989.
8. The Investigating Officers may lawfully detain a suspect for an offence.
But detention in custody for interrogation is not authorised by law. TheMAHAVIR SINGH
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15Investigating Officers may detain for an offence only. In an English Case
where the Customs Officers detained a person “for helping with their
inquiries”, it was held that there was no authority in the Customs Officers
to detain a person except for an offence. The principle that emerges is this:
Any restraint on a person’s liberty except for an offence is illegal. There is
no authority in the Investigating Officers to detain a person for the purpose
of interrogation or helping them in the enquiry.”
(v). The Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in a judgment titled as
General
Mrs. Iqbal Kaur Kwatra versus The Director Gen eral of Police, Rajasthan
State, Jaipur and others,
others, 1996 SCC Online AP 206; has held as under:
“18. It is well settled that “police custody” does not necessarily mean
custody after formal arrest. It also includes “some form of police
surveillance and restriction on the movements of the person concerned by
the police”. The word “custody” does not necessarily mean detention or
confinement. A person is in custody as soon as he comes into the hands of
a police officer.
xx xx xx xx
20. On a reading of Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is
evident that no police officer can detain in custody a person arrested
without warrant for a period longer than twenty-four hours besides the
time taken for journey.”
(vi). The Hon’ble Telangana High Court in a judgment titled as Smt.
T. Ramadevi versus The State of Telangana and ors., 2024(4) Crimes 9; has
held as under:
“2. The present is a second writ petition seeking for issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Corpus by the same petitioner, and by way of the present writ
petition the petitioner herein seeks for production of the four detenus viz.,
Thallapally Srinivas Goud,Thallapally Sai Sharath, Thallapally Sai Rohith
and Palavalasa Siva Saran. This writ petition has been filed substantially
on two questions of law, which are:-
a) Whether the period of apprehension by the police authorities
before the official arrest being shown is also to be considered for
the purpose of fulfilling the requirement of producing the so-called
apprehended person before the Judicial Magistrate within 24
hours?
xx xx xx xx
10. In the given factual backdrop and the judicial precedents referred
to in the preceding paragraphs, what is evident and an admitted fact is that
accused Nos.3 and 4 remained in police custody for a period of 38 hours
before they were produced before the Judicial Magistrate under Section 57MAHAVIR SINGH
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16of Cr.P.C. However; the accused Nos.1, 2 and 6 though remained in police
custody, but were produced within 24hours before the Judicial Magistrate.
11. In the aforesaid backdrop, when we look into the provisions of
Section 57 of Cr.P.C, the very first line of the said provision refers to the
term detention. It does not use the term “from the time of arrest”, which
further strengthens the case of the petitioner when they say that period of
detention starts the moment they stand apprehended by the police, as from
that moment itself there is a restraint so far as personal liberty of the
concerned person and there is also an arrest of his movement, as he
remains under confines of police personnel. Thus, it would amount to a
detention of a person right from the time he is apprehended by the police
personnel. Thus, in terms of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in
the case of Ashak Hussain (supra), the arrest of a person commences from
the time restraint is placed on his liberty and not from the time of the
arrest officially recorded by the arresting officers.
12. Accordingly, this Bench has no hesitation in reaching to the
conclusion that question No.1 as regards the commencement of the period
of apprehension is concerned, it is held that the period of apprehension is
also to be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the period
of 24 hours as is envisaged under Section 57 of Cr.P.C. In other words, 24
hours is not to be calculated from the time of the official arrest being
shown by the police personnel in the arrest memo, but from the time he
was initially apprehended or taken into custody. In view of the same,
accused Nos.3 and 4 have been produced before the Judicial Magistrate
only after completion of 24 hours from the time they were apprehended.
Accused Nos.1, 2 and 6 were produced before the Judicial Magistrate
before completion of 24 hours. Therefore, there is clear violation of the
statutory requirement under Section 57 of Cr.P.C so far as accused Nos.3
and 4 are concerned, and they are accordingly liable to be given the
benefit for the illegal act which the respondent-authorities have
committed.”
Analysis (re law)
10. The police power to investigate into an offence is a creature of
the statute, a delegated authority intended to maintain public peace. To this
end, the procedural code arms the investigating agency with a formidable
panoply of powers: search, seizure, perquisition of documents/other material
objects, and also the arrest of suspected individuals. Yet, the legislature, in
its wisdom, has never intended for these powers to be absolute, rather, they
are hedged by inbuilt safeguards, designed to ensure that the sword of the
state does not become an instrument of oppression. There exists no such
thing as unfettered discretion in the realm of statutory powers indeed,
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17
unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of
personal freedom. The power to investigate into offences must, therefore, be
exercised strictisscimi juris i.e., according to the strictest letter of law and
only on the condition on which it is granted by the Code/procedural law. A
profitable reference in this regard can be made to the following aureate
observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court:
“68. xxx xxx We say and we think it is necessary to
repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-
social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the
personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure
established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal
liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. And
observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on
personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution the only guarantee
of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except
in accordance with the procedure established by law. xxx xxx xxx”
– M.H. Beg, J. vide Prabhu Dayal Deorath Vs. District
Magistrate, Kamrup and Others; 1974 AIR Supreme Court
183
11. In cases of arrest by a Police officer/investigating agency,
otherwise than by way of execution of a warrant, one such safeguard,
requiring production of individual detained, before the nearest magistrate,
within a reasonable time and by the latest within twenty four hours of arrest,
stands as the primary bulwark against the dark peril of incommunicado
detention. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manoj (supra) that
the police officer arresting the individual cannot obviate this legal obligation
as statutorily mandated. This procedural exigency, enshrined in Section 57
of the Cr.P.C./Section 58 of the BNSS and anchored in the bedrock of
Article 22(2) of the Constitution, is designed to facilitate an instantaneous
judicial audit of the executive’s action. The procedural mandate contained in
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Section 57 Cr.P.C./Section 58 BNSS/ Artcile 22(2) of the Constitution
serves a dual, sacrosanct purpose: firstly, to verify the vires and legality of
the arrest; and secondly, to submit the necessity of further detention for
judicial scrutiny. However, for this Constitutional shield to be effective, the
law must resolve a question of profound temporal significance: What should
be the terminus a quo for computation of twenty-four-hour limit?; which
requires for us to determine the meaning of ‘arrest’ as employed in Section
57 Cr.P.C./Section 58 BNSS/Article 22(2) of the Constitution.
11.1. The term ‘arrest’ is neither defined in the Cr.P.C./BNSS nor in
the constitutional framework; however, when interpreted in its ordinary and
natural sense, it signifies a state of apprehension, restraint or the total
deprivation of an individual’s liberty. The dictionary meaning of ‘arrest’ as
contained in different dictionaries, reads thus:
The Oxford Dictionary (online) defines custody as imprisonment,
detention, confinement, incarceration, internment, captivity; remand,
duress, and durance.
Chambers Dictionary (online) clarifies that custody is “the condition
of being held by the police; arrest or imprisonment; to take someone
into custody to arrest them.”
Chambers Thesaurus supplies several synonyms, such as detention,
confinement, imprisonment, captivity, arrest, formal incarceration.
The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary for Advance Learners states
in terms of that someone who is in custody or has been taken into
custody or has been arrested and is being kept in prison until they get
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19tried in a court or if someone is being held in a particular type of
custody, they are being kept in a place that is similar to a prison.
The Corpus Juris Secundum under the topic of Escape & Related
Offenses;
Offenses; Rescue adumbrates that “Custody, within the meaning of
statutes defining the crime, consists of the detention or restraint of a
person against his or her will, or of the exercise of control over
another to confine the other person within certain physical limits or a
restriction of ability or freedom of movement.”
This is how Custody is dealt with in Black’
Black’s Law Dictionary,
Dictionary (5thEdn. 2009):-
Custody- The care and control of a thing or person. The keeping,
guarding, care, watch, inspection, preservation or security of a thing,
carrying with it the idea of the thing being within the immediate
personal care and control of the person to whose custody it is
subjected. Immediate charge and control, and not the final, absolute
control of ownership, implying responsibility for the protection and
preservation of the thing in custody. Also the detainer of a mans
person by virtue of lawful process or authority.
Ergo, the term ‘arrest’ is a term of art representing a state of
affairs where an individual’s autonomy is subsumed under the control and
supervision of an authority acting under the colour of law. For the purposes
of Section 57 Cr.P.C./58 BNSS/Article 22(2), whether an individual has
been ‘arrested’ or not, depends upon the factual imposition of restraint
through physical acts or verbal commands. The quintessential test remains
one of volition: whether the individual has been deprived of his/her personal
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20liberty to move where he/she pleases? As observed by a division Bench of
the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the Iqbal Kaur Kwatra (supra)
that the term does not necessarily mean custody after formal arrest but also
includes some form of surveillance/restriction on the movement by the
police. It is thus clear that ‘arrest’ being a restrain on the personal liberty, it
is complete when such restraint by the authority commences. The moment
some form of police surveillance and restriction on the movements of the
individual concerned by the police/investigating agency begins, he is said to
have been arrested and detained in custody. An ‘arrest’ is crystallized the
moment the individual’s ambulatory providence is extinguished and his
volition is subsumed by the coercive power of authority detaining him.
11.2. Consequently; the nomenclature assigned by the investigating
agency, such as; “detention for questioning”, “custody for inquiry” or
similar expression is wholly immaterial and legally irrelevant for the
purposes of determining whether the individual has been arrested or not and
rather weightage has to be given to the factual aspects of the matter as have
truly transpired. The time recorded in the arrest memo or other police
records is a mere procedural formality that cannot be treated as a definitive
or infallible index of actual time of arrest. To grant such records a status of
absolute verity would be to allow the concerned authorities (investigating
agency) to act as the sole auditor of its own compliance, thereby reducing a
constitutional safeguard to a matter of administrative whim. Whether an
individual is under ‘arrest’ is a question of fact, not of nomenclature. To
hold otherwise would be to allow the Rule of Law to be defeated by a
semantic sleight of hand. The record is merely a post facto declaration; it is
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21the de facto restraint that triggers the clock of liberty. Pertinently, in
Niranjan Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court pointed out this
prevalent practice of using of disingenuous subtitles and linguistic evasions
by the investigating agency whereby an effort is made to distinguish
between informal detention and statutory arrest/ preliminary inquiry and de
facto custody. These are hollow terminological conceits.
Having said so, lest the above analysis be perceived as an
absolute embargo upon the investigative functions of the State, this Court
must hasten to offer a necessary caveat. A clear distinction must be carved
out between the coercive subsumption of volition and the genuine
investigative functions. There are instances where an individual is
summoned for merely joining investigation, production of documents,
recording of statement. In such instances, where there is no palpable fetter
upon the ambulatory providence of the individual and he remains at liberty
to depart the precincts of the police station at his own will; retains
unhindered access to his mobile phone to communicate with the world at
large; and may be accompanied by friends and legal acquaintances, it cannot
be termed as coercive detention. In such like cases/ circumstances, it would
be a legal misconception to suggest that the clock of liberty has commenced.
The twenty-four-hour mandate is not a reflexive trap for a diligent
investigating officer, but a shield against overbearing captor.
11.3. It is a settled principle of jurisprudence that while interpreting
provisions that intend to safeguard fundamental human rights, the Court
must adopt a Pro Homine approach. A narrow and pedantic interpretation of
‘arrest’ would not merely be a legal error; it would be a constitutional
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22
apostasy. It would defeat the very purpose of the provision, which is to
prevent clandestine/illegal detentions. It would tantamount to condoning an
illegality that perpetuates under the colour of authority and granting the
concerned authorities a temporal immunity to operate in a vacuum where the
individual detained is neither free nor yet under the protective aegis of
statutory safeguards. Such a vacuum is abhorred by the law as the same is
antithetical for a system governed by the Rule of Law.
Ergo, for the twenty-four-hour mandate, as provided under
Section 57 Cr.P.C./58 BNSS/Article 22(2) of the Constitution, it must be
reckoned from the exact moment of physical deprivation of personal liberty,
for any delay beyond this window, however, seemingly minute, constitutes a
constitutional trespass that the law cannot and must not condone. As
observed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court Ashak Hussain Allah Detha
(supra) it and the Hon’ble Telangana High Court in T. Ramadevi (supra), the
period of twenty-four hours is not to be computed from the official time of
arrest as shown in the arrest memo but from the time, actual restraint was put
upon the individual’s volition to move.
It goes without saying that it is neither pragmatic nor feasible to
lay any universal exhaustive yardstick or inexorable set of guidelines for
adjudication of this aspect as every case has its own unique factual
conspectus, which has to be taken into account by the Court which is seisin
of the mater in question. It was said by Lord Denning, an observation which
met with approval by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that:
“…..Each case depends on its own facts, and a close similarity between
one case and another is not enough, because even a single significant
detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such case, one should avoid
the temptation to decide case (As said by Cardozo) by matching the colourMAHAVIR SINGH
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23of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which
side of the line a case falls, its broad resemblance to another case is not all
decisive.”
It must be underscored that the mandate enshrined under
Section 57 Cr.P.C./ Section 58 BNSS/ Article 22(2) is not a surplusage of
legal prose; rather a peremptory command, and the violation thereof cannot
be cured by the subsequent passing of remand order. As observed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Sharma (supra), in such like cases, the
arrest itself stands vitiated and the individual concerned, deserves to be
enlarged on bail.
11.4. This court must hasten to add a word of caution herein.
The duty of the magistrate or court, before whom an arrestee is
produced is not a mere ministerial act of recording presence, but a solemn,
judicial interrogation of the arresting authority’s narrative. The magistrate
/court concerned must act as the sentinel on the qui vive; recognizing that
the production of the accused is a jurisdictional gateway designed to bring
the coercive power of arresting authority under direct judicial scrutiny. It is
incumbent upon the concerned Court/Magistrate to proactively pierce the
veil of documentation and look past the self-serving entries contained in the
police record to identify the actual terminus a quo of the detention, which
requires pragmatic and rigorous examination of the factual substratum of the
arrest, stripping away any administrative curtain that the investigating
agency may have drawn to mask a prior de facto apprehension. The
magistrate/Court concerned is duty bound to inquire into the where, when
and how of the capture to ensure that twilight zone of illegal detention is not
regularized through sanitized police record/arrest memo.
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24
12. As a sequitur to the above rumination, the following postulates
emerge:
(i) The twenty-four-hour period under Section 57 Cr.P.C./Section
58 BNSS begins from exact moment of physical arrest. The clock of liberty
begins the moment an individual’s volition is subsumed by the arresting
authority’s coercive power and he/she is no longer free to depart, regardless
of when a formal declaration is made.
(ii) There is no straight-jacket formula for determining the moment
of arrest as it is a question of fact that depends upon the facts/ circumstances
of a particular case, including but not limited to, whether the individual
concerned was kept in the police station/ office of the investigating agency
overnight, whether such individual had freedom to get his own food etc.,
whether the individual was freely permitted to meet his friend(s)/ relative(s),
whether the petitioner could leave the police station/ office of the
investigating agency on his own discretion etc. No universal guidelines or
parameters can possibly be enumerated for this exercise of power by the
Magistrate/ concerned Court as every case has its own unique factual
conspectus.
(iii) Entry(s) contained in police records or arrest memos are merely
declaratory and do not constitute infallible or conclusive proof of the time of
arrest.
(iv) The magistrate /Court before which the arrestee/ detained
person is produced bears a non-delegable solemn duty to act proactively
piercing the documentary veil of the timeline provided by the arresting
authority.
Analysis (re: facts of the present case)
13. The facts of the petition in hand reflect that, upon conclusion of
search at around 10:45 P.M., on 31.10.2025 a notice under Section 67 of the
NDPS Act was served upon the petitioner, wherein, he was asked to appear
before the NCB, Chandigarh office at 11:00 A.M. on 01.11.2025. It is highly
unbelievable that petitioner, instead of making his own arrangements and to
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25
make an attempt to come to the NCB office on 01.11.2025 along with his
friend(s)/ relative(s)/ lawyer, chose to accompany the NCB team in the
intervening night of 31.10.2025 and 01.11.2025. Further, it is not in dispute
that the petitioner remained in NCB office from 03:00 A.M./ 04:00 A.M. in
the early morning hours of 01.11.2025, after reaching Chandigarh NCB
office and continued to remain therein till 09:00 P.M. on 01.11.2025 when
his formal arrest was recorded.
Perusal of remand application dated 02.11.2025, remand
application dated 07.11.2025, remand application dated 11.11.2025 and
remand application dated 13.11.2025 moved by NCB (for police remand/
judicial remand) indubitably reflects that it was the specific stand of the
NCB before the concerned Court that it had apprehended the petitioner from
Dehradun (Uttarakhand) on 31.10.2025.
From the totality of factual milieu of the case in hand;
especially the prosecution narrative of the petitioner having accompanied the
NCB team from Dehradun to Chandigarh in an NCB vehicle; the petitioner
remaining continuously with NCB officials from about 10:45 P.M. on
31.10.2025 till preparation of arrest memo at 09:00 P.M. on 01.11.2025; the
petitioner, even if having access to his mobile phone as stated by the NCB,
but not calling any of the friend(s)/ relative(s)/ lawyer to the NCB office;
does, indubitably, reflect that the petitioner was actually in coercive custody
of NCB right from about 10:45 P.M. on 31.10.2025. It is, thus, clear that
preparation of arrest memo of the petitioner at about 09:00 P.M. on
01.11.2025 is merely a paper transaction. Since this Court has found that the
petitioner was in coercive NCB detention since at about 11:00 P.M. on
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31.10.2025 till about 02:00 P.M. on 02.12.2025 (when he was produced
before the concerned Court), arrest/ detention of the petitioner is clearly
beyond the prescribed period in Section 58 of BNSS, 2023 which renders his
arrest/ custody illegal.
Decision
14. In view of the prevenient ratiocination, it is ordained thus:
(i) The petition in hand is granted and it is held that the petitioner
was arrested/ detained by NCB beyond the prescribed period of
24 hours, as contained in Section 58 of the BNSS, without
requisite judicial order(s);
(ii) Consequently, it is mandated that the petitioner be released
from jail, if not required in any other case, upon furnishing
requisite bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court/
Chief Judicial Magistrate/ Duty Magistrate;
(iii) Any observations made and/ or submissions noted hereinabove
shall not have any effect on the merits of the case and the Trial
Court shall proceed further, in accordance with law, without
being influenced with them;
(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
April 16,
16, 2026
mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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