Punjab-Haryana High Court
Amanpreet Kaur @ Amanpreet Kaur Sidhu vs State Of Punjab And Another on 12 February, 2026
Author: Jasjit Singh Bedi
Bench: Jasjit Singh Bedi
CRM-M-7958-2026 (O & M)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
(134) CRM-M-7958-2026 (O & M)
Date of decision: 12.02.2026
(Through VC)
Amanpreet Kaur @ Amanpreet Kaur Sidhu
...... Petitioner(s)
V/s
State of Punjab and anr.
...Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASJIT SINGH BEDI
Present: Mr. Tarun Singla, Advocate,
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Harkanwar Jeet Singh, AAG, Punjab.
****
JASJIT SINGH BEDI, J. (Oral)
The prayer in the present petition under Section 528 BNSS is
for quashing of FIR No.19 dated 16.03.2025 under Section 108 BNS, 2023
(306 IC), registered at Police Station Phool, District Bathinda (Annexure P-
1) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of a
compromise (Annexure P-2).
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the
aforementioned FIR (Annexure P-1) had been registered on account of some
misunderstandings which have been removed. In furtherance of the same, a
compromise has been arrived at with the intervention of the Panchayat and
respectables, a copy of which is attached as Annexure P-2. As the matter
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stands settled between the parties, the FIR (Annexure P-1) be quashed in the
interest of justice. Reliance is placed on ‘Ashutosh Shiv and others versus
State of Punjab and others 2023 NCPHHC 156537, Mohd. Imran and
others State of U.T., Chandigarh and another (CRM-M-25962-2023
decided on 15.10.2024), Neha Dhiman and others versus State of Haryana
and another 2023 NCPHHC 126317, Narinder Sharma, @ Narinder
Singh versus State of Punjab and another (CRM-M-16283-2025 decided
on 27.05.2025), Arsh Vikram Singh versus State of Punjab and others
2022(4) Law Herald 2897, Gulshan Kumar and another versus State of
Punjab and others (CRM-M-19732-2021 decided on 24.03.2022) and
Hardeep Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (CRM-M-
48995-2024 decided on 18.11.2024)’.
3. The learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, contends
that in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Daxaben
versus State of Gujarat and others 2022 AIR Supreme Court 3530,
Paramjit Kaur and others versus State of Punjab and others 2025(3)
CriCC 432, Kewal Singh and another versus State of Punjab 2025
NCPHHC 38662 and Neelam Devi and another versus State of Punjab
and another 2022(3) RCR(Criminal) 740, an FIR under Section 306 IPC
(Section 108 BNS) cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise.
Therefore, the present petition is liable to be dismissed.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
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5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Daxaben versus State of
Gujarat and others 2022 AIR Supreme Court 3530′ held as under:
38. However, before exercising its power under section 482 of
the Cr.P.C., 1973 to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or
criminal proceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has
to be circumspect and have due regard to the nature and gravity
of the offence. Heinous or serious crimes, which are not private
in nature and have a serious impact on society cannot be
quashed on the basis of a compromise between the offender and
the complainant and/or the victim. Crimes like murder, rape,
burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide are
neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the
society. In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on
compromise, when the offence is serious and grave and falls
within the ambit of crime against society.
39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave
and serious offences only on basis of an agreement with the
complainant, would set a dangerous precedent, where
complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to
extract money from the accused. Furthermore, financially
strong offenders would go scot free, even in cases of grave and
serious offences such as murder, rape, brideburning, etc. by
buying off informants/complainants and settling with them. This
would render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498A,
304B etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific
social purpose.
40. In Criminal Jurisprudence, the position of the complainant
is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal
complaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State,
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it becomes a matter between the State and the accused. The
State has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in
society. It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of
grave and serious noncompoundable offences which impact
society, the informant and/or complainant only has the right of
hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by
conviction and punishment of the offender. An informant has no
right in law to withdraw the complaint of a noncompoundable
offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous nature, which
impacts society.
This Court in ‘Paramjit Kaur and others versus State of
Punjab and others 2025(3) CriCC 432′ held as under:-
19. In offences resulting in death such as those under Sections
302, 304-A, 304-B, 306 IPC etc., the deceased is the primary
victim. Because the harm suffered is inevitable, no compromise
by legal heirs can substitute the voice of the deceased. By
allowing legal heirs to settle such cases unilaterally, the justice
system would fail in its duty to hold perpetrators accountable,
since the crime does not affect only the family but has wider
ramifications for society at large.
20. Another crucial legal principle at play is “Parens Patriae”.
This doctrine empowers the State and the Courts to act as
guardians of those who are unable to defend themselves,
including deceased victims. Therefore, it is not for the accused
and the complainant to negotiate, especially when the primary
victim has lost his life. The duty to ensure that justice is done,
lies with the Court and the State, not with private individuals
who may settle matters for personal convenience. Furthermore,
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where the victim is deceased, like in the present case, the
Courts must act as if it is directly answerable to the deceased
and such cases be approached with the highest sense of
responsibility and gravity ensuring that the rule of law is
upheld.
21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Daxaben (supra)
has categorically held as follows:-
“37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to
commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence.
Of course, the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be
exercised to quash criminal proceedings relating to non-
compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or
to prevent abuse of the process of Court. Where the
victim and offender have compromised disputes
essentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court
can exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to
quash the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to
quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or criminal
proceedings upon compromise can be exercised, would
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
38. However, before exercising its power under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint
and/or criminal proceedings, the High Court, as observed
above, has to be circumspect and have due regard to the
nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous or serious
crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a
compromise between the offender and the complainant
and/or the victim. Crimes like murder, rape, burglary,
dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide are neither
private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the
society. In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed
on compromise, when the offence is serious and grave
and falls within the ambit of crime against society.
39. Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to
grave and serious offences only on basis of an agreement
with the complainant, would set a dangerous precedent,
where complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons,
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with a view to extract money from the accused.
Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go scot
free, even in cases of grave and serious offences such as
murder, rape, bride burning, etc. by buying off
informants/complainants and settling with them. This
would render otiose provisions such as Sections 306,
498A, 304-B etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent,
with a specific social purpose.”
22. Given this binding precedent, any Coordinate Bench of this
Court that has taken a contrary view, with respect, must be
regarded as having acted per incuriam, and therefore, would
not hold authoritative value. The doctrine of Stare Decisis also
mandates that this Court adheres to the authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rather than
embark upon a re-evaluation of an issue that has already been
conclusively settled.
23. Therefore, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for
the petitioners that the matter should be referred to a Larger
Bench are equally untenable. This Court cannot disregard a
binding judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court under the guise of
judicial reconsideration. The principle of judicial discipline
requires that settled law be applied uni-formally, without
entertaining to attempt to circumvent it or seeking judicial
divergence, where none exists.
24. Applying these principles to the present case, this Court
finds no scope for divergence from the settled law laid down in
case of Daxaben (supra) and other authoritative
pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
25. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the present petition
is devoid of merit. The doctrine of Parens Patriae obligates this
Court to ensure that justice is not reduced to a mere private
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settlement, particularly when the primary victim is no longer
alive. The doctrine of Stare Decisis further mandates adherence
to settled law. Any departure from the binding legal position
laid down in Daxaben (supra) would constitute a direct
violation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, thereby
undermining the consistency, stability and predictability that
are the cornerstone of our judicial system.
26. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed. However,
it is made clear that anything observed hereinabove shall not be
construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the
case.
This Court in ‘Kewal Singh and another versus State of
Punjab 2025 NCPHHC 38662′ held as under:-
8. On reading the findings arrived by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, it is deciphered that quashing FIRs and/or complaints
relating to grave and serious offences only on basis of an
agreement with the complainant, would be violative of the law
settled. It has been further observed that this would render
otiose the provisions such as Sections 306, 498- A, 304-B etc.
incorporated in the IPC. Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed
that FIR under Section 306 cannot be quashed on the basis of
any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse,
parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else.
Hon’ble Supreme Court, thus, has totally ruled out the quashing
of the FIR for the offence under Section 306 IPC on the basis of
the compromise. The offence under Section 306 IPC has been
held not to be offence in private nature, but against the society
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as a whole. Accepting the compromise in such like cases would
have serious ramifications in the society.
9. Though learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that
the law settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Daxaben‘s case
(supra) is distinguishable on the facts and circumstances of the
present case as the offence under Section 306 IPC is not made
out in the present case, however, the argument raised is
misconceived, as the petition is filed on the basis of compromise
and not on the basis of merits.
10. Hence, the law cited by learned counsel for the petitioners
cannot be relied upon by this Court, as Hon’ble Supreme Court
has settled the issue in hand in Daxaben‘s case (supra). Thus,
this Court does not find any merit in the present petition and
hence, the same is hereby dismissed.
This Court in Neelam Devi and another versus State of
Punjab and another 2022(3) RCR(Criminal) 740 held as under:-
6. Since an offence under Section 306 IPC is alleged to have
been committed which is a heinous offence and Avtar Chand
had committed suicide, therefore, it is not just the Avtar Chand’s
family who would be the aggrieved, but the offence is broadly
committed against the deceased himself. There can be no
compromise with the dead man. As such the FIR cannot be
quashed on the basis of compromise. As far as the contention of
the petitioner regarding quashing of the FIR on merits is
concerned this Court is of the opinion that the allegations of
raising false allegations against the character of deceased by
Neelam Devi herself to the effect that he was having illicit
relations and subsequent quarrels with him on the said grounds
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would prima-facie attract an offence of abettment to commit
suicide. Even the relatives had also played a part in the same
inasmuch as they had also been troubling the deceased. There
are sufficient allegations in the FIR to constitute the offences.
No ground for quashing of FIR either on basis of compromise
or even on merits is made out.
6. A perusal of the aforementioned judgment would establish
beyond doubt that an FIR registered under Section 306 IPC (Section 108
BNS) cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, though, such an FIR
can be quashed on merit if the Court comes to the conclusion that no offence
is made out.
7. As regards the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, In Ashutosh Shiv (supra), Mohd. Imran (supra) and Neha
Dhiman (supra), though there is a reference to the judgment in Daxaben
(supra), the FIR was quashed on merits and not on the basis of a
compromise.
As regards the judgments in Narinder Sharma @ Narinder
Singh (supra), Arsh Vikram Singh (supra), Gulshan Kumar (supra) and
Hardeep Singh (supra), the respective FIRs have been quashed without
any reference to the judgment in Daxaben (supra).
8. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid discussion is that under
no circumstances whatsoever can an FIR registered under Section 306 IPC
(108 BNS) be quashed on the basis of a compromise, though, such an FIR
can be certainly quashed on merits.
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9. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not
even sought to argue the case on merits but has sought quashing of the FIR
(Annexure P-1) only on the basis of a compromise, which cannot be
allowed.
10. In view of the above, I find no merit in the present petition and
the same stands dismissed.
February 12, 2026 ( JASJIT SINGH BEDI)
sukhpreet JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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