Madhya Pradesh High Court
Akshat Bundela vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 31 March, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:25274
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE B. P. SHARMA
ON THE 31st OF MARCH, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 15443 of 2025
AKSHAT BUNDELA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Saurabh Sunder - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Dinesh Prasad Patel - Government Advocate for the State.
ORDER
The present petition under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 (Section 482 of
CrPC, 1973) has been preferred assailing the order dated 10.01.2025 passed
in Sessions Trial No.21/2020 ( State of M.P. vs. Sanjeev Shrivastava &
Another) by the learned Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Itarsi, District
Narmadapuram (M.P.), whereby invoking powers conferred under the
provisions of Section 319 of CrPC, 1973, petitioner has been summoned to
face trial as an additional accused and also seeking quashment of the entire
criminal proceedings against the petitioner arising out of FIR bearing Crime
No.635/2019 registered at Police Station Itarsi, District Narmadapuram, for
offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409 and 120-B of
IPC.
2. Brief facts given rise to the present petition are that as per the
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prosecution case, a written complaint was submitted on 25.07.2019 by one
Shanker Rasal, alleging that Revenue Sub-Inspector-Sanjeev Shrivastava and
one Raja Saifi prepared forged documents in respect of Priyadarshani
Scheme No.I, LIG Plot No.81, Nyas Colony and sold the land after receiving
consideration, but possession of the said plot was not delivered. During
investigation, it was found that Raja Saifi had used the license and website of
the stamp vendor, Ammar Saifi, to commit the alleged fraud. The accused
persons sold government land as Plot No.81 of Priyadarshani Town, Itarsi to
Shanker Rasal, receiving an amount of Rs.9,00,000/-, while accused Raja
Saify allegedly took Rs.2,00,000/-in the name of the Sub-Registrar. The
original documents of the Municipal Council were allegedly forged and false
receipts were produced. The statement of Shanker Rasal, recorded under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., was also perused. In his statement, he deposed
that accused persons represented that there was a vacant plot in the colony of
the Municipal Council which could be allotted to a Scheduled Tribe or to a
woman. Thereafter, the complainant was taken to the vacant plot by Raja
Saifi, Sanjeev Shrivastava, and Hariom Upadhyay. Sanjeev Shrivastava and
Raja Saifi represented that all documents regarding the sale were prepared
and completed and the complainant was required to pay an amount of
Rs.10,00,000/- as consideration, in addition to Rs.2,00,000/- allegedly to be
paid to the Sub-Registrar. The registered sale deed was executed.
3. FIR bearing Crime No.635/2019 was registered against the accused
persons, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial.
During the course of trial, the learned Trial Court, vide order dated
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10.01.2025, while exercising powers under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.
summoned the petitioner-Akshat Bundela to face trial as an additional
accused on the ground that he, being the then Chief Municipal Officer, Itarsi,
had allegedly committed offences of forgery, fraud, and use of forged
documents knowing them to be forged and had abetted the said offences
through criminal conspiracy, thereby obtaining wrongful gain in the form of
premium amounts to the extent of there being a strong possibility of
establishing his guilt along with co-accused Sanjeev and Raja. The Trial
Court further observed that, despite the petitioner’s name appearing in the
complaint application, no investigation had been conducted against him,
allegedly on account of his holding an important position. Accordingly, the
petitioner was summoned under the provisions of Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.
Hence, the present petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during the course of
trial, the learned Trial Court, vide order dated 10.01.2025, while exercising
powers under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C., summoned the petitioner to face
trial as an additional accused. It is contended that at the relevant point of
time the petitioner was functioning as the Chief Municipal Officer, Itarsi,
District Narmadapuram and was discharging his official duties. In exercise
of the powers under Section 92(2) of Madhya Pradesh Municipalities
Act,1961, the petitioner had delegated the power of executing the registry to
one Sanjeev Shrivastava, who was working as a Revenue Sub-Inspector. It is
further contended that during the course of hearing before learned Trial
Court, documents were produced to demonstrate that such delegation of
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power had already been made by the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner
had no role to play in the instant controversy regarding Plot No.81-A, which
was sold to the wife of complainant, namely Shubhangi Rasul.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner
was neither named in the FIR nor charge-sheeted upon completion of the
investigation. The Investigating Agency, after due and conscious
consideration of the material collected during investigation, did not find
sufficient grounds to array the petitioner as an accused. It is contended that
despite the aforesaid facts, the learned Trial Court, while observing that the
alleged fraud had been committed during the tenure of the present petitioner,
erred in invoking the jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. and
summoned the petitioner as an additional accused. Thus, learned Trial Court
gravely erred in invoking the jurisdiction under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. in the
absence of strong, cogent and unimpeachable evidence emerging during the
course of trial.
6. It is also contended that the petitioner is a public servant and the
alleged acts were purportedly done in discharge of official duties; however,
no sanction under Section 197 of Cr.P.C. was obtained before initiating
proceedings against him.
7. Learned counsel further submits that the criminal proceedings against
the petitioner are manifestly tainted with mala fides and appear to have been
instituted without proper application of mind. There is no material or
documentary evidence on record to show that the petitioner is responsible for
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the alleged acts and therefore no legal evidence exists to justify the
registration of the aforesaid offences against the petitioner. In view of the
aforesaid, it is prayed that the impugned order dated 10.01.2025 passed in ST
No.21/2020 by First Additional Sessions Judge, Itarsi, Narmadapuram
against the petitioner be quashed.
8. Reliance has also been placed upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the cases of G. C. Manjunath and Others vs. Seetaram, (2025) 5SCC
390; Gurmeet Kaur vs. Devender Gupta, (2025) 5 SCC 481; and K. Gopi vs.
Sub-Registrar and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 740.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the prayer
made by learned counsel for the petitioner and supports the impugned order
passed by the Trial Court. It is submitted that during the course of trial,
sufficient evidence has emerged against the petitioner indicating his
involvement in the alleged offences. The learned Trial Court after proper
appreciation of the material available on record has rightly exercised the
powers under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon the petitioner as an
additional accused. In the present case, the evidence adduced during trial
prima facie reveals the role of the petitioner in commission of the alleged
offences and therefore the impugned order passed by learned Trial Court
does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference by
this Court. Accordingly, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
10. Heard the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material available on record.
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11. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the material placed on
record, this Court finds that the very foundation on which the learned Trial
Court has exercised jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code is manifestly
unsustainable in the peculiar facts of the present case. The impugned order
dated 10.01.2025 proceeds on a singular premise that the petitioner, while
functioning as Chief Municipal Officer, had delegated powers under Section
92(2) of the Act, 1961 to a Revenue Sub-Inspector, and that such delegation
was proper. There is no material, either oral or documentary, has been
brought on record during trial to demonstrate any direct or indirect
involvement of the petitioner in the alleged transaction relating to Plot
No.81-A.
12. From a careful perusal of the record, it is evident that the genesis of
the criminal case lies in allegations of fraud committed by specific
individuals, namely Sanjeev Shrivastava and others, in relation to the sale of
a municipal plot and non-delivery of possession despite receipt of
consideration. The FIR itself attributes specific acts of inducement, forgery,
and misrepresentation to the charge-sheeted accused persons. Significantly,
the petitioner was neither named in the FIR nor implicated during the course
of investigation.
13. The material further discloses that the delegation of power for
execution of registries in favor of the Revenue Sub-Inspector was not an
isolated or arbitrary act attributable solely to the petitioner, but rather part of
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an established administrative practice prevailing in the Municipal Council,
Itarsi, even prior to his posting. The documents produced before the Trial
Court demonstrate that such delegation existed as a matter of administrative
convenience owing to the volume of transactions and routine functioning of
the municipal body. Thus, the act of delegation cannot, by any stretch of
reasoning, be construed as participation in or facilitation of the alleged
fraud, particularly when no evidence indicates that the petitioner derived any
benefit or had knowledge of the alleged illegal acts.
14. It is also appeared from the record that the alleged fraudulent
transaction concerning Plot No.81-A was executed by the co-accused persons
independently, and the role attributed to the petitioner is merely inferential,
premised upon his official position at the relevant time. The impugned order
does not indicate any substantive evidence emerging during trial which
would prima facie establish that the petitioner had either conspired with the
principal accused or had knowledge of the alleged forgery or
misrepresentation. Mere holding of a supervisory or administrative position,
without any specific overt act or mens rea, cannot be elevated to the level of
criminal culpability.
15. The documents placed before the Trial Court, as well as those forming
part of the present petition, clearly establish that the petitioner had no direct
role in the execution of the sale deed in question, nor in the alleged acts of
inducement, receipt of money, or preparation of forged documents. The
entire transaction, as alleged by the complainant, was carried out by the
charge-sheeted accused persons, and there is a conspicuous absence of any
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evidence linking the petitioner to the said acts. The impugned order,
therefore, proceeds on an erroneous appreciation of facts and an unwarranted
extension of liability based purely on without proper application of mind.
16. Now, the point for consideration of this court is that, the shelter of 197
Cr.P.C. is applicable to the petitioner. In Amal Kumar Jha vs. State of
Chhattisgarh and another, (2016) 6 SCC 734, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
authoritatively held that even if the act is in excess of duty, so long as there
exists a reasonable connection with official duty, the protection under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. cannot be denied. Similarly, in Jagdish Singh Meena and
another vs. Sagar Mogia and another, 2020 SCC OnLine MP 27, wherein this
Court reiterated that acts of police officials performed during duty, even
involving use of force, would attract the protection under Section 197
Cr.P.C. if reasonably connected with official duty.
17. Additionally, in K. Kalimuthu vs. State, (2005) 4 SCC 512 , Manorama
Tiwari vs. Surendra Nath Rai, (2016) 1 SCC 594 , and State of M.P. vs.
Sheetla Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617, wherein the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the test is whether the act has reasonable nexus with
official duty and that even acts done in purported discharge of duty fall
within the ambit of Section 197 Cr.P.C. In Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari,
(1955) 2 SCC 388 and State of Orissa vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew, (2004) 8
SCC 40 to contend that the expression “official duty” must receive a broad
interpretation and that the act complained of need not be strictly within the
duty, but must be reasonably connected with it. Further, in State through CBI
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vs. B.L. Verma, (1997) 10 SCC 772 , wherein it has been held that sanction
under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory and goes to the root of jurisdiction,
and in absence thereof, cognizance is vitiated.
18. In Anjani Kumar vs. State of Bihar 2008 Cr. L. J. 2558 , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has emphasized that the applicability of Section 197 Cr.P.C.
must be determined with reference to the nature of the act and its nexus with
official duty, and that even at a subsequent stage, if such nexus is established,
the proceedings cannot continue without sanction. The principles laid down
in Matajog Dobey, and Sheetla Sahai (supra) consistently reiterate that there
must be a reasonable connection between the act and official duty and that
the provision cannot be construed narrowly so as to defeat its object. It has
been repeatedly held that even acts done in excess of duty would fall within
the protective ambit if they are reasonably connected with official functions.
19. In Amal Kumar Jha and Ganesh Chandra Jew (supra ), it has been
further clarified that the test is whether omission to perform the act would
have exposed the public servant to a charge of dereliction of duty. If the
answer is in the affirmative, the act must be held to be connected with
official duty. Similarly, in B.L. Verma (supra) it has been categorically held
that the requirement of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is mandatory and
goes to the root of jurisdiction, and cognizance taken without such sanction
is unsustainable in law.
20. In the considered opinion of this Court the legal position regarding the
applicability of Section 197 of the Cr.P.C. is well settled. The expression
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“official duty” appearing in the said provision has consistently been
interpreted in a broad and pragmatic manner by the Supreme Court. The
settled principle emerging from the decisions of the Supreme Court is that if
the act complained of is reasonably connected with the discharge of official
duty, the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. would be attracted. The act
complained of need not be strictly within the limits of official duty and even
acts done in excess of duty or in purported discharge of official duty would
fall within the protective ambit of the provision so long as there exists a
reasonable nexus between the act and the official duty performed.
21. In this regard it has repeatedly been emphasized by the Supreme Court
that the true test is whether omission to perform the act complained of would
have exposed the public servant to a charge of dereliction of duty. If the
answer to that question is in the affirmative, the act must necessarily be
regarded as having been performed in the course of official duty. The
Supreme Court has also consistently held that sanction under Section 197
Cr.P.C. is not a mere procedural requirement but a condition precedent which
goes to the root of jurisdiction and that in absence of such sanction the
prosecution of a public servant for acts connected with official duty cannot
be sustained.
22. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, this
Court is of the view that the alleged acts attributed to the petitioner arose
during the course of delegation of power for registration of the sale deed by
the charge-sheeted accused Sanjeev Shrivastava in his official capacity as a
CMO. The acts complained of therefore bear a clear and reasonable nexus
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with the discharge of official duties by the petitioner. The role of the
petitioner was to discharge his official duties in exercise of the powers under
section 92(2) of the MP Municipalities Act, 1961 as the petitioner has
delegated the power to execute the registry to the charge-sheeted accused
Sanjeev who was working as a revenue sub-inspector. The act of the
petitioner is directly involved with the official function.
23. In such circumstances the protection available under Section 197 of
the Cr.P.C. becomes applicable to the petitioner and sanction from the
competent authority becomes a mandatory prerequisite before taking
cognizance under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioner. The trial
court had committed error while taking cognizance against the petitioner.
24. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the essential ingredients for invoking the power under Section
319 were not made out against the petitioner. The evidence on record does
not disclose any such incriminating material which could justify his
summoning as an accused. The order passed by the learned trial Court,
therefore, suffers from legal infirmity and is liable to be interfered with.
25. Consequently, and for the reasons recorded hereinabove, the present
petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated
10.01.2025 passed by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Itarsi,
whereby the petitioner has been summoned as an additional accused in
exercise of powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C., is hereby set aside.
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26. The petition is accordingly allowed and disposed off.
(B. P. SHARMA)
JUDGE
@SM@
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