Madhya Pradesh High Court
Anil Prajapati vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 March, 2026
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
1 MCRC-6408-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
ON THE 5 th OF MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 6408 of 2026
ANIL PRAJAPATI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Ayush Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Mohit Shivhare Ga appearing on behalf of Advocate General[r-
1].
Abhishek Jat, learned counsel for the respondent [R-2].
ORDER
This petition has been filed by the applicant under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 of
Cr.P.C.) seeking quashment of FIR bearing Crime No.261/2024 registered at
Police Station Girwai, District Gwalior for the offences punishable under
Sections 64(1), 74 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, along with all
consequential criminal proceedings arising out of Sessions Trial No.26/2025,
on the basis of compromise between the parties.
Brief facts of the case are that on the basis of a report lodged by
respondent No.2/prosecutrix, the aforesaid FIR was registered against the
petitioner. After registration of the case, the matter proceeded before the trial
Court and the criminal case is pending as Sessions Trial No.26/2025.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
2 MCRC-6408-2026
Learned counsel for the petitioner as well as counsel for the
complainant submitted that during the pendency of the case the parties have
amicably settled their dispute and a compromise has been arrived at between
them. It is submitted that both the parties have resolved their differences
voluntarily without any pressure, coercion or undue influence and they wish
to maintain cordial relations in future. On the basis of such compromise, it is
prayed that the FIR and all consequential proceedings may be quashed.
Reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 2012 SCW and B.S. Joshi vs.
State of Haryana reported in AIR(2003)1386.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposed the petition
and submitted that the offences alleged in the present case are serious in
nature and are offences against the society. It is submitted that such offences
cannot be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the parties
and therefore the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The scope and ambit of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
(now Section 528 BNSS) is well settled. Though the High Court possesses
wide plenitude of powers to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of
process of Court, such power is required to be exercised sparingly and with
circumspection.
The Apex Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC
303; State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688; and Parbatbhai
Aahir vs. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 has categorically held that
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
3 MCRC-6408-2026
heinous and serious offences of mental depravity such as murder, rape,
dacoity, etc., cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise, as such
offences are not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society.
I n Shimbhu vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318 and State of
M.P. vs. Madan Lal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, the Apex Court has unequivocally
held that rape is a non-compoundable offence and a crime against society.
Compromise between the victim and the accused cannot be a ground for
quashing proceedings or for adopting a lenient approach, as such a course
would be against public policy and the dignity of women.
This Court in the matter of Rishikesh Chandel & Others vs. State of
M.P. & Another (M.Cr.C. No.52709 of 2025, decided on 09.02.2026) has
held as under:
“8. The short question which requires consideration is, whether in the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the FIR as well as the entire proceedings can be quashed in
the cases involving an offence of Rape in view of the compromise entered into by the parties?
9. Before scrutinizing the facts of the present case and rephrasing the scope of powers
exercisable by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it would be appropriate to understand
Section 482 Cr.P.C. which provides for saving of inherent powers of High Court. Section 482
Cr.P.C., reads as under:-
“Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice.”
10. The inherent power of the Courts set up by the Constitution is a power that inheres in such
Courts being Court of record. This power is vested by the Constitution itself, inter-alia, under
Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex-debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists or to
prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Section 482 Cr.P.C. saves inherent powers of the
High Court and it starts with non-obstante clause “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit
or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary.” The
inherent power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (i) to give effect to an order under the
Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
justice.
11. This inherent power possessed by the High Court is of wide plenitude, with no statutory
restrictions. The limitations imposed on exercise of such power are the self imposed restrictions.
Any provision of the Code cannot limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. But, this
power, being extraordinary, is required to be exercised sparingly, carefully, with caution, and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
4 MCRC-6408-2026
circumspection and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
Section 482 Cr.P.C. If there is any specific provision in the statute for redressal of grievance, the
High Court, ordinarily, refuses to invoke the extraordinary powers, and also, in a situation with
respect to the matter where there is a specific bar of law engrafted in the statute. The paramount
consideration to the exercise of this power is to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. If
any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court
would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of any specific
provision in the statute.
12. At this juncture, it would be apropos to illuminate the following principles laid down by a
Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in reported in
(2012) 10 SCC 303 has held as under:-
“61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal
court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz.:- (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR
may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have
settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such
like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family
disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings
if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the
criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of
justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is
put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall
be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
13. The compendium of these broad fundamentals structured in more than one judicial precedent,
has been recapitulated by another Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 elaborating:
“(1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings
for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when
the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
(2) Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:78645 MCRC-6408-2026
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
(3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender;
(4) xxx xxx xxx
(5) While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings
in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious
impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the
offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the
accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had
managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.”
14. Section 320 (1) of the Code provides for compounding of certain offences punishable under
Indian Penal Code (IPC ) specified in first two columns of the Table, given there under, by the
persons mentioned in the third Column of the table. Sub-Section (2) of Section 320 of the Code,
further provides for compounding of certain offences punishable under Indian Penal Code
specified in the first two columns by the persons specified in the third column of the table given
under Sub-section (2), with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such
offence is pending. Subsection (9) of Section 320, specifically provides that, “No offence shall be
compounded except as provided by this Section” i.e. Section 320 of the Code.
15. Section 320 Cr.P.C. does not come in the way of exercise of inherent power of the High Court
for quashment of criminal proceeding. The power of the High Court for quashment of the
criminal proceeding is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal Court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. The inherent power of the High Court
is neither restricted nor controlled by Section 320 of the Code. The proceedings of the offences
which are non-compoundable can also be quashed by the High Court in exercise of inherent
jurisdiction, on the well settled principles, but sparingly and with caution, forming an opinion, on
either of the two objectives of securing the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of
any Court. This bar of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is attracted only before the Criminal Court, where the
prayer for compounding is made. There, only those offences which have been made
compoundable, can be compounded and the offences which are non-compoundable cannot be
compounded in view of Sub-Section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C.
16. It is true that offences which are ‘non-compoundable’ cannot be compounded by a criminal
court in purported exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. There is no patent or latent
ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider interpretation and
include such offences in the docket of ‘compoundable’ offences which have been consciously kept
out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within
the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers by the
High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
17. In B.S. Joshi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of F.I.R becomes necessary,
section 320 Cr.P.C. would not be a Bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a
different matter depending on facts and circumstances of each case, whether to exercise or not,
such a power. The High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings
or F.I.R or complaint and Section 320 Cr.P.C. does not limit or affect the powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C.
18. Similarly, in the case of Madhu Limaye vs. The State Of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1978
SC 47, the Apex Court has held that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of
FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It
is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
6 MCRC-6408-2026
to exercise or not such a power.
19. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699, considering the scope of inherent
power of quashing under Section 482, the Apex Court has held that in the exercise of this
wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion
that the ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind
a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests
and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and
that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be
administered according to laws made by the legislature. The Court said that the compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and
purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice
between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of
that salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of
the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen to the trial of the case where the
wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As also noticed by
the Court, later she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to
temperamental differences and implied imputations. There may be many reasons for not
supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her
husband and his other family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her
husband with whom she earlier had differences or she has willingly parted company and is living
happily on her own or has married someone else on the earlier marriage having been dissolved by
divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In
such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to
decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to
compound non-compoundable offences? The answer clearly has to be in the “negative”. It would,
however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines the prayer for quashing for any
valid reasons including lack of bona fides.
20. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692, the
Apex Court has held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for
the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to
consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.
Where, in the opinion of the court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no
useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court
may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings.
21. Thus, the Apex Court in B.S. Joshi (Supra) case has come to the conclusion that the High
Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and
Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.
22. In Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others Vs. State of Gujrat and
another (2017) 9 SCC 641, the Hon’ble Apex Court again summarized and laid down principles
which emerged from the precedents on the subject, in paragraph no.16 of the judgment, which is
as follows:-
“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised
in the following propositions:
16.1 Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the
process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It
only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16.2 The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a
criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and
the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an
offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 isSignature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:78647 MCRC-6408-2026
attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3 In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;16.4 While the inherent power of the
High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice
or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16.5 The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the
ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6 In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute
has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.
Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled
the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact
upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding
element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7 As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an
overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so
far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16.8 Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile,
partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations
fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16.9 In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the
compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation
of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10 There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9, above.
Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High
Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin
to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”
23. In Parbatbhai Aahir (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court was
justified in declining to entertain the application for quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction, as the case involved extortion, forgery, conspiracy, fabrication of documents,
utilization of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers of title before the registering authorities
and deprivation of the complainant therein of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated
power of attorney, and consequently it was not in the interest of the society to quash the FIR on
the ground that a settlement had been arrived at with the complainant. Such offences could not be
construed to be merely private or civil disputes but implicated the societal interest in prosecuting
serious crime.
24. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, again held that the power to quash the criminal proceedings in exercise of power under
Section 482 of the Code is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are
not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Paragraph 15 of Laxmi Narayan
(Supra) is being reproduced as under:-
“15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred
to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:-
15.1) That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings
for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out ofSignature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:78648 MCRC-6408-2026
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when
the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2) Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3) Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender;
15.4) Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of
heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not
against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section
307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed
in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved
their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence,
which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after
investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise
is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion
in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)
should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated
hereinabove;
15.5) While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal
proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not
have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the
victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the
conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was
absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.”
25. In Laxmi Narayan(Supra), the High Court had quashed the criminal proceedings for the
offences under Section 307 and 34 IPC on the basis of settlement mechanically and even when
the investigation was under process and some how, the accused managed to enter into a
compromise with the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. It
was held that the allegations were serious in nature. Fire arms was used in the commission of the
offence. Considering the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused his antecedents,
quashment of the FIR on the basis of settlement was held as not sustainable in the eye of law.
26. From the above discussion, it is clear that the Court considering the nature of offence and the
fact that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to
the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. even if the offences are non-compoundable. The Court can
indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual
and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished,
does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice system.
27. It has further held that criminal proceedings involving non-heinous offences or where the
offences are predominantly of a private nature, can be quashed. The cases where compromise has
taken place, this Court under inherent power ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude,
keeping in view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compromise
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
9 MCRC-6408-2026
has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the
conduct of the accused, before and after the incidence.
28. This Court is of the opinion that the touchstone for exercising the extra-ordinary power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line
constricting the power of the Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction of inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts
and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where
heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended, as
has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab &
Ors. and Laxmi Narayan (Supra).
29. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which involve moral turpitude or have a
harmful effect on the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public
policy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for such offences have the
potential to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences through quashing process
would not only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to
unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can secure a ‘settlement’ through duress,
threats, social boycotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that “let no guilty man
escape, if it can be avoided.
30. In a case of rape or attempt of rape, the conception of compromise under no circumstances
can really be thought of. These are crimes against the body of a woman which is her own temple.
These are offences which suffocate the breath of life and sully the reputation. And reputation,
needless to emphasise, is the richest jewel one can conceive in life. No one would allow it to be
extinguished. When a human frame is defiled, the “purest treasure”, is lost. Dignity of a woman
is a part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in
clay. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which
matters the most. It is sacrosanct. Sometimes solace is given that the perpetrator of the crime has
acceded to enter into wedlock with her which is nothing but putting pressure in an adroit manner;
and we say with emphasis that the Courts are to remain absolutely away from this subterfuge to
adopt a soft approach to the case, for any kind of liberal approach has to be put in the
compartment of spectacular error.
31. In the case of Shyam Narain vs. State (NCT of Delhi) AIR 2013 SC 2209, the Apex Court has
gone to the extent of sum that an attitude reflects lack of sensibility towards the dignity, the elan
vital, of a woman. Any kind of liberal approach or thought of mediation in this regard thoroughly
and completely sans legal permissibility.
32. A compromise entered into between the parties cannot be construed as a leading factor based
on which lesser punishment can be awarded. Rape is a non-compoundable offence and it is an
offence against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to compromise and settle.
Since the Court cannot always be assured that the consent given by the victim in compromising
the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance that she might have been pressurized by the
convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for a
compromise.
33. In Shimbhu Vs. State of Haryana (2014) 13 SCC 318, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that
rape is a non compoundable offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter to
be left for the parties to compromise and settle. Since the Court cannot always be assured that the
consent given by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance
that she might have been pressurized by the convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years
might have compelled her to opt for a compromise. Infact, accepting this proposition will put an
additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his influence to pressurize her for
compromise. So, in the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the
victim, it would not be safe in considering the compromise arrived at between the parties in rape
cases to be a ground for the court to exercise the discretionary power under proviso to Section
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
10 MCRC-6408-2026
376(2) IPC.
34. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Madan Lal (2015) 7 Supreme Court Cases 681, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that rape or attempt to rape are crimes against the body of a women which is
her own temple. These are the offences which suffocate the breath of life and sully the reputation.
Reputation is the richest jewel one can conceive of in life. No one can allow it to be extinguished.
When a human frame is defiled, the “Purest Treasure” is lost. Dignity of a woman is a part of her
non-perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in clay. There cannot
be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters the most.
Sometimes solace is given that the perpetrator of the crime has acceded to enter into wedlock
with her which is nothing but putting pressure in an adroit manner. The Apex Court emphasized
that, the Courts are to remain absolutely away from this subterfuge to adopt a soft approach to the
case, for any kind of liberal approach has to be put in the compartment of spectacular error. Or to
put it differently, it would be in the realm of a sanctuary of error.
35. Thus, it is very well settled that in respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.,
or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special
statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal
sanction at all. Any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to such offences,
cannot provide for any basis for quashing the criminal proceedings. The inherent power is not to
be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences. Such offences are
not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. The decision to continue with the trial
in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for
serious offences. The offences under Section 376 of IPC fall in the category of serious and
heinous offences. The same is treated as crime against the society and not against individual
alone and therefore, the criminal proceeding for the offences under these sections having a
serious impact on the society, cannot be quashed in exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Code on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute among themselves through
compromise/settlement.
36. Any compromise or settlement with respect to the offence of rape, against the honour of a
woman, which shakes the very core of her life and tantamounts to a serious blow to her supreme
honour, offending both, her esteem and dignity, is not acceptable to this Court.
37. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as above stated position of law,
the Court finds that the alleged offences under Sections 64(2)(f), 64(2)(m), 115(2), 118(1),
351(3), 3(5) of BNS are serious in nature and non-compoundable, therefore, the instant
proceedings cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties in exercise of
powers conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
38. Accordingly, the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed.”
This Court, in the aforesaid matter, after considering the entire gamut
of law on the subject, has reiterated that offences under Section 376 IPC fall
in the category of serious and heinous offences and cannot be quashed in
exercise of inherent jurisdiction merely on the basis of compromise.
In the present case, the allegations in the present case relate to
offences punishable under Sections 64(1), 74 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-GWL:7864
11 MCRC-6408-2026
Nyaya Sanhita, which are serious offences and have a larger impact on
society. The law is well settled that in cases involving offences of serious
nature or offences against society, the criminal proceedings cannot be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the parties.
Even though the prosecutrix has entered into a compromise, the same
cannot override the larger public interest in ensuring that persons accused of
such grave offences are subjected to due process of law. The gravity and
nature of the allegations disentitle the petitioner from seeking quashment on
the basis of compromise.
In view of the settled legal position and considering the seriousness of
the offences alleged, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is
made out for exercise of inherent powers under Section 528 of BNSS
(Section 482 Cr.P.C.) for quashing the FIR and consequential proceedings.
Accordingly, the petition filed under Section 528 of BNSS (Section
482 Cr.P.C.) is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
neetu
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: NEETU
SHASHANK
Signing time: 3/10/2026
12:07:04 PM