Telangana High Court
Alugubelli Venkat Reddy vs Kondri Reddy Somi Reddy on 17 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.M.MOHIUDDIN
APPEAL SUIT No.78 OF 2023
DATE: 17.04.2026
Between:
Alugubelli Venkat Reddy
....Appellant
And
Kondri Reddy Somi Reddy
....Respondent
JUDGMENT
Heard Sri K.Rama Krishna, learned counsel for the appellant
and Sri P.Rama Sharana Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent
and perused the record.
2. This appeal, filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (for short, “CPC“), is directed against the judgment
and decree dated 05.08.2022 passed by the learned Principal District
Judge, Suryapet (for short, “trial Court”) in O.S.No.13 of 2016. The
said suit was instituted by the respondent/plaintiff seeking specific
performance of an agreement of sale dated 25.09.2014 in respect of
agricultural land admeasuring Ac.3.30 Gts in Sy Nos.301 and 302,
situated at B. Madharam Revenue Village, Suryapet Mandal
(hereinafter referred to as the “suit schedule property”). By the
2
impugned judgment, the trial Court decreed the suit, directing the
appellant/defendant to execute and register the sale deed in favour of
the respondent within one month, failing which the respondent was
granted liberty to have the sale deed executed through due process of
Court.
3. The appellant is the defendant and the respondent is the
plaintiff in O.S.No.13 of 2016.
4. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties are
hereinafter referred to in the capacity they were arrayed before the
trial Court.
Plaint Averments (Respondent/Plaintiff’s case)
5. The case of the plaintiff, as pleaded before the trial Court in
O.S.No.13 of 2016, was that the defendant, who is closely related to
him, had offered to sell the suit schedule property at the rate of
Rs.12,00,000/- per acre, fixing the total sale consideration at
Rs.45,00,000/-.
6. It was the specific case of the plaintiff that he paid the entire
sale consideration to the defendant on various occasions on or before
25.09.2014, and on the said date, the defendant executed an
agreement of sale (Ex.A1) at Suryapet in the presence of attesting
witnesses, agreeing to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the
plaintiff or his nominee. It was further pleaded that the defendant, at
3
the time of execution of Ex.A1, had also handed over photocopies of
his pattedar passbook and title deed, which were marked as Exs.A10
and A11.
7. The plaintiff averred that due to paucity of funds, he could not
immediately pursue registration of the sale deed. Subsequently,
whenever he approached the defendant requesting execution of the
registered sale deed, the defendant evaded performance on one
pretext or the other, initially stating that the original pattedar
passbook and title deed were misplaced and assuring that the same
would be executed upon tracing the documents.
8. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff issued a legal notice dated
16.02.2015 (Ex.A2) calling upon the defendant to execute the sale
deed. Though the defendant received the said notice, he failed to
comply and only sought time. As there was no progress, the plaintiff
issued a second legal notice dated 03.02.2016 (Ex.A6). In response
thereto, the defendant caused an interim reply notice dated
05.03.2016 (Ex.A8) demanding a copy of the agreement of sale, which
was duly furnished by the plaintiff under the cover of a rejoinder
notice dated 30.04.2016 (Ex.A9). Despite receipt of the same, the
defendant failed and neglected to perform his part of the contract and,
on the contrary, demanded an additional amount of Rs.15,00,000/-
on the ground of escalation in land value.
4
9. It is the further case of the plaintiff that on 03.05.2016, he,
along with village elders including PW2 i.e., one Tarala Saidulu,
approached the defendant and requested him to honour the
agreement and execute the registered sale deed; however, the
defendant categorically refused to do so unless the additional amount
was paid, thereby necessitating the filing of the suit.
Written Statement (Appellant/Defendant’s case)
10. The defendant, in his written statement, denied the entire case
of the plaintiff. While admitting the relationship between the parties
and his ownership over the suit schedule property, he specifically
denied execution of the agreement of sale dated 25.09.2014.
11. It was stated by the defendant that the alleged agreement of
sale is a fabricated and created document, brought into existence by
the plaintiff by taking advantage of their close relationship and
familiarity with the defendant’s signatures. The defendant asserted
that he never agreed to sell the suit property, nor did he receive any
sale consideration from the plaintiff at any point of time.
12. Defendant also stated that the story of payment of
consideration and postponement of registration due to paucity of
funds is wholly false. It was also pleaded that immediately upon
receipt of the first legal notice, he questioned the plaintiff, who
allegedly agreed to withdraw the same.
5
13. Additionally, the defendant took a specific plea that the alleged
agreement of sale is not duly stamped or registered and therefore is
inadmissible in evidence and unenforceable in law, in view of Sections
17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for short ‘1908 Act’).
Evidence before the trial Court
14. On behalf of the plaintiff, he examined himself as PW1 and
reiterated the averments made in the plaint. Plaintiff also examined
one of the attesting witnesses to the agreement of sale, namely Tarala
Saidulu, as PW2. The plaintiff relied upon documentary evidence
marked as Exs.A1 to A11, which included the original agreement of
sale dated 25.09.2021 (Ex.A1), legal notice dated 16.02.2015 (Ex.A2),
postal records (Ex.A3-A7), reply notice dated 05.03.2016 (Ex.A8),
rejoinder notice dated 30.04.2016 (Ex.A9), and copies of the pattedar
passbook and title deed (Ex.A10 and A11).
15. On behalf of the defendant, he examined himself as DW1 and
denied execution of the agreement of sale. Defendant relied upon
Ex.B1, being the reply notice, and Ex.B2, being an unserved
registered postal cover, in support of his defence.
Findings of the trial Court
16. Upon consideration of the pleadings, oral evidence, and
documentary material on record, the trial Court framed the following
issues:
6
i. Whether the agreement of sale dated 25.09.2014 is true,
valid and binding on the defendant?
ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance
of contract?
iii. To what relief?
17. After a detailed appreciation of the evidence, the trial Court
recorded a categorical finding that the agreement of sale under Ex.A1
is genuine, valid and binding on the defendant. The Court, inter alia,
took note of the admission of the defendant (DW1) regarding his
signature on Ex.A1 and observed that no steps were taken by him to
establish the plea of forgery by seeking expert opinion.
18. The trial Court further held that the plaintiff had successfully
proved payment of entire sale consideration and his continuous
readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.
Consequently, the Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
of specific performance and decreed the suit with costs, directed
execution of the sale deed within one month, failing which liberty was
granted to the plaintiff to get the sale deed executed through process
of Court.
Subsequent Events during Appeal
19. During the pendency of the present appeal, the
respondent/plaintiff has brought on record certain subsequent
developments by filing I.A.No.1 of 2025, wherein it has been stated
7
that the appellant/defendant, in disregard of the interim orders and
pendency of the appeal, has alienated substantial portions of the suit
schedule property in favour of third parties by executing registered
sale deeds dated 04.02.2023, 06.02.2023, 13.02.2023 and
15.03.2023.
20. The said conduct of the appellant/defendant, in dealing with
the suit property during the subsistence of litigation, has been placed
on record and assumes significance for adjudication of the present
appeal.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant (Defendant)
21. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant
assailed the impugned judgment and decree dated 05.08.2022 passed
in O.S.No.13 of 2016 and advanced his submissions as under:
i. That the appellant/defendant never executed the alleged
agreement of sale dated 25.09.2014 (Ex.A1). The
respondent/plaintiff, being a close relative and well acquainted
with the appellant/defendant’s signatures, has fabricated the
said document by misusing such familiarity, and the trial Court
gravely erred in accepting Ex.A1 without subjecting the
disputed signatures to scientific examination.
ii. That the burden of proving execution of Ex.A1 squarely lay
upon the respondent/plaintiff. However, the trial Court
8erroneously shifted the burden onto the appellant/defendant by
drawing an adverse inference on the ground that the
appellant/defendant did not take steps to send the document
for expert examination, which is contrary to the settled
principles governing burden of proof.
iii. That though Ex.A1 purports to have been attested by more than
one witness, the respondent/plaintiff examined only one
attesting witness, namely PW2. The non-examination of the
other attesting witnesses, without any explanation, casts
serious doubt on the alleged execution of the agreement.
iv. That the agreement of sale is stated to have been executed on
25.09.2014, whereas the suit came to be instituted only on
06.05.2016. The appellant/defednant submits that such delay
of nearly two years, in the absence of satisfactory explanation,
disentitles the respondent/plaintiff from the discretionary relief
of specific performance.
v. That the respondent/plaintiff has failed to establish his
continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract, particularly his financial capacity to bear stamp duty
and registration charges at the relevant point of time.
vi. That the alleged payment of Rs.45,00,000/- in cash is not
supported by any independent evidence such as receipts, bank
9
transactions, or accounts. The absence of any documentary
proof renders the respondent/plaintiff’s version inherently
doubtful.
vii. That Ex.A1, being a document relating to immovable property of
substantial value, ought to have been compulsorily registered
under Section 17(1)(b) of the 1908 Act, as in absence of
registration, the said document is inadmissible in evidence for
proving any transaction affecting immovable property, in view of
Section 49 of the 1908 Act.
22. The appellant/defendant in support of his case relied on the
following decisions:
b) Kapil Corepacks Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Harbans Lal (since
deceased) through LRs. 2
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent (Plaintiff)
23. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff
supported the impugned judgment and decree and advanced the
following submissions:
i. That the appellant/defendant, while deposing as DW1, has
categorically admitted that the signature appearing on Ex.A1 is
1 2025 (1) ALD 214
2 AIR 2010 SC 2809
10his own and that the same is identical to the signature on his
written statement. In view of such admission, the execution of
the document stands established, and the burden shifts upon
the appellant/defendant to substantiate his plea of forgery.
Significantly, the appellant/defendant did not take any steps to
seek expert examination of the signatures.
ii. That the respondent/plaintiff examined PW2, one of the
attesting witnesses to Ex.A1, who clearly deposed that the
appellant/defendant executed the agreement and received the
entire sale consideration. Thus, the law does not mandate
examination of all attesting witnesses, and the testimony of one
attesting witness, if found credible, is sufficient to prove
execution.
iii. That respondent/plaintiff was always ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract. The issuance of legal notices
(Exs.A2 and A6) and the institution of the suit immediately after
the appellant/defendant’s final refusal clearly demonstrate such
readiness and willingness.
iv. That the final refusal occurred on 03.05.2016, when the
appellant/defendant demanded additional consideration, and
the suit was filed on 06.05.2016, i.e., within three days. Thus,
there is neither delay nor laches attributable to the
respondent/plaintiff.
11
v. That Ex.A1 contains a clear recital acknowledging receipt of the
entire sale consideration, and when appellant/defendant has
admitted his signature on the said document, a presumption
arises as to the passing of consideration, which the
appellant/defendant has failed to rebut by adducing any
contrary evidence.
vi. That during the pendency of the appeal, the
appellant/defendant has alienated portions of the suit schedule
property in favour of third parties. Such conduct is indicative of
mala fides and is aimed at frustrating the decree for specific
performance, thereby disentitling the appellant/defendant from
any equitable relief.
vii. That an agreement of sale, which does not itself create or
transfer any right, title or interest in immovable property, is not
compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the 1908 Act, as it
applies only to documents which create or declare rights in
presenti (vested right). A mere agreement to sell confers only a
contractual right to obtain a sale deed and does not require
registration, and in any event, by virtue of the proviso to Section
49 of the 1908 Act, an unregistered agreement of sale is
admissible in evidence for the purpose of seeking specific
performance.
12
viii. That Ex.A1 was executed on appropriate stamp paper, and even
assuming any deficiency, the same is curable by impounding
and payment of penalty and does not render the document void
or inadmissible in toto.
Points for determination
24. In the light of the pleadings, plaint, written statement, and the
rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel on either side, the
following points arise for consideration in this appeal:
I. Whether the agreement of sale dated 25.09.2014 (Ex.A1) is true,
valid and binding on the appellant/defendant?
II. Whether Ex.A1 is inadmissible in evidence for want of proper
stamping or registration under the provisions of the
III. Whether the respondent/plaintiff has established his
continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the
contract?
IV. Whether the trial Court erred in law in shifting the burden of
proof with regard to the genuineness of Ex.A1?
V. Whether the subsequent alienation of the suit schedule
property by the appellant to the third parties during the
pendency of the appeal has any bearing on the adjudication of
the present case?
13
VI. Whether the judgment and decree of the trial Court granting
specific performance call for interference in this appeal?
Consideration by this Court
Point No.I
25. The specific plea of the appellant/defendant, as set out in the
written statement, is that Ex.A1 is a “created document” and that the
respondent/plaintiff, being closely related and well acquainted with
his signatures, has fabricated the same. However, a careful scrutiny
of the evidence on record, particularly the cross-examination of DW1,
discloses material admissions which go to the root of the matter. As
noticed by the trial Court and as borne out from the deposition of
DW1, the appellant/defendant has categorically admitted that the
signature appearing on Ex.A1 is his own. Appellant/defendant has
further admitted that the signature found on his written statement is
identical to the signature on Ex.A1. Significantly, appellant/defendant
has also admitted that he had handed over photocopies of his
pattedar passbook and title deed, marked as Exs.A10 and A11, to
PW1 at the relevant point of time.
26. In view of the aforesaid categorical admissions, the execution of
Ex.A1 stands substantially established. Once the executant admits
his signature on the document, he can no longer claim the document
is a forged instrument in the sense of being a fabrication. The burden
14
and the legal focus shifts upon him to establish, by adducing clear,
positive and convincing evidence that his signature was obtained
through fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. In the present case, apart
from making a bald allegation, the appellant/defendant has not taken
any steps to substantiate the same. In the absence of any such
evidence, the plea of forgery remains unsubstantiated and has been
rightly rejected by the trial Court.
27. The testimony of PW2, one of the attesting witnesses to Ex.A1,
lends further assurance to the case of the respondent/plaintiff. PW2
has deposed that he was present at the time of execution of the
agreement, that the appellant/defendant executed Ex.A1 in his
presence, and that the entire sale consideration was paid. PW2 has
also spoken to the subsequent conduct of the appellant/defendant in
demanding an additional amount of Rs.15,00,000/- on the ground of
escalation in land value. Though PW2 was subjected to cross-
examination, nothing material has been elicited to discredit his
testimony.
28. It is well settled that the execution of a document can be proved
by examining even a single attesting witness, if his evidence is found
reliable. There is no legal requirement that all attesting witnesses
must be examined. Therefore, the evidence of PW2, sufficiently
satisfies the requirement of proof of execution.
15
29. Further, the conduct of the appellant/defendant in demanding
an additional sum of Rs.15,00,000/- for execution of the sale deed,
probabilises the case of the respondent/plaintiff, as such conduct is
wholly inconsistent with the defence of total denial and is indicative of
the existence of a prior agreement between the parties.
30. In view of the aforesaid admissions, coupled with the oral and
documentary evidence on record and the absence of any rebuttal on
the part of the appellant/defendant, this Court finds no reason to
differ from the findings of the trial Court. Accordingly, Ex.A1 is held to
be a true, valid and binding agreement of sale executed by the
appellant/defendant.
Point No.II
31. It is to be noted that Section 17(1)(b) of the 1908 Act mandates
registration of documents which create, declare, assign, limit or
extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property of the
value of one hundred rupees and upwards. However, it is well settled
that a mere agreement of sale does not, by itself, create or extinguish
any right, title or interest in immovable property, but only embodies a
contractual obligation to execute a conveyance in future. The transfer
of ownership in immovable property takes place only upon execution
and registration of a sale deed. Further, the possession of the
schedule property was not transferred under the agreement to sell.
16
Therefore, an agreement to sell is not a document compulsorily
registrable under Section 17 of the 1908 Act.
32. It is equally settled that by virtue of the proviso to Section 49 of
the 1908 Act, an unregistered agreement of sale is admissible in
evidence for the purpose of proving the contract and for seeking the
relief of specific performance. The bar under Section 49 operates only
in respect of enforcement of a transaction affecting immovable
property as such, and not in respect of enforcement of a contractual
obligation to execute a sale deed.
33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Hemalatha v. Kashthuri 3,
has held as under:
26. Under the circumstances, as per the proviso to Section 49 of the
Registration Act, an unregistered document affecting immovable property
and required by the Registration Act or the Transfer of Property Act to be
registered, may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific
performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, or as
evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by
registered instrument, however, subject to Section 17(1-A) of the
Registration Act. It is not the case on behalf of either of the parties that the
document/agreement to sell in question would fall under the category of
document as per Section 17(1-A) of the Registration Act. Therefore, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has rightly observed
and held relying upon the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act that
the unregistered document in question, namely, unregistered agreement to
sell in question shall be admissible in evidence in a suit for specific
performance and the proviso is exception to the first part of Section 49.
34. Insofar as the objection relating to stamp duty is concerned,
even assuming that the document is insufficiently stamped, the same
does not render the document void or inadmissible in toto. The Court
3
(2023) 10 SCC 725
17
is empowered to impound the document and collect the deficit stamp
duty along with penalty before admitting the same in evidence. That
apart, it is to be noted that no objection as to insufficiency of stamp
duty was raised by the appellant/defendant at the appropriate stage
before the trial Court. Such an objection, not having been taken at the
earliest opportunity, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time
in appeal.
35. In the case on hand, Ex.A1 is a simple agreement of sale, which
merely records receipt of consideration and an undertaking on the
part of the appellant/defendant to execute a registered sale deed in
future. It does not, by itself, operate as a conveyance of title.
Consequently, registration of the said document is not compulsory.
Therefore, the trial Court has rightly received Ex.A1 in evidence and
relied upon the same.
Point No.III
36. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 mandates that the
plaintiff must plead and prove that he has always been ready and
willing to perform his part of the contract. In the present case, the
respondent/plaintiff (PW1) has categorically deposed that he
possessed the necessary financial capacity to meet the expenses
towards stamp duty and registration charges. Respondent/plaintiff
has stated that he derives an annual income of about Rs.15-20 lakhs
18
from agricultural operations and that his sons, who are gainfully
employed, also extended financial support.
37. The record further discloses that the respondent/plaintiff
issued legal notices (Exs.A2 and A6) and, upon receipt of the interim
reply, furnished a copy of the agreement under Ex.A9. The said
correspondence demonstrates that the respondent was consistently
calling upon the appellant/defendant to perform his part of the
contract. The suit was instituted immediately after the
appellant/defendant’s final refusal on 03.05.2016, thereby evidencing
prompt action on the part of the respondent/plaintiff.
38. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs. v.
Hartar Singh Sangha 4, has held that to succeed in a suit for
specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove (a) the existence of a
valid agreement of sale, (b) that the defendant committed breach of
contract; and (c) that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to
perform his part of the obligations in terms of the contract.
39. It is also pertinent to note that there is no material on record to
indicate that the respondent/plaintiff ever defaulted or exhibited
unwillingness to perform his obligations under the contract. The
contention that the respondent/plaintiff did not deposit any amount
in Court at the time of filing the suit is of no consequence in the facts
4
(2010) 10 SCC 512
19
of the present case, as the entire sale consideration had already been
paid. The remaining obligation of the respondent/plaintiff was only to
bear the expenses towards stamp duty and registration, for which he
has asserted his readiness on oath. Thus, this Court is satisfied that
the respondent/plaintiff has duly established continuous readiness
and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required under
Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.
Ponit No.IV
40. In regard to the contention that the trial Court erred in casting
the burden upon the appellant/defendant to get the disputed
document examined by a handwriting expert, it is to be noted that the
respondent/plaintiff has already discharged such burden by
producing the original agreement of sale (Ex.A1) and examining one of
the attesting witnesses, namely PW2, in support of its execution, and
once such prima facie evidence was adduced, the onus shifts to the
appellant/defendant to rebut the same. Further, the
appellant/defendant, while deposing as DW1, has admitted his
signature on Ex.A1. In the face of such admission, the plea of forgery
could not have been sustained without any supporting evidence.
41. It is trite that a party who alleges forgery must take reasonable
steps to establish the same, including, where necessary, seeking
expert examination of the disputed document. Having failed to do so,
20
the appellant/defendant cannot be permitted to assail the findings of
the trial Court. Thus, the observation of the trial Court that the
appellant/defendant did not take steps to have the document
examined by a handwriting expert cannot be construed as an
improper shifting of burden, as it is just a comment on the failure of
the appellant/defendant to substantiate his plea of forgery by
adducing appropriate evidence.
42. Further, the decisions as relied upon by the
appellant/defendant do not advance his case for the following
reasons:
i. In Lakha Singh (supra 1), the Hon’ble Supreme Court found
pervasive suspicious circumstances such as use of stamp
papers procured by the plaintiff’s associate, signatures only on
the last page of a multi-page document with blanks elsewhere,
absence of financial trail for large cash consideration,
undervaluation, prolonged inaction, and failure to prove
readiness. The agreement to sell in the facts and circumstances
of the case was held to be a fabrication. In contrast, in the
present case, the defendant (DW1) admitted his signature on
Ex.A1 and its identity with the one on his written statement,
and admitted handing over the copies of the title documents
(Exs.A10-A11). Execution is corroborated by PW2; no expert
evidence was sought. The plaintiff issued prompt notices, filed
21the suit without delay, and has established full payment and
demonstrated readiness for registration. Thus, unlike Lakha
Singh‘s case (supra 1), there are no suspicious circumstances,
no evidentiary gaps, and no perversity in findings.
ii. In Kapil Corepacks (supra 2), the alleged admission arose from
a pre-trial, non-oath examination where only the signature
portion of an unexhibited document was shown. The Apex
Court held such admission unreliable and emphasized that
execution must be tested at trial. In the present case, the
admission was made on oath during the trial by DW1, with the
entire document available, and during his cross-examination. It
is a conscious and voluntary admission, not a product of any
procedural impropriety. The appellant/defendant neither
retracted the admission nor sought forensic examination.
Therefore, the principle in Kapil Corepack‘s case (supra 2)
does not dilute the evidentiary value of the
appellant/defendant’s admission in this case.
Point No.V
43. It is brought on record vide I.A. No. 1 of 2025 during the
pendency of the present appeal, that the appellant/defendant had
executed several registered sale deeds in February and March, 2023,
alienating substantial portions of the suit schedule property in favour
of third parties.
22
44. The Delhi High Court in Om Prakash v. Santosh Chaddha
while reiterating the view taken in Surjeet Singh v. Harbans Singh 5
has held as under:
17. I find the Supreme Court, in Surjeet Singh Vs. Harbans Singh
MANU/SC/0032/1996 : (1995) 6 SCC 50, to have held that if
alienation/assignment made in defiance of an injunction order is permitted, it
would defeat the ends of justice and the prevalent public policy. It was further
held that when Courts intend a particular state of affairs to exist while in
seisin of a lis, that state of affairs is not only required to be maintained but
also presumed to exist till the Court orders otherwise and the Court in these
circumstances has the duty as also the right to treat the
alienation/assignment as having not taken place at all and the
alienee/assignee in violation of the interim order thus cannot claim to be
impleaded on the basis of assignment as the same would be in disobedience
of the order of injunction.
(emphasis supplied)
45. The particulars of the transactions undertaken by the
appellant/defendant are set out in the affidavit filed in support of the
I.A.No.1 of 2025 filed by the respondent/plaintiff, which are extracted
hereunder:
Date of
S.No Document Number Extent Name of the Party
RegistrationBandaru Srilatha, W/O
3877/2023 [1] of
Venkatesh, H.No: 2-1-
1 15-03-2023 SRO SURYAPET 220
66/A20/1, Mamillagadda,
(2309)
Suryapet Town
Polagani Balayya (Balu
3876/2023 [1] of
Goud), S/O Ramulu, H.No:
2 15-03-2023 SRO SURYAPET 338.4
3-6-20, Kothagudem Bazar,
(2309)
Suryapet Town
Ganna Pullaiah, S/O
3875/2023 [1] of Guruvayya, H.No:1-82,
3 15-03-2023 SRO SURYAPET 240 Ramapuram Village,
(2309) Chilukuru Mandal,
Suryapeta District
5
(1995) 6 SCC 50
23
Date of
S.No Document Number Extent Name of the Party
Registration
Bommi Venkanna S/O
3874/2023 [1] of Devayya, H.No:3-85,
4 15-03-2023 SRO SURYAPET 118.33 Kondalarayinigudem,
(2309) Chivvemla Mandal,
Suryapeta District
Avudoddi Bhagyamma, W/O
2259/2023 [1] of
Srisailam, H.No:5-111,
5 13-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 133.33
Kudakuda Village, Chivvemla
(2309)
Mandal, Suryapet District
2258/2023 [1] of Banoth Parvathi, W/O Janu,
6 13-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 150 H.No:6-136/3, Bashanayak
(2309) Thanda, Suryapet Mandal
Nemanandam Uppalamma,
2257/2023 [1] of W/O Anjaiah, H.No: 1-85,
7 13-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 108.33 Kudakuda Village, Chivvemla
(2309) Mandal, Suryapet District,
508213
Erpula Sumathi W/O Raju,
2256/2023 [1] of
H.No: 11-100/1, Gandhi
8 13-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 200
Nagar Village, Suryapet
(2309)
Mandal and District
Guntipalli Shyamala W/O
2255/2023 [1] of Venkat Narsimha, H.No:2-
9 13-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 165.4 12/2, Inupaamula Village,
(2309) Kethepally (Mandal),
Nalgonda, 508211
Gaddam Kiran Kumar, S/O
2254/2023 [1] of
Venkanna, H.No:3-101/3,
10 13-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 208.7
Kondalarayinigudem,
(2309)
Suryapeta Town
Gaddam Kiran Kumar, S/O
2253/2023 [1] of
Venkanna, H.No:3-101/3,
11 13-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 253
Kondalarayinigudem,
(2309)
Suryapeta Town
Reddy Yella Reddy, S/O Somi
2061/2023 [1] of
Reddy, H.No:1-71, Yerkaram,
12 08-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET 200
Suryapet Mandal, Suryapeta
(2309)
508376
Modala Ramalingam S/O
2060/2023 [1] of
217.9 Lingaiah, D.Kothapally
13 08-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET
Yds Village, Nagaram Mandal,
(2309)
Suryapet District (Pin
Code:508279)
1943/2023 [1] of
200
14 06-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET Rebbaralapalli Poornima,
Yds
(2309) W/O Sambashiva Chary,
24
Date of
S.No Document Number Extent Name of the Party
Registration
H.No:1-178, Mitta Gudem,
Ashwapuram Mandal,
Khammama (Dist)
Rebbaralapalli Poornima,
1942/2023 [1] of W/O Sambashiva Chary,
200
15 06-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET H.No:1-178, Mitta Gudem,
Yds
(2309) Ashwapuram Mandal,
Khammama (Dist)
1874/2023 [1] of Vatte Jyothi W/O Krishna,
226.8
16 04-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET H.No:11-67-1, Gandhi Nagar,
Yds
(2309) Suryapeta
1873/2023 [1] of Vatte Jyothi W/O Krishna,
200
17 04-02-2023 SRO SURYAPET H.No:11-67-1, Gandhi Nagar,
Yds
(2309) Suryapeta
46. The said conduct on the part of the appellant/defendant cannot
be countenanced and has certain legal implications, such as:
i. Any transfer of the suit property during the pendency of
proceedings is subject to the doctrine of lis pendens, and the
transferees, if any, would be bound by the outcome of the
present appeal.
ii. The act of alienating the property, despite the subsistence of the
decree and pendency of the appeal, reflects conduct which is
not consistent with the stand taken by the appellant/defendant
before this Court. While the appellant/defendant has disputed
the very execution of the agreement of sale, he has
simultaneously dealt with the property in a manner which has
the potential to complicate the enforcement of rights claimed by
the respondent/plaintiff.
25
iii. The relief of specific performance being an equitable relief, the
conduct of the parties becomes a relevant consideration. The
conduct of the appellant/defendant, in creating third-party
interests during the pendency of the appeal, is a factor which
cannot be ignored while exercising appellate jurisdiction.
In view of the above circumstances, this Court takes note of the
aforesaid conduct of the appellant/defendant, which lends support to
the case of the respondent/plaintiff and constitutes a relevant factor
while considering whether the decree for specific performance
warrants interference.
Point No.VI
47. This Court has independently reappreciated the entire evidence
on record, as is required in a first appeal, and upon such
reappreciation, this Court finds that the findings recorded by the trial
Court are based on a proper appreciation of both facts and law and do
not suffer from any perversity or material irregularity warranting
interference.
48. The evidence of PW1 and PW2, read in conjunction with the
admissions of DW1, clearly establish the execution of Ex.A1 and the
passing of consideration thereunder. The plea of forgery set up by the
appellant/defendant remains unsubstantiated, there being no
evidence or any other corroborative material in support thereof.
26
49. The trial Court has compared the signatures and recorded a
finding that the signatures on the agreement of sale and the written
statement are identical. This Court in Kati Maheswara Rao v.
Uppati Lalitha and others 6 has held as under:
11…..Even in spite of availability of expert evidence, the Court can
also compare the signatures under Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act
and opinion of expert is only a guiding factor and it is for the Court
below to examine the entire evidence on record including the evidence
of the handwriting expert and come to a just conclusion. As such,
dismissal of the application filed by the petitioner by the Court below
on this ground by the Court below is erroneous.
50. In the facts and circumstances of the case the
respondent/plaintiff having been diligently pursuing his remedy since
the year 2016 cannot be relegated to a remedy of damages merely on
account of the subsequent acts of the appellant/defendant. In the
considered view of this Court, the trial Court was justified in
decreeing the suit for specific performance.
Conclusion
51. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view
that the judgment and decree dated 05.08.2022 passed by the
Principal District Judge, Suryapet in O.S.No.13 of 2016 are legal,
valid and based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record. The
appellant/defendant has failed to make out any ground warranting
interference in this appeal. Thereby, the present appeal is devoid of
merit and is liable to be dismissed.
6
(2018) 3 ALD 375
27
52. Accordingly, the Appeal Suit is dismissed and the judgment and
decree dated 05.08.2022 passed in O.S.No.13 of 2016 by the Principal
District Judge, Suryapet, is upheld. The appellant shall execute and
register the sale deed in favour of the respondent in respect of the suit
schedule property within a period of one (01) month from the date of
this judgment. In default, the respondent shall be entitled to have the
sale deed executed through the process of the executing Court.
Having regard to the conduct of the appellant, particularly in
alienating portions of the suit schedule property during the pendency
of the proceedings, the Appellant shall pay costs quantified at
Rs.50,000/- (Fifty thousand Rupees only) to the respondent within a
period of two (02) months from the date of this judgment. Any
alienation made by the appellant in respect of the suit schedule
property during the pendency of the suit and this appeal, including
those referred to in I.A.No.1 of 2025, being subject to the doctrine of
lis pendens shall not bind the respondent. The respondent shall be
entitled to obtain conveyance of the entire suit schedule property
through due process of the executing Court, and such conveyance
shall prevail over any pendent lite transfers effected by the appellant.
The executing Court shall issue notice to the subsequent purchasers,
if any, and afford them an opportunity of hearing; however, the
execution shall proceed in accordance with law without permitting
such purchasers to defeat the decree for specific performance. It shall
28
be open to such purchasers to work out their remedies, if any, against
the appellant independently.
As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any in the
appeal, shall stand closed.
________________________
G.M.MOHIUDDIN, J
Date: 17.04.2026
ssp/szt