Delhi High Court
Antonnette Promilla Fernanadez vs State Nct Of Delhi And Anr on 3 March, 2026
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~P-11
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 13.02.2026
Pronounced on:03.03.2026
Uploaded on: 03.03.2026
+ CRL.M.C. 7253/2025
ANTONNETTE PROMILLA FERNANADEZ .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ravi Sharma, Ms. Srishti
Sharma, Mr. Pulkit Luthra & Mr.
Harshit Luthra, Advocates
alongwith Petitioner in Person.
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Hitesh Vali, APP for State
with SI Harish Kumar, P.S. S.B.
Dairy.
Mr. Devansh Gupta, Advocate for
R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner1, by way of this petition under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita [“BNSS”] (corresponding to Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC“]), seeks quashing
of FIR No. 109/2019 dated 07.03.2019 registered at Police Station
Shahbad Dairy, District Outer North, Delhi, under Section 308 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC“], on the ground of a compromise
between her and respondent No.2 – complainant.
1
By order dated 13.02.2026, it was clarified that the name of the petitioner is ‘Ms. Antonette Pamela
Fernandez’, and there is a typographical error in the petition where her name has been mentioned as
‘Antonnette Promilla Fernanadez’.
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2. Notice was issued in this petition on 13.10.2025. The State has
filed a status report, and respondent No. 2 has also filed a detailed reply.
3. I have heard Mr. Ravi Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner,
Mr. Hitesh Vali, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, and
Mr. Devansh Gupta, learned counsel for respondent No. 2.
4. This case arises in unusual circumstances.
5. The petitioner was an orphan, and was being looked after by the
Missionaries of Charity at their home in Civil Lines, Delhi. When she
was about three months old, respondent No. 2 and her husband, Mr.
Malcolm Maurice Fernandez (since deceased), applied to the District
Judge, Delhi, to be appointed as her guardians under the Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890 [“G&W Act”]. The District Judge, Delhi, by an order
dated 25.02.1993, allowed the application, and appointed them as her
guardians, until she attained majority. A certificate dated 03.03.1993 was
issued to this effect, which stipulated that they would act as her guardians
until 21.07.2013. The petitioner thereafter lived with respondent No. 2
and her family from her infancy. She completed her college degree at
Jesus and Mary College in New Delhi.
6. The subject FIR was registered at the instance of respondent No.2
on 07.03.2019, concerning an incident of 03.02.2019. Respondent No. 2
alleged that, on the said day, the petitioner attacked her on her head with
a wooden cross while she was praying, and also bit her hands, injured her
eye and injured her in the abdomen, using a knife. Respondent No.2 did
not immediately make a statement to the police, considering it to be a
family matter, but ultimately made a statement to the police on
16.02.2019, leading to registration of the FIR on 07.03.2019. The FIR
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also refers to the petitioner’s Medico Legal Case [“MLC”] recorded at
Baba Saheb Ambedkar Hospital, Rohini, which characterised the injuries
of respondent No. 2 as simple. The FIR was, therefore, registered under
Section 308 of the IPC. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed on
07.01.2020, and a supplementary chargesheet was thereafter filed on
29.09.2023.
7. By order dated 08.12.2023 (in Sessions Case No. 485/2023), the
learned Principal District & Sessions Judge (North), Rohini Courts,
framed a charge under Section 307 of the IPC against the petitioner.
8. The trial is in progress. However, in the course of cross-
examination, on 09.12.2024, respondent No.2 stated that she was willing
to cooperate in settling the dispute, and quashing of the FIR. Further
evidence was deferred at the request of learned counsel for the petitioner.
9. The petitioner and respondent No. 2 have since entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding [“MoU”] dated 11.08.2025, wherein it
has been recorded that the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement
with the intervention of the Court, and that respondent No. 2 does not
wish to pursue the criminal proceedings any further. The MoU also
records that both parties had filed civil suits against each other, which
were settled and disposed of before the Lok Adalat in the year 2022. In
the statement of the petitioner in the civil proceedings, she had apologised
for her past conduct, including the events of 03.02.2019, and expressed
gratitude for the love and care bestowed upon her by respondent No. 2
and her family. It was further stated that the petitioner would have no
right, title, interest, concern or connection with any assets of respondent
No. 2. The MoU further recorded that respondent No. 2 had forgiven the
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petitioner for her past actions, particularly the events of 03.02.2019, and
undertook to cooperate in quashing of the present FIR.
10. These events have led to the filing of the present petition, seeking
quashing of the criminal proceedings on the ground of compromise. The
petition is accompanied by an affidavit of no objection, signed by
respondent No. 2, which is reproduced below:
“2. The petitioner (i.e. Antonette Pamela Fernandez) has in its
statement before the Civil Judge on 24.09.2022 has stated that she is
apologetic for her acts/ conducts in the past, especially in respect of
the unfortunate events that took place on 03.02.2019. The petitioner is
remorseful for her previous conduct and actions and is grateful to the
respondent No.2 and her family members, who have always treated her
with utmost love and care. The petitioner undertook that she will have
no right, title, interest, concern or connection with the any assets of the
respondent No.2 or her family members especially with regard to the
property i.e. G-4/25, Sector-11, Rohini, Delhi and furthermore the
petitioner will not enter the residential house of the respondent No.2 in
present or in future.
3. I decided to forgive the petitioner for the all past unfortunate
events including the incident of February 3rd, 2019 and have
amicably settled all the disputes with the petitioner herein and no
dispute or claim of any nature whatsoever is left against her.
4. It is made clear that the petitioner is not my adopted daughter. I and
my late husband were appointed only as her joint guardians by the
District Court, Delhi vide order, dated 25.02.1993, of the petitioner till
the majority i.e. 21.07.2013 as per the Guardians & Wards Act, 1890
and the hon’ble Court further issued a certificate on 03.03.1993 in
regard.
5. That it is further made clear that the injuries inflicted upon me by
the petitioner and suffered by me on 03.02.2019 were grievous and not
simple in nature.
6. It is made clear that in no way shall signing and filing this affidavit
be construed as an admission of the submissions and averments made
by the petitioner in the captioned quashing petition. I reserve my right
to file a reply to the quashing petition, if the need arises.
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7. I have No Objection if the FIR bearing No.109/2019 dated
07.03.2019 registered under Section 308 IPC with P.S. Shahbad Dairy,
Delhi, is quashed.”2
11. The petitioner was present in person at the hearings on 10.02.2026,
11.02.2026 and 13.02.2026. She was identified by Mr. Sharma and the
Investigating Officer [“IO”].
12. Respondent No. 2 was present on video conference at the hearing
on 10.02.2026. She was identified by Mr. Gupta and the IO. I had also
interacted with respondent No. 2, and she confirmed that she does not
wish to pursue criminal proceedings against the petitioner.
13. Mr. Vali, however, opposed the present petition on the ground that
the charge relates to a grievous offence under Section 307 of the IPC, and
that the prosecution evidence had already commenced. He submitted that
respondent No. 2 has testified in support of the prosecution charges and
also withstood cross-examination.
14. Mr. Sharma and Mr. Gupta, on the other hand, submitted that
charges be quashed on the basis of the understanding between the parties.
15. It is now well settled that, even in the case of non-compoundable
offences, the High Court may exercise inherent powers, recognised by
Section 482 of the CrPC and Section 528 of the BNSS, to quash
proceedings based on a compromise between the parties. However, the
aforesaid power is discretionary, and certain principles have been laid
down, which guide the Court in adjudicating an application of this nature.
2
Emphasis supplied.
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16. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab3 referred to several earlier judgments, including some concerning
Section 307 of the IPC4, and summarised the law as follows:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. :
(i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process
of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding
or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the
victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed.
However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family
and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private
in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any
compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a
different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the
offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the
wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have
resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court
may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the
compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case
despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim.
In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be
3
(2012) 10 SCC 303, [hereinafter, “Gian Singh”].
4
Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 667.
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unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to
secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put
to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the
affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceeding.”5
17. Three later judgments of the Supreme Court specifically deal with
proceedings under Section 307 of the IPC:
a. In Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr.6, after referring
to the judgment in Gian Singh, and various judgments dealing with
Section 307, the Court distilled the following legal principles:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the
following principles by which the High Court would be guided in
giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482
of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where
the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this
power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding
factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on
either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences
5
Emphasis supplied.
6
(2014) 6 SCC 466, [hereinafter, “Narinder Singh”].
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like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature
and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences
alleged to have been committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their
entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to
whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated
as crime against the society and not against the individual alone.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical
report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High
Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the
former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible
for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based
on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court
can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties
is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their
future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482
of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those
cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the
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High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the
criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at
this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not
been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High
Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned
above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the
stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases
the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on
merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where
the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is
at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise
between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting
in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is
already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”
b. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors.7, the same
principles have been reiterated.
c. In the recent judgment in Naushey Ali & Ors. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Anr.8, these principles were applied to set aside a prosecution
under Section 307.
18. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, upon an
overall consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of
the view that it would be appropriate to exercise the inherent powers of
this Court to quash the proceedings.
19. Although there were several injuries sustained by respondent No.
2, they were characterised as “simple”. That the prosecution, under
7
(2019) 5 SCC 688, [hereinafter, “Laxmi Narayan”].
8
(2025) 4 SCC 78.
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Section 307 of the IPC, would ultimately result in conviction cannot, in
these circumstances, be anticipated at this stage.
20. Further, and most importantly, the dispute is in the nature of a
“family dispute”. The relationship between the parties is akin to a mother-
and-child relationship, a relationship that is socially recognised as
singular and sacrosanct. Respondent No. 2 and her husband brought the
petitioner to their home when the petitioner was, but three months old.
They successfully applied to be appointed as her guardians until she
attained majority. Even thereafter, they permitted her to continue residing
in their home, and, in the words of respondent No. 2 herself:
“9. The Respondent and her family, out of love and affection for the
Petitioner, used to swallow their emotions and gave into every demand
raised by the Petitioner. The Respondent used to express by way of
words and gestures that she loved the Petitioner very much and only
wants what is best for her and that she wanted the Petitioner to stay
with them as a family member.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
11. The Respondent duly discharged all her legal and pious duties
and obligations towards the Petitioner’s support, health, education (a
graduate of Jesus and Mary College, Delhi University) and such other
matters as per law. That even after the Petitioner attained majority i.e.
after 21.07.2013, the Respondent, out of natural love and affection,
permitted the Petitioner to continue to reside with her at the premises,
fed and looked after her. The Petitioner continued to be treated as a
member of the family by the Respondent and her natural born son Mr.
Anthony Fernandez and that too no differently than her natural born
son.”
21. It is clear that the relationship between the petitioner and
respondent No. 2, though not legally that of a parent and child, was no
different from such a relationship, socially and emotionally. Respondent
No. 2 has recounted in her affidavit, the dynamics of that relationship,
which included rough patches and differences of opinion beginning in the
petitioner’s teenage years. However, such elements are not unusual in
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parent-child relationships, and I would not characterise the relationship
differently for that reason.
22. Although respondent No. 2, in her affidavit, has expressed anguish
at the events of 03.02.2019, even at that stage, as mentioned in the FIR,
she initially desisted from giving a statement to the police, describing the
matter as a “family dispute”.
23. Civil proceedings were also instituted between the parties, which
were subsequently settled before the Lok Adalat on 26.08.2022, and
before the Civil Judge, District North West, Rohini Courts, on
24.09.2022. The genesis of the present settlement also lies in that
settlement.
24. Respondent No. 2 is herself an educated lady, being a retired
teacher. She has since taken a consistent and unequivocal stand in support
of this petition:
A. The settlement has been described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
affidavit of no objection affirmed by respondent No. 2 on
11.08.2025, which have been extracted in paragraph 10
hereinabove.
B. At the same time, the parties also entered into an MoU, which
records that respondent No. 2 “forgives the [petitioner] for the
actions of the [petitioner], particularly those that occurred on
03.02.2019, and that the respondent no. 2 undertook to cooperate
in the quashing of the present case.”
C. Six months thereafter, on 07.02.2026, respondent No. 2 affirmed
an affidavit in reply to the present petition, wherein she reiterated
the aforesaid settlement, including her decision to forgive the
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petitioner for the incident in question. She has further stated that
she has no objection if the FIR and all proceedings arising
therefrom are quashed. In fact, the affidavit in reply contains a
specific prayer to that effect.
D. In my personal interaction with respondent No. 2 on 10.02.2026, I
found her resolute in her desire not to proceed against the
petitioner.
25. Respondent No. 2, thus, first affirmed this position in the year
2022, when the civil proceedings were settled; then, in the course of her
cross-examination on 09.12.2024; again, in August 2025, when the MoU
and affidavit of no objection were signed; and lastly in February 2026, in
the reply filed on her behalf as well as during her interaction with the
Court.
26. Despite the forgiveness expressed by respondent No. 2 towards the
petitioner, whom she brought up as a daughter, must the Court compel
the criminal proceedings to be taken to their logical conclusion? In my
considered view, such a course would amount to a travesty of justice. If
justice is ever to be tempered with mercy9, this is a fit case for such an
approach. That profound sentiment must, in the peculiar facts of this
case, transcend any societal or public interest in securing the petitioner’s
conviction.
9
Shakespeare, William, The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene I (Portia’s “Quality of Mercy”
speech):
“The quality of mercy is not strain’d.
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.”
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27. In the facts of this case, I am therefore of the view that the petition
deserves to be allowed, and the criminal proceedings emanating
therefrom are liable to be quashed.
28. In order to avoid any further confusion or litigation, one aspect
requires clarification, namely, the legal status of the relationship between
the petitioner and respondent No. 2. In the petition, the petitioner has
described herself as the “adopted daughter” of respondent No. 2. Indeed,
in the FIR itself, respondent No. 2 is reported to have referred to the
petitioner as “मेरी लड़की” [my daughter], and stated that she had “adopted”
the petitioner from the Missionaries of Charity. However, it has been
clarified in both the affidavits filed by respondent No. 2, that the
petitioner was not, in fact, her adopted daughter; rather, she and her
husband were her joint guardians under the G&W Act. To avoid any
further confusion on this issue, the petitioner’s statement was recorded in
Court on 13.02.2026 as follows:
“1. I am the petitioner in the above case and the accused in
proceedings arising out of FIR No. 109/2019 dated 07.03.2019,
registered under Section 308 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, at
Police Station Shahbad Dairy.
2. I have filed this petition seeking quashing of the criminal
proceedings on account of a compromise.
3. In the petition, I had stated that I am the adopted daughter
of respondent No. 2. However, I acknowledge that I was never
adopted by respondent No. 2 and her husband. Respondent No. 2
and her husband were appointed as my joint guardians by an order
of the learned District Judge, Delhi, dated 25.02.1993, which
remained in effect until I attained majority on 21.07.2013.
4. I acknowledge that respondent No. 2 and her family have
no further obligation towards me, and I have no right over their
10
property, including any right of inheritance.”
10
Emphasis supplied.
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29. It is clarified that nothing stated in this judgment derogates from
the aforesaid accepted legal position.
30. Having come to the conclusion that the petition is liable to succeed,
the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 109/2019 dated
07.03.2019, registered at P.S. Shahbad Dairy, District Outer North, Delhi,
under Section 308 of the IPC, are hereby quashed.
31. However, I am of the view that it would be appropriate to require
the petitioner to undertake a period of community service. She is directed
to report to the Medical Superintendent of St. Stephen’s Hospital,
Railway Colony, Tis Hazari, New Delhi – 110054, on 12.03.2026 at 11
A.M. The Medical Superintendent is requested to assign appropriate
duties to her for 30 sessions of three hours each. The sessions may be
scheduled at the convenience of the Hospital, taking into account any
professional or work-related commitments of the petitioner; however, the
same shall be completed within a period of four months from today.
32. The Medical Superintendent is requested to issue a certificate of
compliance, which the petitioner is directed to place before this Court
within five months from today. A copy of this judgment be transmitted to
the Medical Superintendent.
33. The petition is accordingly disposed of with these directions.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
MARCH 03, 2026
‘pv/Jishnu’/
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