Analysing Anti-Arbitration Injunction in light of MSA Global LLC V. Engineering Projects India LTD

The Indian arbitration landscape has long been defined by a fundamental tension between two competing principles, the statutory mandate for minimal judicial intervention under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A & C Act”) versus the constitutional duty of courts to ensure procedural fairness.

An ‘anti-arbitration injunction’ is the ultimate manifestation of this tension. Simply put, an anti-arbitration injunction is an order restraining a party from initiating or continuing arbitral proceedings. Typically, this relief is and should be granted in very exceptional cases and circumstances. This is reasoned on the principles of ‘minimum judicial intervention’ and ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ as embodied in the A & C Act.

The case of MSA Global LLC v. Engineering Projects India Ltd. FAO (OS) 88/2025, decided on 12.12.2025, is one such example where the Hon’ble Delhi High Court found it appropriate to grant the relief of anti-arbitration injunction given the facts and circumstances. The Hon’ble Court’s decision is couched on the reasoning that the principle of ‘minimal judicial inference’ cannot act as a shroud for “oppressive” or “fundamentally unfair” proceedings.

• The Appellant (hereinafter referred to as ‘A’) is a military and security systems integrator based in Oman. The respondent (hereinafter referred as ‘B’) is a public sector enterprise under the Government of India, having registered office at New Delhi.

• Ministry of Defence, Oman appointed ‘B’ as the main contractor for a supply and build project related to Border Security System at Omam-Yemen border. ‘B’ entered into a sub-contract with ‘A’ for carrying out some specific parts of the main contract.

• Article 19 of the agreement between ‘A’ and ‘B’ provided for a dispute resolution through arbitration under ICC Rules. However, there was a catch in the dispute resolution clause. Even though the arbitration was supposed to be carried out as per the ICC Rules, however, the jurisdiction to decide substantive questions was vested with the Court at New Delhi, India.

• Dispute arose between the parties relating to performance delays. ‘A’ invoked arbitration under the ICC Rules and nominated Mr. Andre Yeap (‘Mr. Yeap’) as its co-arbitrator. Mr. Yeap, in his statement of Acceptance, Availability, Impartiality and Independence declared that he has nothing to disclose.

• Thereafter, ICC Court which was responsible for the procedure of the arbitration, fixed Singapore as the place of arbitration.

• The main bone of contention arose in January 2025, when ‘B’ discovered that in judgment by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court dated 05.07.2025 titled Neeraj Kumarpal Shah v. MSA, it was recorded that Mr. Yeap had acted as co-arbitrator appointed by ‘A’. The same was not disclosed by Mr. Yeap.

• Due to lack of disclosure and raising doubts about the independence and impartiality of Mr. Yeap, ‘B’ filed a challenge before ICC Court with respect to the appointment of Mr. Yeap in the arbitral tribunal. The ICC Court termed the non-disclosure ‘regrettable’ and rejected the claim of ‘B’ on merits and allowed Mr. Yeap to continue.

• Thereafter, proceedings were started in the Singapore High Court seeking termination of Mr. Yeap’s mandate. Simultaneously, ‘B’ instituted civil suit for ‘anti-arbitration injunction’ under Section 9 of CPC seeking the reliefs of declaration that the continuation of the arbitration was oppressive, vexatious and unconscionable, therefore an anti-arbitration injunction be granted.

• In the meantime, the Singapore High Court (SGHC) decided some interim applications in favour of ‘A’ which operated in the nature of a ‘foreign anti-suit injunction.’ However, the Single Judge of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court vide order dated 25.07.2025 granted an anti-arbitration injunction restraining the continuation of ICC arbitration. ‘A’ proceeded to file an appeal in the present matter titled MSA Global LLC v. Engineering Projects India Ltd, FAO (OS) 88/2025. The Hon’ble Delhi Court vide its decision dated 12.12.2025 in FAO (OS) 88/2025 upheld the decision of the Hon’ble Single Judge with a limited caveat that the Single Judge has made a strong prima facie observation bordering on an expression of final opinion which should have been avoided. However, the Court found the case to be fit for ‘rarest of rare’ cases for allowing anti-arbitration injuction and did not interfere with the decision of the Single Judge.

Recalibrating the Standard: Key Takeaways from the judgment of MSA Global

In a suit for an anti-arbitration injunction, usually the parties face a nearly insurmountable wall. Section 13 of the A & C Act and judgments like HRD Corporation (Marcus Oil and Chemical Division) v. GAIL, (2018) 12 SCC 471 makes it clear that where a plea of alleged bias is raised before the arbitral tribunal and is not accepted by it, the party aggrieved has no immediate recourse. Such a challenge can only be pursued at the post-award stage, by way of an application under Section 34 of the Act, for consideration by the Court. However, in the present case, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court took a different approach:

1. It elevated the standards of Section 12 disclosures under A & C Act for granting anti-arbitration injunction in appropriate facts and circumstances. If the learned arbitrator fails to make adequate disclosure, then the Hon’ble Courts are vested with jurisdiction to intervene and provide for an anti-arbitration injunction.

2. The Hon’ble Court relied on the objective test of interpretation (‘the reasonable person’s test’) in order to arrive at the conclusion that the case gave rise to ‘justifiable doubts’ about the arbitrator’s independence.

The Conflict of Jurisdictions: Foreign Anti-Suit Injunctions vis-à-vis Section 13(a) CPC

One of the most profound aspects is highlighted in the latter part of the judgment with respect to the treatment of ‘Foreign Anti-Suit Injunctions’ in the backdrop of Section 13(a) CPC. It was observed that when a foreign court acting merely as a ‘venue’ tries to stop a party from approaching Indian ‘seat’ courts, a clash of jurisdiction occurs. In the present case, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court’s analyses ‘Foreign Anti-Suit Injunctions’ in the backdrop of Section 13(a) CPC provides a defense mechanism of Indian supervisory jurisdiction on the following grounds:

1. For a foreign judgment to be conclusive in India, the issuing court must have competence over the subject matter.

2. If India is the juridical seat, Indian courts have exclusive supervisory power. A foreign court acting as a venue lacks the “subject-matter competence” to restrain a party from exercising statutory rights under the A&C Act in India.

3. Consequently, Foreign Anti-Suit Injunctions from a non-seat forum (like Singapore, if it is only the venue) is rendered null and void in India. It cannot operate as res judicata because it fails the test of a “court of competent jurisdiction.

The judgment in the case of MSA Global signifies that the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has resorted to a nuanced ‘middle ground approach’ instead of a totally hands-off approach in granting the anti-arbitration injunction. Given the complexity and the magnitude of the matter, there is a possibility that the decision may be challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

However, the decision as it stands today sends a loud and clear message that the doors of the Hon’ble Court are open to those being subjected to a process that has lost its legal compass and has become oppressive and fundamentally unfair. The middle ground approach may be called the new equilibrium; however, the Hon’ble Courts ought to be cautious that this approach does not result in judicial overreach and create an imbalance in the arbitration landscape.